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This thesis analyzes China’s public diplomacy in the field of Sino-Africa relations, arguing 
that China has adopted public diplomacy with soft power as a vital component of its foreign 
policy on the continent from the early 2000s onward. The necessity of public diplomacy in 
China’s foreign policy was driven by the objective of developing close economic ties with 
African countries even as Beijing faced manifold issues in its relations. To comprehend the 
link between China’s public diplomacy and Sino-Africa economic ties, the research adopts an 
International Relations approach of neoliberal institutionalism, examining the use of public 
diplomacy to manage the asymmetric relations between China and Africa, in which China 
wields economic dominance over Africa. With the rising importance of public diplomacy 
globally in the twenty-first century, China has employed its public diplomacy to explain and 
justify its rising global influence, and to dispel negative publicity in the international society. 
While China has a government-centered public diplomacy system, unlike that of the West, 
various actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors) 
systematically engage in China’s public diplomacy through diverse instruments such as 
foreign aid, media, institutions for exchanging culture, and language training to the 
populations of foreign countries.  
 
The Chinese government deploys its public diplomacy in African countries based on smart 
power, which combines soft power (culture) and hard power (China model and economic 
power), as most of China’s public diplomacy is linked to aid projects, grants, and low-interest 
loans for building closer economic relations with African countries. China’s public diplomacy 
seeks to build a positive image of China that focuses on a mutual sense of solidarity to elicit 
connectedness and shared identity between China and partner countries, mutual 
development, and harmonious coexistence through diverse public diplomacy activities. 
Public diplomacy fills the gap between China and Africa in asymmetrical economic relations 
that give rise to issues of distrust and discontent towards China – such as the exploitation of 
African wealth, and accusations of neocolonialism. By conducting fieldwork in Nigeria and 
South Africa, the research confirms that China’s public diplomacy is integral to its foreign 
policy that focuses on China’s economic development and securing its position on the global 
stage through African partnerships, bilateral and multilateral (FOCAC). It also discovered 
that Chinese public diplomacy not only promotes an amicable and friendly environment that 
promotes deepen relations for economic objectives, but also boosts China’s claim to be a 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Research topic background: China and the necessity of public diplomacy  
 
Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping formulated a famous strategy of China’s foreign policy 
known as “tao guang yang hui, you sou zuo wei” during the upheavals in Eastern Europe 
from 1989 to 1991. The strategy suggested that “China should keep a low profile and should 
not seek to play a leadership role on the international stage (tao guang yang hui), while 
doing something and promoting the establishment of a new international political and 
economic order (you sou zuo wei)” (Lu, 2017, p.59). However, the character of China’s 
foreign policy has changed from defensive and passive to active1 after Deng’s era, as a result 
of the country’s rapid economic development, Chinese leaders’ views of the world, and 
changes in recognition of China’s role in the international society. Thus, China’s foreign 
policy goals are to promote a pleasant and peaceful international environment favorable to 
China’s economic growth, and at the same time, expand its clout on the global stage, and 
China’s great rejuvenation through socialism with Chinese characteristics. This was clear in 
current President Xi Jinping’s speech, which stressed the aim of achieving the “China Dream” 
at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013 (China Daily, 2013a). 
China is conscious of its international reputation since the Tiananmen Incident, and wants 
to avoid international isolation. The Chinese government, especially, pushed forward 
peaceful development during the Hu Jintao regime to refute the China Threat theory2 that 
sprung from China’s growing economic and military power and influence, during the 1990s. 
Around the same time, the study of public diplomacy and soft power came to the fore in 
China, thanks in part to the importance of effective communication in the conduct of foreign 
policy by engaging with foreign publics around the globe with the advent of globalization and 
the advancement of information technology. China adopted public diplomacy as the core of 
its foreign policy to manage its public image in earnest from the early 2000s, as “public 
opinion is crucial in contemporary international relations, communication becomes a vital 
means of generating influence and an ever-more powerful aspect in the conduct of foreign 
affairs” (Hartig, 2016, p.656). Thus, China carries out public diplomacy through its main 
instruments (culture, foreign aid, and education and cultural exchange institutes) and actors 
                                                
1 It means that ‘tao guang yang hui’ is weakened and ‘you sou zuo wei’ is more highlighted.  
2 China Threat theory is based on several concerns. However, this thesis adopted ‘China Threat’ based 
on China’s rapid development of economic and military power. For more information, see Canrong, J. 
(2011). “From ‘China Threat’ to ‘China’s Responsibility’: Changing International Discourses on China 
and China’s Response”, in H. S. Yee (Ed.), China’s Rise-Threat or Opportunity? (pp.270-279). 
Abingdon: New York: Routledge; Broomfield, E. V. (2003). “Perceptions of Danger: The China threat 
theory”, Journal of Contemporary China, 12(35), 265-284.  
 2 
(governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors) to export its nation’s 
positive image and communicate with the foreign public to improve its reputation as a 
friendly country and promote its national interest. Current President Xi Jinping introduced 
his doctrine, China Dream, to the foreign public and sought the cooperation of the African 
people to realize the doctrine, which focuses on national rejuvenation and prosperity. The 
doctrine was articulated in a speech in Tanzania, during his first visit to Africa in March 2013: 
The Chinese people are currently committed to realizing the Chinese dream of the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation while African people are striving for the 
African dream of self-development through unity and growth. People in China and 
Africa should strengthen unity and cooperation and support and help each other to 
make their respective dreams come true. At the same time, they should also work 
with the international community to push for the realization of the world dream of 
lasting peace and common prosperity, so that we can make greater contributions to 
the peace and development of mankind. (MFA ,2013a) 
Concurrently, he stressed the need to strengthen Sino-African relations through mutual 
respect, win-win cooperation, and cultivating “kinship-like qualities in the relations” through 
people-to-people exchanges – especially through younger generations to create mutual 
understanding (ibid). Xi stressed the significance of public diplomacy at an October 2013 
Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighboring Countries by the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party. He argued that, “We should strive to strengthen publicity work, 
public diplomacy, cultural and people-to-people exchanges with the neighbouring countries, 
and consolidate and expand social and public opinion foundations of the long-term 
development of relations between China and its neighboring countries” (MFA, 2013b). He 
indicated China’s diplomatic goal with neighboring countries is not only to realize two 
“centenary goals”3 and the nation’s great rejuvenation (ibid), but also to protect its interests 
on the global stage.  
In other words, Xi’s speech shows that China utilizes public diplomacy efficiently to cement 
friendly relationships with foreign countries, as well as to achieve its foreign policy goals. 
Furthermore, he showed a strong interest in keeping China’s rights and interests tied to 
peaceful development, established by Hu Jintao during the 2000s, as follows: “We will stick 
to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will 
                                                
3 The first centenary goal is to build a moderately prosperous society in all respect by 2020. The 
second centenary goals is to build a modern socialist country which is strong, prosperous, democratic, 
culturally advanced and harmonious by the middle of the twenty-first century (more information, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/09/c_136666993.htm)  
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never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will trade our 
core interests 4  or that we will allow harm to be done to our sovereignty, security or 
development interests” (China.org.cn, 2013a). All things taken together, this thesis 
understands China’s public diplomacy to be an effective means for bridging the gap that 
arises from a disjunction between foreign negative perceptions of China and the promotion 
of its national interests politically and economically through its foreign policy, so as to create 
a favorable environment for smooth diplomatic activities. At the same time, Beijing 
facilitates public diplomacy to establish its norms, customs, and rules through its soft power 
in an era of internationalization (d’Hooghe, 2010).  
Furthermore, public diplomacy allows China to be a responsible country, as Beijing boosts 
its presence through cooperation within the international system and on the global stage. By 
using public diplomacy, China reduces neighboring countries’ wariness, caused by its sudden 
rise, and increase its favorable image in global society via the image of peaceful development 
and spread of Chinese culture. China concurrently engages in international governance 
issues – such as Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, and supporting South-South 
cooperation – by offering various public diplomacy activities for the resolution of issues at 
the UN. This is not only to enhance its international reputation as a responsible country 
developing peacefully, but also to establish a foothold for multilateral diplomacy. 5  By 
extension, in 2015, Xi promised to provide positive support to UN peacekeeping activities by 
contributing 8,000 troops and providing US$100 million in military assistance for the 
African Union peacekeeping mission over five years, and US$1 billion for a 10-year joint 
China-UN peace and development fund.6 Therefore, Sinologist d’Hooghe (2015) said, “Public 
diplomacy has to make China’s rise palatable to the world and has to create understanding, 
respect, and ultimately support for China’s political model and policies” (p.3). 
 
1.1.1 China and Africa  
Scholars have great interest in China’s attempts to secure energy resources through Sino-
                                                
4 According to a September 2011 white paper of China’s Peaceful Development by the State Council, 
China’s core national interests are state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and 
national reunification, overall social stability, the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic 
and social development, and China’s political system established by the Constitution (China.org.cn, 
2013a).  
5 More information, see China pledges 2 billion USD to support South-South Cooperation. Retrieved 
from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/26/c_134663349.htm 
6  More information, see Chinese President Xi Jinping pledges 8,000 UN peacekeeping troops, 
US$ 1billion to peace fund. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1862255/chinese-president-xi-jinping-makes-us1-billion-pledge 
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Africa relations resulting from the growth of China’s economy during the 1990s.7 Chinese 
leaders, including high-ranking governmental officials, have chosen African countries as a 
first stop on their overseas trips every New Year since the early 1990s. The economic ties 
between China and Africa are thriving (see Appendix III). As mentioned above, China’s 
sustainable economic development is one of its core national interests, and it is the main 
priority for Chinese leaders since China’s reform and opening up. On that note, Africa is 
crucial to the achievement of China’s economic development not only for maintaining 
stability, but also for providing long-term legitimacy to the Communist Party and China’s 
political system. Thus, China focuses on securing raw materials (including oil) from African 
countries. At the same time, China sees Africa as a potential market for its exported products. 
Chinese companies have also extended their business in African countries based on China’s 
‘Going Out’ policy. Recently, their African expansion has been encouraged to solve the 
burden of personnel expenses in China’s domestic market due to a rise in labor costs, 
avoiding regulations in the United States and European countries, and expanding their 
markets in Africa. By extension, Beijing politically recognizes Africa as supporters on the 
international stage, including realizing the One China policy.   
The economic ties between China and Africa began to thrive during the 1990s, when the 
volume of trade between China and Africa increased rapidly, encouraged by China’s rapid 
economic growth. However, this did not continue smoothly in the mid-2010s. Trade dropped 
off sharply, with a lower import volume from African countries to China, from 2015 (UN 
Comtrade, 2017). At the same time, the global economic recession and China’s own 
economic slowdown led to a decline in the price of raw materials, due to weak demand. For 
this reason, from January to October 2015, the trade volume decreased 18 percent over the 
same period in the previous year, but the total volume of Chinese export to Africa showed a 
surprising 5 percent increase. The chief Chinese export items to Africa were mechanical and 
electrical products, whereas China’s imports from Africa were mineral energy resource 
products. China’s import volume did not decline quantitatively, and some products even 
increased (MOFCOM, 2016). Hence, there was a negative impact on the economies of the 
majority of African countries that rely highly on exports to China or Chinese imports, 
because of the imbalanced economic relations coupled with a drop in the price of raw 
materials.  
                                                
7 More information, see Day, K. A. (2005). China’s Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable 
Development. Abingdon: New York: Routledge; Romano, G. C., & Meglio, J-F, D. (Eds.). (2016). 
China’s Energy Security: A multidimensional perspective. Abingdon: New York: Routledge; Taylor, I. 
(1990). China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s. Journal of Modern Africa Studies, 26(3), 
443-460; Zhao, S. (Ed.). (2015). China in Africa: Strategic motives and economic interests. Abingdon: 
New York: Routledge. 
 5 
However, the rumblings of discontent over the economic ties between China and Africa have 
been felt since the 1990s, when China increased its attention on its economic relations with 
African countries. The problems have festered, with the considerable, asymmetric economic 
gap between China and Africa resulting in widespread strife over, for example, favorable 
investment terms for China, China’s turnkey projects and package deal-based foreign aid to 
Africa (such as the Angola model),8 poor-quality and low-priced Chinese imports, and the 
export of raw materials to China in return for manufactured goods. Hence, there has been an 
increase in hatred for and crime against China and its people in Africa (Gebrewold, 2009) as 
relations between China and the continent have become ever more intertwined. Therefore, 
the matter of the lopsided economic situation in Sino-Africa ties is magnified, and there has 
been a greater need to resolve contemporary economic and political issues since the early 
2000s. China’s business activities, including capital investment in Africa, experienced 
difficulties due to different business environments and political, social, and legal systems in 
China and Africa. Chinese enterprises are up against a brick wall on account of the lack of 
understanding between the companies and the African people, regarding environmental 
problems, job creation, and sustainable regional socio-economic development. Hence, the 
Chinese government is keenly aware of the necessity of mending fences with Africa for its 
national interests, because Africa plays a significant role at various stages.  
 
1.1.2 Sino-African relations and public diplomacy  
Based on the discussion in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 above, China utilizes its public diplomacy to boost 
economic ties with African countries by filling the gap that has arisen from the lopsided 
economic relations, and to achieve its diplomatic goals in Sino-Africa relations. Unlike 
China’s previous African policy, which gave undue stress on pursuing economic interests in 
Africa, Africa policy between 2006 and 2015 enhanced its policy towards Africa, based on 
China’s public diplomacy, to consider the African people’s welfare, education, health system, 
human resource development, poverty alleviation, and Africa’s economic development based 
on strengthened political and economic cooperation between China and Africa. By extension, 
China pursues multilateral cooperation with African countries through the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and draws upon the detailed content of China’s public 
diplomacy in the fields of education, media, cultural exchanges, people-to-people exchanges, 
and others for mutual understanding and benefit under win-win cooperation.  
                                                
8 The form and character of China’s foreign aid will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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Based on the above, this thesis found the vital role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign 
policy towards African countries through trends in China’s political economy. First, the study 
observes that the early 2000s marked a turning point in China’s African policy. Through an 
extensive process of change, a soft power concept was introduced by President Hu Jintao, 
China’s leader from 2003 to 2013, emerging as a consequence of China’s expanding 
multilateral diplomacy with multidimensional and multilayered policies related to Africa. As 
China officially adopted soft power as part of its African policy, it also promoted the notion 
of public diplomacy, meaning the engagement of China’s objectives and ambitions with 
government agencies and opinion in Africa. The chief reason for the introduction of public 
diplomacy with soft power was that China also realized that the asymmetrical 
interdependence relationships between China and Africa, mainly concentrated on raw 
materials and industrial products, were an obstacle to cementing its strategic cooperation 
under the principle of mutual benefit. This change shows that China is striving to keep pace 
with the rapid changes in the global political economy. The Chinese government, 
consequently, pushed forward with public diplomacy as its major foreign policy in the early 
2000s. Second, the study also pays attention to the Chinese government, which has been 
prioritizing economic growth since Deng Xiaoping was China’s leader and champion of its 
economic reform. Since then, current Chinese president Xi Jinping has also prioritized “keep 
the economy growth” through his new slogan “China dream”, which he first articulated in his 
2013 inaugural speech. China dreams of becoming a 21st century world power, based on 
domestic economic power and far greater status internationally, accomplished after three 
decades of high growth, and President Xi pledged to fulfill the goal of creating a moderately 
prosperous (Xiaokang) society by 2020, before the Party celebrates its centenary in 2021. 
China concentrates on its foreign policy and public diplomacy with soft power, based on the 
country’s history and culture as well as economic power, to mitigate the “China Threat” seen 
from the West, and to achieve the country’s rejuvenation. Lastly, China has exhibited a 
tendency for converting its interests from securing energy resources to focusing on 
service/manufacturing industries in African nations, resulting from a continuing decline in 
China’s economic growth since 2012. Besides, as part of Chinese government-driven projects, 
a significant number of Chinese private and state-owned enterprises have been making 
inroads into Africa’s service/manufacturing/media/education sectors since the mid-2000s. 
As a result, Chinese companies are involved in its public diplomacy activities in Africa to 
both improve China’s image and boost its business in Africa.  
However, while the purpose of China’s public diplomacy is most linked to boosting economic 
ties and contemporary issues, the linkage is often noted but rarely studied in the vast 
literature on China’s public diplomacy and soft power. Hence, this research stresses the 
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importance of exploring the function and effect of China’s public diplomacy in conjunction 
with its foreign policy, which especially focuses on economic goals in international relations.9 
This is because China puts economic development first in its political system, in tandem with 
conveying to the international community a national image of peaceful development and 
mutual development based on public diplomacy. Thus, this thesis attempts to examine the 
effect and role of public diplomacy with major instruments (soft power and economic power) 
in Sino-African relations. This is because public diplomacy has implications for China’s 
diplomatic activity towards African countries, which has become increasingly important for 
China politically and economically, since the early 2000s.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Aims 
 
Based on the research topic background, above, in order to explore the research, the aims of 
the thesis are as follows: 
 
(1) to explore the diversification of China’s African policy by making use of public 
diplomacy, in accordance with the changes of the diplomatic paradigm that arises from 
globalization; 
(2) to examine the significance and role of China’s public diplomacy in its African 
policy through the power politics of economic interdependence with sub-Saharan 
African nations, and asymmetrical interdependent relations; 
(3) to investigate how China’s diversified new Africa policy is able to compensate for 
the limitations of its previous policies, and produce actual results in amicable Sino-
African relations. 
 
1.2.1 Research questions and relevance  
Drawing on a discussion of neoliberal institutionalism in connection with China and Africa’s 
relations, the theoretical framework and aim of the research leads to three research 
questions. As this research considers China’s public diplomacy in Africa, the research 
questions are divided into three parts to analyze the influence of China’s public diplomacy on 
Africa under asymmetrical interdependence relations. The first question refers to the role of 
                                                
9 The majority of research on China’s public diplomacy with soft power is focused on fields such as 
culture, media, communication, and public relations, rather than looking into the general mechanisms 
between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy based on its public diplomacy activities.  
 8 
public diplomacy within the general sense of diplomatic relations. The second question aims 
to find the major cause(s) of asymmetrical interdependence in Sino-African relations by 
examining past diplomatic relations in order to infer the necessity of China’s public 
diplomacy. The third question seeks to demonstrate how China’s public diplomacy is 
implemented in Africa.  
Question 1: What is the meaning of public diplomacy in international relations, and in the 
Chinese form of international relations? Why and how did China map out and implement its 
new strategy of public diplomacy in the context of the asymmetrical interdependent relations 
between China and Africa, and how did this connect to its political purpose based on former 
and current Chinese leaders’ political perspectives?  
With regards to examining the role of public diplomacy, the first question will account for 
the significance of public diplomacy from both a Chinese perspective and in foreign relations 
following globalization. Since the early 2000s, Beijing has perceived a change in the 
diplomatic paradigm following its experience of globalization, and reconsidered negative 
Western publicity of China in its relations with Africa connected to the considerable growth 
of China’s economy. The Chinese government put new weight on public diplomacy under the 
soft power concept as an component of its implementation process in order to not only boost 
its global image and the realization of its government’s major foreign policy aims, but also to 
ensure friendly relations with Africa. Given this context, the first question is relevant to 
grasp the requisite concepts to understand public diplomacy; the importance of public 
diplomacy through soft power in the Chinese political perspective; the distinctiveness of 
China’s public diplomacy influences on its foreign policy; and the way China’s public 
diplomacy is implemented, i.e. public relations diplomacy, media diplomacy, cultural 
diplomacy. This question will be answered in Chapter 3.  
Question 2: What problems have emerged from asymmetrical economic interdependence in 
Sino-African relations? To what extent does China’s public diplomacy activity in Africa 
coincide with the development of an economic relationship of asymmetric interdependence 
between China and key African partners, and how does that public diplomacy address 
China’s vulnerabilities?  
An analysis of asymmetric interdependence relations between China and Africa is crucial to 
comprehend the big picture of Sino-African relations, in connection with the gap between 
China’s African policy and its implementation, before considering the application of public 
diplomacy in Africa. On the basis of the history of China’s foreign policy towards African 
countries, from the 1950s to 1990s, the second question examines key drivers that effect 
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asymmetrical interdependence in Sino-African relations. This examines aid, trade, and 
investment relations from the past to the present to show how China holds its dominant 
position in the issue-specific forms of power politics. It establishes how and when China and 
Africa produced asymmetrical interdependence; and why, unlike China, Africa has failed to 
reduce its vulnerability.  
The analysis of influential factors that has produced China and Africa’s asymmetrical 
interdependence relationship is significant to comprehending China’s power position in 
Africa. In order to provide a full understanding of the correlation between power and 
asymmetrical interdependence, a brief explanation of the theoretical paradigm is necessary. 
Keohane and Nye (2011),10 whose theory will discussed later in the theoretical framework 
section, argue that “vulnerability” and “sensitivity” should be considered to comprehend the 
nature of power in complex interdependence. Their observation of power and asymmetrical 
interdependence suggests “asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power, links the 
liberal stress on interdependence with the realist focus on power” (p.xxi) and “it is 
asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in 
their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependence 
relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other 
issues” (p. 9).  
Despite China and Africa maintaining close relations through economic cooperation under 
mutual cooperation and mutual interests since the 1980s, the asymmetrical interdependence 
relationship has given rise to discord and animosity in Sino-African ties. By analyzing 
changes in economic interdependence through China’s African policy, the second question is 
relevant to explaining the necessity of public diplomacy in China’s foreign policy in order to 
minimize friction and promote friendship with Africa. This question will be answered in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
Question 3: What role has China’s public diplomacy played in its foreign policy towards sub-
Saharan African countries? How has public diplomacy worked within the greater changes in 
China’s African policy between 2003 and 2016, and influenced not only Africa’s political 
economy and thinking but also the context of Sino-African ties? To what extent can China’s 
public diplomacy activities be seen as separate from, or subordinate to its pursuit of key 
economic relations with African countries?  
The analysis of China’s public diplomacy implementation within its African policy is a crucial 
                                                
10 Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and Interdependence (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson 
College Div. 
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subject. The third question will discuss the performance of public diplomacy as key to 
shaping Sino-African ties, and to bridging the gap between policy and implementation. Thus, 
the third question will seek to explain the role and aim of public diplomacy in multilateral 
and bilateral ties with African countries through China’s African policy during the 2000s. 
Also, this question will examine the role of various actors in various public diplomacy 
activities. The role of transnational actors in public diplomacy, especially, will be discussed 
through the prism of the theory of complex interdependence. This question will be answered 
in Chapter 5 and through case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
1.2.2 Research framework and case studies 
To conduct the research and answer the research questions, this thesis is broken down into 
two parts: a framework part and a case study part. Building upon the theoretical framework 
in Chapter 2, the framework part focuses on the background of public diplomacy, and 
analyzes not only China’s public diplomacy constituents within the scope of its political 
economy and culture, but also China’s African policy. The case study part was conducted to 
assess China’s strategy through public diplomacy in Africa, based on the analysis of content 
in the framework part.  
Framework 
This first section of the thesis provides the framework of the research structure and is 
divided into three primary parts: the nature and roles of public diplomacy in international 
relations, China’s international strategy (the policy framework), and China’s strategy in 
Africa (the implementation framework).   
The first part of the framework on public diplomacy lays the foundation to understand the 
meaning and role of public diplomacy for this thesis. To address the first research question, 
this chapter lays out a comprehensive exploration of the concept of public diplomacy – such 
as its main agents, target audiences, medium of public diplomacy, and assets for public 
diplomacy. It also looks into public diplomacy-affiliated concepts such as soft power, because 
Nye’s concept of “soft power” has influenced traditional diplomacy in the 21st century. In 
addition, it attempts to explain how public diplomacy relates to the traditional idea of 
diplomacy, discusses whether emerging powers have new or distinctive ideas and practices 
in conducting diplomacy, and how culture can be a form of soft power that adds new 
dimensions to the public diplomacy of emerging powers. This part also covers the Chinese 
perspective of public diplomacy with soft power.  
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The second part shifts to an analysis of China’s international strategy and policy on the 
grounds of public diplomacy. This part elucidates what mechanisms of public diplomacy 
China has deployed connected to its soft power and various assets inherent in the realm of 
China’s political economy and social culture, as outlined in the first part. In order to 
understand the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, it is necessary to first examine the 
performance of three actors – government, semi-governmental, and non-governmental 
actors11 – and their roles and activities, which comprise public diplomacy. However, in view 
of the wide range of China’s public diplomacy instruments, this research establishes separate 
categories in order to conduct a detailed analysis as follows: (1) foreign aid, (2) the media, (3) 
cultural and educational institutes. This part will probe how the three actors’ roles and 
activities using the three instruments differ between countries; furthermore, it accounts for 
how China’s traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, and economic and cultural soft power 
connect to their international diplomatic strategy, because China is the most important of 
the new powers in the 21st century. 
The third part examines China’s strategy in Africa. It explains the gap between China’s 
African policy and the reality of Sino-African relations, and looks at the ways China seeks to 
strengthen the sense of solidarity between it and the African continent through public 
diplomacy, including China’s extensive aid and investment in African countries. This part 
also considers the necessity of China’s new African strategy to keep pace with its 
international strategy, in order to answer the second research question. Thus, this part will 
examine how China obtained its ascendency within asymmetric economic interdependence 
in Sino-African relations, retracing the development of China’s policy towards Africa, which 
began with aid in the 1950s, to the funding system and diverse investments established 
during the 1990s. Not only that, it will analyse China’s policy from the 1950s to 1990s, in 
order to draw a comparison between China’s political economy strategy and the status quo of 
Sino-African relations, and therefore investigate the intention of aid and investment as part 
of its African policy. As to African nations’ stances on China, Africa has embraced China’s 
African policy revolving around aid and investment to stabilize the continent politically and 
economically, since the beginning of the postcolonial era in the 1950s. However, relations 
and cooperation began to bloom in earnest following bilateral economic agreements with 
China in the late 1980s. However, the issue of the purpose of China’s African policy has come 
to the fore, especially related to lopsided economic dependency.  
Given this context, the third part identifies problems, and examines the differences between 
                                                
11 China’s public diplomacy is led and implemented by the government, but this does not mean that 
the role of non-government actors is excluded from China’s public diplomacy (d’Hooghe, 2007, p.6). 
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China’s and African nations’ policies and objectives by reviewing political discourse and past 
political economy events, between the 1950s and 1990s, focusing on asymmetrical economic 
interdependence in Sino-African relations. It investigates the differences between China’s 
previous African policy based on traditional diplomacy and its new policy of public 
diplomacy through case studies. In this way, this chapter takes note of interactions between 
the Chinese government and African public, with the assistance of public diplomacy. It also 
explores how this connection exerts influence on Sino-African relations. In addition, the 
analysis of strategy examines how China effectively applies its international diplomatic 
strategy to the formulation of its new African policy to salvage the situation that has arisen 
from the gap between its previous foreign policy and its application in Africa.  
Case Studies 
The case studies will examine how China has implemented its public diplomacy in African 
countries to strengthen and deepen Sino-African relations, in conjunction with the 
conclusions from the first, second, and third chapters, in order to answer the third research 
question. Before discussing the selection of the case studies, it is necessary to classify the 
case studies in two groups as China differentiates in its policy in Africa. Thus, the case 
studies are categorized as “bilateral” and “multilateral” according to the characteristics of 
China’s foreign diplomacy implementation, including the application of its public diplomacy 
in Africa. The case studies will be carried out with three selections on the basis of these two 
categories. The first category of case study, bilateral, will look at China’s relations with 
Nigeria and South Africa; and the second case study, multilateral, will focus on the FOCAC.  
The following reasons explain why these three case studies were chosen (two bilateral case 
studies and one multilateral case study).  
First, China has been striving to improve relations with African countries since 1949, when 
Mao established the People’s Republic of China. Since then, China has emphasized mutual 
interchange, through which the relations between China and African countries were 
strengthened through a variety of aid and investment policies. As China pursued a distinct 
policy12 for each African country, per its national interests, it is important to examine the 
political economy exchanges in bilateral ties between China and African countries. Paying 
                                                
12 For example, African countries are categorized according to China’s different regional policies in 
Africa. First, “regional leaders” – China treats South Africa as their flagship nation for “their regional 
or international political and economic influence”. Second, “problematic countries” – China pays 
attention to the political instability in African nations such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and DRC, so as to 
apply a discreet foreign policy to avoid criticism from international society. (Y. Sun, 2014a, p.20). In 
addition to this, the author argues that China also treats Nigeria as an “important market for securing 
oil and gas and expanding Chinese companies” for its economic development.  
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due attention to the importance of different African countries to China for its various 
interests, this research chose two African countries to analyze China’s public diplomacy 
policy. These two countries have different internal political, economic, and social features, 
but exhibit a sense of solidarity with China. Therefore, a brief explanation of the countries’ 
characteristics to help understand the case selection is as follows:  
Nigeria is a major exporter of oil to China, and it’s the third largest trading partner in Africa. 
In addition, Nigeria is experiencing slow but steady economic growth – although its national 
economy has slowed down recently. It has a relatively democratic governmental system 
among the West African countries. Meanwhile, South Africa has the highest growth potential; 
and leads Africa in economic growth. It stands out as a major economic power among sub-
Saharan African countries after gaining entry to the BRICs club in 2010. Since then, China 
has concentrated on securing a beachhead in South Africa from which it can engage in global 
diplomatic activities. Also, China is interested in South Africa as a hub country for an 
increase in trade; enhancing the mining industry and the steel industry based on its rich 
supply of natural resources.  
Second, FOCAC was launched by China in 2000, and is significant to China not only to fulfill 
its multilateral diplomacy goals with Africa, but also to conduct multidimensional and 
multilayered policies through various institutions in Africa. Also, FOCAC is the fruit of 
former Chinese leaders’ foreign diplomatic endeavours over the last two decades. Its 
development is highly significant to the complex interdependence characteristics of China-
Africa relations and to cement relations with African countries. Thus, FOCAC is a good case 
study with which one can examine the application of China’s public diplomacy across the 
multiple countries affiliated with FOCAC.  
As for the public diplomacy effect on Sino-African relations, the case studies will investigate 
how public diplomacy has influenced three sectors: (1) the African public, (2) China and 
Africa’s political economy, and (3) the relations between China and Africa. This part will 
then evaluate whether the results of public diplomacy activities contribute to address the gap 
between China and Africa that has arisen from asymmetrical economic dependence. Owing 
to the fact that economic relations are the most important dimension of China’s involvement 
in Africa, this part also examines which actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-
governmental) are engaged in China’s public diplomacy and create links between China’s 
public diplomacy activities and African public to advance its strategy in Africa. This part also 
sheds light on the subject of public diplomacy as an effective way for China to advance its 
international economic policy in African countries and cement its political and economic 
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relations with Africa. It examines the idea of China’s culture as a form of power, as well as its 
economy as instruments of public diplomacy. The case study chapters lay the groundwork 
for answering the third research question. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
Drawing on the research aims and research questions, this part will discuss the ideal 
methods for analysis and data collection with which to conduct the research. It will begin 
with an account of the thesis’s research methods, and then describe its practical research 
design for answering the research questions.  
This research is based on qualitative research. Before discussing research methods, it is 
necessary to define this, as it serves as a guide for a general outline of the research: 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in 
terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the 
studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials – case study, personal 
experience, introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, 
and visual texts – that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in 
individuals' lives. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.2) 
Based upon a neoliberal institutionalist analysis of the content of Sino-African relations, and 
through the use of complex interdependence theory developed by Keohane and Nye, the 
research begins by introducing the role of public diplomacy in the context of general 
diplomatic relations. Next, it will establish the frame of China’s public diplomacy in order to 
comprehend its significance in Sino-African relations of asymmetrical interdependence. This 
process is necessary because China stresses the importance of the particular characteristics 
of its diplomatic policy in international relations. Chapter 3 attempts to organize the concept 
of public diplomacy from the Chinese perspective through a comparison between Chinese 
and Western public diplomacy. The related concept of soft power is also discussed, as it is 
seen as a requisite for assisting in the effective implementation of public diplomacy. The 
chapter will also focus on establishing the cause of the necessity of public diplomacy from 
political history and from China’s current international position, which strives to keep pace 
with the rapid changes resulting from globalization. In this process, the research discovers 
key factors that facilitate China’s differentiated approach.  
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To provide a more concrete empirical analysis of Chinese public diplomacy, Chapters 4 and 5 
will discuss the necessity of employing public diplomacy, explained within the context of 
China’s political system and also Sino-African relations, respectively. Chapter 4 will look into 
how China utilizes public diplomacy by using its soft power and actors (governmental, semi- 
governmental, and non-governmental actors) to strengthen foreign relations and achieve 
China’s foreign policy goals in international relations. The following chapter will get to the 
root of the asymmetrical economic relationship between China and Africa, and explains the 
necessity of public diplomacy in dealing with China’s African policy and its recognition and 
acceptance from Africa, and also the lopsided economic relations between China and Africa. 
These processes will be examined through a comparative analysis of China’s 2006 and 2015 
white papers on African policy, former and current leaders’ political slogans, and China’s 
political economy doctrines from the 1950s to 1990s, which are related to China’s public 
diplomacy and relations between China and Africa.  
After this, in order to examine China’s differentiated public diplomacy activities in African 
countries; it will use three case studies – Nigeria, South Africa, and FOCAC – from two 
channels (bilateral and multilateral). The case studies are crucial, and form a large part of 
this thesis. The definition of the case study research method, according to Yin (2014), is “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (p.16). A case study in research assumes comprehending 
actualities in the current world by grasping the case’s significant contextual conditions (ibid). 
Thus, Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the role of China’s differentiated African policy through 
public diplomacy, and evaluate the role of its public diplomacy with respective to its host 
country, according to interview materials and documentary analysis. These case studies, 
especially, will discuss the role of public diplomacy in addressing the gap that has arisen 
from China’s African policy and its implementation. To draw a conclusion from the case 
studies, a comparative method is adopted because it facilitates scrutiny of the context of 
knowledge, forward categorization and prediction (Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry, 
2008, p.80). Therefore, the research will examine China’s differentiated policy of public 
diplomacy in African countries that have different political economy and social cultures, and 
assess how the policy is significant in bilateral and multilateral ties diplomatically, 
economically, and politically.  
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In this research, the qualitative analysis of case studies is applied as a basic analyzing 
method for comparison of the three countries13 through an interpretative approach, with 
core components of a case study: “a selection of case elements and research materials, 
participants’ viewpoint in the event such as interview and documents analysis” (Yin, 2011, 
p.12). Hokpin (2010) pointed out the objective of comparative method in political science as 
establishing, testing, and clarifying causality (p.285). Thus, an interpretive process is crucial 
for understanding “the observers’ value system, political assumption, age and gender” (ibid, 
p.13). In this regards, Bhattacherjee (2012) suggested “observations must be interpreted 
through the eyes of the participants embedded in the social context. Interpretation must 
occur at two levels” (p.115). The first level entails observing or experiencing a certain 
circumstance of the social participants’ subjective view. The next level is to grasp 
participants’ experiences in the context of its meaning for a certain circumstance’s “thick 
description” or “rich narrative story”, which can understand participants’ behaviour in the 
situation (ibid). 
It is also necessary to consider the question of comparative sample size before carrying out 
interpretive process. Concerning the selection of two types of comparative methods between 
“small-N (few cases)” and “large-N (many cases)”, this research adopts small-N, as generally 
small-N is employed in the qualitative comparative method and large-N is employed in the 
quantitative comparative method (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p.88). Besides, compared to 
large-N, small-N cases have a few factors to be considered when one analyzes the causality of 
events, and it is easier to grasp the status quo in the political sector when analysing a small 
number of cases (Collier, 1993, p.105). In this context, the research examines in depth the 
function and role of China’s public diplomacy in the political, economic, and social cultural 
sectors in each case study. By extension, it will identify the primary factors in which China’s 
former diplomatic policy in each African country contrasts with the current, and analyze the 
meaning of the differentiated policies. The research is able to produce detailed and specific 
analysis of China’s public diplomatic policy through the case studies.  
The main difference between the case study and other qualitative designs such as 
ethnography and grounded theory is that the case study is “open to the use of theory or 
conceptual categories that guide the research and analysis of data” (Meyer, 2001, p.331). 
Comparison analysis is necessary because it identifies similarities and differences between 
performers and programs (Gilboa, 2008). However, Yin (2003) pointed out the lack of 
objectivity of case studies while analyzing data and materials related to an empirical research 
                                                
13 The three case studies are the Nigeria and South Africa case in bilateral ties and FOCAC in 
multilateral ties.  
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project, for example on contemporary issues, as it can be influenced by various external 
factors (p.12-13). To avoid these weaknesses, it is necessary to establish detailed limitations 
and collect not only wide-ranging but also in-depth data to analyze from various angles (Yin, 
2011, p.11-13). Thus, the case studies are classified into two groups: bilateral and 
multilateral. In the bilateral cases, the regime is the criteria for comparison in each country; 
it will focus on the correlation between the role of China’s public diplomacy and political 
economy and diplomatic relations regarding different government systems. In the 
multilateral case, over fifty African countries have joined FOCAC. Therefore, it will analyze 
interrelation between the role of China’s public diplomacy and political economy and 
diplomatic relations between China and Africa. 
As the research field is so broad, one needs to set up parameters for the analysis of the 
relationship between China and African nations. First, the thesis considers China’s cultural 
diplomacy to be subordinate to the general concept of public diplomacy. The thesis adopts 
the perspective of Cull (2008a, 2009b), d’Hooghe (2015), and Nye (2008), that culture is 
one element of public diplomacy. Thus, it will not place more emphasis on the explanation of 
cultural diplomacy, but rather it will focus the discussion primarily on China’s public 
diplomacy with core instruments (media, education and cultural exchange institutes, and 
foreign aid). Second, this thesis will focus on researching China’s public diplomacy between 
from 2003 to 2016,14 as it relates to contemporary issues. Therefore, it will only cover 
China’s foreign policy from 2003 to 2016, rather that also including China’s leaders prior to 
Hu Jintao. However, the thesis analyzes Sino-African ties from the 1950s because the 
majority of China’s core Africa policies have been established since then. Third, when it 
comes to selecting African countries, the research set limits on countries’ located in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where China is within public diplomacy range. The two case study countries 
and the FOCAC member nations are not only located in Sub-Saharan Africa, but were also 
selected because they share relations within the sphere of Chinese public diplomacy activity: 
media, educational institutes, cultural exchange institutes, and foreign aid including 
investment. The two case study countries that enjoy bilateral ties with China share some 
common denominators: they employ English as the official language, have ongoing 
economic development in each region, they are attempting to become full democracies, and 
they play an important role in the Chinese political economy system. On the other hand, the 
two countries also exhibit differences, for example their respective supplies of natural 
resources, their political stability, and their leaders’ political impressions of China. By 
                                                
14 It was in 2003, during the regime of Hu Jintao, that soft power was first officially mentioned in 
public as part of China’s foreign policy. Since then, up to 2016 and the regime of Xi Jinping, it has 
continued to be a strategic goal of the nation’s foreign policy. 
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analyzing the three case studies, one can analyze China’s public diplomacy from 2003 to 
2016.  
The next part will discuss data collection, which the research conducted using the following 
sources: 1) documentation, 2) archival records, and 3) interviews. Due to the fact that each 
data source has strengths and weaknesses, the three sources complement each other in the 
research.  
Documentary and Archival Records  
There are three categories of documentary and archival analysis: primary, secondary, and 
tertiary. Primary sources are 1) gained from first-hand/direct evidence or information about 
the event, objective, or people, and 2) made or recorded during the time period by a qualified 
person. Thus, primary sources are raw and need to be interpreted by the researcher, such as 
interviews, surveys, fieldwork, books and newspaper/magazine articles that contain factual 
information besides historical accounts, government records from governmental agencies 
and organizations, speeches, audio/video recordings, photographs, legal and financial 
documents, and others. Secondary sources are any items that were created by someone who 
was not directly involved in, or was an eyewitness to the events. Also, they can include 
interpreted, summarized, or processed primary sources by someone else, based on personal 
views and descriptions, such as articles from journals, newspapers, and magazines after the 
events, literature reviews of journal articles and books, government official publications and 
debates, historical studies, and others. Tertiary sources include dictionaries, bibliographies, 
directories, chronologies, textbooks, databases, encyclopedias, guidebooks, almanacs, and 
others that provide synthesized information and sources. They are comprised of abstracts, 
interpretations, or compilations of primary and secondary sources. (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2004; Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008; Given, 2008; Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016).  
The sources for this research are based primarily on literature in English. Due to the 
uniqueness of Chinese and African nations’ governments, the sources are often not offered in 
a transparent manner, if there are any available at all. In addition, access is not easy. 
Therefore, major materials for the study are drawn from all the sources published by Chinese 
and African nations’ governments; all sources published and issued in China and Africa, 
including speeches about policy makers and related interviews, TV coverage and 
documentaries, books written by policy makers, coverage of incidents, and official web-sites. 
Also, the research collected sources from the publications and archives of international 
organizations and institutions. As for official governmental publications and debates, and 
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publications and archives of international organizations and institutions, they offer more 
reliable information than other secondary sources (Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008). 
Other secondary sources were acquired from scholars’ research papers in major journals and 
books, credible political web-sites, personal blogs of scholars, conferences, seminars, news or 
newspapers reporting and materials, professional surveys, and think-tanks’ and school 
research institutes’ output.  
Interviews  
The purpose of in-depth interviewing is to comprehend not only other individuals’ 
knowledge of life but also the meaning of experience in their lives. Therefore, interviewing 
gives voice to another individual’s story (Seidman, 2006, p.9). In this context, Maccoby and 
Maccoby define interviewing as “a face-to-face verbal exchange, in which one person, the 
interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another 
person or persons” (1954, p.449). Kvale and Brinkmann (2008) interpret an interview as 
gathering an interviewee’s information for analysis and clarification of certain phenomena in 
political science (p.3). Based on the objectives and background of interview research, 
therefore, a combination of “semi-structured interviews” and “standardized open-ended 
interviews” were conducted for the following reasons.  
There are three types of in-depth interview research that can be conducted (Patton, 2014, 
pp.437-438). First, an “informal conversational interview”, which does not follow a 
premeditated path – no prepared question topics nor wording – between interviewer and 
interviewee. Second, a “semi-structured interview”, for which topic and issues are 
predetermined by the interviewer beforehand, and the interviewer makes decisions about 
the sequence of the interview questions and their wording. Third, a “standardized open-
ended interview”, which is conducted by putting a set of the same predetermined questions 
to all interviewees. Interview questions are prepared based on precise word selections and 
sequences conforming with a completely open-ended format. The second interview method 
is similar to the third in terms of utilizing a premeditated interview form for minimizing the 
effect of bias and subjectivity on the interview; whereas the third method has an advantage 
over the second regarding the efficient management of interview time. Not only that, but the 
comparison analysis of interview content is facilitated by this method (ibid, p.441). 
According to Patton’s suggestion, by combining interview types, the interviewer is able to 
conduct in-depth research on certain subjects through flexible examination (ibid). Therefore, 
the interviews conducted for this paper were carried out using the second and third methods 
– the “semi-structured interview” and “standardized open-ended interview” – to answer the 
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research questions through discourse analysis.  
All interviews for the research will be conducted through an elite interview method, as this 
facilitates the interviewer in collecting valuable information through the eyes of elites who 
have broad experience and important positions in the realms of political economy and social 
culture (Marshall and Rossman, 2010, p.155). There are various definitions of the word 
“elite”, since the meaning within a specific area or society diverges from the subjective point 
of view towards it. However, in order to conduct an interview, the research follows Lamont’s 
extensive definition (2015): “elites are anyone who occupies a position of influence or 
importance within a particular organization that is under study” (p.84).  
The purpose for utilizing elite interview methods is similar to the objectives of research case 
studies. One purpose is to confirm the role and necessity of China’s public diplomacy in 
Africa, based on the contents of Chapter 4. This process facilitates the cross-checking of 
collected data that comes from different sources in order to present reliable and definite 
findings. Not only that, another purpose is to gather rich, new and detailed information with 
regards to elites’ thoughts and their way of thinking about issues related to China’s public 
diplomacy in Africa. The other purpose is not only to draw inference from the elite 
interviews about the African public’s responses, opinions and awareness of China’s public 
diplomacy, but also to identify the elements of political economy that are not disclosed in the 
primary documentary and archival sources (Transey, 2007, pp.5-10). 
Before discussing the detailed interview design, one needs to clarify interviewees in this 
research. To hear African public’s opinion, the set of interviews will be conducted with 
Chinese, Nigerian, and South African interviewees in three categories: (1) the media (2) 
cultural institutes, and (3) educational institutes. These were chosen based on the contents 
of China’s second white paper on its African policy (Xinhua News, 2015f). There are three 
reasons why the interview research adopts the three categories from China’s African policy 
white paper. First, in order to help fully understand the reason for selecting the categories, a 
brief account is necessary (a detailed explanation is in Chapter 5). China’s second white 
paper on its African policy, issued by the Chinese government in 2015, it focuses on not only 
supporting aid, trade, and investment but also supporting welfare, education, cultural 
exchanges, and media as part of the public diplomatic policy intended for African publics. 
Put another way, China carries out a multidirectional policy towards African countries’ 
governments and their people. As for China’s public diplomatic policy, it can be interpreted 
as China’s government’s attempts to comprehend African society and culture in tandem with 
disseminating China’s ideology, including its culture and the “peaceful coexistence” line. In 
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addition, the Chinese government takes the lead and establishes all of its public diplomatic 
policy. Thus, it is more reliable to conduct interviews with people in fields in which Chinese 
foreign policies are officially implemented, in order to comprehend its public diplomacy in 
Africa. Second, China executes its African policy with different plans in each African country. 
For that reason, there was some difficulty in gaining uniformity in the interviewees in 
Nigeria and South Africa. Thus, deciding on interviewees who are related to China’s public 
diplomacy activities in each country within each category, facilitated the conduct of 
interviews with appropriate questions. Third, the three categories are directly connected to 
the African public, and therefore it enables us to analyze the purpose of China’s public 
diplomacy that endeavours to communicate with the public. However, as mentioned earlier, 
China’s public diplomacy is implemented mostly through (1) foreign aid, (2) the media, (3) 
cultural institutes, and (4) educational institutes in Africa. For foreign aid, mainly 
documentation and archival records will be used to analyze detailed information. However, 
the research also conducted interviews of Chinese staff who work at Standard Bank and 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which are in South Africa, to learn of the general 
process of China’s aid as part of public diplomacy in African countries.  
Building upon the discussion above, a key sample for interview in each category in each 
country is as follows: (1) the media: broadcast director at newspaper publishing company 
(including Internet newspaper), or broadcasting station, or radio station, or communications 
company; (2) the cultural institute: director or teachers at Confucius Institute/Cultural 
Center, or language centre at University; and (3) the educational institute: professor, or 
director, or trainer at human resource development centre (including technical training 
(agriculture, telecommunication technology, medical treatment), a university that has a 
Chinese government scholarship program, student exchange program to China, or research 
center or think tank to exchange information between China and Nigeria/South Africa. In 
addition to interviewees in the three categories, interviews were conducted with Chinese, 
Nigerian, and South African people who not only support China’s public diplomacy activities 
within the three categories, but who also understand the trends of China’s public diplomacy 
in the three categories.  
The interviewee selection for the research follows the purpose of qualitative research, which 
is to interpret the meaning of the nature or phenomena, and to propose ideas and concepts 
or theories. For that reason, the interview samples are required to be related to relevant 
events, circumstances, and processes (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003, p.82) in order to 
illuminate the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Furthermore, the research focuses 
on not only the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, but also its necessity for each 
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African country. To identify China’s need of public diplomatic policy in Africa, the research 
will hold interviews with officials at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Nigeria 
and South Africa. The reason for this decision is the difficulty in contacting Chinese 
governmental officials in China. Moreover, the Embassy officials in each country fully grasp 
the role of China’s public diplomacy, and have broad experience in their relevant localities. 
The fieldwork for the interviews was carried out in Nigeria (from November 18th, 2016, to 
December 19th, 2016, in Abuja and Lagos) and in South Africa (from February 16th, 2017, to 
March 14th, 2017, in Cape Town and Johannesburg). The sample size is approximately 12 
people in total in each country, depending on the interviewees’ availability. Regarding the 
small sample size, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) suggests less than twenty samples when the 
research relies on phenomenographic research concepts or approaches, and it facilitates the 
researcher’s close associate with the interviewees, and enhance the validity of in-depth 
interview. Since the sample size is small, the research adopts snowball sampling – that is, 
receiving recommendations for other relevant, potential interviewees from confirmed 
interviewees. This sampling method is appropriate for the research that has a dispersed and 
small interviewee population (Ritchie, et al., 2003, p.94). 
As mentioned above, the research focuses on the correlation between China’s public 
diplomacy activities and its effects, especially maintaining close economic relations with 
African countries, boosting Chinese economic development, and encouraging a positive 
reputation from the African public. These have not, so far, been studied in detail. Thus, the 
necessity of conducting interviews for the research lies in that fact that it has been difficult to 
ascertain the association between China’s public diplomacy activities and its effects from 
existing research, and to answer the research questions based only on available documents 
that discuss Chinese public diplomacy in Africa and Chinese enterprises’ activities in Africa 
separately. As for documentary and archival analysis, Bowen (2009) refers to documentary 
analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed 
and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (p.27). Current 
document/archival analysis enables the research to look into a variety of China’s public 
diplomacy policies and its actives in chronological order, rather than detailed descriptions of 
local people’s opinions. Nonetheless, information is sparse as a majority of data are 
published by the Chinese and African governments, and cannot give us a full picture of 
China’s public diplomacy. However, the most important element of the research is the 
general intent of public diplomacy, that China’s public diplomacy activities are also designed 
to engage with the African public, thereby analyzing its effects in Africa and answering the 
research questions. Therefore, the aim of the fieldwork interviews is not only to grasp and 
verify the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy by gathering the opinions of Nigerian 
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and South African people, but also to obtain opinions of China’s public diplomacy strategy 
from Chinese officials at Chinese embassies. The interviews facilitate the gathering of very 
detailed information from the insights of interviewees acquired from their personal 
experience and knowledge.  
The interview questions in Appendix II were used during fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, 
Nigeria, in 2016. The interviews were conducted with Chinese interviewees at a Chinese 
newspaper (West Africa Business Weekly), Confucius Institutes, the Chinese Cultural Centre, 
the Chinese embassy, Chinese telecommunications companies (ZTE, Huawei, and a private 
company for the Chinese government), as well as Nigerian interviewees at government 
agencies. The second round of fieldwork was conducted in Cape Town and Johannesburg, 
South Africa, in 2017. Interviews were conducted with Chinese interviewees working for 
Xinhua (a Chinese newspaper), Confucius Institutes, a private Chinese language education 
foundation, a Chinese telecommunications company (ZTE), the China Segment of South 
Africa at Standard Bank in South Africa, the African representative office at ICBC in South 
Africa, the Chinese property development company Shanghai Zendai, as well as South 
African interviewees at the China-Africa Project in the Journalism Department at University 
of Wits, the department of International Relations at University of Wit, and the Centre for 
Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch. The second round of interviews was 
conducted in the same manner as the first. All interviews were conducted in person, on the 
ground, with in-depth interviews, which enabled me to uncover valuable perceptions, and 
enabled the research to find rich and descriptive data on Chinese public diplomacy activities 
– that is, the “real story” of public diplomacy based on the interviewees’ experiences, and 
opinions in Nigeria and South Africa from participants in the know. Also, it utilized the 
snowball sampling method. However, during the interviews, the majority of interviewees (N-
B1, N-B2, N-B3, N-C1, N-D2, N-E2, S-A1, S-B1, S-C2, and S-E1) related to government 
agencies did not want to reveal their identities due to security concerns at their work, so they 
did not allow the interviews to be recorded, and instead notes were taken for their responses. 
Some Chinese interviewees requested that their English names be used and recorded, which 
they use in Nigeria and South Africa before starting interview. Thus, the research concealed 
names to protect interviewees’ privacy and followed interviewees’ request to use their 
English name which is what they are known as in Nigeria and South Africa on this thesis, 
according to ethical considerations. The list of interviewees is in Appendix I.   
In sum, the research adopted a methodology of both documentary and archival analysis and 
interview methods to support each other and address the weaknesses inherent in in each 
method. The interview findings were helpful to comprehend not only the connection 
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between China’s public diplomacy and its effects especially on economic relations between 
China and Nigeria/South Africa, but also the link between China’s public diplomacy and its 
foreign policy. This is because the interviewees’ personal experiences, current activities, and 
opinions were not published in available books or newspapers, because the Chinese 
government does not open its activities to the world except in official speeches and 
documents. However, it was hard to obtain all detailed information on China’s public 
diplomacy in Nigeria and South Africa from interviewees, due to their respective time 
restrictions. Hence, the research has collected various bits of information from secondary 
sources to address missing pieces that could not be obtained from interviewees to answer 
each chapter’s research question(s). However, the case study chapter about Nigeria and 
South Africa prioritized findings from interviews over secondary sources. Meanwhile, the 
FOCAC case study chapter is primarily based on primary sources published by the Chinese 
government and African countries, due to the inherent difficulty (impossibility) in 
conducting interviews with parties from over 50 African countries. In addition to the case 
study chapters, the other chapters used both primary and secondary sources.  
 
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the research 
topic and establishes the research questions, the structure of the thesis, and the methodology 
used to collect data and its analysis. Chapter 2 discusses neoliberal institutionalism in order 
to understand Sino-African economic relations and public diplomacy and provide a 
theoretical framework. Chapter 3 examines public diplomacy and discusses Joseph S. Nye’s 
concept of soft power, as well as the connection between propaganda and strategic 
communication to comprehend public diplomacy mechanisms. Chapter 3 also covers public 
diplomacy and soft power from the Chinese perspective, including a closer examination of 
the instruments of public diplomacy and the necessity of public diplomacy in international 
relations. Chapter 4 looks at detailed information of public diplomacy, how systematically 
governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors carry out China’s public 
diplomacy, and the significance of sustainable development on China’s foreign policy. This 
chapter also explains how China utilizes its public diplomacy to promote a pleasant 
environment for developing close economic ties with foreign countries. Chapter 5 explores 
Sino-Africa relations with a discussion of the necessity of China’s public diplomacy to 
economic ties between China and African countries, based on the contents of Chapters 3 and 
4. It reviews China’s policies towards Africa from the 1950s to 1990s to trace developments 
and to understand how China obtained its ascendency within the asymmetric economic 
 25 
interdependence in Sino-African relations, and how it utilizes its policies towards African 
countries to become more deeply involved politically and economically. The chapter also 
analyses the white papers of China’s African policy, and investigates the necessity of public 
diplomacy in China’s African policy through an examination of disputes between China and 
Africa resulting from lopsided economic relations. Furthermore, it briefly discusses how 
China utilizes public diplomacy instruments (foreign aid, media, and cultural and education 
institutes) to boost economic ties with Africa. Chapters 6 and 7 are case studies that examine 
the role of public diplomacy to strengthen and deepen Sino-African relations in bilateral and 
multilateral ties. As for the bilateral relations chapters, it focuses on the relationships 
between China and Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. Thus, each chapter describes the 
background to the relationships and how they have evolved, and reviews their disputes with 
China in economic relations. Then, it discusses the role of public diplomacy and the use of 
foreign aid, media, and cultural and educational institutes, and evaluates the effect of China’s 
public diplomacy on the public and political economy sectors, and the relationships between 
each country and China. The multilateral relations chapter focuses on how China boosts 
cooperation with African countries through public diplomacy and institutions. Thus, it 
reviews the main agendas of each FOCAC meeting to examine the role of public diplomacy in 
institutions, and examines the mechanisms and institutions of FOCAC. Then, it examines 
how FOCAC, institutions, and public diplomacy closely connect with each other to boost 
economic relations between China and Africa, and evaluates the role of public diplomacy in 
multilateral ties. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It draws together answers to the research 
questions, and examines the limitations of the research based on the discussion in all 
previous chapters. The chapter suggests research contributions and implications, and 














Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework  
 
 
Understanding China’s foreign policy, strategy, and behaviour has become a major issue in 
International Relations (IR) study in recent years, but there is no consensus on how we 
should understand China as an international actor. Instead, there are several conflicting 
perspectives that have arisen when analyzing China’s contemporary foreign policy and 
behaviour in international relations. Many questions have been raised as to how to account 
for China’s foreign policy, and how it should be studied. This chapter cannot review all these 
questions, but will focus on those theoretical aspects that allow us to understand the 
relationship between China and Africa in terms of public diplomacy. Even this relationship is 
very broad. It is therefore necessary to identify a core relationship to study. This thesis 
focuses on public diplomacy in political economy relations – specifically, the role of China’s 
public diplomacy instruments: foreign assistance, media, and institutions. Therefore, this 
theory chapter explores and explains the role of public diplomacy in shaping the relationship 
between China and African nations in political economy, with a specific focus on economic 
interdependence. The chapter will argue that the focal point for China’s public diplomacy 
activities in African countries can best be explained within the school of neoliberal 
institutionalism, and through the use of complex interdependence theory as developed by 
Keohane and Nye. Drawing on neoliberalism, complex interdependence theory and research 
questions, this chapter will define the theoretical framework to analyze and explain the main 
political economy objectives of Sino-Africa relations and scrutinize why China’s foreign aid 
and investment requires and uses public diplomacy towards the sub-Saharan African nations.  
 
 
2.1 Neoliberalism theory as an interpretation of complex interdependence  
 
To understand complex interdependence in global relations, this section will first locate this 
concept within the school of neoliberalism. Before discussing neoliberalism, there are a few 
aspects of liberalism briefly review in the context of its fundamental assumptions in order to 
create a basis for comprehending neoliberalism. Liberalism as a political theory 
encompasses such as religious freedom rule under agreement, individual freedom, economic 
freedom, and democracy. Unlike realists, liberalists think that human nature is not 
necessarily evil; in other words, that relations between human beings can be reasonable and 
cooperative. The superiority of freedom lies in the good development of personality and 
cultivation of capability. By extension, liberalists emphasise the importance of freedom of 
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political economy, asserting the role of free trade in preventing war and establishing a 
peaceful and social harmony at the global level, through the division of labor in the global 
market, minimum economic interference by the state, and global economic freedom. To 
address anarchy in international relations, liberalists look to international law, new 
international organizations, international regimes, world citizenship, and international 
ethics (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010, pp.96-98). Based on this, they support the view that 
liberalistic values – such as individual freedom, human welfare, world peace, the prevention 
of a war, the development of personality, and worldwide mutual cooperation – could be 
achieved in international society.  
 
Drawing on the assumptions of liberalism, there are various types of liberal International 
Relations (IR) theory, which can be collected into four groups; first, commercial liberalism, 
republican liberalism, sociological liberalism, and neoliberal institutionalism (Grieco 1988; 
Keohane 1989; Baldwin 1993). However, this paper only focuses on the fourth category, 
neoliberal institutionalism, which stresses the importance of cooperation and the role of 
institutions in international relations. Neoliberal institutionalism has a notably different 
view to that of republican and commercial liberalists. Where commercial and republican 
liberalists claim that there is an automatic “balance of profit”, neoliberalism believe in “the 
role international institutions play in obtaining international collective outcomes” (Sterling-
Folker, 2013, p.115). Moreover, neoliberal institutionalism shows the difference between the 
four types of liberalism. Contrary to other three types of liberalism, neoliberalism embraces 
international institutions in liberalism’s core assumptions, and shares several major 
assumptions with neorealism (Nye, 1988). In this way, Keohane interpreted neoliberal 
institutionalism as “not a single logically connected deductive theory, any more than is 
liberalism or neorealism: each is a school of thought that provides a perspective on world 
politics” (2011, p.158). First, neoliberalism shares with neorealism several assumptions that 
relate to man, the state (the state-centered assumption), and international system. Second, 
neoliberalism and neorealism are both considered to be a “paradigm or conceptual 
framework”, because they play a greater role than just “theory”, despite the fact that each is 
rooted in liberalism or Realism (Lamy, 2008, p.116). However, the shared assumptions 
between neoliberalism and neorealism have caused controversy over each other’s perspective. 
This matter is resolved when one examines the perception of the assumption gap between 
neoliberalism and Realism (ibid). 
Despite liberalism regarding institutions as important, not all liberalists place a high value 
upon international institutions as does neoliberal institutionalism. In addition to 
neoliberalism, the following theories have also embraced the assumption of the importance 
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of international institutions: functionalism, which stresses international integration; 
neofunctionalism, which focused on regional integration; and complex interdependence 
theory. Based on complex interdependence theory, neoliberal institutionalism took shape, 
and was further developed by Keohane’s 1984 publication, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy. The following is a summation of the argument 
in his book: 
[…] I assume, with the Realists, that actors are rational egoists. I propose to show, on 
the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of Realism does 
not necessarily follow. I seek to demonstrate that Realist assumptions about world 
politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements, 
containing rules and principles, which promote cooperation (Keohane, 1988, p.67). 
According to the arguments in his book, Keohane accepted the realist’s viewpoint of anarchy 
in the international system, and that anarchy hinders international cooperation. However, 
he pointed out that Realism underestimated international institutions’ ability when it comes 
to improving cooperation in international politics, on account of their overemphasis on 
conflict between nations. Put another way, realists such as Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer 
(2001) are of the opposite viewpoint, in which the anarchic nature of the international 
system would not change despite the influence on globalization. The nation would still be the 
most important actor in international relations; conflicts between nations would increase in 
the Post-Cold War era compared to during the Cold War. Unlike the neoliberalist view, 
realists believe interdependence and cooperation are difficult to realise between great 
powers, and are expected to be realised only between great powers and weaker nations. 
Unless the nature of anarchy in international relations changes, the importance of military 
power, particularly that of nuclear weapons, still takes precedence in the Post-Cold War 
period.   
The major assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism regarding cooperation and institutions 
can be organized as follows. In contrast to liberalism’s view, neoliberalism accepts the salient 
state-centric perspective of neo-realism, whereby neoliberalists consider nations as unitary 
and rational actors in pursuit of maximizing absolute gains – which means that, insofar as 
nations acquire ‘profits’, neoliberalists are indifferent to the extent of other nations’ profit-
making – through cooperation in all issue-areas in competitive international relations. In 
terms of cooperation from the institutional neoliberalist perspective, Keohane addresses 
cooperation as follows: “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies 
actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of 
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their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (1984, p.51-2). By 
extension, he differentiates cooperation from harmony and discord. He considers harmony 
to be “a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard 
for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goal[s]”, which means that 
harmony occurs when actors align their policy and actions. This is shown in the example of 
trade relations in a competitive market world, Adam Smith’s invisible hand (demand and 
supply) (ibid, p.51). Counter to harmony, discord arises when cooperation is needed. 
Cooperation does not have “pre-existent harmony”, and so separate individuals or 
organizations need to reach a consensus on their actions through “policy coordination” in 
order to avoid creating discord (ibid, pp.52-4). However, a hindrance to achieving 
cooperation arises from nations cheat other nations, and do not conform with the 
expectations of cooperation. To overcome problems with cooperation, as Keohane pointed 
out above, nations are required to adopt the character of institutions, as international 
institutions exert their influence on cooperation between nations; and if the circumstance 
requires, nations can reform institution for the sake of mutual benefit and increasing the 
chance of securing their international interests (Lamy, 2008, pp.509-10). Neoliberal 
institutionalism’s assumptions, according to Keohane’s argument, can be fulfilled when it 
meets two requirements. First, mutual interests should exist between two nations, which 
means that the actors can obtain mutual interests through cooperation. Second, “the 
variations in the degree of institutionalization” have a considerable effect on state behaviour. 
This is due to the fact that institutional neoliberalism construes institutionalization as a 
constant instead of a variable in the international politics. It thus stresses that institutional 
variations are meaningless when it comes to explaining variations in actors’ behaviour, if the 
institutions are fully established in world politics (Keohane, 1989, pp. 2-3).  
Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the development of international cooperation between 
states and other actors, stressing not only the relations between cooperation and 
international institutions, but also the role of international organizations and international 
regimes. Institutional neoliberalism, although it overlaps with other liberalistic views, has 
become the mainstream in the era of globalization. Institutional neoliberalists seek to 
explain how and why nations will pursue cooperation based on the expansion of institutions 
in international relations. Thus, it is necessary to examine the meaning of “international 
institution” and “international regime” from the perspective of institutional neoliberalism.  
What is the meaning of “international institution”? Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) pointed 
out that international institutions and international regimes are like the prime vehicle in 
neoliberalism, though the terms “institution” and “regime” are often interpreted differently 
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among International Relations (IR) scholars. Despite the fact that the two words exist, a 
large number of IR scholars put “sets of rules” meaning on international institutions towards 
government’s behaviour in international relations. The contextual meaning of rule is 
interpreted as the expression of “forbid, require, or permit particular kinds of actions” 
(Martin and Simmons, 2013, p. 328). In this regard, Keohane (1988) proposes the definition 
of institution as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”, and he considers as institution 
to be “a general pattern of categorization of activity” or “a particular human-constructed 
arrangement, formally or informally organized”, which can manifest in three forms: “formal 
intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organization, international regimes, 
and conventions”, which would include international institutions (p.383). When 
differentiating between the three forms of international institutions, a “formal 
intergovernmental or cross-international nongovernmental organization” means a formal 
bureaucratic structure based on definite rule and purpose. Second, Keohane and Nye deem 
international regimes as “devices for enhancing the utility of actors whose interests were 
taken as given” (1997, p.660). Keohane also defines the meaning of “international regimes” 
as “specific institutions involving state and/or transnational actors, which apply to particular 
issues in international relations” (ibid, p. 384). In contrast, Young (1982) defines it as an 
“agreement among some specific groups of actors” (p.16). As such, the definition of 
international regime is open to interpretation, depending on the scholar’s perspective. From 
the various interpretations of regime, Krasner (1982)15 attempts to explain the occurrence of 
international regimes as the connection of “sets of [implicit or explicit] principles, norms, 
rules, and decision making procedures” (p.186). Third, according to Keohane (1989), 
“conventions” – such as reciprocity, traditional diplomatic immunity – are “temporally and 
logically prior to regimes or formal international organizations” (p.4). This means that 
Keohane supposes that international institutions go through a process of development from 
convention to regime, to organization. Also, he argues that convention is the most informal 
of the three forms of international institution, and is comprised of actors understanding one 
another’s expectations and regulating actors’ behaviour based on explicit rules. As such, 
Keohane considers international institution to be an expansive concept that counters 
Ruggie’s view that international organizations and international institutions are subsumed 
under international regime as a comprehensive notion (Ruggie, 1975, p.568).  
In summary, neoliberal institutionalism highlights nations’ cooperation through 
international institutions. Neoliberalists believe that international cooperation is both 
                                                
15 The thesis adopted Krasner’s perspective to understand the meaning of international regime.  
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necessary in, and an outcome of interaction and negotiation in international relations. 
Neoliberalists are scholars who analyze the development of international relations from the 
viewpoint of institutional liberalism rather than the influence of human nature and power 
politics. Realists, however, think that international institutions are the result of power 
relationships and can never suppress national interests or actions. Also, nations – especially 
great powers – can ignore institutions, norms and treaties, depending on their necessity. 
Unlike realists, neoliberalists explain the behaviors of international actors, particularly 
national actors, as controlled within institutions producing international relations with 
diverse structures (Grieco, 1998, p.494). This can be verified, in their view, through the 
concept of interdependence. Particularly in the UN, GATT, WTO and numerous 
environmental treaties, nations make an effort to establish the institution. Although nations 
do not always keep to the rules of the institution, regime, or treaty under the uncertain 
conditions of international relations, most of time they try to avoid disruptive behaviour. The 
reason for this can be found in the concept of sensitivity to the cost applied by change to the 
external environment, and vulnerability from the cost applied by foreign change after a 
policy change. In other words, nations seem to avoid subverting existing rules and regimes 
because of these sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Thus, it means that nations can achieve 
cooperation and standardised behaviour even in a state of anarchy. Therefore, neoliberalists 
focus on an optimistic view, in which international institutions can contribute to reducing 
international conflict and war considered inevitable by realists.   
 
2.2 Complex Interdependence Theory  
 
To get a clear understanding of the role of public diplomacy in China’s foreign political 
economy, it is necessary to examine the goals China will pursue, and how China perceives 
external conditions in the process of carrying out its foreign aid and investment policy in 
order to achieve its objectives in international relations. There were three theories that 
prepared the ground for neoliberal institutionalism before the 1990s and oppose Realism’s 
arguments and its critical viewpoint of international politics. First was functional integration 
theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, second was regional integration theory in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, and third was complex interdependency theory in the 1970s. This chapter focuses 
on the importance of interdependence in international relations.  
 
During the 1970s, Keohane and Nye observed the importance of international organizations 
for political negotiation in international relations in both transnational and 
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transgovernmental ties. In light of this, despite the fact that complex interdependence theory 
started as criticism of Realism, they introduced complex interdependence theory not as an 
alternative but as a supplement to Realism, with an explanation of international regime and 
redefinition of international organization in their 1977 publication, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. However, there are various interpretations of 
interdependence in international relations. As explained by Keohane and Nye (2011), 
“Dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. 
Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence” (p.7). And they also 
argued that “Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (ibid). Also, 
interdependence exists “where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) 
costly effects of transactions” (ibid, p.8). Keohane and Nye’s assumptions of Realism can be 
characterized as follows: “Military security will be the dominant goal; military force will be 
most effective, although economic and other instruments will also be used; potential shifts in 
the balance of power and security threats will set the agenda in high politics and will strongly 
influence other agendas” (1997, p.139).  
 
2.2.1 Characteristics of complex interdependence16   
Keohane and Nye suggest three primary characteristics of complex interdependence theory. 
First, there are multiple channels that link societies, which include transgovernmental, 
interstate, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the typical channels 
acknowledged by realists. Complex interdependence theory suggests patterns of 
interdependence will be formed through not only the informal and formal connections 
between governmental elites and foreign office arrangements, but also informal ties among 
nongovernmental elites like face-to-face and through telecommunication and transnational 
organization like multinational banks or corporations. Multinational firms and banks exert 
influence on domestic and interstate relations. Also, these actors are crucial as not only are 
“their activities in pursuit of their own interests”, but also because “they act as transmission 
belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another” 
(Keohane & Nye, 2011, p. 21). Second, there is “the absence of hierarchy among issues” and 
“military security does not consistently dominate the agenda” in complex interdependence 
(ibid, p.20). There are multiple issues and no definite agenda in interstate relationships. The 
boundary line between domestic and foreign issues has become ambiguous, and foreign 
                                                
16 This thesis explained Complex interdependence theory based on Keohane and Nye’s 4th edition book, 
power and interdependence, which was published in 2011. The first edition of the book was published 
in 1977.  
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affairs agendas have broadened. Governments stress not only “Agriculture; Commerce; 
Defense; Health, Education and Welfare; Interior; Justice; Labor; State; and Treasury” but 
also security in complex interdependence, whereas the realist gives weight only to national 
interests, the military, and security (ibid, p. 22). Third, there is a minor role for military force 
as a country’s instrument of policy (ibid, p.21). It means that the use of military force can be 
unrelated to managing conflict of economic issues among members of an alliance, even if it is 
crucial for that alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc when complex 
interdependence prevails. Yet, force is less significant as an instrument of policy and is an 
inappropriate way of attaining objectives – i.e. economic and ecological welfare, which are 
gaining greater importance – despite the fact that intense relationships of mutual influence 
exist. This is because “the effects of military force are both costly and uncertain” (ibid, p.23).  
 
2.2.2 Power in asymmetrical interdependency  
Keohane and Nye argue that asymmetrical interdependency can be the source of power in 
“relations between transnational actors (such as multinational corporations) and 
governments as well as interstate relation” (2011, p. 15). The basis for their argument is as 
follows:  
(1) Asymmetric interdependence can be the root of power. Keohane and Nye considered 
power as “control over resources”, or “the potential to effect outcomes” (2011, p.10).  
(2) There are two different angles of power – “sensitive interdependence” and “vulnerability 
interdependence” –that stem from asymmetric interdependence. The meaning of 
interdependence is “sensitivity obscures some of the most important political aspects of 
mutual dependence” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.11). The significance of sensitivity is the 
“liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change 
the situation”, in a sense of “the cost of dependence” (ibid, p.10). Also, sensitivity contains 
“degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework”. One could therefore ask: “how 
quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the 
costly effects?” Sensitivity can be determined by two cases: “the volume of flows across 
borders” and “the costly effects of changes in transactions on the societies or governments” 
(ibid, p.10). If the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increases oil 
prices, as an example of sensitivity, there is a direct influence on oil prices (an increase) in oil 
importing countries.  
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In addition, vulnerability means “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external 
events after policies have been altered”. This is based on “the relative availability and 
costliness of the alternatives that various actors face”, and is judged “only by the costliness of 
making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time” (Keohane & 
Nye, 2011, p.11). To understand the context of vulnerability, one can extend the example 
above: the oil importing country could formulate various alternative power means, such as 
establishing a nuclear power plant or mediating ways to diversify the oil import market to 
stabilize oil supply, even if the country shows sensitivity due to the rise in the price of oil.  
 
(3) The strong and the weak nature of power are the result of asymmetric interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye, 2011, pp. 13-16). Keohane and Nye suggest the significance of vulnerability 
with regard to “understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships” (2011, 
p.13). In general, a powerful nation in the perspective of Keohane and Nye, is one that it is 
not susceptible to vulnerability (as in 2, above). They also claim that “sensitivity 
interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing 
power resources to actors”, and that “if one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policy, 
either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to 
power resources” (ibid, p.13). Keohane and Nye propose how policy makers and analysts can 
avert asymmetric sensitivity interdependence: policy must be reviewed as a “pattern of 
vulnerability interdependence”, because “an analysis of actual and potential vulnerabilities” 
should provide background for consistent policy (ibid, p. 14). Yet, they pointed out that 
“influence deriving from favourable asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the 
underlying asymmetries in vulnerability are unfavourable”. This is the reason that “if one set 
of rules puts an actor in a disadvantageous position, that actor will probably try to change 
those rules if it can do so at a reasonable cost” (ibid, p.15). 
 
2.3 Theory application and relevance to research topic  
 
Based on the above explanation of neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory, this 
section will explain how the theories can be applied to the research questions of this thesis. 
Therefore, the following explanations provide an approach to understanding the underlying 
causes and factors in Sino-Africa relations, and therefore the connection with China’s public 
diplomacy.  
 
2.3.1 Sino-Africa relations under complex interdependence  
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As has been noted in the section covering the background of China-Africa relations, the long-
standing ties between China and Africa laid the foundations for present bilateral ties. These 
relations display economic interdependence through the fact that China’s objective in Africa 
is securing not only natural resources and a strong market into which they can export their 
products, but also the extension of power alliances to secure China’s position as a strong 
nation in the international community. From the perspective of African nations, Chinese 
foreign aid and overseas investment, notwithstanding some negative opinions, serves as 
encouraging growth in many different spheres including political economy, welfare, 
social/cultural, and others. In this overall perspective, the bilateral ties between China and 
African nations present complex interdependence in terms of the pursuit of economic 
interests, i.e. win-win cooperation, using diverse strategies without resorting to military 
force. In addition, and contrary to realist assumptions, relations between China and Africa 
under complex interdependence exhibit bargaining processes, such as the Forum of China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), in place of a power struggle.  
Thus, Sino-Africa relations, especially in the context of China’s power politics, can be 
explained in the category of complex interdependence. To use Keohane and Nye’s 
formulation, “patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power resources in a 
given issue-area are closely related [- indeed,] two sides of a single coin” (1987, p.730). The 
issue of China’s resource investment and Africa’s natural resource supply is construed as an 
issue-specific power structure model, instead of an overall power structure, as the circulation 
of power capabilities within a specific issue might shift freely, irrespective of the circulation 
of general abilities.  
When considering power politics deriving from asymmetrical sensitivity and vulnerability 
interdependence under complex interdependence, there is a power hierarchy in 
asymmetrical interdependence that is the source of power. China’s power politics to secure 
natural resources in Africa is asymmetric interdependence in terms of sensitivity and 
vulnerability. Given this situation, it is crucial to consider the pattern of asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence that provides power resources to actors in Sino-Africa 
relations. There is a marked contrast between China’s previous and current foreign policies. 
In contrast to China’s previous foreign investment objective, which was confined to 
obtaining natural resources and mining cooperation, the current Xi Jinping era expanded 
the scope of its foreign aid to emphasize mutual cooperation for development in the realms 
of infrastructure, transportation networks, manufacturing industries, medical services and 
health care (Y. Sun, 2014), through multilateral channels in Sino-Africa relations under the 
management of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Even though, ostensibly, China has 
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started to reform its foreign investment, the fact remains that China’s main purpose in Sino-
Africa relations is acquiring a market for its manufactured exports and securing natural 
resources. For example, since the Hu Jintao era, China rendered a large amount of aid to 
Africa and received payment in natural resources, including crude oil and minerals-rights 
and interests. Considering this, two examples lend themselves to ascertain the main purpose 
of China’s foreign aid to Africa. The first is that the Chinese government did not make clear 
their position on a concessional loan to Africa in the foreign aid white paper of 2014. Also, 
according to the Chinese and Africa economic and trade cooperation white paper of 2013, 
investment is highly concentrated in the mining and finance sectors (Xinhua News, 2013). 
The other fact is that China’s natural resources, i.e. those related to oil and not, still comprise 
a large proportion of imports from Africa (The World Bank, 2015c). This will be explained in 
more detail through a case study, in Chapter 6 and 7. Under the conditions of China's foreign 
policy consisting of trade, investment and aid, China and Africa are shown to have an 
asymmetrical structure, since China possesses investment capital and technology, but lacks 
natural resources. Africa is the opposite, as they lack capital and technology but have access 
to natural resources. 
For these reasons, the majority of Africa’s nations failed to hold a dominant position in two 
ways: China’s investment into Africa (such as that is, the inflow of capital and technology 
transfer) and their balance of trade with China (such as markets for manufactured goods). 
Notwithstanding the fact that relations between China and Africa are for pursuing economic 
interests under ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘the five core foreign policy principles’, the 
majority of the African nations’ economies are greatly influenced by Chinese capital 
injections. Africa depends heavily on China not only buying its raw materials and crude oil, 
but also importing industrial products. The following example is a true reflection of the state 
of affairs in Africa that results in a domino effect on most sectors of its economy, resulting 
from of Chinese capital injections: China has been experiencing a prolonged downturn in 
economic growth since 2012, which hit bottom in 2015. Its declining economic growth led to 
a decrease in demand for raw materials and in investment. Consequently, it had trouble 
exporting manufactured goods to Africa. This situation coincided with a price reduction for 
raw materials and oil. This meant less business and income for Africa’s natural resource 
producers, because China’s economic slow-down did not generate the same appetite or need 
for large amounts of imported crude oil and other raw material from Africa. This resulted not 
only in business shrinkage in the private sector, mass unemployment, and a socio-economic 
crisis in African nations, but also led to economic recession – especially in those countries 
whose economies are more focused on natural resources. This phenomenon was unavoidable, 
as most of Africa’s natural resource producers are bound up with their dependence on 
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foreign trade and, for a long time now, their ties to China. Despite the fact that African 
nations are suffering from economy difficulties, however, it is hard for them to set up 
countermeasures, such as import and economic diversification, long-term business support 
policies, to avoid the current situation as it would burden them with costs imposed by 
China’s unexpected events to changed policies. China, on the other hand, can seek 
alternative sources from which to secure natural resources, and other markets for its exports, 
when it comes to advancing their common objective, ‘win-win cooperation’. 
 
2.3.2 The correlation of complex interdependence relations with China’s public 
diplomacy 
To facilitate understanding of China’s public diplomacy it is necessary to examine why the 
Chinese government adopted public diplomacy, by way of soft power, when they pursued a 
differentiation of policy strategy and encountered some difficult situations and responses 
when applying their foreign policy in Sino-Africa relations. 
Africa is indispensable to China’s ability to secure energy resources. Africa’s natural resource 
sector is, as observed earlier, considered a significant factor to stable and abundant energy 
supplies needed to maintain China’s continued economic growth, which is closely linked not 
only to the legitimacy of its one-party system, but also to the unification of the Chinese 
people. To achieve its goal, the Chinese government meditates ways to diversify the overall 
diplomatic strategy; for example, from carrying out summit diplomacy that is based on 
bilateral relations, to multinational diplomacy and exploring and opening overseas markets 
and supply chains. Despite the fact that Sino-African relations are in a condition of complex 
interdependence, the Chinese government has placed increased emphasis on one particular 
tool – public diplomacy – in its foreign assistance strategy, by introducing Chinese culture in 
order to promote amicable relations and resolve conflicts between China and the continent, 
and to maximize its national interest. The following cases show how the Chinese government 
utilizes public diplomacy in its foreign investment policy. 
First, China employs public diplomacy through soft power to manage its public image. There 
have been various instances of negative publicity of China’s foreign aid to African nations, 
and its reputation does not exert favorable influence over African nations in the long term. 
The Chinese government, therefore, adopted different public diplomacy approaches to 
address critical African and international public opinion of China’s investment in Africa. In 
accordance with globalization, the change of the diplomatic paradigm not only defused the 
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prejudice of a “China Threat”, but also boosted its amicable and peaceful national image, a 
kind of “China Opportunity Theory”, to the world. In turn, despite China still adhering to the 
“principle of non-intervention”, it sought to widen its field of cooperation in substantive and 
humanitarian aid – for example, educational assistance, construction of public interest 
facilities, medical services, and others – in order to detract from an impression of a 
purely mercantilist pursuit of profit in troubled nations, as had emerged in Sudan and 
Angola.  
Second, public diplomacy via soft power facilitates the reduction of impression distance 
between China and Africa. The significance of communication is abundantly clear in modern 
society. Insofar as Sino-Africa relations are characterized by complex interdependence, it is 
hard to neglect the development of a mutual sense of solidarity to elicit connectedness and 
identity from two nations’ people. This is because, in turn, it will lead to cooperation for 
mutual benefit. So, the Chinese government pushes forward with cultural and social sharing 
and interaction, by establishing Confucius Institutes and holding a variety of international 
forums, and others.  
Third, public diplomacy assists China’s strategic policy diversification under its policy of 
“peaceful coexistence”. China takes a different approach to Africa than that of Western 
countries, using a variety of means in eclectic fields that the West does not attempt to pursue. 
African nations had accepted the Western model of political reform and economic 
restructuring, based on political democratization and economic liberalization as a means for 
stabilizing public livelihood and lead the development of nations. By following this model, 
they experienced unexpected results, such as intensifying confusion in their politics and 
economies. As a result, African nations became interested in the “China model”, which 
stands on a basis of national political control and state-led development as an alternative to 
the West’s recommendations. China has since formulated its own foreign policy, sometimes 
called the “Beijing Consensus”, based on a performance system and policy regulation 
through public diplomacy that differentiates from the West: for example, introducing the 
elements of capitalistic market economy, no compulsory demands of human rights 
resolutions, nor political liberalization.  
Despite the fact that China’s foreign aid, essentially, performs as the core of its foreign 
relations to support the maintenance of amicable cooperative relations with developing 
nations, public diplomacy through soft power plays a role in bridging the delicate gap 
between policy and African nations by presenting China as “a responsible great power” in 
global society. The Chinese government, for example, offered diverse aid, including 
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preferential loans, development aid, manpower development, medical services, and others, 
as “cooperation” for mutual benefit and development. Not only that, Beijing offers 
infrastructure construction, a so-called “concrete diplomacy”, as a part of foreign aid to 
consolidate its position in Africa, but also stresses a closer identity with developing countries 
through “South-South cooperation”, a condition of equivalent mutual cooperation for 
development in a bid to increase its influence in international society. In recent years, 
Chinese president Xi Jinping pushed ahead with a “One Belt, One Road” strategy to prompt 
economic community that highlighted the expression of “joint”, “mutual”, and “cooperation”. 
 
2.4 Public diplomacy in international relations theory  
 
As public diplomacy has become an important tool for connecting China’s African strategy to 
its economic objectives, this section discusses International Relations theory related to 
public diplomacy and soft power, as these two main concepts are central to this dissertation 
and to understanding the role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign policy. Firstly, public 
diplomacy from the Chinese perspective will be examined, as China adheres to its own 
viewpoints to understand public diplomacy in international society, which differ from the 
West’s interpretation. Secondly, as globalization stresses the importance of soft power, due 
to limitations of hard power f0llowing the end of the Cold War, this section will examine soft 
power within the framework of neoliberalism. Thirdly, a discussion concerning public 
diplomacy after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 from a Constructivist viewpoint will be covered. 
Lastly, the fourth part discusses Realism from a public diplomacy angle during the Cold War. 
  
2.4.1 Public diplomacy from the Chinese perspective  
Before the examination of international relations theory, it is necessary to talk about the 
Chinese viewpoint of public diplomacy through soft power, as it is differs from the Western 
perspective. As soft power has become a key component of China’s foreign policy, it must be 
examined in general context of China’s conduct of public diplomacy. Chinese international 
relations scholars identify problems of systematic analyses, and critique Nye’s concept of soft 
power because it focuses on the American viewpoint and reflects their experiences with 
political economy. Given these reasons, Chinese scholars have redefined the concept of soft 
power from the Chinese perspective, in order to explain and connect it with Chinese culture, 
thereby studying a soft power with Chinese characteristics. These efforts are aimed at 
improving China’s public image, following the example of the West to develop the potential 
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for Chinese soft power as a tool of foreign relations. According to a study by Wang (2014), a 
Chinese international strategy expert, analysis of the Chinese academic world has a broader 
concept of Chinese soft power than the formulation presented by Nye. In contrast to Nye’s 
focus on American culture and politics, which are still connected with the concept of 
American exceptionalism and manifest destiny, Wang pointed out, Chinese scholars 
concentrate on identifying key factors for its soft power based on China’s nature, culture, and 
history to achieve a harmonious world by respecting diversity and stressing ethics from a 
Confucian perspective. China holds Confucian ideals in high self-esteem, which has had a 
positive effect on Chinese modernization, harmonious coexistence thought, patriotism and 
others. The character of China’s soft power, reflected in its public diplomacy which functions 
to boost China’s national image, raises Confucianism’s status further, and is aims to 
disseminate its ideals.  
 
In the matter of China’s different viewpoint of international relations, Buzan and Acharya 
(2010) argue that it is hard to explain the current IR situation in Asia completely using only 
Western international relations theories. They offer the example of how China responds to 
the Chinese “power rise”. According to their argument, China has concentrated on solving 
issues presented by their continuous rise in power by developing a Chinese school of 
international relations, opposed to the “China threat theory”. It is difficult to connect to 
international relations theories developed by Western scholars for interpretation (ibid, pp.2-
3). Despite these difficulties in examination, this research attempts to analyze the role of 
public diplomacy through soft power, identity, and norms by using Constructivism and 
institutionalism, via neoliberalism in international relations theory. This is because those 
theories play a pivotal role in Chinese public diplomacy in sub-Saharan African nations. 
 
2.4.2 Public diplomacy from the perspective of neoliberal and complex 
interdependency theory  
The characteristics of complex interdependence theory are linked to public diplomacy’s 
character:  
Public diplomacy describes the means by which states, associations of states, and non-
state actors understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; build and manage 
relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values. 
(Gregory, 2008).  
Nye’s concept of soft power connotes a typical concept of neoliberalism, and his idea is to 
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place public diplomacy at the centre of 21st Century international relations. A shift from hard 
power to soft power articulated by Nye (2004) illustrates a process where agreement is 
reached depending on the spectrum of actions taken. The process has four steps: “coercion, 
conciliation, agenda-setting and charm” (p.8). These four steps utilize resources amenable to 
each action: “force and restraint, compensation and buy-off, system, value, culture and 
policy” (ibid. p.10). In other words, the concepts of soft power and hard power identified by 
Nye may be deemed as a combination of Robert Dahl’s political power view under 
behaviouralism, and a resource-oriented instrumental political power view adopted by the 
mainstream of international political science. Based on this view, power is an ability to 
procure intended outcomes by affecting others’ actions based on the possession of specific 
resources (ibid, p.3). Rather than merely adopting these two political views, however, a 
notable characteristic of Nye’s power concept lies in the fact that pays more attention to the 
‘non-material’ and ‘relational’ aspects that generate and operate power. 
Nye’s Soft power can be subdivided into culture, political value and foreign policies, with the 
specific components of economic power, education, academic arts and foreign affairs, and 
subjective elements of a nation’s global presence, role and tradition. According to Nye’s 
claim (2004), the soft power of the United States is comprised of three things: American 
culture, political view and foreign policy. That is, America’s high-end (pop) culture, 
democracy and civil rights for American political view, and the details and style of American 
foreign policy. Each of these may have generated hostility in some countries; however, 
America has generally managed to charm or attract the world as a whole. Soft power does 
not engage in direct functions, such as military threats or economic sanctions. Instead, it 
induces others to respond in an intended manner through indirect influence designed to 
promote others’ compliance. Nonetheless, Nye asserts that soft power is a tool difficult to 
directly impose, because it is a concept that exists under universal values – however, soft 
power may be more effective than coercion. This is because the key elements of soft power 
are comprised of intangible resources, and it is therefore difficult for a nation to control. Also, 
because the influence of soft power differs depending on the given situation, it is hard to 
attain intended outcomes within desired timeframes.  
 
The significance of public diplomacy and soft power is highlighted in an interdependent and 
globalized world. Keohane and Nye (2002) defined globalism in connection with 
interdependence as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at a 
multicontinental distance. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of 
capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and 
biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain and pathogens)” (p.193). Thus, “global” 
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refers to “a network of relationship”, including multicontinental distance and global links to 
“networks of connections (multiple relations), not simply to single linages”; a good example 
of economic or military interdependence is between the United States and Japan. Moreover, 
multilateral interdependence, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, 
qualifies as multicontinental interdependence. An integrated world market is another 
example, as it would allow for the free flow of people, goods, and capital, and convergence in 
interest rates (ibid). Hence, Keohane and Nye (2002) understand that globalization refers to 
a series of processes of increases and decreases in globalism (pp.193-195), but they 
emphasized that globalization is “the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick” 
(p.198). 
Keohane and Nye (2002) comprehended that interdependence and globalism are both 
multidimensional phenomena and suggest four types of globalism based on economic, 
military, environmental, and social and cultural network.17 Economic globalism “involves 
long-distance flows of goods, service, and capital, and the information and perceptions and 
that accompany market exchange”; military globalism “refers to long distance network of 
interdependence in which force, and the threat or promises of force, are employed”; 
environmental globalism “refers to the long distance transport of materials in the 
atmosphere or oceans or of biological substances”; and social and cultural globalism 
“involves movement of idea, information, and image, and of people – who of course carry 
idea and information with them” (pp.195-196). This includes the diffusion of knowledge or 
the movement of religions. Moreover, these interdependences interact with other types of 
globalism as economic, military, and environmental activities convey “information and 
general ideas, which may then flow across geographical and political boundaries” (p.197). By 
extension, Keohane and Nye (2002) refer to political globalism refers to that “subset of social 
globalism that refers to ideas and information about power and governance”. Political 
globalism is measured by imitation effects, the diffusion of government politics, or of 
international regimes (ibid). However, Keohane and Nye (2002) point out that the division 
of globalism into separate dimensions is inevitable, yet somehow arbitrary, and suggest three 
ways to create thick globalism:18 increased “density of networks”, “institutional velocity”, and 
“transnational participation” (p.199). 
Thus, due to globalization and the emerging information-age, power was shifted from states 
                                                
17 Keohane and Nye (2002) argue that the World Trade Organization (WTO), Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), Montreal Convention, and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) are responses to economic, military, environmental, and social globalization (p.197). 
18 The meaning of thickness is that “different relationships of interdependence intersect more deeply 
at more different point” (Keohane & Nye, 2002, p.201). 
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to non-state actors, and most information is now interdependent between actors. Public 
diplomacy encourages cooperation among nations, international actors and foreign public 
through mutual understanding through two-way communications. On that note, public 
diplomacy in conjunction with soft power shares the neoliberal perspective that public 
diplomacy pursues cooperation by sharing soft power with others to achieve common goals, 
rather than to dominate others.  
 
2.4.3 Public diplomacy from the perspective of Constructivism  
Constructivism is a theoretical approach focusing on the possibility that national identity or 
national goals can be created and structured depending on the context in which nations 
study each other through interactions in the international community. Also, it holds a 
different perspective of the nature of international relations. Constructivists have focused on 
the following: first, “the idea of social construction suggests difference across context rather 
than a single objective reality”; second, “Constructivists have emphasized the social 
dimensions of international relations, and have demonstrated the importance of norms, 
rules, and language at this level”; and third, “Constructivists introduced the possibility of 
agency and have emphasized processes of interaction” (Fierke, 2013, p.189). According to 
Wendt (1999), a Constructivist, national goals are not fixated with history, and 
Constructivism asserts that a nation's behaviour keeps changing. In other words, national 
preference is not fixed, but rather evolves through new learning processes. Hence, national 
identity as well as international relations is evolving. The concept of nation-states and 
colonial control can be taken as an example. Since Constructivism is an understanding of the 
international society as a reality that continues to change, rather than one with a deductive 
theoretical frame, it may be considered to be more of an approach rather than a theory. 
Wendt (1999) describes international politics as “socially constructed”, and that “these 
structures shape actors’ identities and interests rather than just their behaviour.” He 
suggests two core beliefs that are the main principles of Constructivism, which he calls the 
“two basic tenets”. First, that “the structures of human association are determined primarily 
by shared ideas rather than material forces”. Second, that “the identities and interests of 
purposive actors are conducted by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 
1999, p.1). He explains, using these tenets, that Constructivism criticizes a “materialist” 
perspective, and adopts an “idealist’s” perspective that stresses “social”, opposes 
“individualist” and accepts the “holist” or “structuralist’s” viewpoint. He organizes these 
accounts as “structural idealism”, referred to as “socially constructed” in international 
politics. In other words, it is “mutually constitutive” and “co-determined” under the 
 44 
structure and agency as “social” (ibid, p.1, 184). The idealism in Constructivism is meant to 
accept “the role of ideas” in international politics, and “observes that the meaning and 
construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation” (Barnett, 
2008, p.430). Also, the holism in Constructivism is “recognizing that agents have some 
autonomy and their interactions help to construct, reproduce and transform those structure” 
(ibid, p.430). Wendt suggests three virtues for an idealistic approach to international 
relations. First, a “program of empirical research for studying the content of real world state 
interests.” Second, “an idealist approach to interests also suggests ways to operationalize the 
relationship between cognition (agency) and culture (structure).” Third, “new possibilities 
for foreign policy and systemic change” (1999, pp.133-4). 
In Wendt’s Constructivist view of structure, agency and culture (1999), Constructivism is 
focused on shared “knowledge”, or “culture,” instead of private beliefs. However, this sharing 
can result in either cooperation or conflict. He also points out that culture can be a form of 
ideology, norm, rule, and/or organization. In this way, Constructivism can be associated with 
public diplomacy. Public diplomacy calls this cultural diplomacy, which is “the linchpin of 
public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.1), and their activities can be summarised as follows:  
Cultural Diplomacy may best be described as a course of actions, which are based on 
and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or 
identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or 
promote national interests (Institute for cultural diplomacy, n.d). 
Also, Constructivists consider identity as a crucial element that emerges from international 
interactions. In this regard, Onuf (1998) argues that “Constructivism is a way of studying 
social relations – any kind of social relations” (p.1), and Ruggie (1998) also insists that “core 
Constructivist research concern is what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in” 
(p.867). Wendt (1999) describes identity as the “property of intentional actors that generates 
motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or 
unite-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understanding.” And he suggests there are “four 
kinds of identity” 19; first, “personal or corporate”; second, “type”; third, “role”; fourth, 
                                                
19 Wendt (1999) explains them thus: “personal or corporate identity is a site or platform for other 
identities”. And the term type identity refers to “a social category or label applied to persons who 
share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, 
attitudes, values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities 
(like region or place of birth), and so on” (p.22). Also, the role identity takes the dependency on 
culture and are not based on intrinsic properties (p.227). Collective identity takes “the relationship 
between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification. Identification is a cognitive process in 
which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether” (p.229).  
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“collective” (p.224).  
This Constructivist perspective is focused on non-material elements such as culture, 
knowledge, information and norms as components of international relations and society. 
Public diplomacy also emphasizes the importance of interaction through non-material 
elements that Constructivism prioritises for having common understanding. By extension, 
the ultimate goal of public diplomacy is “ensuring a positive perception of their activities 
among domestic and international audience to achieve their goal” (Pagovski, 2015. p.8). In 
addition, this interaction has led to a shift in the definition of public diplomacy, as follows; 
“from achieving behavioural goals to attitudinal/cognitive goals; ranging from information 
provision (monologue) to communication (dialogue); persuasion to relationship building; 
and managing publics to engaging with publics” (Szondi, 2008, p.10). Therefore, the 
Constructivist perspective is helpful for understanding the identity factor in public 
diplomacy.   
However, Constructivism’s perspective is hard to provide a clear framework with which to 
understand China’s public diplomacy due to the limitations of China’s soft power in areas 
such as human rights issues, minority race issues, Tibetan independence, China’s rapid 
economic development (the ‘China Threat’), freedom of religion, and others that arise from 
its socialist system. In other words, there is a difference in opinion over China’s identity 
based on its culture, history, norms, and institutions, which are the basic source of its soft 
power. In connection with China’s identity in the international society, David Kerr (2015) 
argued as follows:  
China’s international identity is undoubtedly a problem in its relations with 
international society. The official explanation is that this is because other countries 
do not understand China, its history, traditions and institutions. An alternative 
explanation is that the various forms of international identity that China has 
proposed since 1949 have been state-defined and state-interested. Allowing China’s 
civil society to have more influence and authority over China’s international identity 
would not only produce more creativity in this area but would encourage other civil 
societies to revalue their views of China. (p.57) 
Thus, as mentioned above, China’s identity hinders to be identified which “becomes blurred 
and at the limit transcended altogether” (Wendt, 1999, p.229) with other countries. By 
extension, it limits the influence of China’s public diplomacy towards foreign nations.   
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2.4.4 Public diplomacy from the perspective of Realism  
Realist thought emphasizes the state-oriented, international system of anarchy, and 
considers the pursuit of power to be a normal means of achieving survival and security. This 
dominant view was challenged by new international relations theories in the early 1970s. 
This challenge played a great role in encouraging other new responses to emerge. 
Challenging Realism, there are many international relations theories such as neoliberalism 
and concepts of interdependence, international regime and institutionalism. Before 
discussing Realism, it is important to state that, as for Realism’s connection with this 
research topic and content, there is practically no immediate connection between public 
diplomacy and Realism. However, due to the fact that Realism has relevance to institutional 
neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory, this section will cover a comprehensive 
view of Realism that is linked directly with the two core theories, so as to answer the research 
questions. 
 
Realism is divided into three categories: classical Realism, beginning with Thucydides’ text 
on the Peloponnesian War, and extending to the start of the twentieth century; modern 
realism, 1939-79; and structural or neorealism, 1979 onwards (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, 
p.89).20 In Realism, international politics after the World War II is analyzed based on power 
relations between nations. As representative scholars, Morgenthau (2005) asserted that the 
conflicts between nations in international politics are unavoidable in the process of obtaining 
power related to a nation’s advantages over other nations. Therefore, Morgenthau 
mentioned that Realism is the objective law based on human beings’ selfishness. His 
perspective of human nature is based on Hobbes’s view of classical Realism, that “the natural 
condition of man is a state of war” (Donnelly, 2000, p.14). Not only that, his thoughts – such 
as power-oriented and selfish human nature, state-centric view, states as unitary actors, 
power politics in international politics, and others – exerted their influence on the formation 
of Realism’s core assumptions. 
In explaining international relations through the lens of power, Morgenthau (2005) argued 
that in Realism, the most important performer of international politics is the nation. He 
hypothesized that cooperation between nations is not possible because the purpose of 
nations is to increase their national power; and that the best policy is a diplomatic policy 
serving the national interest. In addition, he argued that the superpower system can prevent 
                                                
20 The weakness of the historical sequence’s organization overlooks “the important question about 
divergence within each historical phase.” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.89); Dunne, T., & Schmidt, B. C. 
(2011). Realism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Eds.), The globalization of world politics: An 
introduction to international relations (5th ed.). (pp. 86-99). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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conflicts between nations in the international system, and that the balance of power between 
superpowers is a strong force that can bring the international order and peace.21 His core 
argument was, “politics is government by laws that are created by human nature. The 
mechanism we use to understand international politics is the concept of interests, defined in 
terms of power” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.90). However, his assertion has been criticized 
for the following reasons: the balance of power between superpowers in the international 
system induced conflicts between other nations; it could not explain the increases in 
instances of international cooperation, nor the increased role of non-governmental 
institutions and international organizations (Kaufman, 2006). 
Structural Realism, developed after 1979, shared Morgenthau’s view that international 
politics is organised around the pursuit of power, but takes a different position on human 
nature from the classic realist’s. Structural realists argue, instead, that “the international 
system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers”, and “ignore cultural difference 
among states as well as differences in regime type” (Mearsheimer, 2013, p.78). 
Mearsheimer’s position, an offensive realist theory, accounts for relations between the great 
powers, and the modern state and claims “offensive realism parts company with defensive 
realism over the question of how much power states want” (2001, p.63). He explains the 
reason why states fight over power is because of the “structure of the system”, and 
characterizes states’ interest in strength as “states maximize relative power, with hegemony 
as their ultimate goal” (p.65). He also insists that “great powers recognize that the best way 
to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a 
challenge by another great power” (p.87). He puts emphasis on accumulating power, and 
suggests that the ideal position is to achieve global hegemony, although he acknowledges 
that it is hard to realize (p.32). In contrast to Mearsheimer’s offensive Realism, other realists 
such as Aron (1996), Wight (1978), and Kissinger (1994) think diplomacy plays a crucial role 
in maintaining the equilibrium of international politics. In this regard, culture and 
ideological systems are also significant elements for settling disputes between states who 
“belong to the same type” and “share common policy goals”, via the framework of trusted 
diplomacy (Chiaruzzi , 2012, p.41).  
By reviewing Realism’s core assumptions, in sum, modern Realism focuses on structural 
power under anarchy, since relations between states are determined by their structural 
                                                
21 Morgenthau suggested ‘six principles’ in political realism; first, “politics is governed by objective 
laws that have their roots in human nature”; second, “interest is defined in terms of power”; third, 
“interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but whose meaning can 
change”; fourth, “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; 
the circumstances of time and place must be considered”; fifth, “the moral laws that govern the 
universe are distinct for the morals of any one nations”; sixth, “the differences between political 
realism and other schools is real and profound” (Morgenthau, 2005). 
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relations, and there is a limited role for inter-state diplomacy. Diplomacy points to the 
common interests of states in achieving order under anarchy and avoiding destructive wars, 
but diplomacy cannot guarantee order or peace, which are structural effects. In order to 
settle a dispute, as reviewed above, the majority of realists presuppose that the surest and 
more secure way is through dependence on military force, rather than communication, with 
regards to security issues. But realists face demands to change their approach to military 
power and intervention, to which they adhered since World War II, due to changes in 
international relations since the end of the Cold War. Thus, present-day diplomacy often 
operates as ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, which means the “use of limited force to persuade an 
opponent to stop pursuing an activity it is already undertaking”, with the purpose of showing 
an enemy the cost of defying conformity (Kegley and Blanton, 2015, pp.254-262). In 
conclusion, few structural realists consider diplomacy as an important element in world 
politics, which is still largely organised around force or the threat of force. In consequence, 
what needs to be understood is that the realist’s understanding of diplomacy proposes a 
different approach when compared to neoliberalist and Constructivist public diplomacy, 
which has communication and comprehension at its core. Thus, Realism is excluded as one 
of the primary theories for this research since its core assumptions do not give significance to 




2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has reviewed neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory. It has 
established that Sino-African relations show asymmetrical interdependence notwithstanding 
that China and African nations pursue mutual interests under cooperative relations. China 
achieves its political economy purposes from Africa in return for foreign assistance, such as 
rendering aid and investment, and by introducing its culture and development model under 
the pretext of contributing to African economic growth. However, there is still a considerable 
disparity between China and Africa with regards to economic dependence. Thus, China is 
required to seek ways to reduce the gap between its African policy objectives and the results 
of its policy implementation, as reflected in the responses of African governments, 
organizations and publics. This chapter proposed the necessity for public diplomacy by 
discussing Sino-Africa’s asymmetrical interdependence. It also gave an account of the role of 
China’s public diplomacy in the context of China and Africa’s interdependent relationships, 
using the neoliberal institutionalist perspective. 
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After reviewing neoliberalism, Constructivism, and Realism, this chapter identified the 
character of public diplomacy from a Chinese perspective and three international relations 
theories. It also found that China perceived public diplomacy in its own way, presenting in 
contrast to the West. However, due to globalization and the emerging information-age, 
China’s public diplomacy focuses on encouraging cooperation among nations and foreign 
public through mutual understanding through two-way communications. On that note, 
China’s public diplomacy in connection with soft power could understand the framework of 
neoliberal perspective that public diplomacy pursues cooperation by sharing soft power with 
African countries to achieve common goals, rather than to dominate African public or 
countries. On the basis of these two different viewpoints, it is a cornerstone for 
comprehending China’s public diplomacy in Africa, which will be used to answer the 
research questions. The next chapter will discuss public diplomacy and soft power from both 



























Chapter 3. Conceptual part for public diplomacy  
In the twenty-first century, the awareness of public diplomacy has risen significantly. The 
term public diplomacy refers to governmental and non-governmental diplomatic activities 
targeted at a foreign public. The role of public diplomacy has magnified in recent years, 
especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when most countries realized the limitations of 
traditional diplomacy. Hence, not only superpowers but also emerging countries now 
competitively focus on and utilize public diplomacy as a tool of their foreign policy, including 
soft power and new technologies, in order to keep pace with globalization.  
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of public diplomacy and soft power in 21st 
century international relations. This chapter is designed to comprehend China’s public 
diplomacy to answer the question of why and how China maps out its public diplomacy as a 
strategy for its foreign policy. Therefore, the chapter discusses public diplomacy with soft 
power in a broader context. The chapter begins with a discussion of the Western approach to 
public diplomacy in comparison to traditional diplomacy, as well as looking into its 
subsidiary concepts of propaganda, strategic communication, and Joseph Nye’s conception 
of soft power. After this follows sections analyzing public diplomacy and soft power from the 
Chinese perspective, and, at the same time, how China’s public diplomacy is relevant to its 
political purpose as articulated by current and former leaders in Beijing. Lastly, the chapter 
also identifies the elements that constitute China’s soft power, what it means for its public 
diplomacy, and addresses the importance of the cultural element in China’s soft power.  
 
3.1 A model of Public diplomacy  
3.1.1 Defining and function of Public Diplomacy 
What is the meaning of diplomacy? Prior to looking into public diplomacy, it is worth briefly 
discussing a general definition to help understand the features of public diplomacy. The 
dictionary definition of diplomacy is “the management of the relationship between countries” 
and “skill in dealing with people without offending or upsetting them” (Diplomacy, n.a). The 
derivation of the word diplomacy is from the ancient Greek verb diploun, which means “to 
double”; and from the Greek noun Diploma, which is “an official document written on 
double leaves (diploo) joined together and folded (diplono)” (Constantinou, 1996, p.77). 
Since then, the term Diploma was used for “folded documents of states”, and the first use in 
English is from around 1645. Modern-era diplomacy is generally presumed to have been 
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formed at the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, which serves as a foundation of the 
independence of states and the notion of religious freedom and tolerance. Moreover, 
France’s Cardinal Richelieu, the first foreign ministry, and the classic approach of 
international relations was introduced, based on the nation-state and national interest as its 
final goal, in 1626 (Kissinger, 1995; Siracusa, 2010). The term diplomacy, subsequently, 
emerged in 1796, coined by E. Burke. After one hundred years, the word was properly 
defined as the international relations between nations (Jones, 1999; Nicolson 1963). Since 
then, diplomacy, however, has various interpretations (Melissen, 1999) among scholars, and 
there is no consensus regarding diplomacy (Jönsson, 2012).  
The character of diplomacy has also changed depending on the times, and impressions of 
contemporary issues. In the aftermath of the First World War, the term diplomacy was 
divided into two – ‘old diplomacy’ and ‘new diplomacy’ – due to the failure of old diplomacy 
during the war (Wiseman and Sharp, 2012). The salient characteristics of traditional 
diplomacy, in brief, were “highly formal, institutional, interpersonal, slow, and usually 
protected by secrecy” (Gilboa, 2001, p.1). After this, the establishment of the United Nations 
(UN) in the wake of the Second World War set the stage for attempts to institutionalize the 
multilateral diplomatic method and generate interest in the role of public opinion in foreign 
policy. Institutionalized multilateralism was embraced after the Cold War. Globalization also 
increased the importance of international actors and non-state actors with the aid of 
technological development in the area of communications, travel, and information transfers 
(Wiseman and Sharp, 2012). In a contemporary perspective of diplomacy, Melissen (1999) 
concisely defined diplomacy as, “the mechanism of representation, communication, and 
negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business” (p. 
xvii). Gilboa (2001) argued that diplomacy is mostly related to “international negotiation, to 
a communication system through which representatives of states and international or global 
actors, including elect and appointed officials, express and defend their interests, state their 
grievances, and issue threats and ultimatums” (p.1). In short, diplomacy is “an instrument of 
foreign policy” from the macro view. At the same time, from the micro view, diplomacy is 
associated with “a process of communication”, which plays a role in settling discord and 
leading to negotiation in the international system (Surmacz, 2016, p.74), which shows 
similar characteristics to public diplomacy of the day.  
Public diplomacy has moved to the fore as “a new dimension of diplomacy”, and the key 
method of political communication in the twenty-first century, especially following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the rise of the information age (Snow, 2009). While traditional 
diplomacy was focused on security and conversations between governments, conducted by 
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governmental officials (Powell, 2004; Ham, 2010), public diplomacy has expanded its target 
audience to the public sector. With respect to the relationship between traditional diplomacy 
and public diplomacy, as characterized by Manheim (1994), public diplomacy is associated 
with the diplomacy activity of “government-to-people contacts” and “people-to-people 
contacts”, while traditional diplomacy is concerned with “government-to-government 
contacts” and “diplomat-to-diplomat contacts”. But both types of diplomacy consider 
communication to be important (pp.3-4). Public diplomacy differs in its target audience – 
that is, the public – to whom it communicates as part of diplomacy, but Mellisen (2005) sees 
“public diplomacy as old wine in new bottles” (p.3). To be more exact, the features that 
underpin public diplomacy – such as image cultivation, multilateral relationships, 
propaganda, and activities – already exist in old diplomacy. The invention of the printing 
press in the 15th century changed the manner of official communication with foreign publics 
(ibid). The periodical presses of the 17th century were used as a diplomatic instrument for the 
local powers, including newspapers that were under intense pressure to do “(self)censorship” 
for local or national authorities. Richelieu, for example, utilized Renaudot’s Gazette as a 
mouthpiece to inform broad international audiences (Helmers, 2016). Although the era of 
modern diplomacy (especially modern sovereign-state diplomacy) was introduced by the 
Treaty of Westphalia, it is “equally significant as a major step in the development of 
multilateral diplomacy” (Wiseman and Sharp, 2012, p.259). About the Richelieu’s view of 
diplomacy, scholars believe he laid the foundation for public diplomacy of the day, based on 
the fact that his conception of foreign policy and diplomacy continued to dominated until the 
end of the 20th century (Riordan, 2016). The present-day public diplomacy is aimed at “the 
general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and 
individuals”, which explains postmodern transnational relations (Mellisen, 2005, p.5). By 
utilizing governmental and non-governmental activities, public diplomacy is aimed at the 
publics of foreign countries directly, using the instrument of soft power to promote a positive 
national image. In this way, states expand sympathy and gain trust from foreign publics 
directly through culture, art, history, education, and others. In addition, it helps states to not 
only improve their relations with other countries, but also gain influence in the international 
society.  
The term public diplomacy, which is popular in the present day, was first coined by Edmund 
Gullion, a former US diplomat and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at 
Tufts University, when he established the Edward R. Murrow Center, in 1965. The concept of 
public diplomacy was described on the early Murrow Center brochures, thus: 
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Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and 
execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations 
beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in 
other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with 
those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; 
communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats 
and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications. 
(Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, n.a) 
However, prior to Gullion’s use of the term, there were public diplomacy activities – such as 
the United States Information Agency (USIA), established by President Dwight Eisenhower 
in 1953, to supervise and oversee information operation work. The activities of USIA were 
repackaged with the appearance of the term, as it brought forward a new and positive 
meaning, unlike propaganda; however, it was “a perfect piece of propaganda about 
propaganda” (Cull, 2008b, p.259). In other words, the role of public diplomacy was to 
change opinions in other countries, to exert influence in conjunction with hard power during 
the Cold War. Around this time, the three major powers – the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and Europe – expended a lot of effort on communications with the world, in support 
of conventional diplomatic activities (Melissen, 2005a, p.4). Public diplomacy was 
performed based on government-led projects aimed at foreign publics, conducted mainly 
through academic exchanges, cultural events, and international broadcasts (Servaes, 2012). 
The USIA was in charge of all public diplomacy, including cultural relations until its closure, 
in 1999 (Cull, 2008b). Hence, by using the term public diplomacy during the mid-1960s, 
Gullion had the intention of not only segregating the image of propaganda during the 1950s 
from America’s practice of international information exchange, as part of public diplomacy 
but also to raise the status of staffers at USIA from agents of advertising or public relations 
to the role of diplomats (Cowan and Cull, 2008). The background for Gullion’s efforts to 
change the image of public diplomacy was that the term was widely used as “a cluster of new 
diplomatic practices” during the First World War. In the 1950s, it markedly shifted towards 
the sphere of propaganda and international information (Cull, 2009a, pp.19-21). When the 
term public diplomacy was first applied in 1956, it was for “the process by which 
international actors seek to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging with 
foreign publics”; however the term only gained traction internationally after the Cold war 
ended (Cull, 2008, p.31).  
With the cessation of the Cold War, the discussion of and necessity for public diplomacy 
temporarily seemed to be on the wane. Public diplomacy, however, was identified as a new 
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diplomatic style in the twenty-first century, especially following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, as mentioned earlier (Melissen, 2013). To date, the conceptualization of public 
diplomacy has been widely researched in mass communications, marketing, diplomacy, 
international relations, strategic studies, and diplomatic studies (Gilboa 2008; Gregory 2008; 
Sharp 2013; Golan and Yang 2015). Nevertheless, Gilboa (2008) has argued that “scholars 
have not yet pursued or even sufficiently promoted systematic theoretical research in this 
field”, until now (p.73). Most public diplomacy studies, furthermore, are based on a 
historical perspective research and American experiences during the Cold War, although 
some European countries have, since 1949, adopted German-style public diplomacy as a core 
component of their foreign policy, and France also utilized public diplomacy to cultivate its 
national grandeur and politique d’influence (Melissen, 2005a). On the other hand, d’Hooghe 
(2015) has pointed out the limitation of public diplomacy, that “[c]urrent understanding of 
public diplomacy is mainly based on Western concepts such as soft power, and on the public 
diplomacy practice of the United States and other Western countries with democratic 
political system” (p.7). Regarding this, Wang (2013) claimed that public diplomacy is not 
only connected to American culture, politics and national characteristics, but also reflects 
well “Americanization” and “universalism” as the United States was the leading country in 
research of public diplomacy (p.89). Taken together, the lack of an accurate definition of 
public diplomacy in International Relations could lead to a situation in which most public 
diplomacy research is based on American standards. Most scholars and experts in the 
International Relations field, moreover, do not have precise information about public 
diplomacy with regards to propaganda, public relations, international public relations, and 
public affairs. The lack of research into the non-governmental sector’s activities, including 
NGOs, civil society, and individuals, is another impediment to developing a theory (Gilboa, 
2008; Gregory, 2008). Nowadays, the most interesting multidisciplinary field is the 
communicative facet of public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008; Kelley, 2009; 
L’Etang, 2009; Zahara 2009), on which diplomacy focuses.  
One way to understand the trend in public diplomacy is to examine the connection between 
public diplomacy and propaganda (Snow, 2004; Snow and Taylor, 2006; Zahara, 2004) – 
this will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.2. At the same time, researchers look at 
the correlation between public relations, public diplomacy and diplomacy. Public relations, 
which has greater relevance to public diplomacy, is regarded as communication management 
between an organization and its public. On this, Golan and Yang (2015) have argued that 
“international public relations can be understood as the relationship management function 
in its global sense” (p.1). The connection between public relations and public diplomacy has 
been further researched by Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick (2013), Gilboa (2008), 
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L’Etang (1996, 2009), Signitzer and Coombs (1992), Signitzer and Wasmer (2006), and Yun 
(2009). L’Etang (2009), for example, noted that “PR [public relations] and public diplomacy 
may both be seen as euphemistic terms for propaganda, from which practitioners in both 
areas have endeavored to distinguish themselves” (p.608). However, public diplomacy 
correlates with public relations in the function of “representational (rhetoric, oratory, 
advocacy), dialogic (negotiation, peacemaking), advisory (counseling), intelligence gathering 
(research and environmental scanning, issues management) intercultural communication, 
and public opinion management” (p.616). Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argued that the two 
spheres are “in a natural process of convergence” and “a process which should be cultivated 
and not ignored” (p.146). The convergence is a result of modern technology and the needs of 
modern nation-states (p.145). They also observed that people in the two spheres often 
pursue the same objective, “to affect public opinion for the benefit of their 
client/organization” (p.139). By extension, Signitzer and Wasmer (2006) expressed their 
view of public diplomacy as a specific governmental function of public relations, and argued 
that “[f]ormal political relations are becoming more and more closely connected with actors 
other than national governments. There is a shift away from the traditional, state-level 
diplomacy and towards public, citizen-level diplomacy” (p.382), resulting from 
developments in international relations. However, Golan and Yang (2015) contend that, 
although there is a convergence of public diplomacy and public relations as identified in 
their ultimate goals, public diplomacy’s final goal is to collect information for a nation’s 
foreign policy. Public relations, on the other hand, concentrates on a relationship of mutual 
benefit between any organizations and foreign publics.  
There are researchers in another academic field who are interested in the interaction 
between public diplomacy and communication. Public diplomacy is communication with 
other nations to create a dialogue that is designed to inform and influence. According to 
Tuch (1990), a former American Diplomat, argued that “a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” 
(p.3). Also, Sharp (2007) viewed the definition of public diplomacy as “the process by which 
direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the 
values of those being represented” (p.106). Hence, scholars focus on the research of the 
parallelism and marked difference between public diplomacy and strategic communication, 
and the denoting of strategic communication in public diplomacy (Gregory 2005; Haydon 
2010; Jönsson and Martin, 2003; Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, 2002; Pamment 2011; van 
Dyke and Verčič, 2009) – this will be discussed later, in chapter 3.3. Furthermore, research 
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is being carried out to discover how to boost national branding via public diplomacy 
(Copeland, 2006; Potter 2009; Szondi, 2008).  
While public diplomacy plays an important role in the twenty-first century, it still lacks a 
clear and widely agreed-upon definition, despite the variety of public diplomacy-related 
activities in which actors are involved (Lee and Melissen, 2011; Pamment, 2013; d’Hooghe, 
2015; Dolea, 2016). The definition, as well as purpose and objectives of public diplomacy, are 
also diverse; the strategies which provide the means for public diplomacy feature a variety of 
opinions among scholars (Hoking, 2005). The commonly-accepted meaning of public 
diplomacy is:  
a. referring as the direct or mass-mediated communication activities through 
individuals, governmental/non-governmental organizations towards a foreign 
government and/or foreign public and/or the domestic publics;  
b. aiming at directly or indirectly reducing negative images, phrases, generating 
sympathy and understanding for a nation’s ideas, goals, foreign policies and its 
institutions, culture and model of society;  
c. targeting at building relationships and positive images, facilitating closer political ties 
or alliances, and boosting tourism and foreign direct investment (Löffelholz, Auer, 
and Srugies, 2015, p.440). Also, involving activities in the field of information, 
education and culture (Ham, 2005, p.57).  
However, there is a difference in viewpoint between traditional public diplomacy and new 
public diplomacy (see Table 1). The definition of public diplomacy before the 9/11 attacks 
was, per the U.S. Department of State (1987)’s definition, that public diplomacy 
encompasses “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public 
opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural 
exchanges, radio and televisions” (p.85). Malone’s view of public diplomacy is “one of direct 
communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, 
that of their governments” (1985, p. 199). Traditional public diplomacy is different in several 
ways to the new public diplomacy (Snow, 2014), as follows: official in nature; government-
to-publics (one-way communication); connected to foreign policy and national security 
outcomes; passive public roles; a necessary evil of technology and new media democratized 
international relations; bilateral informational and asymmetrical bilateral communication 
style between partners; crisis-driven and reactive. However, a recent trend among scholars is 
the acceptance that nongovernmental actors also play a role in public diplomacy, partly as a 
result of accepting new international circumstances – this has given rise to a new definition 
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(Rugh, 2011). For example, Cowan and Cull (2008) defined public diplomacy to mean “an 
international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics” 
(p.6). It is not only in defining public diplomacy, but there are also diverse views of who is 
the main agent and target in public diplomacy (Kelley, 2009) depending on the country, but 
the origins of contemporary public diplomacy are based on the US experience (Melissen, 
2005a; Cowan and Cull, 2008). This notwithstanding, public diplomacy has become a 
measure that applies social power in international politics in many countries around the 
world (Ham, 2010). But each country sees it differently. For example, the main agent of 
public diplomacy in the United States is government-level actors, and their activities are 
targeted towards the people of other countries (Hayden, 2015, pp. 212-129). On the other 
hand, public diplomacy in the United Kingdom allows various non-state actors, with the help 
of state-actors, to lead its public diplomacy efforts towards foreigners in its own country and 
also publics of other nations (Pamment, 2016a). Hence, the University of Southern 
California (USC) - Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), which has led public diplomacy 
research since 2003, defines public diplomacy more broadly as 
the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy, which is not only global in nature, 
but also involves a multitude of actors and networks. It is a key mechanism through 
which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships and has become 
crucial to building a secure global environment (USC-CPD, n.a). 
Table 1: The comparison between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy 
 
Traditional diplomacy 
Public diplomacy  
(in the twentieth century) 
Public diplomacy 
(in the twenty-first century) 
Main agent Government Government 
Government and various 
private actors including 
NGOs 
Target Government 
Government and Foreign 
publics (excluding domestic 
public) 
Government and Foreign 
publics (including domestic 
public) 
Communication style 
and Type of relations 
(between main agent and 
target) 
Horizon between government 
and government 
Unilateral and Top-down 
with a closed communication 
style 





(when carrying out public 
diplomacy) 
Conversation and negotiation 
between government and 
government 
 
Public Relations (PR) 
Including campaign, short 
wave radio, print 
newspapers, land-line 
telephones 
Various means including 
digital media 
 (internet, satellite, real-
time news, and Mobile 
telephones) which is based 
on information and 
communication 
technologies 
Resources and Assets Hard Power  Hard Power < Soft Power  Hard Power < Soft Power  
 
Note. Author organized contents, adopted from Cull, 2009c, p.14; Melissen, 2005a, pp.11-15; Hocking, 
2008, p. 64; Fitzpatrick, 2010, pp. 85-87; McPhail,2011, p.89; d’Hooghe, 2014, p.18; Löffelholz, Auer, 
and Srugies, 2015, p.440 
According to Fitzpatrick (2010), public diplomacy generally has the following functions, 
categorized based on the distinct features and practices: advocacy/influence, 
communication/informational, relational, promotional, warfare/propaganda, and political 
(p.89). Based on these functions, states utilize public diplomacy to achieve the following 
goals:  
a. “Increasing people’s familiarity with one’s country”, which “mak[es] them think 
about it, updating their images, turning around unfavourable opinions”; 
b. “Increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country”, which “creat[es] positive 
perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same 
perspective”; 
c. “Engaging people with one’s country”, which “strengthen[s] ties – from education 
reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive 
destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our products; 
getting to understand and subscribe to our values”; 
d. “Influencing people”, which “get[s] companies to invest, publics to back our positions 
or politicians to turn to us as a favoured partner” (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002, 
pp.9-10) 
In the same context, Mark (2009) identified the objectives of public diplomacy: one is 
idealistic, the other is functional. The idealistic objectives contain the notion of a two-way 
relationship based on mutual exchange; and the functional objectives include advancing the 
interests of trade, politics, diplomacy, and economy, developing bilateral relationships in 
order to maintain bilateral relationship in times of tension. By extension, a research of 
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functional objectives has lately developed, which concerns the relationship between public 
diplomacy and aid. This research aims to help understand contemporary issues in 
international relations that have arisen with newly-emerged aid actors, such as BRICS, who 
employ public diplomacy with non-traditional soft power, such as international development 
funds to support states’ political and economic objectives (Fisher and Bröckerhoff, 2008; 
Gilboa, 2008; Pamment, 2015, 2016b; Pamment and Wilkins, 2016; Shah and Wilkins, 
2004).  
So, what is the new public diplomacy? The ‘new public diplomacy’ became a common term in 
2005 (Pamment, 2014), after the 9/11 attacks, which highlighted the need to build up a 
national image for foreign publics, as part of a country’s foreign policy. Now, foreign 
ministries from all countries prioritize public diplomacy. Not only to boost a country’s image, 
but states also utilize public diplomacy as an instrument for supporting the most vital of 
national interests. A good example of this is Poland, which deployed public diplomacy for its 
campaign to join NATO and the EU. Countries in the Global South participate in public 
diplomacy due to strong economic motives (inviting travel business after terrorism), as do 
rogue and socialist states who need a bridge to communicate with the foreign public 
(Melissen, 2005a). Moreover, with the advent of globalization and the information age, 
public diplomacy practitioners and scholars take note of the rising clout of non-state actors 
in foreign affairs, which also highlights in growth in importance of new public diplomacy in 
the international relations (Fitzpatrick, 2010).  
The paradigm shifted from state-centred and hierarchical ‘traditional public diplomacy’ to a 
‘network-centered’ or ‘new public diplomacy model’ that involves a diverse set of actors by 
boosting collaboration and dialog (d’Hooghe, 2014, p.5-6, 18). The new public diplomacy is 
especially focused on mutual understanding, engagement and relationship building 
(Melissen, 2005a). Pammet (2013) described new public diplomacy as “a major paradigm 
shifts in international political communication, about which there has been strong consensus” 
(p.3). Fitzpatrick (2010) wrote that new public diplomacy reflects “a perceived need for 
greater collaboration and cooperation among nations and peoples by emphasizing principles 
of mutuality and dialogue” (pp.85-86). Gilboa (2008) interpreted new public diplomacy as 
“an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the conditions of the information age” (p.58). 
Melissen (2005a) argued that the new public diplomacy is more and more ‘interconnected’ 
with foreign publics, and is moving away from a one-way information flow to engagement 
and communicating with foreign audiences (p.13). The background to the shift is based on 
the revolution in three spheres – mass communication, politics, and international relations – 
each of which have influenced public diplomacy in the post-Cold War and post-p/11 eras. 
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Mass communication enjoyed two major technological innovations: the global news network, 
which provides real-time broadcasting services; and the Internet, which facilitates the 
exchange of ideas about world affairs between states, NGOs, communities, firms, and 
individuals. Certain revolutions in politics have also produced mass participation in the 
political process, as societies transformed from autocracies into democracies. Lastly, the 
revolution in international relations influence the goals and means of foreign policy. In other 
words, “favourable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and 
persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials, 
traditionally acquired through military and economic measures” (Gilboa, 2008, p.56). The 
development of three factors provided an opportunity for the redefine of public diplomacy 
from an angle of “an active role for publics” over a passive object of government foreign 
policy strategies. The growth of global social movements and civil society has changed the 
character of multilateral diplomacy, due to the increase in NGOs’ participation in 
international affairs (Hoking, 2005). In addition to these factors, the media and the new 
trend that identifies image as a concern in international politics, and the possibility for 
states to ‘rebrand’ themselves in the global marketplace are components of the new public 
diplomacy. Image and branding, especially, reflect the mass market over policy elites (ibid, 
p.31), as part of a new wave of ‘people power’ resulting from globalization and the spread of 
democracy. Bruce Gregory (2011) summarized that public diplomacy today “comes to mean 
an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors 
to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to 
influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (p. 276).  
New public diplomacy creates various forms of public diplomacy based on the new 
multidimensional environment of public diplomacy. First, Fitzpatrick (2011) proposed “a 
dialogic model of public diplomacy” to clarify the conceptual and practical requirements of 
the model based on eight criteria: (a) mutuality: a reciprocity of parties and interests, as well 
as the opportunity for expression; (b) presence: being open to each other and involved in 
matters; (c) commitment: engaging with others and participating in effort to reach mutually 
satisfying outcomes; (d) authenticity: honesty, transparency, and genuineness; (e) trust: 
empathetic to the other rather than using authority and power; (f) respect: recognizing and 
accepting differences; (g) collaboration: removing the idea of winning-losing and defeating, 
and engaging between parties; and (h) risk: parties accept the uncertain dialogic outcomes 
(pp.19-21). Due to rise in prominence of NGOs and other non-state actors’ involvement in 
diplomacy, the situation has led to a ‘new’ or ‘network’ and ‘relational’ public diplomacy, and 
thus competitive strategies have been supplanted by collaborative strategies with multiple 
stakeholders (d’Hooghe, 2015). Hence, d’Hooghe puts citizen diplomacy, cultural 
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diplomacy 22 , and strategic communications (including national-branding) as subsets of 
public diplomacy. 23  Cowan and Arsenault (2008) observed that new communication 
technologies, including the Internet, provide a cornerstone to encourage monologic and 
dialogue communication, and cross-national collaborations. Park and Lim (2014) have 
observed that digital media leads “networked public diplomacy” through analyses of the web 
and social media practices. By mapping the organizational information network online, for 
example, the activities of the core public diplomacy organizations in both South Korea and 
Japan were identified due to highly interconnected information networks by sharing 
information and sources. Network-based public diplomacy performs the role of a bridge 
between communities and practices (Fisher, 2013a). Thus, public diplomacy in a globalized 
world embraces networking and collaboration with diverse actors, because no single actor 
has the answer (Fisher, 2013b), and a variety of actors with diverse views are more credible 
and legitimate, and more easily appeal to foreign publics and earn trust.  
Under the various forms of 21st century public diplomacy, public diplomacy requires utilizing 
efficiently its components and instruments. Nye (2008) argued that the means of public 
diplomacy is soft power, whereas Hoking (2008) advanced three powers – hard power, soft 
power, and sticky power – which are crucial to carrying out public diplomacy successfully, 
and stresses that public diplomacy is not itself uniquely the expression of soft power. Hoking 
said that the three powers are connected to each other. For example, soft power supports the 
                                                
22 As to cultural diplomacy, Barr (2015) understands that “one of the best examples of the broader 
field of public diplomacy, which refers to the methods governments and organizations use to 
communicate their values, policies and beliefs – with the goal of improving their relationship, image 
and reputation with the publics (i.e. not just governments) of other countries” (p.181).  
23 The main objective of citizen diplomacy is to build relationships with the international community 
through academic grants and exchanges, visitor programs, twinning activities, cultural activities, and 
business for public diplomacy initiatives; considering as a connection with people of different nations 
which distinct from official contacts between government officials or between officials and people. So, 
diplomacy is useful when relations between countries experience problems, and official contacts have 
been frozen. As for nation-branding, it applies corporate branding techniques to countries; thus, 
public diplomacy and nation-branding share the matter of a country’s reputation and image 
(d’Hooghe, 2015; also see Bishop, C. W. (2003). Citizen Diplomacy. Foreign Policy, 135, 91; Marshall, 
J. (1949). International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy. The American Political Science Review, 43(1), 83-
90; Meyer-Knapp, H., & Matsuda, Y. (2013). Improving International Relations at the Grass Roots: 
Japanese Student Attitudes to Japanes-Korean relations. Japan Social Innovation Journal, 3(1), 1-11; 
Molander, E. A. (1991). Bridge building from the grass roots: Organization and management of 
citizen diplomacy programs. In D. Leviton (Ed.), Horrendous death and health: Toward action (pp. 
227-224). Hemisphere.). Public diplomacy and national-branding utilize as foreign policy goal with 
soft power, but showing differences between the two. Branding is prone to send a static message and 
comprises a slogan and a one-dimensional image, but public diplomacy has a character of bilateral or 
multilateral communication (d’Hooghe, 2015; also see Dinnie, K (ed.). (2016). Nation Branding: 
Concepts, issues, practice. (2nd ed.). Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge.; Gilmore, F. (2002). A 
country-Can it be Repositioned? Spain: The success story of nation branding. The Journal of Brand 
Management, 9, 281-293; Szondi, G. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual 
Similarities and Differences (Discussion Paper No. 112). The Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations: Clingendael.; Wang, J. (2006). Localising public diplomacy: The role of sub-national actors 
in nation branding. Place Branding, 2(1), 32-42.).  
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use and influence of the military and hard economic strength. Recently, economic power can 
partly establish an environment through the appeal economic principles and influences – for 
example, the Beijing Consensus attracts adherents that are repelled by the American model. 
Gilboa (2008) also observed that soft power relies on hard power from the perspective of the 
state, because a powerful military, economy, and established technological infrastructure all 
make strong nations attractive. Nicholas Cull (2008a, 2009b) examined soft power, and 
concluded that public diplomacy needs the following elements as instruments of public 
diplomacy: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international 
broadcasting. Based on these elements, and the new multidimensional environment of 
public diplomacy, Leonard, Stead, & Smewing (2002) suggested three dimensions of public 
diplomacy: news management (short-term strategy), strategic communication (mid-term 
strategy), and relationship building (long-term strategy). They also drew a distinction of 
public diplomacy based on three spheres (political/military, economic, and social/cultural); 
two types (cooperation and competition); and five instruments (political party diplomacy, 
brand diplomacy, NGO diplomacy, Diaspora diplomacy, and business diplomacy). By 
extension, Gilboa (2008) proposed to distinguish based on time dimensions. The first, 
immediate level expects to react within hours, or a few days, to developing events by using 
advocacy, international broadcasting, and cyber-public diplomacy. The second, intermediate 
level allows weeks or months for proactive planning and implementation of policies with the 
instruments of international public relations, corporate diplomacy, and diaspora public 
diplomacy. The final, long-term level is similar to traditional public diplomacy, and aims to 
construct relationships with global publics over years by building favorable conditions 
through cultural diplomacy, exchanges, and branding. 
 
3.1.1.1 Propaganda and Public diplomacy 
 
Propaganda has been around since the time of the ancient Greeks. Then, as now, there were 
differing opinions about politics and religion. Even though they lacked modern tools – such 
as newspapers, the radio, movies and, most recently, the Internet – ancient practitioners had 
their own methods. The games, theatre, assembly, law courts and religious festivals all 
provided ample opportunity to spread ideas and beliefs (Taylor, 2003). Unlike the 
traditional method of communication in diplomacy, which was between the nations, public 
diplomacy had as its objective the improvement of the nation’s image and diplomatic 
relations, together with the communication of history, culture, language, and others to the 
public of another country. It can be said that public diplomacy is related to propaganda; by 
the 1950s, the meaning public diplomacy shifted remarkably towards the sphere of 
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international information and propaganda (Cull, 2009).  
In its origins, “propaganda” is an ancient and honorable word, meaning the respectful 
attention of mankind. Propaganda, the word, is derived from the seventeenth century 
Roman Catholic Church (Black, 2001, p.121; Somerville, 2012, p.3), specifically from the 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Committee for the Propagation of the Faith) in 1622. The 
Propaganda Fide was used as a means to an end to subdue the Protestant Reformation. 
(Bernays, 2004, pp.26-27; Brown and Davis, 2012, p.76; Auerbach and Castronovo, 2013, 
pp.2-3). The lexical-semantic of public diplomacy in Oxford dictionary is “information, 
especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view” 
(Propaganda, n.a). In other words, the general meaning of propaganda is the activity of 
explanting one’s argument to obtain somebody else’s agreement or understanding (Black, 
2001; Alleyne, 2003, p.93). In a similar vein, Harold Lasswell (1927), an American political 
scientist and a linchpin of propaganda research, said “propaganda is the management of 
collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (p.627). Somerville (2012) 
also defined a general standard for propaganda as follows: “A simplistic and very narrow 
image, with propaganda presented as something that only repressive, autocratic or 
essentially ‘bad’ regimes practice in order to lie to and control their subjects or to lie to the 
world to present a falsely positive view of an essentially negative regime” (p.3). Taking these 
definitions together, the general impression of propaganda in our society is negative. 
However, Bernays (2004) saw the other aspect of propaganda in the early twentieth century, 
and argued that whether “propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merits of the cause 
urged, and the correctness of the information published” (p.20). He researched a way to 
make use of the meaning and role of propaganda born in capitalism in many different fields 
in society, in which it does not have a negative connotation. Also, he emphasized the good 
points of promotion by reinterpreting public relations, focusing on the communication of the 
public rather than promoting the governing method. The use of information sharing is 
essential to winning battles and war (Garcia, 2010). The role of propaganda is comparable to 
public persuasion as it stresses the importance of public decision-making. Taylor (2003) 
explained the meaning of propaganda as “a process by which an idea or an opinion is 
communicated to someone else for a specific persuasive purpose” (p.7). The technological 
advancement of communications has had an equal effect on international propaganda 
(Rubin, 1971, p.83). Also, Murrow (1963), a former US diplomat who coined the term of 
public diplomacy, mentioned with regards to propaganda: “the most important reason is the 
truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believe; to 
be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that”. 
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Nevertheless, there remain diverse opinions about propaganda. Jewett and O’Donnell 
(2006), who have defined a negative opinion of propaganda, describe it as “the deliberate, 
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to 
achieve a response that fur- there is the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Nowadays, 
propaganda is used more as a soft power tool to encourage and invoke people’s ideas, and 
beliefs, and is identified as part of public diplomacy. The terms propaganda and public 
diplomacy are similar, and conceptual confusion arises as a result (Brown, 2008; Seib, 
2009a). Propaganda and public diplomacy are like two sides of the same coin, and have 
unclear boundaries (Brown, 2008). However, the main difference between public diplomacy 
and propaganda is their communication system: one is a one-way communication, while the 
other is two-way communication (Mellisen 2004, d’Hooghe 2014). That being said, Snow 
(2010) observed that, for relations between propaganda and public diplomacy based on 
power, propaganda and public diplomacy interact like the linkage between soft power and 
hard power introduced by Nye. Therefore, even though propaganda has a negative 
connotation, when taken together, the two are like two sides of the same coin.  
 
3.1.1.2 Strategic communication and Public diplomacy 
 
The general understanding of strategic communication is being magnified as a key issue by 
government agencies and scholars following the advent of globalization and developments in 
information and communications technologies. Former U.S. National Security Advisor 
James Jones (2009) stressed the importance of strategic communication at the 45th Munich 
Conference on Security Policy in 2009 as follows: “The world is a smaller place. 
Communications is more rapid. And therefore our reactions must be swifter. And we must be 
able to communicate rapidly throughout the government and around the world in order to 
effectively respond.” Gregory (2005) also stressed the significance of strategic 
communication gaining prominence following the September 11 terrorist attacks, when 
countries around the world realized the importance of communication and information 
exchange through public diplomacy.  
Even though the significance of strategic communication has increased in the twenty-first 
century, there remains no unified definition and comprehension regarding strategic 
communication (Cornish, Lindley-French and Yorke, 2011; Paul, 2011). Instead, many 
scholars interpret strategic communication from different angles. Moss and Warnaby (1998) 
approach strategic communication from two perspectives: first, strategy communication, 
which stands for “the role of communication in facilitating the strategy-making process” 
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(p.133); and second, communication strategy, which refers to “the nature and focus of 
communications strategy itself” (ibid), thus interpreting strategic communication as 
communication and ensuring that it is designed and implemented as planned (p.139). On the 
other hand, Manheim (1994) and Halloran (2007) refer to strategic communication as 
persuading, and Halloran (2007) views it as follows:   
Strategic communication means persuading allies and friends to stand with you. It 
means persuading neutrals to come over to your side or at least stay neutral. In the 
best of all worlds, it means persuading adversaries that you have the power and the 
will to prevail over them. Vitally important, strategic communication means 
persuading the nation’s citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a 
national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. (p.6) 
Due to the difficulties in single-word or simple interpretations of strategic communication, 
Cornish, Lindley-French, and York (2011) identified four approaches: “information 
operations, psychological operations, public diplomacy, and public affairs” (pp.3-4). There 
are many divergent opinions among scholars regarding the relationship between strategic 
communication and public diplomacy. Paul (2011) understands public diplomacy is a 
component of strategic communication. He compares public diplomacy and strategic 
communication as follows:  
Public diplomacy is a narrowly conceived set of activities focused on government 
engagement, outreach, and broadcast, while strategic communication includes all of 
those things, but further capabilities, such as those included in information 
operations, as well as the communicative value of policies and more importantly 
actions . . . [and] Strategic communication, includes only elements that could be 
harnessed in support of national policy objectives. Some of public diplomacy is (and 
should remain) as unfocused and unpurposive efforts to build relationships, foster 
understanding, and promote engagement with foreign audiences that have absolutely 
nothing to do with current national policy goals. (pp.40-41)  
However, this study contends that strategic communication is a subset, or function of public 
diplomacy. Nye (2004) considered strategic communication to be a part of the three 
dimensions of public diplomacy,24 and the role of strategic communication here focuses 
heavily and effectively on designing and disseminating a message to accomplish a nation’s 
                                                
24  The first dimension of public diplomacy is daily communication; the second is strategic 
communication; and the final dimension is developing lasting, long-term relationships with key 
individuals.  
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persuasive objective (Zahara, 2010). D’Hooghe (2015) understands strategic 
communication’s activities and strategies to be within the realm of public diplomacy, with 
the intention of achieving long-term and well-defined goals on selected issues, as well as 
mutual understanding based on long-term relationships. The correlation between the two is 
easily seen in the function of public diplomacy, which is the communication of a nation’s 
foreign policies to foreign citizens through strategic communication methods – such as 
conferences and events, media outreach, and exchanges of culture, students or personnel. 
Also, due to the development of information technology, modern strategic communication 
needs to be understood using careful mapping of networked relationships over simple 
broadcasting (Pamment, 2011; Zahara, 2009).  
 
3.2 Relationship between Public Diplomacy and Soft Power  
3.2.1. A Review of Nye’s Theory of Soft Power  
As stated earlier, following the First World War, the world became ever more interested in 
soft power, which is a kind new power that dominates the opinions of other countries. Later, 
as the information era began, with the development of the internet and new communication 
media, many countries placed greater importance on soft power as a new power, believing it 
to be as important as hard power. Thus, many political researchers became interested in the 
conceptual research of soft power and how to apply it effectively in developing diplomatic 
strategies (Mellisen, 2005a). The concept of soft power was first proposed by Joseph S. Nye, 
a political scientist at the Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University in the U.S., 
in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and further developed in his 2004 book, Soft power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics. This latter book criticised the Bush administration’s 
post-9/11 strategies for dealing with terrorism. In addition, Nye pointed out that it would 
significantly taint the United States’ positive image in the world. He further stressed that the 
United States was exposing the limits of an imperialism based on conventional military 
strength and economic power while they also dealt with the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, as 
well as Chinese power after the financial crisis in 2008 (Nye, 2010b, 2011).  
Nye (1990b, 2004) differentiated between hard power and soft power to enhance on the 
meaning of soft power. Prior to distinguishing between the two types of power, he 
interpreted power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one 
wants”, and introducing several ways to affect the behavior of others: (1) coerce with threats; 
(2) induce with payments; and (3) attract and co-opt” (Nye, 2008a, p.27). He argued that 
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hard power is based on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”) (Nye, 2004), and 
defined hard power as “the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial 
preferences and strategies” (Nye, 2011, p.11). On the other hand, soft power is “getting others 
to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye, 2004, 
p.5). Nye’s concept of soft power was fully adapted from work by Peter Bachrach and Morton 
Baratz (1963), which referred to a “second face of power” (as cited in Nye, 2008). To 
understand soft power, more specifically, it is necessary to understand the three aspects of 
relational power: “commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences” 
(Nye, 2011, p.11) – inspired by Robert Dahl, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, and Steven 
Lukes respectively (pp.11-18). The first face of relational power was from Dahl’s 1957 
definition of power, that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do” (pp.202-203), which focuses on the coercive exercise of 
power. The second face of power, as articulated by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is that power 
is “[also] exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political 
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (p.948). Thus, “A 
controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B’s choices of strategy” (Nye, 2011, p.14), 
which highlights the agenda-setting exercise of power. Unlike the previous two faces of 
power, which explain how power is used to get A’s wants from B, regardless of B’s will, the 
last face of the power, articulated by Luke (1974, 2005), describes the aspect of power to 
manipulate B to do something. Thus, “A helps to create and shape B’s basic beliefs, 
perceptions, and preferences” (Nye, 2011, p.14), and normally shows a government’s 
ideological and decision-making power to control people. Nye applied these three different 
aspects of relational power to expand his interpretation of soft power; that is, “the ability to 
affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting 
positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcome” (Nye, 2011, p.13).  
Based on these conclusions, Nye (2004, 2011) proposed an analogy for the global political 
climate of the 21st century, which he saw as being unfolded vertically and horizontally, and a 
three-dimensional chess game. At the top of the chessboard, the unipolar military power 
game is being played; multipolar economic power is on the middle level; and at the bottom is 
the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, such 
as international terrorism, pandemics, and climate change. He argued that the United States 
is at the top of the chessboard, joined by Europe, Japan, and China as the major players in 
economic power. The power at the bottom of the board includes non-state actors, but power 
at this level is widely diffused. Thus, at the bottom of the board, it is unnecessary to draw the 
boundaries of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, and other clichés about which political 
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leaders and pundits argue. Most of all, he asserted that the chessboard of international 
politics in the 21st century is now in its third stage due to two recent great power shifts: one 
is a power transition among states, and the other one is a power diffusion away from states 
to non-state actors. Through the expansion of networks and dissemination of knowledge 
powered by information technology, global power has shifted from hard power (military and 
economic power) to soft power (ibid). Furthermore, also due to the advent of the information 
age, Nye (2002, 2004, 2014) has argued that the importance of soft power will continue to 
increase relative to that of hard power, as countries are able to draw cultural and ideological 
inspiration from dominant cultures and ideas that are closer to global norms (such as 
liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy), and exert influence over how issues are framed using 
multiple communication channels. Countries’ credibility is also enhanced through their 
domestic and international performance.  
Table. 2: Three types of power 
  
Note. Adopted from Nye, 2004, pp. 8, 30-32 
Nye (2004) divided sources of power25 into three categories – military, economic, and soft 
power – each with its own behaviors, primary currencies, and government policies (see Table 
2 above). He said that power today is less tangible and less coercive than in the past, but the 
three sources of power remain relevant. Hard and soft power are also related, because both 
operate around the ability to achieve one’s aims by affecting the behavior of others. The two 
types of power are also based on the usual resources and attributes an actor possesses. The 
                                                
25 Keohane and Nye (1998) divided power into “resource power”, which is “the possession of resources 
that are usually associated with the ability to reach outcomes you want”; and “behavior power”, which 
is “the ability to obtain outcomes you want”. “Behavior power” was further divided into hard power 
and soft power. According to Keohane and Nye, hard power is “the ability to get others to do what they 
otherwise would not do through threat of punishment of promise of reward”, whereas soft power is 
“the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. If a state can make it 
power legitimate in the eyes of others and establish international institutions that encourage others to 
define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional 
economic or military resources. Hard and soft power are related, but they are not the same” (p.86).  
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power shift from hard to soft power is the result of a “spectrum of behaviors”, which ranges 
from command power (the ability to change what others do) to co-optive power (the ability 
to shape what others want), and from coercion to economic inducements, to agenda-setting 
to pure attraction. Economic power exhibits similar behaviors to hard power, utilizing force 
and sanction (pp.6-11). Meanwhile, soft power tends to be closer to co-optive power, based 
on three power resources: a country’s “culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its 
political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when 
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (p.13). Nevertheless, Nye (2004, 
2010a) asserted, while soft power is difficult to directly impose on others, because it is a 
concept of universal values, soft power may be more effective than coercion. This is because 
soft power is not only comprised of intangible resources, but also difficult for a nation to 
control. The influence of soft power also differs depending on the given situation, which may 
make it difficult to realise intended outcomes within a desired timespan.  
The general sources of power are “simply the tangible and intangible raw materials or 
vehicles that underlie power relationships, and whether a given set of resources produces 
preferred outcomes or not depends upon behavior in context” (Nye, 2011, p. 9). However, in 
the twenty-first century, with evolved technologies, behavioral or relational power is also 
significant (Nye, 2004, 2011). Power in the context of relations carries weight only when 
resources and its attributes are recognized by the opponent as valuable. In the same vein, in 
addition to soft power, the development of information and communication technology gave 
rise to relational power, which focuses on credibility and reciprocity between agents and 
non-agents of international society. Network/cyber power is created through relational 
power and networks and, by extension, social and communication power comes from the 
establishment of network/cyber power and relational power (ibid). Based on the importance 
of soft power in the twenty-first century, Nye further introduced smart power, which 
combines the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and 
attraction (Nye, 2011), and utilizes hard and soft power flexibly to produce successful results 
(see, Nye, 2009, 2010a, pp.224-225). Wilson (2008) elaborated, explaining smart power as 
“the capacity… to combine elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually 
reinforcing” (p. 115). For example, China’s military support to African countries to combat 
terrorism, the Beijing Consensus and economic power are accepted as positive and favorable 
by developing countries, and can subsequently be seen as preparing the groundwork for the 
future implementation of China’s soft power policies.  
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3.2.2 Soft Power: Academic discussions regarding soft power and public 
diplomacy 
As soft power took centre-stage in the twenty-first century, Gallarottie (2011) proposed three 
grounds for understanding the importance of soft power in international relations. First, the 
impact of interdependence and the pervasive process that compounds its effects on the 
power of globalization, because globalization enhances the process of social and economic 
interdependence in the international system. Furthermore, globalization gives rise to 
information interdependence (Rogerson, 2000). Second, social and political changes 
resulting from globalization bring about a modern population more concerned with the 
economy than hard power and, consequently, led to economic interdependence. Lastly, the 
growth of international organizations and regimes has created a network of cooperation that 
provides a fundamental component of soft power (Gallarottie, 2011, pp.33-36). 
Soft power is a type of power to gain desired result by influencing others without using. 
However, soft power has limits: (1) it is “a descriptive rather than a normative concept” (Barr, 
2011, p.15); (2) soft power is not fully managed by governments, as abstract factors such as 
culture and values come from civil societies (Nye, 2004, p.17), and the factors are hard to 
evaluate (Mead, 2004, p.51); and (3) the strength of culture, a resource of soft power, does 
not equal political power (Cooper, 2004, pp.170-171). However, Seib (2009b) argued that 
soft power is hard to separate from the government. As soft power is not clearly separated 
from hard power, there are limits to the exercise soft power if a country does not have 
sufficient hard power.26 The reason for the limitations of soft power is that it is concentrated 
on “the ability to get what you want through attraction” (Nye, 2004, p.11), and that exerting 
soft power is conjoined with a country’s economic, social and cultural factors. So, soft power 
does not carry much weight on its own. On the interaction between soft power and public 
diplomacy, Nye (2011) observed that “soft power is generated only in part by what the 
government does through its policies and public diplomacy” (p.101). Nye (2004), has also 
highlighted multiple channels of communication, which help to frame issues, cultural 
customs and ideas that are connected to prevailing global norms, and credibility in an 
information age. He defined credibility as “the crucial resource and an important source of 
soft power”, and referred to public diplomacy as a means to communicate with foreign 
publics, to lead public reputation and opinion through “shared goals to create credibility” by 
using broadcasting, arranging exchanges, subsidizing cultural exports, and others (p.106). 
                                                
26 For more on the critical perspective of soft power, see Baldwin (2002), Ferguson (2003), Fraser 
(2003), Gallarottie (2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), Kurlantzik (2007), Lennon (2003), McConnell 
(2008), and Meade (2004).  
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Also, a country’s foreign policy and political value, three of the power resources Nye 
identified, above, are relevant to government policy. Thus, government policy enhances 
credibility through foreign policies such as peacekeeping, development assistance, and 
embracing diverse opinions, which are reflected in an increase in a country’s soft power. A 
foreign policy characterized by hypocrisy, arrogance, and brutality (for example, the 
invasions of and war in Iraq) would diminish a country’s soft power. 
Soft power shows effective results when public diplomacy is performed through the different 
tools that soft power possesses. Public diplomacy is therefore one of soft power’s primary 
instruments; the role of public diplomacy was recognized in practice before it came to the 
fore in contemporary debates (d’Hooghe, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2010; Hoking 2005; Melissen, 
2005b; Snow, 2004, 2009). McDowell (2008) elucidates the connection between public 
diplomacy and soft power by building on Nye’s conception that soft power requires three 
elements (a country’s culture, its ideals and values, and its foreign policies), explaining that 
is a serious concentric circle between the two, “with PD [public diplomacy] forming a subset 
of diplomacy, which is itself a subset of government activities, which is just one element of a 
country’s soft power” (p.12). On the other hand, due to the advent of globalization and 
improved information technology, some in academia have argued that the interrelation 
between public diplomacy and soft power does not accord with current social phenomena, as 
there are different types of power 27  that exert influence on the notion of new public 
diplomacy (Ham, 2008, 2010; Hayden, 2011, 2015; Pammet, 2014, 2015). 
 
3.3. Chinese view of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power  
3.3.1 The China’s Public Diplomacy from Chinese perspective 
There are four milestone events in the past sixty years of China’s diplomatic history: the 
conflict between China and Russia in the early 1960s; the ‘opening up’ of the country in 
1970s; the acceleration towards becoming a market economy, starting in 1992; and China’s 
arrival on the global stage, symbolized by its joining the WTO in 2001. While China went 
through a period of change in its diplomatic history, one thing remained consistent in 
                                                
27 Such as social power which defines as “the ability to set standards, create norms and values that are 
deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment” (Ham, 2010, p.8). 
Integrated power means “leading and using alliances; developing new strategies and combining them 
with traditional strategies; and ending divisions between defense, homeland security, diplomacy, 
energy, and foreign aid” (Gilboa, 2008, p.62). And smart power which combines soft power and hard 
power (Nye, 2010a).  
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China’s foreign policy: its attempts to communicate with the world. In its first attempt to 
establish a dialogue with the world, the Chinese government invited foreign journalists to 
visit Yan’an in the 1930s, to report on the domestic situation of the Sino-Japanese War. In 
1937, American journalist Edgar Snow interviewed Mao Zedong and other key personnel – 
including Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Xiao Jinguang – over four months in China, and 
Snow started to introduce China to the world through Western news articles and his book, 
Red Star Over China (1937), based on real stories about the Communist Party of China, the 
Red Army, the Sino-Japanese War – later, the book would be translated into over twenty 
languages (China Daily, 2010c). In 1971, China’s “Ping-Pong diplomacy” also functioned as a 
boost to Sino-America relations, and helped to finally establish diplomatic relations between 
the two countries, in 1979. The Tiananmen Incident in 1989, in particular, led China to focus 
on the country’s reputation around the world. In the aftermath of the incident, the Chinese 
government focused on improving its propaganda models, to burnish its image abroad 
(Kurlantzick, 2007a). On this topic, K. Zhao (2015a) pays attention to China’s “peaceful 
goals”, as expressed by its scholars and its government’s officials. He argued that China’s 
public diplomacy is not a new concept or idea, but one derived from its existing experiences, 
including Ping-Pong diplomacy, Panda diplomacy, Chess diplomacy, and people-to-people 
diplomacy (p.57). However, scholars and policymakers began to systematically research how 
to employ soft power, and China’s fostering of public diplomacy following the Tiananmen 
Incident (Hall & Smith, 2013). To start mending fences with its Asian neighbors, China tried 
to spread its culture and keep pace with the changing global order, by dispelling its 
communist image and avoiding critical international public opinion of it violation of human 
rights. Along with this process, China’s public diplomacy did innovate internally, and in this 
way, international cultural relations have gradually improved (Zhu, 2013).  
A feature of China’s public diplomacy that can be seen in contemporary issues can be 
deduced from its character. One is that traditional Chinese think highly of its image in all 
relationships, and the other is that its external propaganda was under the Communist 
regime’s control and management. In recent years, the central role of its public diplomacy 
and communication has been shown to the new world (Cull, 2009b). In the Chinese 
language, there is no big difference between ‘public relations’ and ‘propaganda’. However, 
since the term propaganda has a negative connotation, the country has gradually started to 
favour ‘public relations’, the interpretation of which has greatly changed as well (Q. Zhao, 
2011). Unlike the Western image of propaganda, propaganda in China is more like public 
diplomacy, given that it is considered a conversation between the government and the public. 
The meaning of propaganda in China is different from that in the Western, and it connotes 
positive images. Furthermore, the term propaganda is classified in two groups – internal 
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propaganda (duinei xuanchuan) and external propaganda (duwai xuanchuan)28 – which 
improve China’s image abroad. The practice of mixing internal and external propaganda 
makes China’s public diplomacy weak (Wang, 2008). The concept of China’s public 
diplomacy (gongong waijiao),29 was first proposed in the 1990 book Diplomacy Abroad, 
edited by Qipeng Zhou. Since then, the term was used as mass and civil diplomacy mixing 
with the term public, due to a translation issue from English to Chinese. However, the 
Chinese mostly perceive public diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy (minjian waijiao) 
with the approach of cultural exchange or diplomacy (ibid).  
Wang (2008) and Aoyama (2007) argued that China’s public diplomacy was shaped when 
Beijing introduced a mouthpiece system in 1983, during its reformation and open period 
(Aoyama, 2007). In the era of Chinese Economic Reform, propaganda was developed and 
expanded considerably to enhance communication with foreign countries (Q. Zhao, 2011). 
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has spread carefully-worded statements of 
customary Chinese thought, normally a part of its internal propaganda (duinei xuanchuan), 
to overseas Chinese, the Taiwanese, and non-Chinese foreigners (Brady, 2012, p.63). The 
best examples of this are as follows: Civilization (wenming), Filial Piety (xiao), virtue (de), 
Prosperous Society (xiao kang shehui), Harmony (hexie), Confucius (kongzi), Yellow 
Emperor (huangdi), Respecting the Rites (mingli), and Honesty and Trust (chengxin) (ibid, 
pp.63-67). Especially since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Beijing policymakers have put 
international publicity ahead of everything else in order to build a favorable national brand 
abroad, and has adopted a strategy of “foreign publicity with Chinese characteristics” (Ding, 
2011, p.312), and utilized public diplomacy to publicize itself to the world. By extension, in 
2004, it introduced a new Division for Public Diplomacy, as part of the Information 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Public diplomacy was now applied in earnest 
to China’s foreign policy, based on the governmental guideline that “foreign policy must be 
an extension of domestic policy and that diplomacy should serve domestic politics” (Wang, 
2008, p.260). 
The general goal of China’s public diplomacy is “to serve China’s foreign policy objectives 
                                                
28 The external propaganda is associated with “rising global awareness of Chinese achievements and to 
the construction of a new image of China for oversea audience” and controlled by the jurisdiction of a 
broad system of state publicity over diplomatic institutions (K. Zhao, 2015b, pp.168-169).  
29 Li Zhiyong (2009) differentiated clearly the meanings of public diplomacy between the new and 
original terms. The terms are public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao), people-to-people diplomacy 
(minjian waijiao), civil diplomacy (gongmin waijiao), mass diplomacy (gongzhong waijiao), and 
people diplomacy (renmin waijiao). When the word public is translated into Chinese, it is rendered as 
‘non-private’, ‘non-competitive’, or ‘non-discriminatory’. Thus, there are different public diplomacy 
activities based on these differing translations (K. Zhao, 2015b, pp.169-170). 
 
 74 
and its domestic development by improving China’s image in the world” (d’Hooghe, 2015, 
p.99). Giving a detailed account of the goal, Yang Jiechi (2011), a former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and now a State Councilor, observed that the characteristics of China’s public 
diplomacy are based on people-to-people diplomacy and civil diplomacy, which Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai established to encourage the development of foreign relations between China 
and other countries. Consequently, China established diplomatic ties with the United States 
and improved its relations with Japan. Furthermore, China’s public diplomacy is aimed at 
promoting common development and prosperity in the world. Constantly, China draws close 
to other countries, showing a true version of China’s image that seeks world peace and 
prosperity, and seeks to resolve any misunderstandings and negative impressions of China in 
international society. Therefore, China’s public diplomacy functions to boost cooperation, 
trust, and mutual understanding between foreign publics and China based on both domestic 
and international perspectives about contributing to world development and peace. To 
realize its goals, the Chinese government has established five main strategies for its public 
diplomacy (Hall and Smith, 2013). First, the Chinese government pays attention to Chinese 
citizens abroad, as they can be a potential source of influence in its overseas expansion. 
Second, Beijing corrects its weakness in international media, by establishing its own TV 
channels with, for example, English-language, French, and Spanish content. Third, the 
Chinese government supports a public diplomacy division, which operates under the 
umbrella of its Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to cope with the 
task of “peaceful development” and “peaceful rise” in order to improve its public image. 
Further, the government founded a Public Diplomacy Research Center and journal, Public 
Diplomacy Quarterly. Fourth, Beijing financially supports over 320 Confucius Institutions, 
which have spread to 100 countries. Fifth, China hosts cultural, sports, and business events, 
such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Exhibition (pp.3-4).  
So, how does China’s public diplomacy develop and carry out its strategies? China’s public 







Figure 1: The mechanism of public diplomacy30 
 
Note. Adopted from Q. Zhao, 2011 
1.  A nation’s government to B nation’s public: The primary significance is public 
diplomacy, and government conducts public diplomacy through mass media. It contains 
cultural exchanges and education offered to the other nation’s public under 
governmental support.  
2. A nation’s public to B nation’s government: This type of activity includes non-
government organizations, university researchers visiting foreign governments for 
research, or introducing the country to another government. These personal initiative 
activities increase and have a wide range of activities aimed at the other nation’s 
government. As time goes by, it establishes a public diplomacy. 
3. A nation’s public to B nation’s public: The exchange between public and public is called 
“nongovernmental diplomacy”, or the people-to-people diplomacy in China. It has been 
pursued since the new government of the People’s Republic of China was formed, and 
carries out both government and non-governmental diplomacy. Prior to China 
establishing diplomatic ties with Japan in 1972, it conducted information exchanges and 
trade interchange, under non-government leads. 
4. Communication and interaction between government and public within A and B’s 
nation individually: This is the mutual exchanges between a government and its citizen. 
                                                
30 This idea is adopted from Zhao, Q. (2011), Gonggong Waijiao yu Kuawenhua Jiaoliu (Public 
Diplomacy and Cross-cultural Communication). Beijing: Renmin University of China Press. p.31.  
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It is not common to identify it as a category of public diplomacy, but it is more often 
related to public diplomacy today. It is analogous with public relations. 
Above all, three different actors conform and its detail strategies are designed under China’s 
foreign policy. Interviewee N-C1 gave his opinion that China’s public diplomacy is an 
instrument of foreign policy, used to achieve long-term strategies put in place by previous 
leaders. Based on the interviewee’s view, dividing public relations started with Deng 
Xiaoping, and has been continued by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, their rhetoric connecting 
with the objectives of China’s public diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese 
foreign policy started to evolve based on the external situation of the world. Also, reform has 
been a major theme of China’s economic and political development since 1978, but China’s 
reforms were confronted by serious obstacles (Liu and Dittmer, 2006). Deng Xiaoping 
encouraged deeper reform in China and its people in 1988: 
China is conducting a deep reform in order to create better conditions for future 
development. We do not just set our sight on the twentieth century but also think 
about the new century. The problem is that if we do not move ahead we have to 
retreat. Only deep and comprehensive reform can guarantee that we can build a well-
to-do (xiaokang) society by the end the twentieth century and make more progress in 
the next century. (Xiaoping, 1993, p.268 as cited in Liu & Dittmer, 2006, p.2) 
China was also criticised by the international community as a result of the crackdown on the 
Tiananmen Square protest in 1989. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping proposed that China’s 
core foreign policy strategy was “tao guang yang hui” (hide capability and keep a low 
profile). It became the model for China’s foreign relations for the next two decades (Brandy, 
2017; Sørensen, 2015). Based on Deng’s model, the Hu Jintao regime put forward “heping 
jueqi”, which refers to “peaceful rise”31 as opposed to a Chinese threat to international society 
potentially posed by its rapid economic development (Lam, 2015). The “heping jueqi” slogan 
was first mentioned by then-Vice President Zheng Bijian’s speech to a plenary session of the 
Bo’ao Forum for Asia in 2003, and explained the meaning of China rise as peaceful in the 
world: 
              In the twenty-five years since its reform and opening up, China has blazed a new 
strategic path that not only suits its national conditions but also conforms to the tide 
of the times. This new path enables China’s peaceful rise by independently building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics while participating in, rather than isolating 
                                                
31 The term “peaceful rise”, from 2003-2004, was later replaced by “peaceful development” due to the 
nuance of “rise”, which many thought sounded too provocative (Buzan, 2014).  
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itself from, economic globalization. (B. Zhang, 2015) 
In addition, Hu’s scientific perspective on development (kexue fazhanguan) 32  led to 
economic development and the advancement of science and technology, which are now 
utilized as a source and means of China’s public diplomacy. By extension, Hu appreciated the 
importance of soft power and public diplomacy, and applied it to China’s foreign policy. 
Unlike the report of 17th National Party Congress, the report of the 18th declared that China 
would carry on public and cultural diplomacy, to safeguard legitimate rights and interests 
overseas. The report also stressed that the country realized the importance of public and 
cultural diplomacy, and thus the CPC would focus on soft power and protection of its 
overseas rights and national interests (Yang, 2014). As a result of previous leaders’ 
achievements, current President of China Xi Jinping has promoted the idea of a China 
Dream (Zhongguo Meng)33 as a major ideological campaign within China. This is not a 
wholly new idea, but it is one that is defined and advanced differently by Xi, suggesting “a 
new phase in China’s modernization and internationalization” (Kerr, 2015, p.1). He 
suggested the direction for the China Dream at the first session of the 12th National People’s 
Congress in 2013:  
The Chinese dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We must realize it by closely 
depending on the people. We must incessantly bring benefits to the people […] We 
must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push 
forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to 
achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation […] We must 
follow the strategic thinking that development is of overriding importance […] We 
must constantly tamp the material and cultural foundations for the realization of the 
Chinese dream. (China Daily, 2013a) 
A lot of time passed from the reign of Deng Xiaoping to that of Xi Jinping, but examining the 
national slogans of former Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping’s stable development slogan, 
which prevented clashes with external powers, was developed by Hu Jintao to mean a 
harmonized society and responsibility to the international society. Also, it shows that before 
Xi Jinping, Deng Xiaoping’s slogan provided China’s main diplomatic value, and this official 
foreign relations policy is a response to criticisms from and checking by Western countries, 
including those from the United States. Currently, China proposes the ‘China Dream’ to 
                                                
32 The mean of the scientific outlook on development is that China has changed from the situation of 
over-reliance on a cheap labor force, funds and natural resources to well-educated workers and 
improvement of science and technology, a development mode for the country (China Daily, 2010b).  
33 The meaning of China Dream can be interpreted in various ways. However, this research adopted 
Kerr (2015)’s perspective to understand China’s public diplomacy.  
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generate a national revival on the international stage (Tsang, 2015), by putting forward a far-
reaching goal of recreating the Silk Road, through the “One Belt and One Road” policy. 
Taken together, the main objective of China’s public diplomacy is to promote the nation’s 
economic development through peaceful coexistence on the international stage. Public 
diplomacy helps China to achieve amicable relations with foreign countries. For example, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and World Trade Organization (WTO) played important 
roles in Chinese economic development, through vigorous interactions with related nations, 
and contributed to major changes in Chinese strategy from “bringing in” (yin jin lai) to 
“going out” (zou chu qu) (Zhu, 2013, p.7). In this regard, China seeks to achieve its goals 
through its public diplomacy in following ways: First, China pursues a “harmonious society” 
to bridge the gap between rich and poor and, by extension, to seek “scientific development” 
to maintain sustainable economic development. Second, China pursues their “harmonious 
world” and “peaceful rise” strategies to erase China’s negative public image and improve 
cooperation with other nations, and to stimulate China’s economic activity. Third, China 
wants to be recognized by the world as a friendly and contributing nation. Finally, China 
wants to introduce its ancestors’ culture and lessons to the world (d’Hooghe, 2008, p.43). In 
sum, public diplomacy is a suitable tool for China to achieve its contemporary goals, as 
Beijing has traditionally sought many of the rights and privileges of a great power, without 
accepting the responsibilities that came with them (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003). The 
following section will discuss China’s soft power, which is the means of its public diplomacy.  
 
3.3.2 China’s soft power and its culture and history 
Soft power has been adopted as a core concept in Chinese foreign policy since the Hu Jintao 
era. Hu officially highlighted China’s cultural soft power in his keynote report made on 
behalf of the 16th CPC Central Committee to the 17th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China, in 2007: 
Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and 
creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national 
strength […] enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better 
guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests […] The great rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese 
culture. (China.org.cn, 2007) 
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Notwithstanding Hu’s public announcement in 2007, Hu did not give shape to what and how 
soft power was going to enhance China’s ability to get others to “want what it wants” (Suzuki, 
2009). After the concept of soft power arrived in China from the West, around 1993, China’s 
soft power was buttressed by the Chinese government through research by Chinese scholars 
and policy-makers (Wang, 1993; Wang and Lu, 2008, p.442).34 The majority of Chinese 
scholars, including Cho & Jeong (2008), Li (2008), W. Zhang (2010), and Wang & Lu 
(2008), pointed out the limitations of Nye’s conception of soft power to understand Chinese 
soft power. While Nye’s concept is typical of American knowledge-based experiences and 
pragmatic characteristics, Chinese soft power has a broader scope, covering a larger 
spectrum, and emphasizes China’s own characteristics, and also considers its present 
condition based on Chinese thought. Hence, Chinese scholars and analysts refer to soft 
power as an “intangible, non-quantifiable, non-material or spiritual power” (Wang & Lu, 
2008, p.427). Chinese scholars concentrate on analyzing Chinese traditional culture and 
economic development models, which are interpreted as hard power to exert sort power. 
Therefore, the concept of soft power in China is more like the concept of smart power (Wang, 
2008). In a similar vein, Chinese writers use soft power term in three different ways: first 
ruan shili (soft strength), which has the closest to the Western definition of soft power and 
often used among Chinese writers; second ruan quanli (soft authority or right); third ruan 
liliang (soft physical strength or force) (Barr, 2015, p. 183). In other words, the Chinese 
perspective of power is that hard and soft power are “more intertwined and in agreement 
with the policy line that they are both essential parts of a state’s Comprehensive National 
Power” (d’Hooghe, 2015, p.110). In addition, Ding (2008) referred to soft power as a 
medium to lead to Chinese development through the glorification or idealization of historical 
background. Moreover, Wang (2011) considered China’s soft power facilitates to 
communicate with the world. 
China began to focus on soft power due to the international situation. Like public 
diplomacy’s goal, the reason that China has paid attention to soft power is related to its high 
level of economic growth. Since the 1990s, China has discussed its role in international 
society with more confidence thanks to its rapid economic growth. In particular, China’s 
economic growth model gained the spotlight following the global financial crisis in 2008. 
However, China’s economic development has been shown as menacing or a threat to the 
                                                
34 With regards to China’s soft power in China, the view diverges over the matter of the core elements 
of China’s soft power. One is that Chinese soft power is strong, due to its unique values. The other 
view suggests that China’s political power is the most important component of its ability to exercise its 
soft power overseas (d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.111-113; Shambaugh, 2013, p.170; Wang, 2011; Wang 2015 
also see Yan. X. (2007). Ruanshili yu Zhongguo Jueqi (Soft power and the Rise of China). 
Beijingdaxue Zhongguo yu Shijie Yanjiuzhongxin YanjiuBaogao (research paper of the Beijing 
University’s China and the World Research Center), 5, 1–18;  
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world, and as an authoritarian and nationalistic model for international society (Roy, 1996). 
China, concurrently, recognized the expansion of America’s values in the era of globalization 
and information age. Hence, the Chinese leadership began to develop more sophisticated 
diplomatic policies based on soft power, by mobilizing officials and scholars and 
emphasizing its favorite national image – that of a peaceful and responsible great power, as 
well as one fostering an amicable international environment for its ascendancy (Ding, 2008). 
Hence, high-ranking government advisors in China deem soft power to be “indispensable in 
the country’s attempt to increase its ‘comprehensive national strength’ (zonghe guoli) and 
regain its status as a leading world power” (Huang and Ding, 2006). This approach is similar 
to Kurlantzick’s understanding of Chinese soft power, that  
[for] the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security 
realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more 
coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in 
multilateral organizations. (2007b, p.6) 
When one considers that the current debate on soft power in China is connected to its 
foreign policy orientation, there is little doubt that soft power has become an important topic 
in Chinese strategic circles (Li, 2008). China’s soft power is relevant to fostering a positive 
and intimate image of China overseas. China’s soft power had become embedded in its 
traditional ideology, culture, and foreign strategies (Ding, 2008a, 2008b; Lai, 2012a). Thus, 
Chinese discourse proposes that the most vital source of soft power is from culture, domestic 
institutions and values (Zhang & Liu, 2009). Based on this vital source of China’s soft power, 
Beijing employs the following elements as a tool kit to exercise soft power leverage: China’s 
reassuring political discourse and diplomatic conduct, including self-control against 
contentious subjects and issues, public diplomacy, and trade and assistance (Lai, 2012a). 
Taken together, interviewee N-C1 argued that the China model, foreign aid, and its culture 
play a leading role in its soft power based on his experience in African countries. Other 
scholars also understand the source of China’s soft power as follows: the Confucius 
Institutions (which provide Chinese cultural and language instruction), the policy of a 
harmonious world and being good neighbor, foreign aid, and China model35 provided by its 
domestic policies and values (Bin, 2008; Grill and Huang, 2006; Huang and Ding, 2006; 
Kurlantzick, 2007b; Li, 2008; Liu and Tsai, 2014; Suzuki, 2009). Based on the last thirty 
years, China’s soft power activities in developing countries, in particular, has been deployed 
in the form of grants, aid projects, low-interest loans, direct investment, economic 
                                                
35 Due to the controversies over the concept of the Beijing Consensus, this research has adopted the 
“China model”, which refers to China’s model of economic development, or the Beijing Consensus, to 
avoid controversy in this thesis. More discussion on this topic will appear in Chapter 4.  
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collaboration agreement, and cultural exchanges to promote its soft power among 
developing countries (Tang and Li, 2011). 
As to providing a definition of the concept of China’s cultural soft power, Guozuo Zhang 
(2017) has divided Chinese culture into three levels: at the macro-level, culture leaves its 
marks on the human mind, in the form of material culture and spiritual culture. At the 
medium-level, culture is comprised of China’s general development of economics, politics, 
culture, society, diplomacy, and others and refers to ideologies that can be spread through 
language and images, and influence others’ emotions and psychology. The micro-level covers 
all specific knowledge of different fields, disciplines, and policies. However, among the three 
levels, the medium- and micro-levels of culture are involved in major cultural soft power 
(p.40). The importance of China’s culture36 for its soft power has been expressed by Li 
Yunshan. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, and President of the Party School of the CPC 
Central Committee, he highlighted the significance of culture and the core values of 
socialism during his speech at a Party School opening ceremony: “We have every reason to 
consolidate our confidence in culture, and the key is to be aware of the deep root of our 
culture that has unique advantages, […] this would help enhance China's soft power, 
elevating it into a major socialist cultural power” (Xinhua News, 2016d). The component of 
culture that the Chinese government and scholars consider to be an important part of its soft 
power is comprised of those China’s values that highlight its cohesion, solidarity and long-
term stability (G. Zhang, 2017, p. 40), which are different from those in the West, and 
especially from those in America.  
Hence, China tries to connect its contemporary cultural soft power to its traditional culture, 
as its traditions are the root, the path of historical development, as well as the soul of China 
that distinguishes it from other countries. Positive core values from China’s traditional 
culture popular today include an optimistic and sanguine ethos, unity, harmony, high-
spiritedness, courage, creativity, and others (G. Zhang, 2017, pp.45-47). Two historical 
Chinese characteristics influence its soft power. The first is the doctrine of the system. In the 
past, traditional society recognized that it was necessary to establish a doctrine of the system 
as an ideology of provide norms and standards of traditional order to maintain the order of a 
unified empire. Confucianism and School of Law were used as the basis of a doctrine of the 
system by the ruling classes. These ideas not only helped to provide unification and 
homogeneity to the empire as a whole, but also served to justify the profits of the ruling 
classes and races. Accordingly, several religious systems had been developed, including 
                                                
36 Wang Huning (1993) also stressed culture as a core component of China’s soft power. 
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Taoism and Buddhism, which helped form the ideas and cultural system coping with 
Confucianism. China has a long, thousand-year history of cultural glory in East Asia, based 
on the values of traditional Chinese culture found in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and 
other classic schools of thought, such as winning respect through virtue (ri de furen), 
benevolent governance (wang dao), peace and harmony (he), and harmony without 
suppressing differences (he er bu tong) (Li, 2008, p.292). Also, the term harmony is 
emphasised, ‘giving priority to human beings’ (yi ren wei ben) and ‘harmony between nature 
and human kind’ (tian ren he yi) in traditional Chinese culture (ibid). The other historical 
characteristic is Sinocentrism, or a China-centered view of world order. The view of the 
world in traditional Chinese society was not that of the modern nation-state system 
comprised of equal, sovereign nations. Rather, it was Sinocentrism, in which hierarchical 
order is created centred around China. With the emergence of Chinese nationalism, 
Sinocentrism was again revived in the Chinese people’s view of the world (Scott, 2008; S. 
Zhao, 2011). Their historical practice of tributary trade, which allows differentiated and 
preferential treatment in economic and diplomatic relations, is found again in today’s 
strategies for pursuing the national interest with proper harmony of hard power, such as 
military force and foreign relations.  
 
3.3.3 The varied opinions of China’s Soft Power 
As discussed earlier, China’s soft power differs from Nye’s concept of Soft power. There is a 
wide range of opinion about China’s soft power among scholars, with regards to which 
component of soft power makes China’s so different. Moreover, there have been many 
controversies about whether China’s soft power is able to be an instrument to achieve 
peaceful development on the global stage. Studies on China in International Relations so far 
have focused on the emergence of China as an economic and military power. However, many 
Western scholars, including Nye, have shown interest in China’s soft power, but have 
pointed out China’s soft power has limitations, despite the fact that Chinese culture, 
including language, is spreading through developing countries. 
Most scholars offer China’s political system as the greatest hindrance to smoothly 
implementing its soft power strategies. Joseph Nye (2015b) recently interpreted the situation 
as “China has emphasized its cultural and economic strengths, but it has paid less attention 
to the political aspects that can undermine its effort”, and pointed out two factors (China’s 
nationalism and censored civil society) as limitations on China’s soft power. Despite the 
frequent assertions of it being a socialist China that has adopted soft power to seek a peaceful 
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rise, and a positive image of the country on the world stage, its authoritarian regime is a 
problem when China exercises its soft power, due to the lack of transparency, censorship, 
unequal opportunities, and domestic corruption (Li and Worm, 2011). In other words, the 
high rate of China’s economic growth and nationalism are the result of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s battle for legitimacy, but nationalism has a negative impact on China’s 
soft power (for example, when China was establishing a Confucius Institution in Manila, 
during an ongoing ownership contest between China and the Philippines over islands in the 
South China Sea). The authoritarian governmental system also limits the strength that can 
be drawn from civil society, and believes that the government is the primary source of its soft 
power, and publicizes the belief that its ancient culture appeals to the world at large (Nye, 
2015b). Not only this, internationally, the West raises the issue of the suppression of human 
rights and freedoms, which are related to China’s non-compliance with international norms 
(Huang and Ding, 2006), whereby the unfavorable international reputation is linked to 
China’s soft power. Based on contemporary issues and China’s soft power system, China’s 
unique political system affects not only the value of its soft power, but also its public 
diplomacy, and gives rise to unintended consequences that are far from the positive 
responses of foreign publics. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has reviewed public diplomacy and its related subordinate concepts (propaganda 
and strategic communication), and has drawn common points between public diplomacy and 
these concepts. Based on the discussion, the chapter has discovered the importance of public 
diplomacy for states, especially in the globalization and information-oriented age, and has 
found that the development of communication technology gave rise to a new public 
diplomacy. 
 
Unlike earlier, or old public diplomacy, the new public diplomacy displays five 
characteristics: 1) seeking mutual understanding to sustain relationships among nations, 
international actors, and foreign publics with bilateral and symmetric dialogue; (2) 
considering public opinion; (3) attaching great importance to mutuality and trust, and long-
term focus on relationship-building; (4) establishing networks of relationships between non-
state actors and organizations and multiple stakeholders; and (5) facilitating a collaborative 
approach to foreign relations.  In addition, it has reviewed Nye’s concept of soft power with 
three different aspects of relational power to understand the flow of power from hard 
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(command power) to soft (co-optive power). The chapter has also acknowledged the 
necessity and importance of public diplomacy to generate soft power, which is intangible; 
and recognizes the that there is a dispute about the connection between public diplomacy 
and soft power due to the advent of other forms of power, such as smart power, social power, 
and integrated power.  
 
By reviewing the Western perspective on public diplomacy and soft power, and also China’s 
public diplomacy and soft power, the chapter has recognized that the concept of public 
diplomacy and soft power is broader in China than it is in Western conceptions. In particular, 
the notion of propaganda in China connotes a positive image, unlike in the West, and China 
had attempted to communicate with the world before the introduction of the concept of 
public diplomacy to China, in the early 1990s. The goal of China’s public diplomacy is to 
create an amicable image of the country to achieve its goal of being a responsible power and 
maneuvering through a peaceful rise/development. In addition, China wants to be shown to 
contribute to world peace, as well as construct for itself an image of a respectable country 
through soft power based on the China model, and a harmonized and civilized historical 
background. Based on this positive image, China attempts to move past, or dissuade the 
China threat theory, and refute distorted impressions of the country arising from the West. 
By extension, China is pursuing an expansion of its role, and is waiting for an opportunity to 
fulfill the Sino-Globalization.  
Building on the general background of China’s public diplomacy and soft power outlined in 
this chapter, the next chapter will look at mechanisms for its implementation, based on the 
three dimensions (government actor, semi-governmental actor, and non- governmental 
actor), and also how the Chinese government applies public diplomacy to shape the 









Chapter 4. China’s Public Diplomacy in its International Strategy with a focus 
on economic relations  
 
This chapter aims will expand our overview of China’s public diplomacy and soft power, as 
introduced in Chapter 3, and link it with the necessity of China’s public diplomacy to achieve 
its foreign policy goals, before starting the discussion on Sino-African relations. First, 
therefore, this chapter will analyze the China model from a Chinese perspective, and discuss 
Joshua Ramo’s Beijing Consensus37. Then, it will examine the role of each of China’s main 
actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actor) who have ties to its 
public diplomacy activities, and analyze how – and with which instruments – they carry out 
public diplomacy. Third, it will consider how culture and foreign aid exert influence on 
China’s public diplomacy, and how to create a favorable environment for China to have close 
economic relations with foreign countries.  
 
4.1 China’s International Strategy and the Importance of Public Diplomacy 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, through public diplomacy, the Chinese government seeks to foster 
common development, cooperation, and mutual understanding with other countries and 
foreign publics. To this end, Hu Jintao expounded a four-point proposal for building a 
harmonious world, at the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2005. The first point is to 
embrace multilateralism. He argued that “[w]e must abandon the Cold War mentality, 
cultivate a new security concept featuring trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and 
build a fair and effective collective security mechanism aimed at preventing war and conflict 
and safeguarding world peace and security”. The second is to foster economic cooperation, 
which is of mutual benefit to all countries that are intertwined, by establishing and enhancing 
“a multilateral trading system that is open, fair and non-discriminatory”, and by engaging in a 
“worldwide energy dialogue and cooperation” and “balanced development in the world”. The 
third is “to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make 
international relations more democratic” as all countries are entitled to choose their own 
                                                
37 As for Beijing consensus publications, Stefan Halper (2010) is also famous for his work on Beijing 




social system and paths of development, independent of outside meddling. The final point is 
to reform the UN to maintain its authority and improve its validity to produce better results 
(China.org.cn, 2005b). Two years later, Hu explained how to realize a harmonious world, in a 
report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Part of China. He pointed out that 
“the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of 
lasting peace and common prosperity” (China Daily, 2007c). To achieve this, he suggests that 
all countries should (1) observe the United Nations Charters’ principles and aim, (2) follow 
international law and universal norms, and (3) boost democracy, collaboration, harmony, and 
mutual advantage in international relations. Hu identified five aspects of a harmonious world:  
 
Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an 
equal footing in a common endeavor to promote democracy in international relations. 
Economically, they should cooperate with each other, draw on each other's strengths 
and work together to advance economic globalization in the direction of balanced 
development, shared benefits and win-win progress. Culturally, they should learn 
from each other in the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences, 
respect the diversity of the world, and make joint efforts to advance human 
civilization. In the area of security, they should trust each other, strengthen 
cooperation, settle international disputes by peaceful means rather than by war, and 
work together to safeguard peace and stability in the world. On environmental issues, 
they should assist and cooperate with each other in conservation efforts to take good 
care of the Earth, the only home of human beings. (ibid) 
Hu’s suggestion for how to create a harmonious world is directly connected to China’s 
foreign policy, which aims to foster an image of China as a stable, reliable, and responsible 
economic partner, a rising economic power that does not have to be feared (d’Hooghe, 2011). 
China’s international strategy aligns with the objective of public diplomacy as proposed by 
Mark (2009), and mentioned in Chapter 3.1, that the idealistic objective is to create a 
bilateral relationship based on mutual exchange, with the functional objective of boosting 
the interests of trade, politics, diplomacy, and economy, and manage tensions in 
international bilateral relations. In other words, explains that China’s public diplomacy is 
designed by and focused on its foreign policy, based on domestic policy. The following 
sections will discuss the importance of sustainable economic development in China’s foreign 
policy and how it links to its public diplomacy activities.  
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4.1.1 The significance of sustainable development as China’s international 
strategy  
As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s development model is widely recognized as a source of its 
soft power. China’s economic development is important not only to China’s socialist political 
party as a way of creating domestic legitimacy for national unification (Buzan, 2014), but 
also offers a favorable impression for developing countries (d’Hooghe, 2007; Kurlantzick, 
2007b) such as Vietnam, Kazakhstan, India, Brazil, Iran, and Zimbabwe (Huang & Ding 
2006). According to a white paper on China’s peaceful development, published by the State 
Council Information Office in 2011, the core components of China’s national interests are 
state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification. The paper 
also states clearly that China’s political system is based on an all-round social stability, 
including ensuring sustainable economic and social development (State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011b). Since economic reform began in 1978, China has enjoyed 
remarkable economic growth. China accumulated the largest amount of currency reserves; 
addressed the poverty of 200 million people in the late of 1970s; and, especially in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the Chinese public and its leadership gained confidence that it had a right 
to become a global power through economic success, enjoying trade surpluses of around 
$100 billion trade annually (Kurlantzick, 2007a). Especially, even though China’s recent 
economic growth has slowed since the global financial crisis during the mid-to-late-2000s, 
China’s GDP grew between 2009 to 2010, from 9.4 to 10.6 percent (World Bank, n.a). Also, 
in 2008, China’s exports changed from labor-intensive products to medium-technical 
products. The volume of exports was $1.423 trillion, an increase of 17.2 percent from the 
previous year; and its trade surplus was $295.4 billion, an increase of 12.5 percent over the 
previous year, when the world experienced an economic recession (Takahara, 2012). Since 
then, China has become a second largest economy in the world, through large-scale 
expansion of financial investment-related business, and by increasing intermediary-goods 
imports between 2009 and 2010. Around the same time, the import of end goods has also 
improved, due to increased consumption. 
China’s rapidly growing economic prowess led to a reputation for prosperity and affluence, 
and improved China’s attractiveness, making it an exemplar of success (Huang & Ding, 
2006). China’s economic development method became known as the “Beijing Consensus”, as 
opposed to the Washington Consensus. The phrase was first coined in 2004 by Joshua 
Cooper Ramo, a former Time magazine foreign affairs editor, Goldman Sachs China advisor, 
and a professor at Tsinghua University: 
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China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure 
out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the 
international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their 
way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of 
gravity. I call this new centre and physics of power and development the Beijing 
Consensus. (Ramo, 2004 p.3-4) 
He argued that the Beijing Consensus is going to replace the Washington Consensus, 
especially in developing countries. The three core theorems of the Beijing Consensus are: 
first, the innovation theorem – China has pushed ahead balanced development between 
urban and rural areas, regions, economy and society, humans and nature and its domestic 
economy and the international economy, by establishing improvements in quality of life, 
rather than growth of GDP. Second, demanding a development model where sustainability 
and equality as its first considerations theorem – focusing on quality-of-life rather than 
measuring like per-capita GDP to manage the massive contradictions of Chinese 
development. And third, a self-determination theorem – China has endeavored to promote 
self-determination in relation to the United States, for example, focusing peaceful 
development not reliant on weaponry, and by developing asymmetric capabilities to balance 
the United States (Ramo, 2004, pp.11-12). Based on this, Ramo noted that the “Chinese 
development policy is more effective and practical for system-transition states and 
developing countries” rather than the Washington Consensus, which consistently applies a 
series of so-called neoliberal policies to reach economic development goals (Cho and Jeong, 
2008, p.462). To sum up, the term “Beijing Consensus” represents a model for economic 
development based on China’s successful growth into an economic superpower under one-
party communist rule, while the Washington Consensus demands a free market system in 
conjunction with liberal democratic reform through the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Hayden, 2011; S. Zhao, 2010).  
However, the Beijing consensus is controversial among scholars who question whether or 
not the pattern of China’s economic development can be an alternative development model 
for other countries (Chen and Goodman, 2012; Barr,2011; Ferchen, 2013; Kennedy, 2010; 
Lai, 2016; So, 2013; Naughton, 2010; S. Zhao, 2010, 2011). When one looks into the three 
theorems of the Beijing Consensus, technological innovation is not a core element of China’s 
growth. China has not been an innovation leader, nor innovative in its technological and 
policy initiatives, but its enterprises have invented and designed products and provided 
services outside China. As to China’s high-tech sectors, the successful and massive Chinese 
companies build networks as assemblers and manufacturers of other designs. And China’s 
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economic policy is not an innovation, but resembles a modified version of the East Asian 
model of several newly-industrialized East Asian economies – referring to the development 
of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, China’s 
sustainable and equitable development is highly limited. China concentrates on rapid GDP 
growth over environmental concerns, although China has taken steps to draw up measures 
of infrastructure for environmental protection. Also, China puts economic growth and legal 
reform before political liberalization and robust civil society. China still exhibits inequality in 
its growth experience – for example, personal, sectoral, or regional inequality – however, 
700 million people have been lifted out of poverty. Third, China’s economic development 
strategy is not unique, as China shares similarities and differences in policies with other 
countries, including liberal capitalist governance regimes, and those of developing states. 
Also, due to diverse reasons including non-policy-related elements of China’s remarkable 
economic growth, it is hard to link its success with the Beijing Consensus (Barr, 2011; 
Kennedy, 2010; Lai, 2016; S. Zhao, 2010, 2011). Additionally, the concept of the Beijing 
Consensus excludes several overarching features to understand China’s development, such 
as, economically, the increase and progression of reform from a basic sector (agriculture) to 
a complex sector (manufacture and finance); utilization of China’s comparative advantage by 
using labor-intensive manufactured exports; a connection with the global economy; 
promotion of non-state enterprises; and increased reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
And in the political arena, the improvement of governance and cadre promotion, 
highlighting political stability, and slow political reform (Lai, 2016, p.25). Hence, in lieu of 
embracing Ramo’s Beijing Consensus, Chinese scholars have put forward “the China model” 
to “describe the possible component and features in China’s path of development” (ibid). In 
addition to the China model and the Beijing Consensus, other names have been suggested, 
such as “state capitalism”, “market authoritarianism”, “authoritarian capitalism” (Barr, 2011). 
Michael Barr also argued that the Beijing Consensus is not a consensus, nor unique to China. 
Hence, the Beijing Consensus is recognized as a concept and term that that distinguishes 
between China and the West.  
As Minglu Chen and David S. G. Goodman (2012) have argued, despite many efforts to 
identify a China model by journalists, scholars, and public intellectuals, there is little 
agreement about the dimensions of the China model. Moreover, Barr (2011) also observed 
the difficulties of China’s model, in that it is hard to standardize the style or pattern of 
China’s 30-plus years economic strategy of reform and opening up. He also cautions that 
“framing China’s success by referring to the uniqueness of its model can be more misleading 
than helpful and has set up a barrier rather than a bridge to comprehend China’s soft power” 
(Barr, 2011, p.15). However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the China model is a component of 
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its soft power and makes a favorable impression on developing countries, and boosts close 
ties and economic cooperation between China and developing countries. Therefore, this 
research will briefly summarize the features and patterns contained in the China model only 
to understand the further discussion on Sino-Africa relations, which will be discuss in 
Chapters 5-7. When taking all scholarly arguments together, the term “China model” is a 
constant in China’s strategic planning, which forms the basis of all its economic development 
policies. The China model was well summarized by S. Zhao (2010), who argued that the 
model is associated with diverse aspects of China’s unique economic and political reform 
such as gradualism, pragmatism, the important role of the Chinese government in markets 
and economic development, the advance in commercial law, and the limitation of civil and 
political rights for stability and economic growth. 
 
4.1.2 China’s public diplomacy system: strategic connection between political 
leadership, various government departments, and instruments  
To grasp China’s government organizations, we need to address the fundamental meaning of 
the public from the Chinese perspective. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the Chinese 
government considers public to mean Chinese public. In parallel, the West – especially 
American scholars – believe it means public affairs, which has a broader scope than 
diplomacy. Thus, a mixture of public diplomacy and public affairs holds a place in the 
Chinese political system, which organizes and coordinates its policy. The Chinese 
government does not, however, have single organ of public diplomacy, which is solely 
responsible of its operation as in the America’s system. Most of Chinese public diplomacy’s 
work, therefore, is shared by the various government departments, such as the Ministry of 
Commerce, the Ministry of Culture (MOC), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Information Office of the State Council, and other stakeholders in the 
Central Government, the business sector, media organizations, and think tanks (Wang, 
2008; K. Zhao 2015b). Regarding China’s public diplomacy operation, Yang (2011) explained 
a systematic and close cooperation among all relevant government departments, institutions, 
and Chinese citizens for its public diplomacy. First, China carries out public diplomacy, 
which pertains to major diplomatic activities and high-level visits. In this case, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has managed national leaders’ overseas visits or international conference 
attendance, where China shares its fundamental perspectives and its polities with foreign 
audiences. The Chinese government has hosted various events, such as the Shanghai World 
Expo, the Beijing Olympics, China’s National Pavilion Day, and the Summit Forum. Chinese 
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leaders, including high-level government personnel are involved in its events for opening 
and closing ceremonies. Not only that, but China arranges media interviews and Internet 
forums for foreign leaders and ambassadors to fosters positive impressions towards China. 
Second, China utilizes public diplomacy to encourage external publicity and communicate 
with the public through information utilization under Chinese government supervision. To 
do this, Beijing holds nearly one hundred press conferences every year, sharing authoritative 
information on sensitive subjects with supportive foreign correspondents working in China. 
Moreover, China makes good use of the Internet to impart Chinese information through 
various websites, which are under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various 
agencies stationed overseas. Third, China focuses on boosting its institutions and 
mechanisms both internally and externally to improve the structure and function of its 
public diplomacy system. This is carried out at a high level, a joint operation between Beijing 
leader’s initiatives and Chinese embassies abroad, and various institutions on the ground. By 
extension, the Chinese government focuses on training diplomatic staff not only to have 
smooth communication skills and encourage understanding between China and foreign 
publics, but also to publicize China’s policies. Beijing has enhanced personnel exchanges 
with media and research institutions, and has dispatched key personnel to research at 
Chinese and foreign universities and research institutions. Thus, the hallmark of China’s 
public diplomacy is a government-centered (the government exerts influence directly or 
indirectly), top-down system.  
To examine the feature of China’s diplomacy above, the next section will look at three 
different actors of China’s public diplomacy. This research into the three actors38 is divided 
into three, based on their role in China’s public diplomacy system: (1) governmental actors at 
the central level, including state leaders and major ministries related to diplomatic missions 
overseas;  (2) semi-governmental actors at the local level, including local governments, 
provinces and cities; and (3) non-governmental actors, including academic circles 
(universities think tanks), cultural organizations, businesses (large corporations and 
chambers of commerce), NGOs and lobby groups (national and international advocacy 
                                                
38 The ideas to divide three categories in the study are adopted from the definition of Gregory (2011) 
approach of public diplomacy which mentioned in Chapter 3.1.1 that public diplomacy refers as “an 
instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to 
understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence 
thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” with Shambaugh (2013) 
suggestion that China deploys three divided institutions – governmental, semi-governmental, and 
nongovernmental – and various instruments to conduct its public diplomacy with soft power abroad 
(p.176). Based on this, the study adopted d’Hooghe (2015)’s understanding of the framework of 
China’s public diplomacy on the basis of decision-making and role of its public diplomacy policy 
(pp.35-36).  
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group), and citizens (exchange and friendship organizations and associations and individual 
citizens). The three actors deploy diverse instruments (media, foreign aid, education 
institutions/activities including Confucius Institutes) when they carry out public diplomacy. 
The discussion of each actor begins with governmental actors in conjunction with public 
diplomacy programs, because China’s public diplomacy is a government-centered system, 
and most programs are designed by government ministries. After discussing the main actors, 
the chapter will briefly review the central role of sub-state actors and non-state actors, with 
the purpose of promoting understanding of China’s public diplomacy activities in Sino-
African relations, in Chapters 6-7.  
Governmental main actors for China’s Public diplomacy 
 
China’s public diplomacy expert Ingrid d’Hooghe (2015), who is a research associate at the 
Clingendael Institution, has proposed six departments’ groups that perform similar work 
through government-level actors: the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and State 
Information Internet Office (SII); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies and 
missions abroad; the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education and the State 
Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT); the Ministry of Defense and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA); China’s leaders; the Communist Party of China (CCP); and 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (p.134). This section will 
look into the main actors who play a significant role in constructing and practicing China’s 
public diplomacy policy. These actors will be separated into two categories (information, and 
cultural and education), because the main actors and related institutions formulate and take 
charge of the programs of the two categories (Han, 2010, p.296). Although China’s foreign 
aid is important to its public diplomacy, it will be covered in Chapter 4.2.2, because China’s 
foreign aid is mostly concentrated in African countries unlike Asian countries.  
Governmental major actors handling of information programs  
 
In general, the foreign ministry is the primary state actor to perform public diplomacy, 
although China’s public diplomacy activities are under the purview of the State Council 
Information Office (SCIO) and the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity (Wang, 
2011). According to China.org.cn (the so-called China Internet Information Center), referred 
to as China’s authorized government portal site under the control of the SCIO and China 
International Publishing Group (CIPG), the aim of SCIO is officially “to promote 
communication, cooperation and mutual trust between China and the world” (China.org.cn, 
2014a). Established in 1990, the SCIO set the Chinese government’s sights on changing its 
international image. It was subsequently responsibility for online news contents (Shirk, 2011, 
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p. 238). Its major role is not only vital to most of China’s public diplomacy development and 
determination, but it is also responsible for monitoring foreign media and cooperating with 
foreign news agencies and rendering assistance to foreign journalists, in order to ensure 
delivery of “accurate” Chinese news and information (Chen, 2011, p.75). Not only that, but 
the SCIO is also responsible for censoring domestic media and the Internet information 
about its domestic and foreign policies, education and culture, history, economic and social 
development, foreign media monitoring, domestic media and Internet censoring, providing 
information on Chinese human rights promotion, organizing news conferences, compiling 
and publishing both the Chinese government’s white papers and visual images, and 
arranging cultural interagency and cross-regional exchanges (China.org.cn, 2014a). 
In fact, the original home of the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity was the Party 
Central Committee-affiliated Overseas Propaganda Department, which the CCP founded in 
the wake of the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989 (Chen, 2011, pp.76-7). In 1998, the 
Chinese government renamed its department to the External Publicity Department based 
around ‘xuan’ in the word Zhong Xuan Bu, as it is called in Chinese. In Chinese, xuan means 
“propaganda” or “propagate”, and “publicity” or “publicize”. Therefore, Western scholars 
have two impressions of the External Publicity Department: one of “publicity” to 
“propaganda”, and the other of both “publicity” and “propaganda” (Hartig, 2015, p.85). 
Moreover, it supervised the creation of the SCIO, which took it upon itself to “publicizing 
China in an authentic, colorful, lively, and timely way” in international society during the 
1990s (Hayden, 2011, p.192). The SCIO is typically referred to in Chinese as both the Guo 
Xin Ban and Wai Xuan Ban, which means External Propaganda Office, as the role it 
performs covers both the party and the state’s bureaucratic system. It is also both a 
subordinate in the State Council, and superintended by the CCP’s Small Groups.39 In other 
words, the SCIO performs administrative work for the External Propaganda Leading Small 
Group (EPLSG), similar to the work of the Leading Group of Foreign Affairs Work (who 
assigns duties to the Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO)). However, the SCIO has more 
authority than the CFAO in terms of manpower, finances, and exerting said authority. In 
regards to the SCIO’s management system, the Chinese refer to it as “one organ, two 
signboards”, which connotes the CCP in tandem with the state organs for the determination 
                                                
39 The Central Committee “leading group (lingdao xiaozu)” or “small groups (xiaozu)” falls under the 
direct control of the Party Secretariat and reports to the Politburo and its Standing Committee, 
including its members (Miller, 2008, pp.1-3) Miller, A. (2008). The CCP Central Committee’s Leading 
Small Groups. China Leadership Monitor. 26. 1-21.; more information on Zheng, Y., & Chen, G. 
(2015). The Chinese Communist Party: an institutional perspective. In D.S.G. Goodman (ed.), 
Handbook of the Politics of China (pp. 57-75). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing; Hsiao, 
C.C. & Cheek, T. (1995). Open and Closed Media: External and Internal Newspapers in the 
Propaganda System. In C. L. Hamrin, S. Zhao, & A. D. Barnett (eds.), Decision-making in Deng’s 
China: Perspectives from Insiders (pp. 76-90). New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.  
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and management of its major cases (Shambaugh, 2013, p.221; d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.134-5; 
Hartig, 2015, p. 85; Zheng and Chen, 2015, p.67). Despite the fact that the SCIO has had a 
vital role in China’s public diplomacy ever since it was established, it plays a similar role to 
that of the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity, which falls under the Communist 
Party’s Central Publicity Department (CPD) umbrella. The CPD draws up guidelines and 
disciplines through the Communist Party’s office of external publicity consultation; its realm 
of responsibility is not only China’s media – including film, drama, art, news, education, and 
literature (Brady, 2002, p. 565), but also international publicity environment and publicity 
work that requires permission for certain issues (d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.134-5). The SCIO 
embarked in earnest on China’s public diplomacy work under Zhao Qizheng’s leadership, 
who was minister from 1998 to 2005. Put another way, China established a foothold for its 
public diplomacy policy implementation during this period. During his career, he served as 
vice mayor of Shanghai, and played an active part in the “Shanghai-clique” with Jiang Zemin, 
and communication with the outside world (Cull, 2008c, p.128). Zhao’s greatest 
accomplishment was the improvement of the Chinese government’s under-utilized press 
conference and unilateral information-delivery spokesperson system. In an interview with 
China.org.cn, in 2008, Zhao clarified the role of the government spokesperson at the SCIO 
thus: “the spokesperson prepares with a process that we call a ‘production line’. They must 
have a good command of the public information in their field and a good understanding of 
what the press and the public are interested in.” (China.org.cn, 2005a) In addition, he 
focused on official information by holding frequent press conferences, restoring the use of 
English language at news conferences, exhorting its officials to cooperate with journalists, 
and instituting “the risky Western-style approach of speaking off-the-record in Beijing” 
(d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.135-6). He also avoids to used specific terms, xuanchuan, which implies 
“propaganda” when translated into English, in favour of the more benign ‘explaining’ or 
‘shuo ming’ (Cull, 2008c, p.129).  
With the SCIO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA or MFA, hereafter MFA) is a 
government department inseparable from the conduct of China’s public diplomacy. The 
China’s MFA has been a major department in the domain of public diplomacy since 2009, 
when China’s then-leader Hu Jintao included it in his diplomatic policy (Lai, 2012b, p. 501). 
Chinese government acknowledged the importance of public diplomacy, and as a result the 
MFA set up a Public Diplomacy Division (Gonggong Waijiao Chu) within its Information 
Department in 2004, to take responsibility for “Internet-related issues and public diplomacy 
coordination with targeted domestic audiences” (K. Zhao, 2015b, p.3). Five years later, the 
division was promoted to the Public Diplomacy Office (Gonggong Waijiao Bangongshi) 
(Hartig, 2015, p.86), with responsibility for “the overall planning and coordination of public 
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diplomacy for the MFA and oversea Chinese embassies and consulates” (K. Zhao, 2015b, 
p.56). The primary responsibility of the office is advising public diplomacy regarding Chinese 
diplomatic envoys, including coordinating its public diplomacy and managing MFA’s 204 
websites. In 2010, the MFA established a Consultative Committee on Public Diplomacy with 
the objective of advising, operation and assessment, and taking the lead in its public 
diplomacy. In the spring of the same year, the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) launched 
Public Diplomacy Quarterly, managed by Zhao Qizheng, the former director of the SCIO 
and spokesman of the CPPCC. He said the following regarding the founding of the journal: 
“The aim and mission of this journal is to facilitate the development of China’s public 
diplomacy” (People’s Daily, 2010). 
In December 2012, the Chinese government also established the China Public Diplomacy 
Association (CPDA) with the purpose of creating “a nationwide non-profit organization 
compromising experts and scholars, celebrities, and relevant institutions and enterprises in 
the field of public diplomacy” (China Public Diplomacy Association, 2014). The president, Li 
Zhaoxing who held several other posts, including the Minister at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the chairman at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress 
before joining the China Public Diplomacy Association, delivered the hopeful message in his 
first inaugural speech that the association would “contribute to strengthening the soft power 
of China by mobilizing, coordinating and organizing social resources and the public for the 
promotion of China’s public diplomacy in an inclusive and pioneering manner” (MFA, 2012). 
The Association’s work was mainly composed of inspiring and organizing social and people-
to-people resources not only for the implementation of its public diplomacy activities, but 
also contribution to the nationwide diplomacy and general public diplomacy (China Public 
Diplomacy Association, 2014). In addition to CPDA, the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is another crucial department of public diplomacy with 
MFA. The CPPCC typically does not exert influence on the country’s foreign affairs; yet 
exceptions are made in connection with public diplomacy, as “it stresses the communication 
with foreign civil society, and CPPCC is the organ that represents Chinese civil society” 
(Wang, 2014, p. 94). The features of the CPPCC-led public diplomacy show “flexibility, 
diversity and extensiveness” (Yu, 2014, p.404). The CPPCC mostly conducts public 
diplomacy through its Committee of Foreign Affairs; it takes charge of organising exchanges 
with international officials and representatives from non-governmental organisations as well 
as communication with foreign countries through such as think tank and the Public 
Diplomacy Quarterly like mentioned above (Hertig, 2015). 
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Media and its subordinate instruments and programs for public diplomacy  
 
China’s information is shared through the media. The Chinese government employs media 
as one of its main tools of public diplomacy implementation. In this regard, in 2009, China’s 
former leader Jiang Zemin encouraged “China to establish a publicity capacity to exert an 
influence on world opinion that is as strong as China’s international standing”. Since then, 
the Beijing government initiated a renovation of its international broadcasting, coinciding 
with the Tiananmen Square Massacre (Rawnsley, 2015, p. 465); they invested approximately 
US$6.6 billion in that year, concentrating especially on China Radio International (CRI), 
China Central Television (CCTV), China’s official news wire, the Xinhua News Agency, and 
the newspaper China Daily (d’Hooghe, 2015, p. 164). 
Xinhua News Agency  
The Xinhua News Agency is the largest state news agency and the center for collecting and 
releasing information in China (Xinhua News, n.d.).  Xinhua has been the CCP’s mouthpiece 
since it was established, in 1931. More specifically, then Xinhua’s main role was the 
dissemination of news reports and Party and state propaganda (Shambaugh, 2013). In 1998, 
the Beijing government initiated significant reforms, and, ten years later, Xinhua became the 
largest news agencies in the world (Hong, 2012). Over the past three decades, the Chinese 
government has extended the Xinhua News Agency with the aim of creating “a central 
platform for the promotion of its global narrative” (Chen, Gloan, and Kiousis, 2016, p. 2). 
China still censors the media, which is still controlled by and under the supervision of the 
Communist Party, but they have relaxed control in recent years. The ongoing improvement 
of the media have promoted the activities of commercialization and professional journalism. 
Xinhua, consequently, has showed progressive improvement in the means of its propaganda 
proliferation, growing into a multi-purposed and multi-dimensional media platform (Jiang, 
2011; Shirk, 2011).  
Now, Xinhua has full news coverage and release facilities with multiple channels, functions, 
and means such as a satellite communications and transmission network, and computerized 
information processing systems. Xinhua releases diverse types of news items, in the fields of 
its politics, economics, society, technology, science, education, and culture, with overall 
400,000 words daily to Chinese and foreign public through its special circuits to its domestic 
TV stations, newspapers, and radio stations. Likewise, it publishes same amount of news and 
new photo plates 24 hours a day, with Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabian, 
and Portuguese versions for overseas audiences (Xinhua News, n.d). Xinhua News Agency 
established Xinhuanet in 1997, as an online news service. The responsibility of Xinhuanet is 
to publicize China and report the world through three online domains: xinhuanet.com, 
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xinhua.org, and news.cn. The domain chinaview.cn is offered only in English. It also covers 
over 200 countries and regions in six different languages: Chinese, English, Spanish, French, 
Russian, and Arabic. Xinhuanet is the third top news website after BBC and CNN providing 
news services to overseas Internet users. Not only that, but it also manages several main 
governmental websites, but also numerous official conference and crucial international 
events websites, such as the APEC Forum, China-Africa Cooperation Forum Beijing Summit, 
and China-Korea Exchange Year (Jirik, 2016; Reilly, 2012; Wasserman, 2015). 
Xinhua not only employs approximately 10,000 employees and 1,000 correspondents in 162 
bureaus around the world, but also has overseas branches in over 100 nations and regions, 
including Hong Kong, New York, London, Paris, and others, so as to collecting on-the-spot 
information and broadcast China’s information. Xinhua is also planning to expand to 180 
more bureaus by 2020 (Hartig, 2015, p.87). In 2010, The Chinese government launched 
Xinhua’s 24-hour global news channel in English, known as the China Network Corporation 
(or CNC World) in order to present an international vision from a Chinese perspective 
(Zheng and Robertson, 2011). At a lunch ceremony in Beijing, Xinhua’s President Li Congjun 
stated, “I will broadcast news report in a timely way and objectively, and be a new source of 
information for global audiences” (BBC, 2010). At the same time, Xinhua opened new 
bureaus to strengthen its staffs especially in the North American, European, and Asian 
market (Shambaugh, 2013, p.229) and diversified its product line through enhanced web 
presence, video, multimedia, and audio streaming. 
CCTV  
China Central Television (CCTV)40 is China’s single national television network. Its original 
name was Beijing Television, established in 1958, and was renamed as CCTV in 1978. The 
main function of CCTV between 1958 and 1978 was to function as a mouthpiece of the CCP, 
and therefore the Chinese government utilized it as an “ideological vehicle” to promote the 
continuous political movement to their people. CCTV mirrors China’s politics, economy, 
society, and its transition. In this context, Zhu and Berry (2009) interpret CCTV as 
“demonstrate[ing] that the country has been moving toward a society of mass consumption 
with a public-oriented civic culture, even while it is sternly maintaining communist ideology” 
(pp. 40-1). 
By the late 1970s, the China’s television started foreign exchange programs and broadcasting 
to the outside world. Its activity began when CCTV signed an agreement with similar news 
                                                
40  For more information on CCTV’s channels organization information, see Latham, K. (2007). Pop 
Culture China!: Media, Arts, and Lift style. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO (pp. 54-5). 
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agencies in the United Kingdom and the United States, for the purpose of exchanging 
programs in 1979. After the 1980s, CCTV’s overseas expansion accelerated when a large 
number of foreign media in Africa, Europe, North America, and Latin America started to 
purchase CCTV’s programs. In 1984, the Chinese government established a special 
department in CCTV that took charge of external communication. Since then, new programs 
aimed at foreign audiences have been launched, such as English News, Focus (an English-
language program), Cultural Lounge and Hello Beijing (entertainment programming). 
Based on the work of these programs, CCTV dispatched to the United States a one-hour 
external program recording in Chinese and English language in order to provide updated 
Chinese news to North American through China’s daily news in 1992 (Liu, 2012, p.119). 
Beijing launched its external television broadcasting with its first international channel, 
CCTV-4 the same year, which is available for broadcast in more than 80 countries in North 
Africa, East Asia, Australia, and East Europe. By the late 1990s, CCTV-4’s  network covered 
98% countries and regions of the world, and enlarged its facilities to broadcast 24 hours a 
day in four units rotating every six hours (Liu, 2012, p.120). 
In 2000, another satellite channel, CCTV-9, was set up with the goal of promoting “Your 
Window on China” (CCTV, 2007). CCTV-4 was aimed at foreign and overseas Chinese 
viewers based on Chinese-language programs. In contrast, programs on CCTV-9 are in 
English, and targeted at foreigners who live in China and in the English-speaking world. For 
this reason, CCTV-9 allowed its programs to take a more liberal line, while CCTV-4 adheres 
to the political line. The main task of CCTV-9 is to introduce China to the non-Chinese world, 
especially “emphasizing programs on life in China and contemporary culture alongside 
China’s perspective on international news” (Brandy, 2010, p.167). Since 2001, under the 
Chinese government’s “going out” policy, CCTV-9 made a new leap forward, setting up a 24-
hour channel and broadcasting in French and Spanish, and keeping abreast of global media 
such as CNN. When most international broadcasters such as the BBC World Service reduced 
services it provided due to a retrenchment in expenditure, the Chinese government 
encouraged CCTV’s international services. Between 2004 and 2009, individual channels – 
CCTV-French, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic – were set up to take aim at viewers in specific 
cultures and regions. In 2007, the overseas Chinese service department of CCTV-4 was 
divided into three channels according to region – CCTV International Asia, International 
America, and International Europe. In 2010, CCTV-9 changed its name to CCTV-News (or 
CCTV-N) targeting English-speaking viewers (Rawnsley, 2014). Now CCTV owns six 
international channels, in six languages (Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Russian, and 
Arabic) (Zhu, 2011, p.301). CCTV also launched new businesses in the new media field, for 
example Mobile TV, Bus Mobile TV, Internet TV and Internet Protocol TV, which is provided 
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by CCTV.com. CCTV offers its programs in 140 countries and regions, and maintains 
cooperative relationships with 241 media outlets in 140 countries and regions. 
Despite the Chinese government’s communication endeavors with the outside world, there 
are inherent difficulties in CCTV’s management. Brandy (2008) pointed out that there is a 
limitation in terms of the absence of editorial independence, even though China has access to 
the latest equipment for its world broadcasting. She found that CCTV-9 is still the 
mouthpiece for the Chinese government with regards to foreign relations, and mirrors the 
Party-line perspectives on Chinese domestic affairs (Brandy, p.168). She attributes the cause 
to the political controls put on the broadcasting station, and the prominence given to 
advanced broadcasting equipment over staff training, which has a disruptive influence on 
the creation of quality programs for overseas channels and audiences. The actual CCTV-9 
audience rating is low; moreover those viewers are concentrated (around 50 percent) on 
Chinese who reside in China whose objective is to study English (Puppin, 2017). According to 
Branigan (2011), who spent seven years as the Guardian’s correspondent in China, however, 
CCTV viewers still question the veracity of its news reports, in contrast to foreign-language 
state media, and believe they are meant to spread China’s soft power. Beijing, however, 
concentrates on producing non-news programming that enhances its appeal, such as cultural 
shows. 
China’s CCTV shows offer the Chinese people the chance to come close to unconstrained and 
liberated new ideas, in tandem with enhancing its authoritarian propaganda to the world 
through globalization. Moreover, CCTV-9 receives governmental financial support, whereas 
other CCTV channels on the CCTV network are funded by private and public enterprises 
through advertising expenses (Geevarghese, 2015). In this regard, Cull (2009b) argues that 
“the channels operate as badges of prestige as much as an actual ideological delivery 
apparatus, and are not subject to the same market pressures as commercial channels”. Zhang 
(2011) construes this situation that people who live outside China are possibility to access 
official Chinese website and watch its programs easily, thereby they are “subject to the state’s 
version of the world view” (pp.73-4). Thus, the Chinese government hires foreigners for 
CCTV-9, because as “the door of the Chinese media is opening wider, more voices are 
allowed and the media has become more objective when reporting sensitive issues” (CCTV, 
2008). In a bid to avoid impartial broadcasting, the main role for foreigners was that of news 
anchor, and copyeditor; the number of foreigner employees gradually increased in 
comparison to when CCTV Africa and CCTV America have lunched. Besides, their 
workspaces have been expanded from Beijing headquarters to Nairobi and DC (Jirik, 2016). 
In this context, Hartig (2015) explains that foreigners’ activities in CCTV “should not only be 
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understood as a means of adapting to Western journalistic standards, but also as a means of 
winning (more) international credibility” (p.89). 
China Radio International  
China Radio International (CRI) is a state-run radio station, establishing in 1941 aimed at a 
global audience. Seeking to play the role of a bridge between China and the world, CRI airs 
both domestic and world news through 61 language services, which is the largest number of 
all global media organizations. CRI produces for radio, Internet, mobile web, print, and 
television, with 18 Internet radio services, 70 public radio service branches abroad, and three 
domestic FM radio services. To deliver accurate and comprehensive broadcasting about 
global affairs, CRI also cooperates with international news agencies and media groups, and 
has established 32 correspondent bureaus in foreign countries (CRI, 2012). 
Based on the media-related content above, the characteristics and mechanisms of media in 
China’s public diplomacy are understood as follows. When China describes its global media 
around the world, there are several words which they never forget to mention: “abroad” 
(jingwai), “overseas” (haiwai or guowai), “foreign” (waigui), and “international” (guoji). To 
reach out to the foreign public and promote China, the Chinese government operates its 
media system in three symbolic spaces – inside China (guonei), outside China (guowai), and 
overseas China (haiwai huaren). The first is Chinese media that are produced inside China 
and controlled by the government. It is also aimed at its own people, and circulated only in 
China. The second is so-called “ethnic community media”, produced for Chinese residents 
abroad in the Chinese-language. The third is aimed at foreigners who reside in other foreign 
countries, and speak different languages. Foreign correspondents based in China are 
involved in the production of programs for foreign viewers. Lately, Chinese media displays a 
tendency towards equivocal differentiation of these three symbolic spaces. The Chinese 
government manipulates to redraw the boundary between inside China and outside China, 
so as to awaken its One China policy. Increasingly, most of China’s media for foreign viewers 
contains its ideological and political contents because of the inseparable relationship (W. 
Sun, 2014, pp.1894-1895) between the Party-state and its media. 
To understand the role of China’s media in its public diplomacy, we need to comprehend 
what kind of images Chinese leaders hope to show the world. When examining China’s 
media policy from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping (so-called, Media 1.0, Media 2.0, 
and Media 3.0 respectively), Jiang suggested “guidance of public opinion”, which inherited 
the Mao era’s notion of “politicians running the newspapers” for the purpose of maintaining 
social and political stability. On the other hand, Hu stood on “public opinion channeling”, 
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which took aim at its soft power development and dissemination of “China’s [official] voice” 
overseas. Based on Hu’s media policy, Xi, by extension, seeks multilateral and expansive 
control of media platforms, which act as a bridge between the domestic and international 
situation (Bandurski, 2016). Given Xi’s general government policy focused on the 
international system accommodating a transformed China based on its political economy 
and military strength, he adopted a more intense media policy to handle the immense 
disruptions which arose from his reform programs (Hadland, 2015). State media, especially, 
adheres to the current political stance (Wang and Zeng, 2016). Despite Chinese leaders’ 
endeavors to develop the media, certain challenges must be overcome to outperform its 
“going out” policy through media. Rawnsley (2015) pointed out that China’s media have 
issues, such as their lack of comprehension of targeted audiences, and the strong connection 
between its government and media, and thus other countries are antagonizing China.  
 
Culture-related main actors and programs for public diplomacy  
In order to fulfill the State Council’s purview of supervising culture and art, the Chinese 
Ministry of Culture consists of ten departments41 responsible for drafting culture and art 
policies, strategies, and regulations, and supervising the system – such as a nation-wide 
network of public culture services, general national cultural activities, the construction of key 
national cultural facilities, administering the cultural market, developing cultural market 
plans and libraries, overseeing the State Cultural Relics Bureau and Chinese Cultural Centers 
in foreign countries, and guiding artistic creation and its production (China.org.cn, n.d.). 
Moreover, the Ministry has an administrative organ, the State Bureau of External Cultural 
Relations (SBCR),42 established to handle foreign affairs associated with “culture work and 
cultural exchange” with the Hong Kong Administrative Region (HKSAR), Macao, and 
Taiwan. The SBCR is in charge of establishing regulations and policies of their work field, 
carrying out liaison work in tandem with the Cultural Department, which is administered by 
Chinese embassies in foreign countries, performing publicity activities in foreign countries, 
entering into cultural arrangements between China and foreign countries, and conducting 
plans for cultural exchange programs and executive annual schedule. In 2003, furthermore, 
Chinaculture.org commenced operations to provide not only China’s up-to-date news about 
                                                
41  The General Affairs Office, Policy and Regulation Department; Planning and Finance Department; 
Personnel Department; Art Department; Education, Science and Technology Department; Cultural 
Market Department; Cultural Industry Department; Social Cultural Department; and Bureau for 
External Cultural Exchanges. 
42  They have three functioning departments: 1) General Office, 2) Relics Protection Department, and 
3) Department of Museums. They also cover the affairs of North America and Oceania, Asia and Africa, 
African, Asian, Eurasian, Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, translation and international affairs.  
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its culture, history, politics, and economy, but also its comprehensive services through 
Chinese and English languages. The Website is another name of Chinadaily.com.cn, 
supervised by the Ministry (Chinaculture.org, 2014). 
The Chinese Ministry of Culture, with the aim of “promoting all-round cultural exchanges 
and facilitating the prosperity of the African culture”, set up the Chinese Cultural Center in 
the Republic of Benin in 1988, the first such endeavor, through cooperative efforts between 
the Chinese Ministry of Culture and the Benin Government. China provided Chinese 
language, art, and shadowboxing courses, and supported diverse cultural activities, e.g., art 
exhibitions, books, drama performances, and others (China Cultural Center, n.d.). China 
operates over 95 cultural departments in the Chinese embassies and consulates in 82 
countries (China.org.cn, 2009b). Along the ancient Silk Road, China also has grand plans for 
building at least more 50 cultural centers by 2020. By the end of 2014, China had set up 
twenty centers43 in the main cities of leading countries, spending around $214 million (1.33 
billion yuan) to establish the overseas culture centers. In 2015, the total expenditure 
increased by 181 percent when compares to the previous year. As a role of “window” into 
Chinese culture, the Chinese Cultural Centers focus on publicizing its culture, which includes 
the lives of ordinary Chinese, unlike the Confucius Institutes (China Daily, 2015). Not only 
this, but China has contracted both cultural cooperation agreements and executives’ 
programs with nearly 800 with 145 national governments; enjoying good cultural relations 
with around 159 countries. The Chinese Ministry of Culture is in charge of major cultural 
events such as the “China-Japan Culture and Sports Years”, “China-France Cultural Years”, 
“China-Russia Cultural Years” in a bid of “multi-dimensional and multi-layered” 
international cultural exchange extensively through multiple channels (China.org.cn, 2009b). 
Take, for example, the cosmopolitan “Happy Chinese New Year” celebration, which has been 
celebrated since 2009: in 2015, the Ministry of Culture and other several Chinese authorities 
hosted events in over 320 cities in 118 countries, through more than 800 programs.44 The 
following year, it celebrated with 2,100 festive activities in 400 cities in 140 countries. As a 
result, Vice-Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Culture Ding Wei gave a press briefing for 
“2016 Happy Chinese New Year”, in which he said that China will “seek a new way to engage 
China's large enterprises in the promotion. Happy Chinese New Year activities will give a 
boost to the development of the enterprises” (China Daily, 2016a). 
As can be seen from Wei’s address, China has been striving to reform its cultural system and 
the growth of its cultural industry to expand their culture widely to abroad since the 16th CPC 
                                                
43  Centers have been set up in Cairo, Paris, Malta, and Tokyo since 2002. 
44  Most “Chinese New Year” celebration activities or programs are temple fairs, China lantern 
festivals, parades, exhibitions, special performances, and intangible cultural heritage displays. 
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National Congress, when Beijing required that the opening of its cultural markets picked up 
steam, complying with China’s WTO commitment. As a way of executing the “going out” 
strategy, cultural enterprises took part in displaying China’s capability to cooperate and 
compete on the international stage. In 2006, the Ministry of Culture engaged in “Policies on 
Encouraging and Supporting the Production and Export of Cultural Products and Services”, 
which is under the control of the Office of the State Council and six other institutions: the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, the General 
Administration of Customs and Taxation, the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV 
(SARFT), and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP). The policies are 
based on “The Advice on Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Exporting 
Cultural Products and Services”, which was issued by the central government in 2005. The 
two documents, published in 2005 and 2006, laid the groundwork for support mechanisms 
for Chinese enterprises that entered foreign markets (Li, 2016, pp.129-130). Since then, 
China’s first culture industry plan, “The Cultural Industry Revitalization Plan”, launched by 
the State Council in 2009, aimed to promote “culture industry into new economic growth 
point for further improving cultural market main body and enhancing its development vigor” 
(Xu, 2011, p.913). Under the Ministry of Culture’s supervision,45 the China Cultural Industry 
Association (CCIA) was established in June 2013 with the aim of “building platform, 
providing service, enhancing coordination and attaining innovative development” in the 
various spheres of culture.46 The association is responsible for fostering China’s cultural 
industry and Chinese cultural soft power as a global-centric social organization in the area of 
culture, through the operations of its six47 essential businesses as an independent legal entity 
and a top-level national association (CCIA, n.d.).  The Ministry has also established the name 
of the project, “Team China”, to systematize Chinese companies which take part in China’s 
major celebrating events – such as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 60th 
anniversary of the founding of New China in 2009 – for the sake of exporting China’s 
cultural work. As “key export-oriented” cultural enterprises, the 211 companies are on the list 
of the Ministry of Culture. In 2009, the total value of China’s cultural products exports and 
services was $86.13 million; the film sector accounts for over $400 millions of its total 
overseas revenue. China makes profits from a cultural export sector on the rise (China Daily, 
2010b). 
                                                
45  The State Council approved and the Ministry of Civil Affairs registered CCIA.  
46 The various cultural fields are art performance & entertainment, E-commerce, web culture, cartoon 
& gaming, film & TV media, fine arts & crafts and cultural finance, Cultural Tourism.  
47  The six businesses are international communication and cultural exchange, exchange and 
cooperation, industry research, cultural finance, industrial investment, and real entity operation.  
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Not only the Ministry of Culture, but also the Ministry of Education is crucial to China’s 
public diplomacy, as it conducts and establishes Chinese education-related policies, plans, 
and strategies, which are in the realm of public diplomacy (the Ministry of Education, n.d.). 
The Ministry is in charge of organizing and supervising international education exchange 
cooperation; drawing up programs’ policies for Chinese students to study overseas and vice 
versa; and creating joint education programs between Chinese and foreign educational 
institutions (Hartig, 2015). As a non-governmental and non-profit public institution 
affiliated with the Ministry, Hanban not only aims to provide the source and teaching service 
of Chinese language and culture throughout the world, but also focuses on the development 
of multiculturalism and world harmony. The function of Hanban covers the entire process of 
establishing Confucius Institutions, formulating development plans and policies for boosting 
Chinese language internationally, supporting various types and levels of Chinese-language 
programs at educational institutions all over the world, and establishing the standards of 
Chinese teaching, and promoting Chinese language teaching materials (Hanban, n.a). To 
achieve these goals, Hanban sets up the Confucius Institution to introduce Chinese language 
and culture to the foreign public. Furthermore, since 1997, the Chinese Scholarship Council 
(CSC) has been entrusted by the Ministry of Education with managing the daily operations of 
international students’ enrollment and administration, due to the increased number of 
foreign students in China (Han, 2010). 
In addition to the main actors in China’s public diplomacy, municipal and provincial 
governments48 also engage in promoting China’s international image, cultural exchange, and 
overseas expansion. Since the end of 2003, the Chinese government started to expand its 
system of spokespersons, from the level of central government offices to the provincial 
government level (Aoyama, 2007). In 2011, the CCPCC at provincial and municipal levels 
was instructed to set up public diplomacy offices and activities (Shambaugh, 2013). Recently, 
the Chinese government, through the MFA, has held diverse events in Ningxia, Guangxi, 
Shaanxi, and Sichuan so as to set the stage for expanding cooperation and communication 
between provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in central and western China 
and overseas nations, as well as with famous international enterprises. Events from 2016 
included the China-Arab States Economic and Trade Forum and the China-Arab States Expo, 
hosted by Ningxia province as a core region in China’s Belt and Road Initiatives; the China-
ASEAN Expo in Guangxi province, which is a crucial region for the Silk Road Economic Belt 
                                                
48 China’s provinces are Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, 
Yunnan, and Zhejiang. The autonomous regions are Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang. The municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. The special 
administrative regions are Hong Kong and Macao (Zhang, et al., 2015, pp.56-58). 
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and the Modern Maritime Silk Road; “An Open China: Shaanxi Engaging the World” in 
Shaanxi province; and the 3rd China International Logistics Development Conference held 
in Sichuan, to discuss mutual development and collaborative work between China and 
foreign countries. Through these events, China optimizes a given opportunity based on 
frontline channels, connections, and information. By extension, the MFA and Chinese 
embassies overseas provide full-dimensional support and services for foreign local’s opening 
up and development (MFA, 2016). 
Not only that, China’s provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and two special 
administrative regions each have their own ties with foreign countries, especially African 
countries. With regards to supporting financial relations, for example, the Shanghai 
municipal government operated its own investment strategy in Africa in 1998, with the 
purpose of encouraging local Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Provincial support for 
Chinese companies’ investment produces results that strengthen not only ties between China 
and African countries, but also expected sustainable development in Africa countries. For 
example, the Shanghai Construction Corporation and Ningbo C.S.I. Power and Machinery 
Group in Zhejiang province have built 20 power plants in Nigeria. The Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, in collaboration with the Guangxi province program has worked with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to invest in Africa. The general aim of the 
Guangxi program is to deepen economic ties in Sino-African relations, coupled with Chinese 
companies’ social responsibility (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012, pp.84-89). 
In addition to China’s governmental and semi-governmental actors, China’s non-
governmental actors play an important role in China’s public diplomacy. The majority of 
non-governmental actors operating as part of China’s public diplomacy are from Chinese 
academic-related institutions and schools, culture organizations, Chinese companies, and 
Chinese people (those living in China and abroad). All non-governmental actors work in 
various fields of public diplomacy, within the established policies of the Chinese government 
with its governmental ministries. The engagement of non-governmental actors is important 
because cultural factors plays a leading part in China’s public diplomacy, largely because 
they can have a greater ripple effect with the public than governmental activities. Based on 
fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa, for example, Chinese interviewees N-A2 and N-B2 
stressed the Chinese people’s participation in maximizing the effectiveness of China’s 
cultural activities when the Chinese embassy or cultural center organized public diplomacy 
events, such as Chinese traditional dance performances and diverse exhibitions to boost 
mutual understanding of Chinese culture in Nigeria. Nigeria-D3 also stresses the importance 
of the engagement overseas of Chinese residents and companies with China’s public 
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diplomacy, when a company holds an event for the local people, such as a charity bazaar or 
voluntary service. Interviewee S-B2, a Chinese businesswoman, also autonomously sponsors 
a scholarship and supports Chinese language teaching to the local students. Interviewee S-G1 
argued that his company makes a lot of effort to boost mutual understanding between the 
local people and the company, not only to encourage the company’s reputation for business 
purposes, but also to dispel an ingrained negative perception of China in South Africa. While 
these examples are limited to only Nigeria and South Africa, they show that Chinese public 
diplomacy is based on people-to-people diplomacy, which China has turned to in its foreign 
policy for a quite some time (e.g., ping-pong diplomacy was also a typical form of people-to-
people diplomacy during the 1970s).  
With the purpose of boosting people-to-people exchanges, the Chinese People’s Association 
for Friendship with Foreign Countries was established in 1954, purely for the promotion of 
friendship and mutual understanding between the Chinese people and the foreign public 
around the world. The association has several branches in each of China’s provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities. Also, the oldest China’s organization is Chinese 
People’s Institution of Foreign Affairs, which was founded in 1949, with the intent of 
conducting international exchanges and expanding people-to-people diplomatic activities as 
part of the political activities with diplomats and other successful and famous people in 
organizations and academic circles in foreign countries. The institution’s work is mainly to 
boost friendship between the Chinese people and international public, including promoting 
the development of China’s diplomatic relations and contributing to world peace. The 
institution also organizes and participates in diverse academic-related activities for research 
in international affairs, by exchanging thoughts with various foreign experts (China.org.cn, 
2011). China’s universities and institutions contribute to the expansion of China’s public 
diplomacy activities as well. According to interviewee N-B3, in 2015 the Chinese embassy in 
Nigeria received a lot of consuls from China’s major universities when a Centre for China 
Studies was opened in Abuja, Nigeria, and promoted various conferences and seminars 
between Chinese and Nigerian universities, on a wide variety of subjects. The representative 
think tank for China’s public diplomacy is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), 
which was founded in 1956 as an affiliated organization of the MFA. The institute primarily 
focuses on medium- and long-term policy issues of strategic importance in international 
politics and world economics, as well as organizing various seminars and conferences to 
exchange different views and constructing a worldwide network for collaborative research 
with domestic and foreign scholars (CIIS, n.a). In addition to CIIS, there are the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science (CASS), the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), and the State 
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Council International Studies Research Center. Contrary to expectations that all think tanks 
are closely linked to the Chinese government, in the case of CASS, the academy is more 
concerned with pure scholarship, sharing and establishing knowledge and information about 
foreign countries with other, similar organizations. The academy’s research agenda also does 
not cover all contemporary policy concerns. However, the majority of think tank personnel 
provide information, intelligence collection and policy analysis for the Chinese government 
(Shambaugh, 2002, p.576). 
In sum, by reviewing these three different China’s public diplomacy actors, this research has 
ascertained that the Chinese government pushes forward public diplomacy as a means of 
improving China’s reputation in the eyes of the foreign public, based on collaborative public 
diplomacy activities as organized by a government-centered system. It has also found out 
that China’s public diplomacy is an instrument with which to gain a foothold to achieve the 
goals of its foreign policy using certain tools (e.g., the media, foreign aid, education 
institutions/ activities). The following section will discuss the ways in which China’s soft 
power, especially cultural and foreign aid, promote a favorable environment and how it 
applies to the relations between China and other foreign countries to boost economic ties. 
 
4.2 China’s Soft Power in Public Diplomacy for supporting close economic 
relations  
 
The fundamental purpose of China’s public diplomacy is to concentrate on the CPC and the 
government’s central objectives, and to achieve greater interest in reform, development, and 
stability. Thus, the ultimate goal of public diplomacy is to ensure that China’s overall 
interests are safeguarded and promoted (H. Zhang, 2013, p.238). Put another way, as 
explained earlier in Chapter 3 and 4.1.1, former and current Chinese leaders focus on 
economic development as a core political policy, and China’s public diplomacy is the means 
by which they can fill in the gaps in other countries’ understanding of and address 
misconceptions about China. China, at the same time, stimulates friendship, trust, 
cooperation and mutual understanding in international society, and is committed to lasting 
peace and common development on the global stage. Drawing upon this goal of China’s 
public diplomacy, the following section will discuss how China’s cultural soft power and 
foreign aid, among the instruments of its public diplomacy, are concerned with setting up a 
favorable environment in support of close economic relations with other countries. 
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4.2.1 The role of cultural soft power in shaping the conditions of diplomacy for 
economic relations  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the element of culture cannot be ignored in China’s 
contemporary foreign policy, and may even be its main component. Xi Jinping addressed the 
cultural component at a conference on diplomatic work with neighboring countries, held by 
the CPC Central Committee in 2013: 
We should strive to strengthen publicity work, public diplomacy, cultural and people-
to-people exchanges with the neighbouring countries, and consolidate and expand 
social and public opinion foundations of the long-term development of relations 
between China and its neighboring countries. The development of relations depends 
on people-to-people friendship. We should comprehensively promote cultural and 
people-to-people exchanges, deepen friendly exchanges on tourism, science and 
education, regional cooperation and others, and make a lot of good friends. (MFA, 
2013) 
Hu Jintao also highlighted the need to boost Chinese culture as soft power when he delivered 
the keynote address on behalf of the 16th CPC Central Committee to the 17th National 
Congress of the Communist Party, in 2007. In the speech, he said "[c]ulture has become a 
more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing 
significance in the competition in overall national strength”, and “the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture” (China 
Daily, 2007b). Furthermore, he proposed guidelines to straighten out Chinese culture 
nationally and internationally, discussing the topic of “cultural security” at the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the 17th Central Committee in 2011 (Xinhua News, 2011). 
Considering the positions of China’s former and the current leaders, the significance of 
cultural diplomacy with people-to-people exchanges in its foreign policy is clear, and has 
only grown as China’s economic and political influence on the global stage has increased. 
Chinese culture is a frequently mentioned in China’s government-related major strategies, 
and Chinese leaders (Hu and Xi) have frequently referred to “cultural power”, “cultural 
security”, “soft power”, “cultural soft power”, “cultural diplomacy” in public, and have 
declared that soft power is a core policy in China (deLisle, 2014, pp.274-275). By employing 
cultural diplomacy in China’s public diplomacy strategy, the Chinese government encourages 
people-to-people ties through language training, cultural festival, exhibitions, and others. 
However, the connections and boundaries between China’s cultural diplomacy and its public 
diplomacy are not entirely clear (Hartig, 2015). Deng (2006) also notes that it is hard to 
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distinguish between public diplomacy and soft power, because the two are closely 
intertwined with each other, due to the diplomatic context of cultural diplomacy as a 
substantive instrument of public diplomacy and the nature of public opinion. In a similar 
vein, Li (2004) understood that both public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy have a certain 
objective in realizing foreign policy strategy. However, public diplomacy focuses on a short-
term policy with a view to promoting the country’s foreign policy to implement efficiently, 
whereas cultural diplomacy aims at understanding a country’s culture and system, thus 
promoting a favorable environment for that country’s long-term goals.  
Wang (2015) regarded China’s culture as a core source of soft power, because the 
background of its culture represents China’s footprints, containing religion, social culture, 
and history. As a result, China’s culture is an important tool with which to communicate with 
the world in the age of globalization. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recognized its 
culture as a significant tool to support peace, development, and cooperation in international 
society. His understanding of Chinese culture and cultural exchange has been explained as 
follows:  
Cultural exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people of all 
countries and an important way to project a country's image. The rich and profound 
Chinese culture, which has a time-honored history, has made significant contribution 
to the progress of human civilization. The traditional Chinese culture is noted for its 
many luminous ideas: the philosophical precept of harmony without uniformity, the 
political belief that people is the foundation of the nation, the educational guideline 
of respecting teachers and valuing education, and the moral ethic of do not do to 
others what you would not have them do to you. We should use various forms and 
means, including tour performance and exhibition, Chinese language teaching, 
academic exchange and sponsoring culture year activities, to promote Chinese 
culture and increase its appeal overseas. We should implement a ‘going global’ 
cultural strategy, develop culture industry, improve the international competitiveness 
of Chinese cultural enterprises and products, increase the export of books, films, TV 
programs and other cultural products, so that these Chinese cultural products and 
particularly the best of them, will reach the rest of the world. (China Daily, 2007b) 
Thus, Chinese scholar Li Xinhua (2004) referred to cultural diplomacy as one of the 
diplomatic forms, with which a country can, using cultural exchange and cultural diffusion, 
achieve its foreign policy or political goals. In the same vein, Peng Xingling (2006) viewed 
cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic activity that uses inclusive, peaceful instruments, with a 
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view to achieving foreign policy objective by introducing a country’s culture to the world. 
Taken together, the meaning of cultural diplomacy from the Chinese perspective is as an 
instrument for China’s diplomatic activities not only to maintain China’s cultural 
peculiarities, but also to pursue its interests. On that note, cultural diplomacy is different to 
other general cultural exchanges, because it stresses the important role of the Chinese 
government and political purpose (China.com.cn, 2009a). China’s cultural diplomacy is 
mainly targeted at foreign governments, and promotes mutual understanding and friendship 
though foreign student exchanges, using its traditional and modern culture. Cultural 
diplomacy acted as a bridge to connect China with the world through people-to-people 
exchanges, when China’s cultural diplomatic capacity was limited due to the containment 
and isolation policies of the West, until normalization was achieved and diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries improved (Deng, 2006; D. Zhang, 2010). 
China’s cultural diplomacy is based on its traditional and contemporary cultures. China aims 
to grow into a cultural nation, based on the cultural inheritance accumulated over its long 
history. The Chinese Government offered extensive support to promote its cultural industry, 
so that the cultural industry can grow at a higher rate than the Chinese economy, after 
discovering the that cultural industry lagged behind politics and economy growth. Today, 
China’s cultural diplomacy continues to evolve, increasing its capabilities, commensurate 
with the modern interpretation of cultural diplomacy, building on diverse examples of 
successful foreign cultural diplomacy (Hu, 2008; D. Zhang, 2010). Jia (2012) and Lin and 
Qu (2013) suggested that the strategic goal of cultural diplomacy is, 1) realizing “heping jueqi” 
(peaceful rise/development) in international society, while dispelling the “China threat” 
image; 2) establishing trust, friendship, and mutual understanding, not only in the world but 
also among countries that enjoy economic relations and are interdependent with China, and 
at the same time pursuing “qiutongcunyi” (let us agree to differ) to open and embrace 
differences between other countries; 3) maintaining the core values of socialism and learning 
about advanced and exceptional foreign cultures to improve China’s development and 
influence in the world; and, 4) promoting the world’s cultural development based on Chinese 
competitive culture. By using cultural diplomacy in public diplomacy, therefore, China seeks 
to boost China’s image through sincere and concrete actions, which lay the groundwork for 
mutual understanding and friendship between China and other countries. The Chinese 
government pursues a harmonious society with peaceful development because it is based on 
“stability” (wending) rather than “chaos” and “disorder” (luan). The Chinese government 
has prioritized stability as a political agenda since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. In 
addition, the true meaning of harmonious society has changed from control and prevention, 
grappling with economic uncertainty, to the realization of a “xiaokang” society. 
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To achieve these goals, the Chinese government utilizes three instruments to apply leverage 
in its cultural diplomacy (D. Zhang, 2010). First, it focuses on teaching the Chinese language 
to introduce culture through its Confucius Institutes. China has much pride in its culture and 
civilization. In particular, China traditionally emphasizes Confucian ideas, which have had a 
positive effect on Chinese modernization, harmony (he) and gentle (wen), patriotism and its 
peaceful image. It began establishing Chinese institutes in other countries to spread its 
culture in remote lands. As of 2017, a total of 516 Confucius Institutes and 1,076 Confucius 
Classrooms have been established in 142 countries. Among them, 135 Confucius Institutes 
were established in 51 countries along the Belt and Road. Establishing the Confucius 
Institutes was called for by the Chinese Ministry of Education, and is promoted as a national 
policy that plays the role of advance guard in a culture war, one of the strategies through 
which that China develops its soft power (China Daily, 2017b). Second, it concentrates on 
cultural exchanges with foreign cultures by establishing firm cooperative relationships 
between China’s central, provincial, and municipal offices, embassies and legations abroad 
to smooth cultural exchanges between China and the world. Third, establishing a strategic 
alliance with mass media such as news, newspapers, and opening TV channels to introduce 
China through CCTV and CNN. Fourth, developing cultural goods and services (D. Zhang, 
2010). China hosts diverse cultural events and major world tournaments in China. Cultural 
diplomacy shows the uniqueness of Chinese civilization, and made good use of the 2008 
Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo. 
In sum, through China’s cultural diplomacy, China has used many instruments and tools in 
its pursuit of introducing a positive Chinese image (friendly and trustworthy), its spirit, and 
joining the cultural community. Also, China realizes its peaceful rise/development through 
mutual understanding, resulting from its multidimensional approach to spreading China’s 
culture to foreign countries and its people. 
 
4.2.2 China’s public diplomacy with soft power in shaping the conditions of 
diplomacy for economic relations  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, China’s soft power is closer to smart power, which combines soft 
power (such as culture) and hard power (such as its development model and economic 
power). Also, China utilizes foreign aid in its public diplomacy towards African countries – 
for example, case grants, aid projects, low-interest loans, direct investment, economic 
collaboration agreement, and cultural exchanges – to promote its soft power among 
developing countries (Tang and Li, 2011). China renders its aid not only to prevent and cure 
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malaria, for example, but also to support the region’s important economic organizations 
when countries need help, especially in Asia and Africa, but also without interfering in a 
country’s domestic affairs, unlike the West (Cooper, 2016). Consequently, China presents a 
positive image to foreign countries through its foreign aid, which at the same time 
supporting its economic development. By extension, by utilizing foreign aid in its public 
diplomacy, China aims to promote common development and common prosperity for China 
and the world at large, as expressed in Chinese leaders’ speeches (mentioned earlier). Thus, 
the following section will discuss the difference in understanding of foreign aid between 
China and the West, and in which sectors China renders its support to foreign countries. 
 
4.2.2.1 The Characteristic of China’s foreign aid system  
 
Prior to discussing China’s aid in Africa, it is necessary to have a clear understanding and 
interpretation of China’s foreign aid, because China’s aid system is distinctive and also 
opaque regarding how it is constituted (Brautigam, 2011; Davies, 2008; Lancaster, 2007). 
Chinese foreign assistance somewhat shares the intentions of the definition of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)- Development Assistance Committee (DAC).49 Be that as it may, it is 
not clear how to distinguish between China’s foreign aid and ODA. Nonetheless, analysis of 
China’s foreign aid system has identified certain characteristics. First, in lieu of embracing 
the ODA aid framework that DAC stipulates, China bolsters the integration of aid and 
investment through its own political economy purposes and style, based on its bilateral ties. 
Second, unlike DAC member donors, China’s foreign aid plays a significant role in its foreign 
policy, which could shape its political doctrine – such as “peaceful rise or peaceful 
development”, or “responsible great power” – and its long-cherished dream of a Sinocentric 
international environment. Not only that, China is not a member of the OECD, so there is no 
justification for going after and carrying out its aid activities within the boundaries of ODA. 
Thus, most Chinese foreign aid lies within the category of development finance, as opposed 
to other kinds of aid (Y. Sun, 2014a). Lengauer (2011) also argued that Chinese financial 
programs do not fit into aid terms in principle, due to the fact that the Eight Principles to 
which the Chinese government adheres holds as a fundamental principle that its foreign aid 
                                                
49 The understanding of ODA by the DAC as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of 
ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which as provided by official agencies, including state 
and local government, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which is administrated 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant of at least 25 percent  (calculated at a 
rate of discount of 10 percent)” (OECD, n.a).  
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offers different instruments for political economy engagement. For now, there is no 
definitive definition of China’s aid in academia, but one can infer a meaning through the 
context of a whitepaper on China’s foreign aid, published in 2011: 
China maintains that foreign aid is mutual help between developing countries, 
focuses on practical effects, accommodates recipient countries’ interests, and strives 
to promote friendly bilateral relations and mutual benefit through economic and 
technical cooperation with other developing countries. (The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011a) 
China’s aid, which has clear differences to ODA, is based on bilateral aid agreements with no 
strings attached, nor political preconditions for receiving the aid or loans; unlike the 
conditions Western donors and multilateral organizations can insist on, in order to receive – 
for example, aid in return for specific economic reforms that adhere to the Washington 
Consensus (Mattlin and Nojonen, 2015). Also, the definition of ODA does not include 
funding for cultural exchanges, export credits or trade financing, private charity, remittances, 
or financial aid for covert actions by intelligence agencies (Lancaster, 2007). On the other 
hand, when one examines China’s 2011 and 2014 foreign aid white papers, Chinese aid 
contains all of these things. To put it another way, there is a gap between the Chinese view 
concerning the purpose of aid, and that of the OECD-DAC (see Table 3).  
Table 3: The comparison of foreign aid between China and DAC 
 
Area China’s aid DAC aid 
Scope 
No concept of ODA 
Mixing with aid-investment-trade 







Win-win and self-reliance 
Physical capital 
Growth in income 
 











Strategic, diplomatic, and commercial 
importance 
Strategic and historical importance 
Priority Sector 
Economic & productive sectors (i.e. 
infrastructure, industry, agriculture) 




No political conditionality Good governance and policy conditionality 
Modality 
Project aid and other financing modalities 
(i.e. export credit subsidies, resource-for-
infrastructure deals) 
Programme aid becoming increasingly 
dominant 
 
Note. Adopted from Ohno, 2013, p.195; Trinidad, 2013, pp. 36-37  
Since 1950, the contents of China’s aid programs have steadily adapted to the changing 
international landscape, its interests marching in step with the domestic situation (Trinidad, 
2013, p. 19). Specifically, since China began its foreign aid program in 1950, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese government has successfully optimized its foreign aid as 
a means of seeking profits in the field of political economy and security, and building up its 
strategic national power.50 Additionally, today, China utilizes foreign aid in order to increase 
publicity of its values through public diplomacy activities, which include soft power 
(Lengauer, 2011, p.9). The transition of China’s foreign aid can be divided into four periods. 
The first period is from the 1950s to the early of 1970s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
beneficiary countries were selected based on ideological and historical homogeneity, such as 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Vietnam. The spread of aid widened 
to countries in Africa and Central and South America due to the Sino-Soviet split and the 
Cultural Revolution (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a). In 1964, 
the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance were articulated, 
establishing the basic principles for China’s foreign aid. Since then, China has become a 
member of the UN, in 1971, and the purpose of China’s aid shifted from an ideology-centric 
unification to one that will support China’s standing and goals internationally, for example, 
by isolating Taiwan from the global stage.  
                                                
50 Chapter 5, due to the historical backdrop covering most staple events related to China’s foreign aid 
policy in Sino-Africa relations, briefly discusses China’s aid purpose transition and its aid system 
development according to chronological changes. This is to confirm that China’s foreign aid is also in 
company with its government’s political economy purpose on the international stage. It will be 
connected to an understanding of how China’s foreign aid works in Africa countries.  
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The second period was after China adopted Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and opening up policy, 
in 1978. China increased the variety in its foreign aid from purely economic aid to mutually-
beneficial cooperation for national development, focusing more on practical interests. Also, a 
hallmark of China’s foreign aid during the late 1970 and the 1980s was that the Chinese 
government gave increasing weight to the economic value of its foreign aid, as opposed to 
political value. Another characteristic during this period was that China increased aid for 
public health and technical assistance, infrastructure projects, public works, and awarding 
scholarships to give a chance to study in China (Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland, 
2009). During the 1980s, there were two major changes adopted by China’s foreign aid, 
which concentrated on win-win and common development, based around augmented 
technical assistance and profit-seeking behavior (Kjøllesdal & Welle-Strand, 2010, p.5).  
The final period is from the mid-1990s to 2003. In the 1990s, China embraced the socialist 
market economy and achieved a high level of economic growth (Cheng, Fang, and Lien, 2012, 
p.4). Hence, the Chinese government diversified the sources and means of funding by 
restructuring its foreign aid mechanisms, for example, by establishing in 1993 the Foreign 
Aid Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects to support its small- and medium-
sized enterprises. Not only that, since the 1990s, Beijing started to pay attention to aid’s 
capacity for improving human resource development, including technical training in 
recipient countries. From 1995, the Export-Import Bank of China has also taken a role in 
foreign aid, providing medium-and long-term low-interest loans (The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011a).  
The final period is from 2004 until the present. China’s rapid economic growth and 
improved economic strength leads to active foreign financial assistance (Cheng, Fang, and 
Lien, 2012, p.5). Furthermore, China began to take part in multilateral aid programs 
administered by various international organizations, in light of its desire to fulfil its 
responsibilities as a responsible power, and to boost its image as a humanitarian country in 
the international community. As part of its infrastructure assistance, Beijing utilizes ‘One 
Belt One Road’ and AIIB for expanding economic exchanges and cooperation via joint 
construction in member and neighbouring countries (see OBOR, below).  
China’s foreign aid is based on soft power and the China model, which are intertwined in 
China’s foreign aid policy. Beijing’s foreign aid policy is also different to that of the West, the 
so-called Washington Consensus, focusing on South-South cooperation and a harmonious 
world; both of these are reflected in its foreign aid strategy. As has already been discussed, 
the Beijing Consensus (or China model), which is the opposite to the Washington Consensus, 
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is more concerned with preserving the value of the political economy systems in developing 
countries. In this way, China strategically presents a united front with developing countries 
through South-South cooperation, focusing on achieving the goal of economic growth 
through gradual market-based economic reforms. China also maintains its position in the 
international society as “a developing country”, rather than “a developed country” so as to 
cement cooperative relationships with other developing countries through South-South 
cooperation. In connection with this, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of South-South 
cooperation during his first appearance at the UN headquarters: “the South-South 
cooperation is set to play a bigger role in promoting the collective rise of developing 
countries and generating a robust, sustained, balanced and inclusive growth of the world 
economy”. During the meeting, Xi also highlighted South-South cooperation should comply 
with “the principles of mutual respect and trust, equality, solidarity and win-win cooperation, 
and help developing countries realize fair, open, all-round and innovation-driven 
development” (Xinhua News, 2015d). China claims peaceful development, to which harmony 
is central, and endeavors to become a responsible country in the company of the other 
superpowers. Looking ahead, Hu Jintao first announced the need to forge a “Harmonious 
World” in 2005, which reflected the direction of China’s foreign aid.  
Looking at the big picture, China’s foreign aid functions as not only the medium of 
presenting its institutions and thoughts, its soft power. It also assists with finance, 
technology, infrastructure facilities, and human resource development. Thus, China’s aid 
policy is divided into two approaches: investment, which refers to “co-operation”; and 
assistance, which contains concessionary grants, interest-free loans and debt relief (Davies, 
2008, p.2). However, China tends to integrate trade and investment in order to foster 
diverse partnerships, because China’s aid is often rendered as part of larger investments and 
trade deal packages, in tandem with large amounts of non-concessional loans and export 
credits. Therefore, the line between aid, investment, and trade are closer than for DAC 
members (OECD, 2012, p.11). When one standardizes China’s foreign aid into bilateral aid 
and multilateral aid, according to equity shares or contributions to multilateral institutions, 
the bilateral aid system is divided into three types based on the category of payment: grants, 
loans, and debt relief.51 (See Figure 2, below.)  
                                                
51 Taking a closer look at China’s foreign aid system, one can see that there are three major financial 
resources that make up China’s foreign aid: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Grants 
are widely used for recipient countries’ social welfare, human resources development, emergency 
humanitarian aid, and technical cooperation. Interest-free loans are for backing of constructing public 
facilities to improve people’s livelihood in recipient countries. China tends to provide concessional 
loans only for larger projects (minimum size of US$2.4 million), which are tied to considerable use of 
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Figure 2: China’s foreign aid scheme 
 
 
Note. Adopted from Kobayashi, 2008, p.15 
 
China’s bilateral aid decides on whether or not a country needs to repay loans according to 
an assessment of the recipient’s cooperative relations and financial conditions. Grand-type 
aid finances small- or medium-scale welfare projects, technical cooperation, material 
assistance, human resource development cooperation, education and training aid, and 
others. Credit assistance is divided into interest-free loans and concessional loans. The 
former is intended to assist recipient countries’ construction of, for example, public facilities 
and launching projects for improving the public’s livelihood. Concessional loans are aimed at 
helping establish manufacturing projects, including large- and medium-sized infrastructure 
projects that will benefit society and the economic sphere, and to support the completion of 
plants, electronic and machinery products. As circumstances require, China will expand debt 
relief aid, which alters what type of aid they are providing – from credit assistance to grand-
type aid. As for loans, the Chinese government’s post-2012 focus has experienced a marked 
shift, from non-interest loans to concessional loans (Kitano, 2016, p.30), collecting both into 
its foreign aid program, as can be seen in the FOCAC case (Kobayashi, 2008). The share of 
aid dispensed in the form of grants has decreased slightly, from 41.4 to 36.2 percent (Y. Sun, 
2014b). The tenure of interest-free loans is normally 20 years, including five years of use, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Chinese goods (at least 50 percent) and services, which are a condition for using Chinese construction 
firms as contractors (Brautigam, 2011, p.205). 
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five years of grace, and ten years of repayment. Meanwhile, the period for concessional loans’ 
repayment is usually 15-20 years, with 5-7 years of grace and the annual interest rate is 
between two and three percent (Stallings, 2016). China’s concessional loans are broadly 
attached to its goods, services, and materials, unlike those provided by DAC donors, which 
provide foreign aid without conditions – a so-called “untied aid”. Furthermore, China’s non-
interest loans are different to those from DAC members (Watanabe, 2013, pp.74-75). Also, 
the proportion of grants is much lower than 25 percent, which is the ODA standard (Strange, 
Bradley, Michael, Andreas, and Axel, 2015).  
It is necessary to pay attention to China’s concessional loans’ features and management 
process. Concessional loans are one type of official development assistance that form the 
basis of South-South cooperation: equal and mutually beneficial. The Export-Import Bank of 
China is the sole lender designated by Chinese government to issue these loans. The loan is 
supposed to first boost social and economic development and improve living standards in 
developing countries, and to promote economic cooperation between China and the recipient 
countries (Dornan and Brant, 2014). However, unlike interest-free loans, it can’t be 
cancelled, nor easily rescheduled. Put it another way, once the interest rate and terms have 
been negotiated and signed, nothing will change (Brautigam, 2011, p.114). Although the 
Exim bank is in charge of project estimations, credit management, loan disbursements, and 
collection of principle and interest payments, MOFCOM is practically the authorized 
ministry of concessional loans. MOFCOM is responsible for signing intergovernmental 
framework agreements with recipient country governments plus establishing policies. To 
provide concessional loans, the following basic criteria need to be fulfilled: 1) the project 
should be approved by both the Chinese and the borrowing country’s government; 2) the 
borrowing country should have cordial and amicable diplomatic ties with China, with a 
stable political economy situation, and the ability to reimburse debt; 3) the project should 
have social benefits; 4) the project should be practical technically and realizable, and can 
produce smooth economic returns; 5) Chinese enterprises should be selected as the exporter 
and contractor; 6) more than 50% of the requisite items for the project (such as equipment, 
materials, technology, and services) should be provided by China; 7) local equipment, funds 
and labour needs for the project should be secured before starting the project (Kobayashi, 
2008, p.16). Under these criteria, concessional loans are issued through MOFCOM 







Figure 3: Structure of Concessional Loans by China Exim bank 
 
 
Note. Adopted from Davies, Edinger, Tay, and Naidu, 2008, p.18 and the Exim Bank (n.a) 
1. Government of the borrowing country applies to the Chinese government for loan (no 
less than $2.4 million) and submits necessary documents to China Exim bank. 
2. China Exim bank goes through the documentation of the application and submit to 
MOFCOM. 
3. The Chinese government enters into an agreement with the borrowing country, given the 
recommendation is accepted.  
4. The Exim bank signs a project loan agreement with the borrowing country. Then, it 
negotiates the loan’s interest rate and grace period, with repayment due semi-annually. 
For preferential export buyer’s credit, the Bank signs a project loan agreement upon 
approval from relevant government authorities. 
5. The Chinese contractors and exporters send invoices to the borrowing country’s 
government, per the contracted terms.  
6. The borrowing country’s executing agency sends a progress report and invoice to its 
government.  
7. The borrowing country’s government submits the same document (number 6), plus a 
drawing application to the Exim bank. 
8. China’s Exim bank disburses the loan according to project timetable. 
9. The borrowing country’s government makes a payment of the interest, fees, principal, 
and loan repayment to the Exim bank.  
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Based on the three major financial sources above, China provides its foreign aid in eight 
ways,52 as follows: complete projects, technical cooperation, goods and materials, medical 
teams sent abroad, human resource development cooperation, volunteer programs in foreign 
countries, emergency humanitarian aid, and debt relief (the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011a). The choice of aid type is chosen based on Beijing’s interpretation 
of the project-specific needs, which are part of a larger package with commercial contracts; 
structuralizing purely state-to-state relation and managing different cases of its aid project’s 
tendering process under the Chinese government (Kjøllesdal & Welle-Strand, 2010, p.6). The 
salient feature of Chinese foreign aid assistance, in particular, is the focus on infrastructure 
sectors.53 Since 1950, 61 percent of China’s foreign assistance loans have comprised of 
transportation construction projects, and only 8.9% of the total for energy and resource 
development such as oil and mineral (the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2011a). The second white paper on China’s foreign aid, published in 2014, states that 
between 2010-12, 44.8% of the distributed loans were for economic infrastructure (transport 
and communications, broadcasting and telecommunications, and power supply), and 27.6% 
were for social and public infrastructure (hospitals, schools, civil construction, well drilling 
and water supply, and other public infrastructure). Although China’s aid for infrastructure 
sector has deceased since 2010, the Chinese government has increased more practical 
assistance, such as for office supplies, mechanical equipment, transport vehicles, medicine 
and medical devices to recipient countries (the State Council of the People’s Republic of 







                                                
52 The forms of ODA are general budget support, project-type interventions, donor country personnel, 
other technical assistance, scholarships/training in donor country, imputed student costs, debt relief, 
administrative costs not included elsewhere, development awareness, refuges in donor countries, and 
core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institute.  
53 China offers aid in the fields of education, health, communication, agriculture, transportation, and 
energy.  
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Note. Adopted from The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011 and 2014 
 
Recently, Beijing has concentrated on concessional loans along with investment for the sake 
of China’s continued economic growth, at the same time taking into account of strategic 
interest for exercising political leverage to developing countries. In terms of this, New York 
University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of public service has convincingly argued that 
China’s foreign aid “is driven primarily by the need for natural resources and secondarily by 
diplomatic objectives. […] opening up foreign market for Chinese goods and help PRC 
companies invest, set up manufacturing plants, and develop markets overseas” (Lum, et al., 
2009, p.5). Hence, Chinese foreign assistance is comprised of 53 percent government-
sponsored investment, 42 percent concessional loans, and 5 percent in grants and debt 

































cancellations in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia (ibid, p.7).54  
The scale of China’s foreign aid has also increased. In the early 2000s, China’s foreign 
assistance was relatively limited and small when compared to the DAC’s top donor countries. 
Since then, however, as part of its “go global” strategy, China has contributed roughly 3.9 
percent of total global development aid, a threefold rise in total contributions compared with 
2001 (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017). However, when one compares the larger scale of China’s 
foreign assistance with its growing economic power, it is still inadequate when compared 
with other advanced nations, and exhibits clear weighting towards certain countries that are 
of value to China’s economy. Moreover, Beijing is still a low contributor to multilateral 
assistance through international organizations, such as the UN and UNDP. In general, 
according to China’s foreign aid white papers in 2011 and 2014 (the State of Council of 
People’s Republic of China, 2011a, 2014), from 1950 to 2009, China rendered total aid of 
256.29 billion yuan (US$37 billion) to foreign countries. Of that, 106.2 billion yuan (US$15 
billion) was in grants, and 76.54 billion yuan (US$11 billion) was in interest-free loans, and 
73.55 billion yuan (US$10 billion) was in concession loans. But China’s foreign aid decreased 
from 2010 to 2012: total aid dropped to 89.34 billion yuan (US$14.41 billion). Contrary to 
this, aid to Africa55 has increased from 45.7 percent to 51.8 percent, since 2010.  
There is a noteworthy feature in Chinese foreign assistance system. As has been noted earlier, 
the Chinese government applies public diplomacy to its aid program. This is because it is of 
great importance not only to make up for critical factors that come from general foreign aid 
system, but also to mitigate the go-ahead and hidden selfish intentions of its foreign 
financial assistance. To China, public diplomacy is also a tool of own country’s economic 
growth, according to Interviewee S-A3. Therefore, it is no wonder that China employs public 
diplomacy to strengthen its foreign assistance. Yet, when we examine the argument of 
economics Nobel Prize-winning Professor Angus Deaton (2015), that there is an ODA blind 
spot when it comes to the vitalization of recipient countries’ economic growth,56 one cannot 
find any unadulterated or perfect foreign aid aimed at purely reducing poverty and economic 
development in the international arena. Not only that, but given that aid is a means of “hard-
                                                
54 This data is researched during the period from 2002 to 2007. 
55 China tends to prioritize its foreign aid as follows: the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined 
by the United Nations as an income level, Africa by geographic dimension, economic society 
infrastructure by sectoral dimension. As for the standard of poorest nation, DAC classifies them into 
four categories based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as reported by the World Bank: as of 
2013, Least Developed Countries (per capita GNI < $992), Other Low Income countries (per capita 
GNI≤$1045), Lower Middle Income countries ($1046≤ per capita GNI ≤$4125), Upper Middle 
Income Countries ($4126≤ per capita GNI ≤$12745) (OECD, 2017).  
56 Read more information of Professor Angus Deaton argument with ODA, Deaton, A. (2015). The 
great escape: health, wealth, and the originals of inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
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headed diplomacy” (Lancaster, 2007, p.3), Beijing also considers it to make up for the 
weaknesses in its foreign aid, such as the lack of transparency, the negative effects of its non-
intervention policy, the political economy purposes of its aid projects as well as the same 
blind spot as the West above. 
At the forefront of China’s efforts, ODA plays the role of an initiator to poverty reduction, in 
social sectors such as health and education, and governance. The social sectors have been 
gaining importance (i.e. around the 51 percent of total ODA in 2004) in the 2000s, when 
compared to 1990, when 82 percent of ODA was distributed to economic infrastructure, 
financial sector, agriculture, and industry. ODA allocation is also shifting from infrastructure 
and production to social sectors in African countries, taking up 60 percent of all sector 
allocated ODA (Saidi & Wolf, 2011, p.10). China’s efforts are an indication that it wants to 
march in step with the West in rendering humanitarian and practical assistance; and reflects 
the policy outlined in China’s first and second foreign aid white papers. China reports that 
62.1 percent of its completed projects were carried out on public facilities, and 26.9 percent 
on economic infrastructure, from 2010 to 2012. The number of complete public facilities 
projects has doubled than since 2010. As the main form of China’s foreign aid is complete 
projects, the growth in public facilities assistance is intended to boost China’s public 
diplomacy in its aid system. Not only that, it is not only foreign humanitarian assistance 
aimed at improving people’s livelihood and promoting economic and social development in 
recipient countries, but also a commercial-focused aid to create a regional cooperation 
mechanism. The aid can be broken down into specific assistance categories, focusing on the 
public in recipient countries. Unlike ODA’s recent trend, however, the Chinese government 
has reported increasing importance in assistance for social and public infrastructure in 
tandem with basic facilities, which are directly related to the public. While the previous style, 
which focused only on constructing transportation, Beijing has also highlighted that 
“medical and health care is a major field where China directs it foreign assistance”. In light of 
this, the Chinese government provides both full infrastructure assistance (such as hospital 
construction and medical equipment) and technical development cooperation, including 
dispatching medical teams to recipient countries. However, Shung Lin and colleagues (2016) 
point out that China’s medical aid is not yet ready for recipient countries. Unlike the West’s 
aid system, the unique style of China’s foreign aid raises additional doubts regarding 
whether the medical aid is given out of a sense of altruism, to give the people a helping hand, 
or whether China uses medical aid as another part for China’s strategic approach to recipient 
countries (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017; Lin et al., 2016, pp.1-5). For example, a Chinese 
medical aid team dispatched to Africa focused too much on a single region (66 percent of 
total) (Wang, Zhu, and Zhang. 2013, p. 92) that was beneficial to China: therefore, it is hard 
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for Beijing to evade the negative international publicity. Nevertheless, China offers foreign 
aid in diverse fields to benefit the public in aid-receiving counties (see Table 4).  
Table 4: The comparison of scale of China’s foreign aid between prior to 2009 and after  
Forms of foreign aid 2010-2012 (a) 1950-2009 (b) 
Complete project 
580 construction projects in 80 
countries 
2,205 projects1 
Goods and materials 
424 batches1 of aid in 96 
countries and regions 
-2 
Technical cooperation 171 projects2 in 61 countries                            - 
Human resources 
development cooperation 
1,951 training sessions3 in 
China/ 29,148 people training 
from developing countries 
4,000 training sessions and 





Dispatching 55 teams, including 
3,600 medical personnel, to 54 
countries4 
Dispatching 21,000 medical 
workers in total, and treated 
260 million patients/ 60 
medical team with 1,324 
medical personnel, and 130 
medical institution in 57 
developing countries 
Volunteer programs 
Dispatching 7,000 young 
volunteers, including Chinese-
language teachers, to 60 
countries 
Dispatching 405 young 
volunteers to 19 countries/ 
7,590 Chinese language 
teaching to 70 countries4 
Emergency humanitarian aid 
Rendering RMB 1.15 billion to 
30 countries 
200 occasions from 2004 
Debt relief 
Assisting 9 LDCs5 with 16 
mature zero-interest loans, RMB 
1.42 billion in total 
Assisting 50 countries 
regarding cancellation of 380 
mature debts, RMB 25.58 
billion  in total5 
Note. Adopted from the white paper of China’s foreign aid in 2011 and 2014 (the State of Council of 
People’s Republic of China, 2011a, 2014) 
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(a) 1 This includes mechanical equipment, office supplies, inspection equipment, articles for 
daily use, transport vehicles, medical devices.  
2This mainly covers industrial and agriculture-related management projects, clean energy 
development, cultural and education, sports and physical training, and medical and 
health care.  
3 The training sessions are the program of technical and official personnel education and 
on-the-job academic education. 
4 This is for supporting medical service and providing medical treatment around 7 million 
patients.  
5 The nine less-developed countries are Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Mali, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan, which are heavily indebted. 
 
(b) 1 This includes agriculture, industry, power supply, energy, transportation, cultural and 
education, communication, and health care.  
2 The Chinese government does not release an accurate number of its work, but then the 
form is for the purpose of technical, industrial, and living related products assistance.  
3 The trained people are mostly managers, interns, technical personnel and officials. Also, 
the trainees are drawn from over 20 fields, including agriculture, medical and health 
care, economy, diplomacy, and environment protection.  
4 Beginning with five volunteers to Laos to provide education and medical and health care 
services for the first time, in 2002, the 405 young volunteers are for traditional Chinese 
medicine treatment, Chinese language teaching, agricultural technology, computer skills, 
and sports and physical training in 2009. As to Chinese language teachers, China began 
to dispatch volunteer Chinese language teachers in 2003; after six years, an increased 
number of teachers were dispatched to 70 countries.  
5 China started to assist in debt relief in 2000, at the FOCAC First Ministerial Conference. 
Since then, Beijing had held several meetings of the FOCAC and UN High-Level Meeting 
by 2009; after which it signed debt relief protocols with 50 countries, of which 35 are 
African countries; 312 of 380 debts cancelled, between RMB 189.6 and RMB 255.8 billion 
cancelled in total.  
 
The last noteworthy feature of the Chinese foreign assistance system is the foreign aid it 
gives through multilateral agencies. For effective and comprehensive foreign aid for 
development, China promotes international and regional cooperation through dialogue and 
assistance via multilateral organizations. Taking advantage of the establishment of the 
FOCAC, the Chinese government began in earnest to take part in multilateral joint projects 
across diverse platforms. Also, China refined its policies and principles of foreign aid 
through multilateral international conferences. The majority of scholars agree that the 
reasons for China’s multilateral cooperation, is that it is the role of multinational agencies in 
the global arena. Given numerous and momentous transnational problems, multilateral aid 
agencies have come to play a gradually-more-significant role in solving problems through 
regional or global networks with diverse perspectives. In this sense, as long as China 
maintains bilateral aid agreements in its foreign policy system on the condition of trade for 
aid, Beijing feels keenly the necessity of multilateral agencies, for the sake of transnational 
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cooperation (Zhang and Smith, 2017; Zhou, 2017). On the other hand, Xiong (2017) found 
that the reason for China’s multilateral cooperation is global transformation in the era of 
internationalization. China just goes with the flow when the whole world grapples with 
resolving urgent problems: “strengthening international cooperation for development, 
narrowing the North-South gap, and ensuring the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals” (p.61). This is because China is ready to alter its role from “active 
participation” to “active developer” or “active advocate” with a better understanding of 
multilateral diplomacy in the international society (ibid, p.63). Nonetheless, it is clear that 
China is able to mitigate poverty by means of multilateral agencies, on which China did not 
previously place much emphasis. In 2006, the International Poverty Reduction Center in 
China, which was jointly sponsored and funded by the Chinese government, the UNDP, the 
Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank Group. Since then, the significance of poverty 
reduction aid has increased, as can be seen in China’s first and second foreign aid white 
papers. In the first white paper, “poverty reduction” and “poverty alleviation” were 
mentioned only twice, whereas they appeared eleven times in the second white paper, when 
China officially explained the forms and purpose of its aid. There is little official information 
from the Chinese government regarding poverty reduction as related to official aid data. As a 
result, it is difficult to accurately analyze and track how much money the Chinese 
government has dispersed for poverty alleviation. Yet, it is possible to estimate China’s 
poverty reduction aid, because Beijing recognizes the responsibility of the present global 
development challenges. At the same time, Beijing has a chance to reframe China’s foreign 
aid, to address a gap in the Five Principles and the Eight Principles, while at the same time 
distinguishing it from the West’s foreign assistance (UNDP, 2014). By extension, China has 
proposed pushing ahead with trilateral cooperation57 for effective international experience-
learning and training programs – e.g. UNDP-China-Cambodia for cassava planning, 
UNESCO-China-Africa (one of African countries) for education – to promote an upgraded 
version of bilateral or South-South Cooperation that China adheres to in its foreign aid policy. 
OBOR  
The importance of trade with infrastructure aid in the Sino-African relations feeds into the 
Beijing leadership’s grand long-term strategy – China’s Belt and Road Initiative58 – which 
                                                
57  Trilateral aid cooperation works in a triangular relationship between a recipient country, a 
traditional donor, and an emerging country such as China or India (Fordelone, 2013, p.31).  
58 This is also called as “One Belt, One Road (OBOR)”, or ‘The Belt and Road (B&R)’. Xi Jinping 
proposed ‘Silk Road Belt’, which stands for boosting cooperation between China and Central Asia 
through establishing a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ on September, 2013. And a month later, at the 
Indonesian parliament, Xi put forward establishing a ‘21st Century Maritimes Silk Road’ to boost 
maritime cooperation with setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) not only to 
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was proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan, in 2013. The aim of his ambitious 
and grandiose plan was to remake Eurasia as an economic block centred on China. Thus, the 
Chinese government concentrates on increasing the interconnectivity and cooperation 
between China, especially its inland regions, and Eurasia using a “Silk Road Economic Belt 
“between Central Asia and Europe, and a “Maritimes Silk Road” between Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa. Beijing also attaches great importance to its “One Belt and One Road 
(OBOR)” strategy for its own sustainable economic development, which is evolving out of the 
low-price and export-oriented economy in China (Woo, 2017). Thus, it is designed as a tool 
for considering China’s economy and the significance of diplomatic relations with its 
surrounding nations. The chief hidden economic agenda of OBOR is to resolve issues of 
overcapacity, job creation, overproduction problems, and regional imbalance issue in China’s 
economic growth, following the 2008 recession, through infrastructure construction and its 
facilities business. Pu (2016) suggests that OBOR is part of China’s expanded economic 
development strategy, providing an opportunity for an “upgraded version” of China’s “Going 
Out” strategy, which encourages Chinese outward foreign direct investment, such as 
overseas investment, building infrastructure, conducting mergers and acquisitions, and 
exporting workers. He said OBOR is pursued to carry out the “five connections”, which 
fundamentally concentrate on economy (connecting infrastructure, finance, and trade), 
“policy communication”, and “connecting the peoples’ minds” (Pu, 2016, pp.113-5). The last 
two elements are for the sake of consolidating cooperation and trust-building by meditating 
policy, and the invigoration of non-governmental exchanges with the help of education and 
cultural exchanges, which are based on public diplomacy activities. Due to the fact that 
economic and political strategies are intertwined, OBOR includes China’s political views – 
“geopolitical and diplomatic offensive” – which endeavors to expand China’s influence and 
political power using investment, which is designed by its government (Summers, 2016, 
p.1628). OBOR reflects the views of the leadership in Beijing, which is not only to fulfil 
“China’s Dream” and revive the historic Silk Road through economic diplomacy, but also to 
raise its voice to hold the United States in check.  
In 2014, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to achieve its goal 
of becoming the regional center of political economy. The OBOR strategy and the AIIB 
signify that China is acquiring greater capabilities in oversight of its economy and finance. 
The main purpose of the AIIB is to “foster sustainable economic growth and development, by 
investing infrastructure and other productive industries, to improve connectivity and to 
promote regional cooperation” (China Daily, 2016e) in the Asian region. This highlights 
                                                                                                                                                  
fund infrastructure but also to stimulate economic integration and interconnection between 
infrastructure construction regions.  
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differences with the Asia Development Bank (ADB), which focuses on reducing poverty 
through social development, such as education extension and exterminating disease, for 
developing countries59 (see table 5).  
Table 5. The comparison between AIIB and ADB 
 
 AIIB ADB 
The year of establishment June 2015 December 1966 
President* Jin Liqun (Chinese) Takehiko Nakao (Japanese) 
Headquarters Beijing, China Mandaluyong, Philippines 
Leading country China Japan and United States 
Type and Aim 
Multilateral financial institution/ 
Aiding infrastructure construction for 
developing countries in the Asian 
region 
Social development organization/ 
Reducing poverty, financial support 
(loans and grants), technical assistance 
for developing countries in the Asian 
region 
Member nation 57 members** 
67 members (48 are from within 
Asia and the Pacific and 19 outside) 
Capital base US$ 100 billion US$ 165 billion 
Shareholders*** 
China less then 30% 
India 10-15% 
Japan 15.6% 
United States 15.5% 
People’s Republic of China 6.5% 
 
Note. * the present president in 2017 ** 2017 criterion *** based on December 2015 data 
Source: Author60 
                                                
59 Furthermore, OBOR is distinguished from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has the 
purpose of boosting global financial stability; and from the World Bank, which concentrates on 
poverty reduction, and development support through financial and technical assistance.  
60 The author organized information on the basis of AIIB Articles of Agreement (AOA) based on A 
History of Financial Management at the Asian Development Bank published by ADB. 
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With the introduction of the AIIB, China is empowered to secure finance and employ funds 
for OBOR from AIIB, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB), and a Silk Road Fund. The AIIB alongside the OBOR, especially, 
supports Beijing to facilitate the following: first, China currently assures US dollar as the 
main currency of the AIIB, but the Beijing government pushes ahead with the Renminbi’s 
(RMB) internationalization through the OBOR initiative. Second, China will create a new 
China-centric financial order by managing China-led financial institutions (AIIB, SCO, NDB), 
in tandem with gaining recognition in the international financial system and market. China 
took the lead in establishing the AIIB, and has a nearly-30 percent stake, with nearly 26 
percent of the voting rights in the AIIB, thereby wielding substantial influence over its 
management. However, Jin Liqun, a president of AIIB, described the direction of the bank 
operation, which focuses on complementary cooperation, during the AIIB opening ceremony: 
“AIIB worked closely with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), like co-financing 
projects with World Bank, Asian Development Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development” (China Daily, 2016e). Third, China already utilizes its foreign exchange 
holdings for infrastructure investment through the Silk Road Fund, and will expand the 
efficiency of its foreign exchange reserves through OBOR. China’s AIIB engages African 
countries in pursuing practical interests in the economic sector through infrastructure 
development, although it was established for developing Asian countries. In 2015, the 
president of the African Development Bank (AfDB),61 Donald Kaberuka, hinted at jointing 
hands with AIIB with regards to infrastructure issues in Africa. He likened AIIB to “a game 
changer in international financial architecture”, commenting that AIIB could satisfy African 
countries’ needs for infrastructure funding, because the necessary expense for infrastructure 
construction would require US$1.5 trillion per year. However, the development funds are 
still insufficient, although the IMF and World Bank have increased their financing to 
US$400 billion (Xinhua News, 2015c). Not only that, but African countries are delighted 
about the AIIB’s infrastructure investment in Africa, due to the diversification of financial 




This Chapter began with a review of the China model, based on Ramo’s formulation of the 
“Beijing Consensus”. The China model shows the character of China’s economic 
                                                
61 China joined AfDB in 1985, and signed US$2 billion for the Africa Growing Together Fund, a co-
financing fund through the People’s Bank of China in 2014.  
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development based on an authoritarian system with a core policy of a gradual and step-by-
step economic reform, and the importance of sustainable and equal domestic development, 
focused also on China’s peaceful development/rise in the international society. The model 
has been positively received by developing countries, which has hitherto only experienced 
the Western-style development model, and therefore functions as an element of China’s soft 
power for public diplomacy. Next, the chapter examined China’s three different actors 
(government, sub-government, and non-governmental actors) to understand how China’s 
governmental-centered public diplomacy system realizes China’s foreign policy. In addition, 
it examined how China tries to foster a favorable image of itself, to dispel its negative global 
image (especially that of the “China threat theory”, and false and skewed images of China 
from the Western media), with a purpose to establish a groundwork for communicating with 
the world. Then, the chapter looked into China’s cultural diplomacy, which exhibits China’s 
strong intent to rise or develop peacefully, through mutual understanding with foreign 
public and accepting differences in the world, based on China’s culture and people-to-people 
exchange activities. Finally, the chapter examined the role of China’s foreign aid, and the 
different ways it is understood by those in China and in the West. From the Chinese point of 
view, foreign aid boosts friendly relations without interference in domestic affairs, as part of 
its public diplomacy. One can see this in China’s aid to developing countries, especially 
Africa, which offers various types of assistance for medical, education, developing welfare 
system, and others to achieve a harmonious world and mutual development. By extension, 
China, utilizing the OBOR long-term strategy, offers infrastructure development to African 
countries to derive terms favorable to vitalize China’s exports and establishing facilities that 



















Chapter 5. China international strategy for Africa and the role of public 
diplomacy  
 
Drawing on Chapter 3 and 4, which focused on the background and mechanisms of China’s 
soft power public diplomacy and the connection between its foreign policy and public 
diplomacy, this chapter will discuss China’s Africa policy – especially the economic relations 
between China and African countries, and China’s public diplomacy towards African 
countries. It also aims to illuminate the problem of asymmetric economic relations between 
China and Africa to elicit the necessity of public diplomacy in the Sino-Africa relations. This 
chapter will help us to understand China’s public diplomacy policy in detail, as well as the 
case studies on China’s relationships with Nigeria, South Africa, and FOCAC, which will 
follow in Chapter 6.  
Therefore, this chapter will begin with a description of Sino-African ties from the 1950s to 
the post-Tiananmen Square years (after 1989, and review not only stable policies that have 
established the foundations for current China’s Africa policy, but also the impact of major 
events that have solidified today’s relations. Second, based on the historical background of 
Sino-Africa relations, it will examine China’s two Africa policy white papers, published in 
2006 and 2015, in order to examine which factors are stressed by the Chinese government in 
its relations with African countries. Third, it will scrutinize the disharmony caused by 
lopsided economic ties between China and Africa. Lastly, it will discuss the general character 
of China’s public diplomacy in Africa aimed at fostering close economic relations with 
African countries, before moving on to the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.1 Africa in China’s strategy 
 
This part examines China’s foreign policy towards African nations, from the 1950s to the 
early 2000s, to grasp the big picture of Sino-African relations. The reason for this review is 
that the core policies between China and Africa were established during the 1950s, and they 
remain cornerstone of China’s contemporary Africa policy. By reviewing previous Sino-
Africa ties, and the range of policies between them since the 1950s, this part will ascertain 
the significance and necessity of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign diplomatic strategy. 
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Hence, the part is divided into three parts62 based on major landmarks for periodization to 
give an overview of the flow of political economy, China’s aid, and investment in the context 
of China’s political purpose in Sino-Africa relations: first, the Mao era, between 1949 and 
1976; second, the first decade under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 1989; and third, the 
post-Tiananmen Square years, from 1989. Then, drawing upon the historical backdrop of 
China and Africa relations, China’s pursuits in its relations with Africa will be scrutinized, 
through the lens of the two white papers on China’s Africa policy.  
 
5.1.1 China’s African policy from the 1950s to the 1990s 
5.1.1.1 The Mao era, between 1949 and 1976 
 
The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” are hailed as the first guiding principles of 
China’s diplomacy that were established to engage in international relations in the Mao era 
(Raine, 2009, p.15). China has adhered to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”63 as 
their foreign policy tenets since 1954, after they were expressed by former Premier Zhou 
Enlai during negotiations between the Chinese and Indian governments on the subject of the 
Tibet issue. Using the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, China engages in realistic 
diplomacy towards Asia and Africa’s emerging countries. The “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” are extended to the various Afro-Asian conferences. A representative example 
is, in 1955, the Bandung Conference (also called the Asian-African Conference (AAC)), 
convened in Bandung, Indonesia, and attended by representatives from 29 Asian and African 
nations. The conference was sponsored by Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), 
India, Indonesia, and Pakistan; it presented a new indicator for relations between China and 
Africa (Xinhua News, 2015a). This conference played a catalytic role in sustaining the Sino-
Africa relation, addressing some of the limitations in China’s relations with African nations 
prior to 1956. Former Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai moved toward establishing 
diplomatic relations with Egypt as a first step among African nations, in 1956, after meeting 
with a few African leaders at the Bandung Conference.  
Starting there, Beijing mapped out a strategy to integrate itself with Africa by providing three 
factors: standing up to the superpowers, spreading the China model, and China’s third world 
policy (Yu, 1977, p.98; Alan and Alves, 2008, p.47). Also, China had the opportunity to 
                                                
62 The division is based on Mawdsley’s understanding of the relations between China and Africa in 
chronological order (2007).   
63 The contents of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 
4) equality and mutual benefit and 5) peaceful coexistence.  
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promulgate the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, starting with the declaration of the 
Ten Principles of Bandung,64 which are based on promoting peace and cooperation in the 
world. Since then, these Five Principles have formed the core of China’s foreign policy – for 
example, the First Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization was held in 
1957; China set up the China-African People’s Friendship Association in 1960; Organization 
of African Unity Charter in 1963; and other non-aligned movements (Rain, 2009, pp.15-16). 
China established a socialist constitution, and specified the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” as key to its foreign policy in China’s constitution in 1954. The United Nations 
General Assembly, moreover, took up these Five Principles and included them in the 
declarations in 1970 and 1974 (MFA, 2014b). In 1982, China’s new foreign policy was 
amended at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, highlighting these 
Five Principles in 1982:  
China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges 
with other countries. (People’s Daily, 1982) 
Adherence to the Five Principles in Chinese politic system as guiding principles was evident 
during the 1960s and 1970s in many ways. China pursued an equal partnership, undeterred 
by system or ideology, for its best interests during the deterioration in relations with the 
Soviet Union. China, moreover, was protected by the Principles from other nations’ 
intervention in China’s domestic affairs, and legitimized its cooperative exchanges with 
Africa’s dictatorships. These Principles were employed to establish amicable relations with 
the new nations of Asia and Africa; China gave prominence to the voices of Third World 
countries that sought independence and autonomous politic systems by opposing the Soviet 
Union and United States imperialism. In addition, the Principles were utilized to create 
                                                
64 The contents of The Ten Principle of Bandung are: (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and 
for the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) Respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the 
equality of all nations large and small; (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal 
affairs of another country; (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of 
collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country 
from exerting pressures on other countries; (7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (8) Settlement of all 
international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial 
settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; (10) Respect for justice and 
international obligation. (Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
04/23/content_436882.htm) 
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stable international relations and economic cooperation, to sustain China’s economic 
development and political stability during the 1970s, after China’s reform and opening up. 
However, the international community condemned the Chinese government’s lack of clarity 
on the meaning of the Principles and its diplomatic strategy – i.e., without establishing clear 
interpretations of the Principles, and standards for the Principles’ application, China stands 
on the principle of non-intervention for its national interests with regards to its aid to rogue 
nations in Africa such as Sudan; the issue of Tibetan independence; and the problem of 
human rights in China, and others. By extension, according to Li (2007), during the Mao era, 
a “dogmatic approach” and diplomacy of an “ultra-leftist mentality” inclination dominated in 
Sino-Africa relations; China treated Africa as an ally in fighting hegemony and imperialism 
in the aftermath of the 1960s Sino-Soviet split (Li, 2007, p.70). Yet, by the end of the 1960s, 
China reoriented its diplomatic policy, and adopted a pragmatic line, an aid basis of “free 
and unconditional”, a diplomacy based on existing Chinese communist thought, which had 
its roots in the slogan of “exporting revolution” with an attendant absurdity in the principle 
of “non-interference in international affairs” (ibid, p.71).  
Between December 1963 and February 1964, Zhou Enlai made a tour of ten African 
countries,65 and proposed the Eight Principles for Chinese Economic Assistance66 and Five 
Principles67 governing China’s relations with the Arab and African countries as reflected in 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and Bandung spirit. China’s economic 
assistance is offered as long-term, interest-free or low-interest loans, technical assistance, 
and landmark construction for establishing their own independent domains, emphasizing 
mutual economic assistance, equality, and mutual benefit. China left a good impression 
                                                
65 The ten African countries are: the United Arab Republic (currently Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.   
66 (1) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in 
providing aid to other countries; (2) In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government 
strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks 
for any privileges; (3) China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans 
and extends the time limit for repayment; (4) The purpose of the Chinese Government is to help them 
to be self-reliant and gain independent economic development; (5) The Chinese Government tries its 
best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker 
results; (6) The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own 
manufacture at international market prices; (7) In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese 
Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique; (8) 
The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same 
standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.  
67 (1) China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and 
new colonialism, and to win and safeguard national independence; (2) It supports the pursuit of a 
policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries; (3) 
It supports the desire of the Arab and African people to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of 
their own choice; (4) It supports the Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes 
through peaceful consultations; (5) It holds that the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries 
should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter 
should be opposed.  
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behind after preferring this unconventional offer to African nations in the 1960s (MFA, n.a-
b). China began to render its aid to friendly nations of North Africa during 1950s: e.g., Egypt 
(1956) and Algeria (1958); and in the 1960s, extended aid to sub-Saharan African nations, 
e.g., Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia (Brautigam, 2014, p.132). As a majority of 
African nations declared their independence from colonial rulers, the more actively aid was 
utilized as a major instrument in Beijing’s diplomacy. 
From 1949 to 1978, the primary aim of China’s diplomatic policy towards Africa, however, 
was virtually confined to aid that was not given on the basis of practical and sustainable 
development, but rather connected to politics. This is because political conditions in Africa 
from 1960s through 1980s were still influenced by the Soviet Union, through the supply a 
large amounts of arms, compared to other countries. Also, the contest for ideology between 
the Soviet Union, the United States, and European nations was exercised in Africa (Li, 2007, 
pp.70-71). Beijing focused on deploying its aid as part of a policy of containment aimed at the 
Soviet Union, and the use of patronage for political advantage from African nations to solve 
the Taiwan issue. Drawing on the purpose of China’s diplomacy towards Africa, China began 
to support Africa’s revolutionary movements and its liberation, which were ideologically 
based on Maoist China (Alden and Alves, 2008, p.48); and began to provide military 
assistance to Africa governments. In 1958, Beijing began to support Algeria’s goal of 
liberation and revolution from France by furnishing it with US$10 million for military 
procurement (Hickey and Guo, 2010, p.135); in 1960, it helped train Guinea Bissau’s rebels 
to secede from Portuguese rule. During the 1960s, Beijing broadened the boundary of 
military support in the name of liberation movements. The U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency allegedly, from 1961 through 1971, assessed that 75 percent of military 
supplies procurement was from foreign countries, and that China supplied Africa with 
US$42 million worth of arms (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, pp.164-165).  
In terms of China’s aid for ingratiating with Africa during 1960s, as observed earlier, China’s 
aid supply was interlocked with African nations’ independence, and besides military support, 
provided aid to in sub-Saharan Africa as follows: First, China began to offer its economic and 
technical cooperation, including 5,000 tons of rice to Guinea after they voted down de 
Gaulle’s constitution by plebiscite in 1960 (Hickey & Guo, 2010, p.135). Second, Beijing 
offered a US$20 million interest-free loan to Ghana in 1961 and provided technical 
assistance, high-profile visits, and diverse loan agreements between 1966 and 1972. China’s 
established its first diplomatic ties with a sub-Saharan African nation with Ghana (Hess and 
Aidoo, 2015, p.47). Third, in the same year as Ghana, China signed an economic and 
cooperation agreement with Mali and dispatched technical experts in the field of 
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construction, oil refinery, textile mill, and leather processing. China aided the agriculture 
sector in tea plantation in 1962, and sugar plantation in 1966. In 1968, China sent medical 
teams to Mali, and promised US$100 million for agricultural and light industrial projects in 
the late-1970s (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.241). Fourth, Tanzania received a US$42 million 
loan, and a US$3 million subsidy from China in 1964, following Tanzania’s former vice 
president’s visit to China. It was the beginning of an impressive Chinese financial and 
technical assistance program for Tanzania (ibid. pp.260-261). Fifth, Beijing promised US$50 
million in assistance to Zambia in 1964, the same year in which Zambia became independent 
from Great Britain. China worked on diplomatic relations with Zambia because it was pivotal 
to China’s strategic goals in southern Africa, based on its abundant resources. In 1967, China 
granted Zambia a US$17 million interest-free loan while its president, Kenneth David 
Kaunda visited Beijing; in the ensuing months, China provided a US$7 million line of credit 
to Zambia; and later that year, the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway was 
confirmed by China, Tanzania, and Zambia (ibid. p.324-325).  
The Tanzania and Zambia railroad is a transport artery that links east Africa with southern 
Africa; it has been a primary means of transportation until recently. The purpose of the 
TAZARA Railway (also called the Tanzam Railway or the Uhuru68 Railway in Swahili) was to 
sever dependent relations with Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Angola that had white-ruled 
political systems, when Zambia exported its copper abroad. Thus, the TAZARA line began at 
the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, and extended southwest by traversing Tanzania. In 
this context, TAZARA Railway, which was one of China’s largest foreign aid projects has a 
symbolic meaning to Africans, one of “anti-apartheid and anti-imperialist”. The World Bank, 
in fact, even declined this railway project for the reason of financially impracticality. In 1970, 
despite it being an onerous construction project, China dispatched not only over fifty 
thousand experts, including workers in order to construct the “Freedom Railway”, but also 
US$400 million in long-term, interest-free loans for TAZARA building funds, under the 
China’s turnkey project management. The actual cost was nevertheless assumed to be much 
higher than the official fund. In 1976, TAZARA was opened (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p. 261; 
Brautigam and Tang, 2012, p.6; Akyeampong and Xu, 2015, pp. 764-765). Consideration 
China’s economic situation at the time, prior to its reforms and opening up, the cost of 
TAZARA’s construction were tremendous. During the early 1970s, when the TAZARA 
Railway was under construction, Zambia’s average per capita income was higher than 
China’s. Beijing persisted in excessive investment, despite the fact that China was suffering 
from famine due to food shortages, from 1956 to 1961. Guinea received 10,000 tons of rice 
                                                
68 Uhuru means “freedom” in Swahili.  
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from China in 1960, and China’s aid fund towards Africa was expanded from US$25 million 
in 1960 to US$39.2 million in 1961 (J. Zhang, 2017).  Nevertheless, China took into 
consideration the impact of aid to Africa had on its unstable economy, and China offered a 
projected estimated total of US$4.7 billion in aid to Africa, from 1960 to 1989 (Brautigam, 
2008). The sum total of aid was almost half of its total when compared to its overall overseas 
support during the same time period. Through China’s outgoing foreign policy, China set up 
diplomatic relations with 20 African nations from 1970 and 1976 (Alden and Alves, 2008. 
p.51).  
China’s intent for its aid in foreign policy contributed a valuable reward to China after it 
officially appeared on the international stage, with its entry into the United Nations, in 1971. 
Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations, concurrently, led China to hold a seat as a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. From 1971 to 1979, China was 
recognized by 46 states instead of Taiwan. Despite gaining the recognition of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Taiwan was still seen as a barrier to establishing bilateral 
relations between China and the U.S., until they officially established diplomatic relations in 
1979. During the 1970s, China was required to keep Taiwan in check as they pursued an 
intensive diplomatic drive to increase Taiwan’s international recognition. In this, they 
presented China’s coercive diplomatic tactics to get Taiwan under its influence and force 
Taiwan to break off diplomatic relations with all countries in the international community. 
In the case of Africa, China forged new links with African countries that broke off diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan (Taylor, 2002, p.126). The Beijing leadership expressed China’s 
position, to make the Taiwan issue clear in a meeting with then-President of the U.S. Richard 
Nixon in Beijing, through the Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the 
United State of America, in 1972:  
the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of 
China; Taiwan is a province of China, which has long been returned to the 
motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must 
be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities, 
which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan’, ‘one China two governments’, 
‘two Chinas’, an ‘independent Taiwan’ or advocate that ‘the status of Taiwan remains 
to be determined’. (MFA, n.a-d) 
With regards to China’s goal of reunification with Taiwan, the majority of African countries 
contributed much in supporting the One China policy in opposition to Taiwan’s so-called 
 138 
“flexible diplomacy”. Most African countries abide by China’s One China policy in support of 
China’s policy becoming a reality. Insofar as China needed to enhance the nation’s position 
in the international community through the Third World, especially Africa, Taiwan’s 
diplomatic isolation is a substantive issue for China not only to secure and enlarge a 
bridgehead in Africa but also to fulfill the One China policy.  
 
5.1.1.2 The First decade under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 1989 
 
In counterpoint to Sino-Africa relations stance based on “third world” and ideological unity 
in 1960s, under the influence of Deng’s economic liberalization policy, the aim of China’s 
relations shifted from ideology to trade during the 1980s. The possible reason for the shift 
was that a mutual sense of solidarity in Sino-Africa relations changed the perception of 
China in Africa (Obiorah, 2008, p.3). China achieved results through its economic openness 
and policy of pragmatism, and so radical Maoism was supplanted by Deng’s new policy.  
China began to place its top priority on economic development and introducing technology 
and foreign capital, carrying out its reforms and opening up policy in 1978, at the third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. However, 
Deng’s new policy produced transient changes in its relations with Africa, owing to 
insufficient funds for China’s domestic economic development. China’s aid expenditure in 
1978, for instance, was 1,721 billion RMB, which represented about 1.53 percent of its gross 
expenditure. This was a 0.97 percent drop when compared to China’s gross expenditure on 
aid in 1977. All expenditure on China’s aid in 1980 fell by 1.86 percent from two years earlier, 
the largest year-on-year decline since 1978 (Watanabe, 2013). From the year of policy 
enforcement to 1982, the new policy led to unexpected results, such as dwindled economic 
aid and bilateral trade. To straighten out Sino-African relations, the 12th CPC National 
Assembly adjusted its foreign policy to satisfy both China and African countries’ economic 
development based on the “Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence” (Li, 2007, p.90). In the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution during Mao’s era, Beijing’s new foreign strategy was 
invigorated by market-oriented economic development projects under the opening up policy 
and non-antagonism, including the relaxation of relations with the Soviet Union on a global 
basis around the mid-1980s. Also, China toughened its foreign policy towards Africa to 
cement diplomatic relations between China and the continent.  
 139 
In a bid to promote relations with Africa following the unavoidable reduction in assistance, 
from 1982 to 1983, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang made a tour of 11 African countries,69 
promoting South-South cooperation and smooth aid supply. Zhao’s statement, unlike Zhou 
Enlai’s principles during his visit to Africa from 1963 to 1964, reassured “mutual assistance” 
and “mutual benefit” based relations between China and Africa, pledging to stand against 
“racism, aggression, and expansionism” (Q. Zhang, 2015, pp.57-58). In addition, he made an 
additional remark, stressing the importance of economic and technological cooperation in 
Tanzania at the end of the tour: (1) equality and mutual benefit; (2) common progress; (3) 
stress on practical results; and (4) diversity in form. In 1984, China henceforth provided 
US$258.9 million in aid to Africa’s sixth-largest donor (Brautigam, 2008, pp.203-204). 
Furthermore, there is a new wave of African economic development following independence. 
In 1980, the first economic summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was held in Lagos, and adopted the Lagos Plan of 
Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) that called for “self-reliance” and “self-
sustainment” (Asuk, 2011, p.134). In connection with self-directed movement, in Shaw’s 
understanding, a large number of civil societies across multiple regions were influenced by 
the movement. Also, he argued, “The dynamic of regional exchange given economic crisis 
and conditionalities is already a reality which sustains many local political economies, 
whether through the transnational movement of capital, commodities, currencies, drugs or 
labour” (Shaw, 1994, p.21). Unfortunately, the LPA fell short of solving issues with Africa’s 
economic growth, and the majority of African nations carried out large-scale restructuring 
through the IMF and World Bank. Subsequently, there were calls for the foundation of a 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001.  
China’s diplomatic policy strategy after the reforms and openness policy was modified, to 
reduce the scale of aid and bring to an end extensive technical support, as a result of the 
government’s financial deficit for its modernization plan. China adopted a position of “low 
profile co-operation projects” that demanded “small investments” and “quicker returns” 
(Alden & Alves, 2008, p.53). For the sake of maintaining relations with Africa, and 
promoting mutual dependence in economic interests, China also shifted its aid method: first, 
Beijing adopted the practice of providing its aid fund through tripartite cooperation, under a 
mutual assistance system that was established by African governments, international aid 
agencies such as the United Nations and its related agencies. Second, China looked to its 
companies to help establish the growth of its foreign aid and thus contributed vastly to the 
economic boom in the late 1970s. And third, leaders in Beijing applied new elements to its 
                                                
69 The 11 African countries are: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaire, the Congo, Zimbabwe, Gabon, 
Tanzania, and Kenya. 
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aid: “debt-equity swaps”, “joint ventures”, “assisted sustainability”, and “aid-to-profit” 
(Brautigam, 2008, pp.205-206).  
All considered, China’s diplomatic policy after the reform and opening up of China’s 
economy was the search for internal solutions to make effective use of its market economy 
system to support aid for Africa, under the overall aim of cooperative development 
fulfillment. Ultimately, China's new foreign policy was influenced by the opening up of the 
Chinese economy – i.e., the introduction of new technologies led to China obtaining foreign 
exchanges through technology sales; promoting development in its lagging industrial field; 
and seizing opportunities of keep up with developed countries. Beijing’s new diplomatic 
policy of international aid, investment, and trade built a stable basis not only for pursuing its 
economic interests, but also for establishing a firm cooperation in Sino-African relations 
(Ross, 1994, p.446). Though China set up independent foreign policy during the 1980s, this 
did not mean that China mapped out a specific diplomatic strategy towards Africa, but was 
more focused on pursing its modernization – although, China did have a close connection 
with the developed world. All these early stages of China’s foreign policy towards Africa were 
embarked on during a process of looking for solutions to the Tiananmen Square protest in 
1989. 
 
5.1.2 The post-Tiananmen Square years, from 1989 
During the political turmoil in China during the 1990s, the Tiananmen Square protest of 
1989 was a momentous event. The incident was a watershed in China’s modern history, 
which led to a structural shift in the domestic and international systems. Externally, a mass-
democratization movement arose in Africa, influenced by the 1980s, and there were plentiful 
signs of change in Africa, such as “the national conference, co-opted transitions, government 
change via democratic election, guided democratization, conditional transitions, 
recalcitrance and piecemeal reforms, and armed insurrections culminating in elections” 
(Joseph, 1999, p.3).70 Moreover, Sino-African relations showed signs of faltering, owing to 
Taiwan’s revival in outside activity, and growing economic power and strengthened 
democratic identity. China set about its work to salvage the internal and external situations.  
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protest, China was not only subjected to 
diplomatic isolation, but also denounced by the community of nations with regards to its 
                                                
70 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and development in Africa. 
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution pp. 135-142; Bratton, M., & Van, W. N. (1997). Democratic 
experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. 
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human rights record. The West called China to account for its human rights abuses after the 
Tiananmen Square incident. This produced an unexpected result of worsening relations 
between China and the West. By highlighting its “peaceful coexistence” line, to relieve this 
situation, China started to get down to reviving a broad connection with the developing 
world, especially Africa, as a way of alleviating tension in its relations with other nations, 
especially the Western world. Soon after the Tiananmen incident, from 1989 to 1992, China’s 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Vice Premier Wu Xueqian visited seventeen and three 
sub-Saharan African countries, respectively. Foreign Minister Qian visited Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Zamia, and Zimbabwe. China’s endeavor to smooth the events of 
Tiananmen Square was presented in a different way. Not only did Qian Qichen mention the 
Tiananmen Square incident in African countries while touring in southern Africa, but also 
the Chinese government invited the representatives of sixteen sub-Saharan African countries 
to visit China (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.46).  
Qian Qichen, however, did not make a sudden visit to Africa in order to suppress the 
Tiananmen incident; in the 1970s and ’80s, there were brisk exchanges between China and 
Africa – African leaders, including presidents and heads, visited China 84 times in a brief 
span of ten years. Between 1978 and 1980, five of China’s leaders71 paid 33 visits to African 
nations, and former Premiere Zhao Ziyang visited 11 African nations in the same year that 
China’s new foreign policy was amended at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Even after Zhao’s visits, three more high-ranking governmental officials – 
Li Xianlin, Li Peng, and Wu Xueqian – promoted amity in Sino-African relations on their 
way to Africa (Li, 2008, p.28). The West’s upbraiding of China over human rights issues 
roused support rather than antipathy from the Third World countries, who saw this as the 
West meddling with China’s modernization in order to derail its development. It led to 
deepening political alliances with China (Taylor, 1998, pp.446-448). By virtue of the 
influence of developing countries, particularly African nations, China’s human rights issues, 
that had a drag on China for twelve years following the Tiananmen Massacre, were not 
placed on the conference table of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Given China’s 
then-position in international relations and the political situation following the Tiananmen 
Square protest, as Konings (2007) observes, the following three factors that made African 
countries ally with China. First, the majority of corrupt African government officials and 
their political elites were under pressure to democratize and liberalize their politics. Second, 
the enmity towards “neo-imperialists” due to intervention in the internal affairs of 
developing countries, a sense of fellowship among countries of the Third World. Third, an 
                                                
71 The Five leaders who visited Africa from 1978 and 1980 are Li Xianlian, Geng Biao, Ulanfu, Ji 
Pengfei, and Chen Muhua. 
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implicit agreement to disregard condemnation of China in order to receive continued 
support (Konings, 2007, p.350). The Tiananmen Square incident, after all, became an 
impetus to cement Sino-African relations; which developed into expanded diplomatic 
cooperation. 
In the early 1990s, China’s external affairs were concern with Taiwan’s sudden rise in 
economic power, and support for its independence movement, because China saw this as a 
threat to its international prestige. Taiwan devoted all its strength to regaining diplomatic 
recognition. Taiwan made the most of its chances at the time by going slow on China’s aid in 
Africa; launching an all-out diplomatic assault through Dollar Diplomacy, vis-à-vis small 
African countries that faced indigent circumstances. It created a stir in ten African 
countries, 72  starting with Liberia, that were delighted to receive substantive economic 
assistance rather than a political alliance; this led to establishing ties with Taiwan over China 
for nine years, starting in 1998 (Liu, 2011, p.88).  In terms of China’s economic growth, 
relations with Africa were a considerable issue for China after it carried out its economic 
reforms and opening up policy, because China required a considerable quantity of raw 
materials to supply its production, and also new export markets into which it could sell its 
products. Thus, Taiwan’s obstruction of diplomatic ties with Africa was a real thorn in 
China’s side, despite the fact that China had been imposing sanctions to isolate Taiwan from 
the international community since 1970s. This caused China to impose a stranglehold on 
Taiwan’s growing economic and political influence through the One China policy, in order to 
take back the initiative in Africa. As to Africa’s demeanor, in Taylor’s (2002) view, especially 
in light of diplomatic ties between China and Taiwan, African countries’ elites became aware 
of the two Chinas’ scramble for Africa, and chose to use this competition to pursue the 
economic interests of Africa: “most Africans do not care much who is the ‘real’ China or with 
whom official diplomatic ties should be established” (Taylor, 2002, p.129).  
China’s efforts to cement Sino-African ties by strengthening solidarity continued during the 
1990s. In 1992, China’s former president Yang Shangkun, during his visit to Africa, 
expressed five principles73 that refreshed antipathy for the West’s intervention under the 
existing principles in China’s African policy (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, pp.46-47). In 1996, 
                                                
72  Liberia, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Niger, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Senegal, Chad and Sao Tome.  
73 The five principles are: 1) support for African sovereignty, national independence, and economic 
development; 2) opposition to foreign intervention; 3) respect for different political systems and 
development paths; 4) support for African unity, cooperation and the Organization of African Unity; 
and 5) Belief that African states should participate actively in the international system as equal 
members.  
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China’s previous president Jiang Zemin visited six African countries74 at the invitation of 
their leaders. He announced China’s African policy75 for a new era while in Africa, meeting 
with representatives of these countries to converse and exchange opinion. Jiang renewed 
China’s guiding principles relative to bilateral ties, “to treat each other as equals, develop 
sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and seek common development”, 
and called for “strengthen[ing] solidarity and cooperation with African countries and 
work[ing] together with them to contribute to the lofty cause of world peace and 
development” (MFA, n.a-a). Jiang also suggested a five-point proposal,76 which underlined 
“the development of a 21st century-oriented long-term stable China-Africa relationship of 
all-round cooperation” during his keynote address in Ethiopia. His Africa visit paved the way 
to making relations more active, and resulted in agreements with six African countries 
related to technical and cultural cooperation, trade and economy (ibid).  
China’s African policy during the 1990s stands in opposition to previous leaders’ diplomatic 
policy towards Africa. In counterpoint to the previous ideology-centric policy, from the 
1980s onwards, strategic economic interests of “mutual confidence”, “sovereign equality”, 
“sovereign equality”, and “non-intervention” adhered to existing principles of African policy, 
“mutual benefit and development”. This foreign policy prepared the ground for subsequent 
presidents to solidify Sino-African ties, and kept Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping onside for 
establishing public diplomacy during the 2000s. Furthermore, the internal economic and 
political moves of China’s previous president Jiang Zemin continued, which cast a long 
shadow over its aid to and diplomatic performance in Africa. His attempts at economic 
reform can be summarized as follows: He proposed the idea of socialist market economy as 
mandatory to the conduct of foreign aid programs in accordance with the market principle in 
the report to the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992; the following year, his proposal was 
                                                
74 The six African countries former leader, Jiang Zemin visited are Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe. 
75  China’s African policy contains the following contents: 1) respecting the choices of road to 
development made by African people themselves; 2) abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries; 3) respecting all countries 
and treat them as equals, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth; 4) supporting African 
countries in their just struggle to maintain national independence, state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and oppose foreign interference; 5) promoting unity among African countries and advocate 
settlement of disputes among them, if any, through peaceful negotiation; 6) upholding justice and 
help safeguard the rights and interests of African countries in international affairs; 8) continuing to 
provide economic aid to African countries without attaching any political strings; and 9) sticking to 
the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its economic cooperation and trade with African 
countries.  
76 The five-point proposal included the following elements: 1) fostering a sincere friendship between 
the two sides and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends"; 2) treating each other as equals 
and respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; 3) 
seeking common development on the basis of mutual benefit; 4) enhancing consultation and 
cooperation in international affairs; and 5) looking into the future and create a more splendid world. 
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accepted by the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP. 
Beijing’s leadership carried out an extensive reform in the following areas: “systemic reforms 
in the market systems, the nature of enterprises, the public finance and taxation systems, the 
banking system, the social security system, and macroeconomic management” (Wu and Fan, 
2015, p.64). In 1994, China set up the China Export Import Bank, which is a financial 
institution working as a government agency with the immediate effect on the introduction of 
socialist market economy. This new system facilitated concessional loans as a new tool of its 
foreign aid from the following year. 
Thus, China executed its foreign aid reforms based on the fruits of Jiang’s labor, in 1995. It 
brought about several changes in China’s foreign aid. The first change was that the new 
Chinese foreign aid program facilitated not only to increase its aid funds through 
concessional loans, but also to strengthen its overseas aid. Breaking with pre-1995 practice, 
when the Chinese government covered all the expenses of foreign aid, the concessional loans 
were supported to lighten the burden on the government. The China Export Import Bank 
offered long-term and low-interest loans, and a large number of developing countries took 
out loans, which led to an increase in the Chinese aid fund. By extension, by the late of 1990s, 
China provided training and seminar sessions for development in the fields of human 
resources, economy, welfare, and technical training in developing countries. The second 
change was that the new foreign aid program improved China’s aid projects between China 
and recipients, making their operation smoother. Third, China instituted a grant assistance 
system, overseas volunteers and debt relief; a starting point for launching its overseas 
volunteer program and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). For nine consecutive 
years beginning in 2002, Beijing has run its overseas volunteer program: volunteers were 
sent to 17 countries in Africa, including Ethiopia and Liberia, in order to train each country’s 
people in the fields of education, international relief, welfare, technical training, Chinese 
language education, and others (Watanabe, 2013, pp.70-72). Also, in 2000, FOCAC was 
established to combine China’s foreign aid with its diplomacy.  
The launch of FOCAC heralded a new era of Sino-African relations that is full of possibility. 
FOCAC, according to Taylor’s view, is a crucial outgrowth of China’s foreign policy after the 
Tiananmen Square incident. In terms of FOCAC’s political basis, Taylor pointed out that 
“anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonist rhetoric was revived and Chinese diplomacy 
embarked on a prolonged campaign to nurture ties with developing nations” (Taylor, 2011, 
p.36). China achieved a strong partnership with Africa through FOCAC, which has served as 
a foundation for promoting “strengthening friendship, promoting cooperation, equal 
consultation, enhancing understanding, and expanding consensus” (FOCAC, 2013). FOCAC 
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pushes forward mutual development and common interests through a multi-layered and 
multi-dimensional approach to China’s African policy-making and practice. (There is a more 
detailed discussion of FOCAC in Chapter 8.) 
 
5.2 Character and progress of China’s economic relations in Africa  
5.2.1 The characteristic of key drivers for African policy in Chinese politic 
system 
Drawing upon the five-decade history of Sino-African relations, above, China has released 
two white papers on its African policy, in 2006 and 2015. China’s attention to African 
countries is growing day by day, and its African policy is more extensive and clear. Given the 
consideration that there was no official document outlining China’s African policy before 
2006, the two white policy papers are a clear expression that China underwent a substantial 
change in order to interact with the world. Also, with regards to the actual publication years 
of the two policy papers, they were released in the same year as the third and sixth FOCAC. It 
is therefore accepted that China’s African policy is an outgrowth of its multilateral 
communications with African countries. Though China’s Africa policy should be discussed in 
relation to FOCAC’s agenda, this section will cover the chief purpose of Africa policy, which 
China considers to be first in their policy. FOCAC will be analyzed in a case study, Chapter 8, 
of multilateral communication in Sino-African relations.  
When we examine China’s Africa policy, there are four principles and goals that the Chinese 
government stipulated on the first white paper: first, from a political angle, “Sincerely, 
friendship and equality” through high-level visits, exchanges between each country’s 
legislative bodies, political parties, local governments, consultation mechanisms, and 
cooperation in international affairs. Second, from an economic standpoint, “mutual benefit, 
reciprocity and common prosperity” by means of trade, investment, financial cooperation, 
agriculture, tourism, and multilateral cooperation, infrastructure, resource cooperation, debt 
reduction and relief including economic assistance. Third, from a global outlook perspective, 
“mutual support and close coordination” for Africa’s peace and security. Fourth, from an 
international social exchange perspective, “mutual learning and seeking common 
development” in the fields of education, science, culture and health through the help of 
cooperation in environment, consul, administration, media, medical and health, science and 
technology, human resource development and education, people-to-people exchange, 
disaster reduction, and humanitarian assistance (FOCAC, 2006a). Before releasing the 
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policy paper officially in 2006, however, China had already stated the aims to which it 
adheres for its Africa policy (China Daily, 2003): 
• First, China sticks to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
• Second, China countenances unity, cooperation, and union among African countries 
along with their self-improvement. 
• Third, China aims at developed and cement a long-term and stable political 
relationship with Africa under by friendship, mutual trust, and cooperation in many 
ways.  
• Fourth, China carries on providing economic assistance to African countries under 
the condition of no political involvement and implementing measures for the China 
aid projects in Africa of profit improvement.  
• Fifth, China demands the international community to have a concern for the issue of 
African peace and development and provide assistance to African countries in terms 
of investment, remission of debt and launching a new business.  
• Sixth, China supports Africa to participate in and play a bigger role in international 
affairs. 
Overall, China’s first Africa policy built on existing policies, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence and the Five Points Proposal of the 1990s, and added public diplomacy which 
stresses the importance of multilateral communication and soft power policy, for 
consideration of China’s image on the global stage. Through the white paper, China firmed 
up its African policy as part of its political and economic policies for pursuing its economic 
interests and African recognition and acceptance of the One China policy. At the same time, 
the style of the policy displayed a tendency that underlines “ideological neutrality and 
diplomacy” which contributes to China’s economic needs from African countries, by 
adhering to the principle of nonintervention and anti-colonial affinities as part of strategic 
partnership in Sino-African relations (Median, 2006, pp.76-77). Beijing also strategically 
attracted the African Union (AU) to become a member of the FOCAC, and communicates 
with AU and NEPAD, thereby allowing for the “comprehensive development of pragmatic 
cooperation” and “mutual political trust” (FOCAC, 2006a) in Sino-African relations, and 
Africa’s integration and political stability. Furthermore, Wen Jiabao underlined the strategic 
partnership when he gave a speech to African countries at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th 
Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, in 2009: 
I am convinced that as long as China and Africa go hand in hand with an enterprising 
spirit and cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, we will seize 
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opportunities and overcome challenges to take the new type of China-Africa strategic 
partnership to a new level, and make China-Africa friendship and cooperation even 
more fruitful. (FOCAC, 2009c) 
Drawing on the first white policy paper, China published another, reinforced African policy 
in 2015. There are a couple of previously unmentioned terms that we should pay careful 
attention to in the second policy paper. First, China’s newly expressed interest in 
“establishing and developing comprehensive strategic and cooperative China-Africa 
partnership”. There is no formal definition of “comprehensive strategic and cooperative 
partnership” that the Chinese government has yet formulated. But, when one takes into 
consideration the overall contextual signification of the second policy paper, its meaning is 
clear: extensive and multidimensional cooperation in social, scientific, political and 
economic spheres through various channels to communicate with government and 
nongovernment for abiding and strong relationship and mutual benefit. Furthermore, the 
expansive relationship is based on the South-South development cooperation that China is 
the leading country in the world market and plays various important roles for development 
in the international community. On the basis of the two Africa policy papers, China set the 
stage for communication with African countries in two ways. One is bilateral cooperation in 
which economic activities, through trade, China’s investment and aid, take place between 
China and each African country. The Chinese government encourages the cooperation of its 
government-owned companies when Beijing provides aid and the bulk of investment for 
infrastructure development through the bilateral ties. Recently, China continued its efforts to 
communicate with African publics by means of various exchange programs, as part of its 
“mutual learning and seeking common development” African policy. The second important 
element is multilateral cooperation via the FOCAC. China brings a new agenda for its African 
policy activities based on collective dialogue with participating African countries of the 
forum (as previously mentioned, there is more discussion of FOCAC in Chapter 8).  
All this considered, China’s two Africa policy papers are thoroughly designed based on its 
aims in the fields of economics, politics, and security in Africa. As mentioned earlier, China 
has immense cultural and economic appeal in and influence on African countries; in 
particular, from its aid, investment, trade, and infrastructure development. Africa buttressed 
China’s broad sphere of political activities on the international stage, as an example of its 
support for China to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 
the 1970s. In the same vein, China recently presented an image of itself taking responsibility 
in the field of security, such as engaging in UN peacekeeping in Africa, putting a temporary 
hold on its non-interference principle to improve its image on the global stage by attaining 
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and expanding its economic interests in Africa.  
Since the early 1990s, China has maintained extensive relations with African nations in areas 
such as finance, trade, investment, development assistance, technology transfer and training, 
tourism, and cultural exchanges. China has displayed special interests in African countries 
from four strategic perspectives: obtaining natural resources (especially oil and gas), a 
market for China’s exports, sufficient security and stability, and political legitimacy (Alden, 
2005; Haroz, 2011). The aim of these interests is ultimately to benefits China’s economy. 
First, for China’s economic concerns in Africa, China started to turn its attention to African 
countries during the early 1990s, due to its need to secure stable and dependable energy 
resources (e.g., crude oil) for its continuing economic growth. According to U.S. Energy 
Information Administration data, China imported 22 percent77 of all Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
crude oil exports (EIA, 2013). China depended heavily on imports from oil-producing 
countries, including African countries, after the 1990s due to its rapid economic growth. The 
total amount of China’s energy imports increased steadily post-1996. In the case of coal, 
China has shown increased energy import dependency on coal, from 3.8% in 2000 to 8.2% 
in 2006, whereas China relied on petroleum imports of around 33.8% in 200078. This 
situation resulted from an increased consumption by transportation or automobiles that 
need petroleum in China, resulting from steep economic development (Ma & Oxley, 2014, 
pp.73-5). African crude oil exports accounted for 62% of total exports, from a total bilateral 
trade value between China and Africa of $160 billion, in 2013. Meanwhile, in the same year, 
the United States imports of crude oil from Africa were more than 80% of the whole 
merchandise imports (IEA, 2014). China relies on a large amount of crude oil from African 
countries, just as the United States does, but African oil resources come into strategic 
relations between China and Africa because of their interdependent bilateral trade, which 
opens a gate for Africa stating its demands of China in return for resources. For this reason, 
China utilizes its economic means to acquire natural resources from African countries. 
Unlike during the 1990s, Africa has grown in value as a new market for the 21st century. The 
majority of African countries underwent the change of swift political transition towards the 
establishment of democracies, with the cessation of civil wars after the mid-1990s. From the 
2000s, especially, most countries in Africa showed high rates of growth, growing at an 
average annual rate of 5.3% from 2000 to 2010 (IMF, 2016, p.11), resulting from political 
stability and a rise in the prices of raw materials. From the 2000s, furthermore, the driving 
force of Africa’s ever-growing middle class and urbanization has led to a rapidly-growing 
                                                
77 The number will be increased when adding other African resources such as copper, iron ore, timber, 
and cotton. 
78 China’s reliance on imports of petroleum was 7.6 percent in 1995 (Ma & Oxley, 2014, pp.73). 
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consumer market. Africa’s emerging markets are driven by large, young generations and 
abundant resources, which furnish China with motive for concentrating on Africa. Unlike 
Africa, due to the rising cost of the labor force, water and electricity domestically, and global 
economic recession internationally, from the 2000s, the salient characteristic of China’s 
economic transition has been a slowdown in its labor-intensive industries.79 Thus, Africa’s 
potential as an emerging market matches China’s craving for a new place to which it can 
relocate its industry, which could provide the low-cost human resources and abundant 
resources unavailable in China. Moreover, the Chinese government formulated its “go 
global”80 strategy in 2001, further urging its enterprises to enter the African market. China’s 
investment field in Africa has also shifted from the development and securing of natural 
resource to the manufacturing and service industries, so as to find new markets in which to 
sell Chinese products with “Made in Africa” labels, in order to evade the European and 
United States’ control over Chinese products’ quality and price.  
Therefore, China has arranged to relocate 85 million of its light manufacturing jobs from 
China to Africa, said Justin Yifu Lin, the former World Bank Chief Economist and Senior 
Vice President, Development Economics (The World Bank, 2011). Chinese enterprises show 
signs of focusing on potential investment in African countries that have continuous 
economic growth and large populations, such as Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya, which are among Africa’s top ten fastest-
growing economic countries (Kamel, 2017, p.34); and also countries that possess 
considerable amounts of raw materials and crude oil such as Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, 
Zambia, and others.  
                                                
79 The driving force of China’s rapid economic development comes from the cheap and abundant 
Chinese labor force, which produced the result of a successful exporting country. However, as a result 
of the economic depression of developed countries, which were China’s main importers, China 
encountered not only the limitations of an export-driven economic structure for its development, but 
concurrently suffered from oversupply in its manufacturing market. Moreover, owing to the cityward 
migration tendency of the Chinese population, China faces difficulties in supporting cheap labor for its 
exports; it has led to a reduction in China’s low-price benefits.  
80 China’s “go global” strategy has gone through four stages in entering foreign market, since 2001, 
when China established the policy. In the “go global” era, 1.0, the preliminary stage, most Chinese 
enterprises began establishing sales networks abroad and targeting low-end international trade. The 
“go global” era 2.0 focused on state-owned enterprises overseas expansion, focusing on infrastructure 
projects and securing oil and natural gas. Then during the era 3.0, China’s manufacturing sets about 
gradually shifting its base from China to overseas. Private enterprises concentrated on investing in 
foreign markets directly, in tandem with setting up factories abroad, increasing local labor 
employment and international infrastructure and companies acquisition. Now China’s “go global” 
policy enters its 4.0 era: private enterprises are the main engine, as the impetus for developing into 
world-class innovators through diversified investments and elevating their positions within global 
value chains. Based on China’s continuing economic transformation in the 4.0 era, Chinese 
enterprises endeavor to translate their ideas into reality as follows: from “world factory” to “world 
market”, from “a capital importing country” to “a capital exporting country”; from “made in China” to 
“made for China” under China’s new opening-up strategy in the 21st century (The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016a). 
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Second, in terms of China’s political concerns in Africa, China seeks political recognition and 
legitimacy from Africa. As for China’s political recognition, its strict adherence to the One 
China policy is by far the most important. China holds support for Taiwan in check in African 
countries, because China sees value in Africa. Beijing has been observing Taiwan’s political 
activities to drive out in Africa through fair or foul means since the 1990s, but there are still 
three African countries (Swaziland, Burkina Faso, and São Tomé and Príncipe) that maintain 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Brautigam, 2008, pp.211-212; Eisenman, 2007, pp.36-37). The 
background to China’s efforts is that African countries hold an especially important position 
at the UN in terms of their number: African countries make up over one-quarter of UN 
members, and three non-permanent UN Security Council seats are from the Africa Group 
regional block. On the strength of the African countries’ position at the UN, China peddles 
influence in the global market based on Chinese-led initiatives without Western criticism of 
its record on human rights and environmental pollution (Hanauer and Morris, 2014a, p.7). 
African countries also have the potential power to lend assistance politically to China in the 
international community, due to their great importance at the UN. African countries are 
always at the center of matters of substance to China regarding devising solutions to 
contentious China issues in the international relations. Typical examples are when African 
countries have recognized China over Taiwan, and supported China’s induction as a member 
of the UN, in 1972; six African countries 81  supported the end to China’s international 
isolation, including ending Western sanctions, in 1989. Since 1991, China has been 
designating Africa as the first Chinese foreign minister’s destination in every new year out of 
gratitude for the continent’s general political support (Taylor, 2006, pp.64-67). To give an 
example of a recent, contemporary issue, on January 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi secured definitive support for the “One-China” policy from five African countries82 during 
his trip to Africa. Nigeria, as a representative of the five African countries, issued a joint 
statement that adhered to the “One-China” policy with China, and subsequently reaffirmed 
the strong relationships between China and Nigeria. During the meeting, Nigeria’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister Geoffrey Onyeama said, “Taiwan will stop enjoying any privileges because it 
is not a country […], we recognize the People’s Republic of China, the One-China Policy” 
(Xinhua News, 2017a). Nigeria also showed its support by imposing limitations on Taiwan’s 
presence in Nigeria, ordering Taiwan to shut down its offices in Nigeria’s capital and moving 
its trade mission to Lagos. In return, China promised Nigeria a US$40 billion investment in 
addition to a US$60 billion economic package pledged by Xi Jinping in 2015 (Africa Times, 
2017).  
                                                
81 The six African countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
82 The five countries are Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania, Congo, and Nigeria.  
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With regards to the matter of China’s legitimacy, China recognizes the power that comes 
from political connections with African countries to establish a solid foothold for itself on the 
international stage. The Chinese government began to provide financial support to African 
nations during the 1950s, for the purpose of developing political solidarity based on 
ideological support, and claims of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism for the sake of 
gaining global recognition with African help. But now Beijing appreciates the difficulties for 
its policy that arise from its authoritarian political system in an era of internationalization. 
So, China utilizes Africa for legitimization of its non-intervention policy, including the 
human right issue, by pursuing tangible benefits through its aid to and investment in rogue 
African countries, and by infusing African countries with new hope for a rapid economic 
growth like China. By forming a strong sense of solidarity, China acquired the possibility of 
sharing common ground and mutual benefits with African countries without political 
interruption regarding matters of Western ethics. For this, having left behind international 
criticism about rendering assistance to corrupt leaders, Chinese leader Xi Jinping arranged a 
meeting with Zimbabwe President Robert Gabriel Mugabe in January 2017, to confirm the 
two countries’ solidarity and a pledge to deepen collaboration with Zimbabwe via continuous 
support across various fields. 
Third, as more and more of China’s enterprises push into overseas markets, the significance 
of security issues for the Chinese government are highlighted. Though the purpose of 
Beijing’s security is focused on its people’s protection, there are three fundamental reasons 
that can be placed in three categories. First, from the angle of China’s domestic situation, 
China’s security interests rightly focus on the profits of its country and people, rather than 
substantive national security problems in African countries, so as to justify the Chinese 
people a government based around the CCP. Also, taking into account that Beijing prefers to 
maintain the dignity of the CCP externally, it is a matter of utmost importance that it 
protects Chinese who are in African countries. Second, from the perspective of seeking 
economic profits in Africa, maintaining the conditions of prosperity, stability, and security of 
African countries has an important bearing on the stability of Sino-African relations. By 
extension, it informs vigorous Chinese commerce activities in conjunction with sustaining 
continued trade and investment (Hanauer and Morris, 2014b). On that note, the Chinese 
government reiterated security and common prosperity-related words and expressions in 
both of its Africa policy papers. Third, from the international point of view, China desires to 
pave the way for elevating China’s voice and bolstering the country’s image on the world 
stage, by way of a deeper Chinese engagement in international peace. Unlike previous images 
of China, that of a country that uses any means to make profit in its relations with another 
country, by using peaceful means, China pursues its own strategy to extend its reach in the 
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world, reorganizing international order based on China, not the West. China’s intention 
reflects Xi Jinping’s address to the United Nations General Assembly’s annual gathering of 
world leaders in 2015. Xi said, “Let prosperity, fairness and justice spread across the world”. 
He demanded “a new form of international relations”, under which all countries are equal, 
and pledged to support developing countries, especially those in Africa including the 
establishment of a $1 billion, 10-year China Peace Development Fund for the UN and joint 
new UN peacekeeping system. Moreover, China founded an 8,000-troop stand-by 
peacekeeping force, giving $100 million for the purpose of establishing its own stand-by 
force (The UN, 2015a). According to the UN troop police contributors archive (1990-2016) 
data (The UN, n.a), China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping is growing. The number of 
Chinese peacekeepers in 2003 was 358, and in 2004 the number was 1,036. By 2016, there 
had been a sevenfold increase in thirteen years. Now, China is ranked 12th in peacekeeper 
contributions.83  
 
5.2.2 The disharmony of China’s African policy in Africa 
As discussed earlier, China is not only interested in Africa for economic reasons; China 
expects security and political interests as collateral benefits through its economic relations 
with the continent. Though Beijing argues that Sino-African relations are win-win and 
strategic relations, there have been disputes between China and Africa; most of these arise 
from asymmetrical economic ties. To understand the existing, lopsided economic ties 
between China and Africa, it is necessary to briefly examine how the features of the economic 
relations have changed overtime. The initial stage of economic cooperation between China 
and Africa, as mentioned in the previous chapter, began in the 1950s when China established 
diplomatic relations with African countries. Also, China established its mercantile-centric 
relations with foreign countries to benefit the nation’s economic development; they 
cemented this approach at “the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference”, in September 1949, in Beijing. The Common Program’s Article 57 
specifies the following: “the People’s Republic of China may restore and develop commercial 
relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” 
(Levi, 1953, p.281). Moreover, it underlines the need for the “protection of the independence, 
freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting 
international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and 
opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war” (MFA, n.a-c). From the 1950s to 
                                                
83 More detailed information on the UN peace operation by numbers is from Global Peace Operation 
Review, http://peaceoperationsreview.org 
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1970s, and drawing on the contents of the Common Program, China focused on expanding 
its relations with Africa as a way of promoting friendship with the Third World. The official 
bilateral trade agreements, which established current economic ties, started in the late 1950s, 
with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan were based on the political and geopolitical 
considerations of China’s foreign policy (AfDB, 2010). As for the feature of China’s aid, China 
rendered aid unilaterally, despite China’s difficult economic situation – e.g., the 
aforementioned TAZARA railway.  
However, China’s reforms and opening-up policy marked a watershed moment in Sino-
African relations, which developed into “equality and mutual benefit” under the ‘Four 
Principles’ of then-Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, and concentrated more on its economic 
development and practical results and diversification than before (C. Zhang, 2013, p.11). 
Beijing began small-scale investment in African countries in the 1980s, and started to 
expand and widen the scale of its investment and diversification in the 1990s (Xinhua News, 
2010). Since the mid-1990s, China has shifted its recognition of African countries from 
strategic relations for political purposes to equal and mutual benefits on the principle of 
reciprocation and win-win. The relations between China and Africa also entered a stabilized 
stage in the fields of trade and mutual investments. China made use of a diversified strategy 
of aid and investment, moving beyond simple trade deals in Africa. Thus, Sino-African 
relations, from the 1980s to the 1990s, concentrated on conventional inter-government 
communication, based on reciprocal contracts. By establishing FOCAC in 2000, China 
increased its assistance to Africa through extensive discussions about strengthening the 
solidarity and boosting multilateral economic ties with African countries. To maintain close 
economic ties with Africa, China formulated its African investment policy; its aid and 
investment were also divided based on business purpose, as related to the Chinese 
government’s “go global” policy and public diplomacy strategy.  
Given the transition of Sino-African economic relations, one must consider Beijing’s 
tendency for displaying signs of moving forward with its general foreign diplomatic policy 
towards Africa.  In addition, the policy also focuses on financial means, with special 
preferential treatment only for Africa. The link between China’s foreign policy and economic 
diplomacy can be found in China’s grand strategy, which makes economic development the 
highest priority for its political system, and a strategic approach that strengthens the link 
between its orientation to the international stage and its interests. China’s new approach, 
which adjusts its system for the era of globalization, is reflected in speeches from the 
leadership at the time. During the 10th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed 
Abroad, in Beijing in 2002, Hu Jintao stressed the significance of strengthening “diplomatic 
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work in the economic and cultural fields” in order to “protect China’s rights and interests 
overseas”, and to “build a contingent of diplomatic professionals”. At the meeting, Premier 
Wen Jiabao also underlined that all foreign affairs should contribute to China’s major 
economic development-related strategies (People’s Daily, 2004). Furthermore, Hu 
announced “peaceful rising” in 2004 during Boao Forum for Asia (BFA). Eight years later, he 
announced that “China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, 
cooperation and mutual benefit and strive to uphold world peace and promote common 
development”, at the opening of the 18th National Congress of the Community Party of China 
(Xinhua News, 2012b).  
All things considered, since the inauguration of Hu Jintao’s government in 2002, Beijing 
placed greater emphasis on its strategy for expanding diplomatic activities for the benefit of 
its economic development on the global stage, after joining the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001. China’s rapid economic growth gave rise to considerable foreign exchange 
holdings. This empowered China to extend its clout into African countries. China 
concurrently recognized the importance of sweeping away the China threat image through 
cultural diplomacy, to turn opinion in its favour by taking advantage of the international 
situation and relations. Thus, the Beijing government aimed to establish a friendly and 
cordial international environment, which was beneficial to its economy, through its aid and 
investment. China provided for rapid changes in the international situation more actively 
after the global financial crisis in 2008, carrying out its comprehensive, assertive foreign 
policy based on cultural and economic factor to expand its influence throughout the world.  
Notwithstanding China’s pushing ahead with mutually beneficial peaceful development with 
Africa, complaints are coming from many African countries regarding the lopsided economic 
relationships. There are differing opinions about economic cooperation in Sino-African 
relations, over the question of whether or not the relationships are actually win-win. In 
terms of economic cooperation, Africa is an indispensable continent, from which China can 
secure energy resources and develop its business abilities and activities by expanding trade 
and fostering a foreign market. Africa also needs China, as it provides many opportunities, 
such as assistance and investment in infrastructure development and industrial cooperation, 
including supporting technology and science, helping African nations to establish a foothold 
for economic growth. Also, from Africa’s perspective, economic ties with China are important 
because they offer a more attractive model for rapid economic growth, especially after the 
past failures of economic structure reforms based on the Western system – the World Bank 
and IMF. Moreover, China’s economic cooperation methods are unique: rendering 
assistance with no string attached across all sectors including commerce, agriculture, and 
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trade, and without any interference in the internal affairs of African countries, to boost the 
business sector for its economic growth. Nonetheless, the reality behind China’s cordial 
diplomacy is that Beijing’s economic interest in securing natural resources from Africa is also 
no different from the interests of Western countries (Tull, 2006, p.471). In this regard, Alden 
and Large (2011) argue that China’s style of involvement in Africa is confronted by common 
questions of power, states and restrictions on Africa’s development after all, although 
expanding and deepening China’s engagement with African countries could bring benefits 
and even great possibilities of gains in the world economy (p.33).  
On closer scrutiny of the economic links between China and Africa, the debates associated 
with the matter of equality occurs due to China’s dominant position in socioeconomic 
aspects, i.e. gaining the upper hand in Sino-African relations, in the market economy and 
achieving economic and social development. To be more precise, Africa is strongly 
influenced by China’s economy due to its reliance on substantive goods, such as industrial 
and agriculture products, machinery and transport equipment from China (see China’s trade 
with Africa, below). When one examines contentious aspects affecting the ties between China 
and Africa, one can separate them into three categories, as will be described next.84  
First, from a policy angle, China’s general African strategy is purposeful and calculated based 
on its demands (Rich and Recker, 2013, p.62). For example, for China’s Africa policy in 2006, 
the goal of Chinese companies was to seek to maximize economic profits within a short time, 
whereas the Chinese government mapped out long-term, public good-oriented objectives 
(Dent, 2011, p.14). Considering that China’s interests in Africa focus on economic profits, the 
majority of China’s projects are based on a short-term strategy of exploitation, and a long-
term strategy of favoring China’s enterprises to provide a better environment when they 
conduct their business in Africa. On that note, China’s tempting policies do not directly help 
African countries, as China takes de facto control of the Sino-African economic relations. As 
in the case of Angola, Uganda, and Zambia, for example, China’s promising resource-for-
infrastructure deals stir up serious liquidity crises for natural resource-producing countries, 
due to an ongoing slump in global commodity prices (Olander, Bosielo, Huang, and Wu, 
2015). However, the reality is that Africa’s resource-dependent countries’ main source of 
revenue is from selling natural resources, including crude oil. If China considered Africa to 
be a true partner enjoying mutual benefits and sustained economic development, China 
would not support African countries based on putting China’s economic profit first. Although 
China provides loans to secure access to Africa’s oil and minerals, the situation is the same 
                                                
84 The discussing part is expanded based on the content of Africa’s vulnerability in the Sino-African 
economic ties which the author briefly mentioned on Chapter 2. 
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for the resource-for-infrastructure deals. According to an interviewee S-F1, South Africa, on 
the subject of global oil prices declines, China places a high price on oil when they provide 
African countries with huge amounts of money in oil-backed Chinese loans (Interviewee S-F1, 
2017). In 2006, the International Monetary Fund warned that the problem of China’s loans 
hinders African countries’ development, and “creat[es] a new wave of hidden debt” in Africa. 
The IMF voiced concern over the situation that it is difficulty to examine the details of how 
this money is used for the recipient African country’s political and economic development 
(Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power, 2010; Wang and Elliot, 2014). China’s aid projects provide 
the possibility of corruption by focusing too much on producing “quick and tangible results” 
(May, Mohan, and Marcus, 2010). Luckily, this has not been reported yet, as of 2014, while 
debt levels were still moderate for most countries in receipt of Chinese loans. Some countries, 
such as Angola and Ghana, have taken out considerable loans from China, have since turned 
to the IMF after all (Brautigam and Hwang, 2016). In the case of Angola, it is a classic 
example of how China’s mercantile-centric aid works in a country’s economic system. In 
2003, the Angolan government published that they no longer agreed with the IMF regarding 
the adoption of a staff-monitored programme (SMP) for demonstrating good performance, 
which would have provided credibility to its economic policies and fundraising for national 
reconstruction. Instead, Angola elected to accept China’s US$2 billion financing package for 
public investment, which contained oil-backed lines of credit with far looser, less onerous 
conditions (Mullins, Mohan, and Power, 2010, p.868). Since the end of the war in 2002, 
Angola has shown considerable progress in its political economy sector, but the country still 
faces the difficult task of reducing its dependency on oil and diversifying its economy, and 
public financial management system, according to the World Bank (2016a). 
Based on the China’s strategy for Africa, the question emerges whether or not China’s loans 
or aid in return for commodities as collateral are actually providing proper aid to African 
countries. China has made numerous pledges of aid for infrastructure development in 
African; Beijing’s leaders renew its commitment to aid whenever they give a speech on the 
development of Sino-African relations. In December 2015, at a China-Africa summit in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, Xi Jinping pledged US$60 billion in aid for Africa’s 
development, including US$35 billion in loans and export credits, and US$5 billion in grants 
and interest-free loans, especially for African countries’ industrialization, and supported 
Africa’s development and prosperity achievements. The money that Xi proposed was triple 
the amount pledged at the FOCAC meeting, three years before (China Daily, 2015b). In 
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reality, the impressive Chinese aid package,85 however, did not directly cover all African 
countries, but rather focused on countries that have an impact on China’s economy. 
According to the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative (CARI)’s report on the flow 
of China’s loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises, from 2000 to 2014, 54 
percent of total Chinese loans went to the following five countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When we consider that there are 54 
African countries on the continent, the question is how many countries could receive 
appropriate aid from the remaining 46 percent of Chinese loans. Moreover, over the same 
period, the four largest sectors that took Chinese loans were transportation ($24.2 billion), 
energy ($17.6 billion), mining ($9.0 billion), and communications ($7 billion) (Hwang, 
Brautigam, and Eom, 2016, pp.1-2), all of which are most advantageous to Chinese 
enterprises operating in African countries. Not only that, while China’s investment is not 
limited to natural resource-rich countries, and has expanded to include commodity-poor 
countries since 2009 (Alves, 2013), it is undeniable that China’s investment is still focused 
on African countries who have proven beneficial to China. This is because, when China made 
a pitch for securing energy before the 2000s, it now focuses on Africa as a new substitute 
market for its manufacturing business after losing manufacturing competitiveness in its 
domestic market (as mentioned earlier). Of course, there are benefits that China provides, 
such as providing a foothold for infrastructure, development of Africa’s unexploited 
resources, and potential economic markets to become a global value chain. The result has 
been that several African countries, such as Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, have shown 
steady economic growth with the assistance of China’s investment and aid.86 However, it 
remains a small number of African countries that have experienced positive economic 
growth, so it is hard to deem that the Chinese loan and investment system are an immediate 
factor for sustained Africa’s development.  
Second, from the perspective of intertwined economic engagement, the fast-growing 
economic ties between China and Africa do not resolve Africa’s endemic problems, such as 
its asymmetrical integration into the world market; nor does it curtail the continent’s 
dependency on price-volatile primary goods, which comprise around 73 percent of the total 
export revenues from African countries (Tadros, 2013, p.103). Overall Sino-African 
                                                
85 The meaning of aid from China side is different than what OECD defined. Aid, investment, and loan 
programs are all in China’s aid. More information, read China’s aid and investment section in Chapter 
4. 
86 For example, China is deep engaged in the cocoa sector in the Ivory Coast, which is the world’s 
largest cocoa producer. Meanwhile, China has provided $10 billion in financing to expand the port of 
Abidjan, which is used by landlocked countries Burkina Faso and Mali. The money is also meant to be 
used to build a railroad to transport iron from the country’s west; and to construct a hydroelectric 
power plant (Essoh, 2014).  
 158 
economic ties were proceeding comparatively briskly, when one calculates gains and losses 
in the context of the global economic recession, and the decline in global demand for raw 
materials. However, China and Africa’s domestic economic situations are changing because 
the price of raw materials is falling, and the demand for commodities in China is slowing due 
to a domestic economic decline. For this reason, there is a conspicuous, growing gap in 
demands between China and Africa. Even though Beijing provides a considerable amount of 
foreign aid to Africa every year, China’s aid always provokes international controversy 
regarding whether or not China’s aid is effectively linked to African countries’ development. 
This is because, unlike the West, Beijing deploys its aid as a means of China’s geopolitical 
incentives and economic diplomacy, which are a driving force in an era of 
internationalization and a globalized market economy. At the same time, China continues its 
efforts to boost the African public’s welfare and economic growth through its substantive 
African aid programs. 
While China penetrates deep into African countries to expand its business, secure its export 
market, and procure natural resources, Africa’s situation is the opposite to China’s. African 
countries still rely on the majority of high-value products from China, while China’s economy 
has moved from heavy industry to light and service since the 1990s. China’s trade with 
African countries is mainly concentrated in countries with competitive and abundant 
resources, and five countries (Angola, South Africa, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea) account for around 75 percent of Africa’s 
total exports to China. However, fewer than half of African countries benefit from trade with 
China: generally, the majority of African countries maintain a slight trade deficit with China 
(AfDB, OECD Development Centre, and UNDP, 2017; Wang & Elliot, 2014). By extension, 
based on Africa’s general need to develop a manufacturing sector and maintain existing 
trade trends, it would be hard for Africa to close the distance between it and China. Africa 
has begun to focus on economic development based on its young human resources, and the 
growth of the middle class. Hence, Africa is dependent upon Chinese aid and investment in 
telecommunication and infrastructure, including power, potable water, and transport 
systems, which are linked to African countries’ development. However, the situation of 
China’s investment is very much the same with trade, and exerts influence on African 
countries. Beijing also tends to invest in capital-intensive sectors in the more capital-scarce 
African countries (Chen, Dollar, and Tang, 2016). Moreover, China’s financial flows 
interlocks with African countries’ domestic economies. China’s investment growth impinges 
on African countries’ export growth – for example, a 1 percent decline in China’s investment 
growth is linked to an average 0.6 percentage decline in Africa’s export growth. In particular, 
resource-rich countries (especially oil exporters) are strongly influenced by China’s 
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investment (The World Bank, 2015b, pp.159-160), although they are also subject to the 
influence of global growth and commodity prices. In general, African countries (South Africa, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia) that receive large sums of direct investment 
from China (China Daily, 2010d). However, not all African countries are bogged down by 
unfair trade with China; typical examples of this are Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and others, 
who do not depend on natural resources, achieving sustained growth based on China’s 
investment in infrastructure development and their manufacturing sectors. 
The Chinese government invests in Africa mostly in the manufacturing, mining, and 
construction sectors to assist with Africa’s economic development. Moreover, a large number 
of Chinese manufacturing companies are operating in Africa as well. However, the truth is 
Chinese enterprises are often involved in Africa’s aid and investment projects, enjoying 
symbiotic relationships in Africa. At the Chinese governmental level, aid for infrastructure 
(mostly social overhead capital) is provided not only on the condition of securing oil and 
mining area development rights, but also on the condition that the work is carried out by 
Chinese employees dispatched from China. Also, the Chinese government offers basic 
infrastructure, such as railroads, harbor facilities, power supply networks, pipeline 
construction, and others, under the name of development assistance, but also to facilitate the 
supply of minerals, timber, cotton, oil and gas to China. Also, China’s development 
assistance is based on a combination with commerce, a so-called “tied aid”. A typical 
example is Sudan. In 2004, China exercised its veto when the U.N. Security Council imposed 
economic sanctions against Sudan; and instead made a massive investment in Sudan. As a 
result, China possessed exclusive access to the South Sudan oil industry, including refining, 
exploration, and the pipeline. As of 2015, Sudan’s biggest oil customer was China, with 
exports worth $3,153 million. China is also Sudan’s biggest source of imports, totaling 
around $1,915 million (The World Bank, 2015a). From the Chinese enterprises' perspective, 
the reason for running their business in Africa is the low production cost, especially cheap 
labor and local market access, and potential for export markets – these are the critical 
factors in Africa, according to Dr. Xiaofang Shen (2015) at Johns Hopkins University. 
Chinese enterprises in Africa contribute to job creation for the African people, and train and 
educate them to look forward to a brighter future. However, problems arise here, regarding 
the difference in opinion of “substantive assistances” between China and Africa. African 
people complain that China does not provide practical support, such as technology transfer, 
which is crucial for the African people’s ability to become independent. On the other hand, 
the Chinese government and Chinese companies concentrate on the improvement of all-
around living conditions and assisting with development in regions in which they conduct 
their business. When one examines Chinese investments in the manufacturing sector, which 
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accounts for almost half of total investment, local African populations perceive the Chinese 
economic impact as generally positive, in terms of job creation (Shen, 2015, pp.16-17). In 
contrast, small and medium African enterprises often collapsed or lost competitiveness due 
to the inflow of low-cost Chinese textile goods. Also, China does not provide technology 
transfer, significant skills development, or productivity improvements in Africa relative to 
the level of trade between China and the continent (Gadzala, 2009; Zafar, 2007).  
Third, from the procedural perspective, there is the issue of nonfulfillment of China’s 
investment and trade deals, which are anchored to agreements with high-ranking Chinese 
government officials; proposing similar deals without completion (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). 
This is also evident when China and African countries meet multilaterally at FOCAC. 
Although the FOCAC action plans outline cooperative projects, they do not clearly determine 
which African country will deliver on the project. The majority of China’s deals, which are 
supposed to provide assistance to the African people, are decided under a process that needs 
greater transparence and equitable bidding procedures. Hence, weaknesses are ascribed to 
the inadequacy of the Chinese government or companies’ research before approaching 
African countries. This became a cause for concern among African populations, when 
China’s foreign direct investment in Africa was declining as a proportion of its other, 
increasing investment. When one lists the top ten failed, canceled, or stalled deals and 
projects, they are as follows: Nigeria’s railway construction project, in 2006, which is valued 
at US$7.5 billion; Angola’s railway construction project, in 2011, valued at US$4.2 billion; 
and US$3 billion investments, respectively, in Democratic Republic of Congo’s metals sector 
(2009), in Gabon’s metals sector (2012), and in Ghana’s energy sector (2011). Also, US$1.4 
billion of China’s projects were in Nigeria’s energy sector in 2007, and real estate in 2008 
(Wall Street Journal, 2014).  
However, this is just the tip of the iceberg of China’s failure to follow through with its 
investment pledges to Africa. Interviewee S-F1 (2017) pointed out that the lack of Chinese 
information gathering for investments in Africa gives rise to negative impacts on the 
recipient African countries, which count on the deal with China for their development.87 
Nonetheless, the Chinese government continues to propose considerable amounts of funds 
for investment in infrastructure construction and other projects, with direct links to African 
people’s living standards. Furthermore, the intended beneficiaries of Chinese-funded 
projects are open to censure regarding total quality management issues in Africa. The 
                                                
87 A typical example of the problem of the lack of accurate information before investment, is the case 
of Democratic Republic of Congo: due to an insufficient information gathering on local area 
investment, and failure to adapt to African-style management, a $1 billion investment in a 3m hectare 
palm-oil plantation went down the drain, because of are selected for the plantation was unsuitable. 
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Chinese government rushes its assistance to African countries, establishing the hardware of 
economic development (such as railroads, dams, bridges, highways, and ports) to attract 
attention from African countries instead of concerns about the quality of facilities. However, 
it is necessary to take note of the procedures for China’s completed projects when they 
render aid to Africa. China’s completed projects are not completed by local African workers, 
but rather by Chinese laborers and engineers and shipped to Africa. The African countries 
complain about the lack of technology and skills transfer from Chinese projects in Africa. 
David N. Abdula (2017) found the cause of the issue to be the myopic strategy between China 
and African government officials and policymakers, who just focuses on a visible change in 
Africa through China’s aid.  
Also, there is a communication problem. The Chinese government still heavily adheres to a 
foreign policy based on state-to-state communications that focuses on large contracts, such 
as resource development and infrastructure aid, supporting the African public from a 
distance, due to the lack of a sympathetic bond between its rulers and the public. The 
majority of China’s African policy is concentrated on the economic sector, rather than on 
assisting in ending the civil wars in Africa, as part of its non-interference policy. “China 
strongly believes that Africa belongs to the African people and that African affairs should be 
decided by the African people […] Africa belongs to Africans and we must be allowed to chart 
our development path”, Xi Jinping has said (China Daily, 2015b). However, China has been 
criticized by the West over its continued support for rogue African nations, who need to 
reform their political systems. China props up immoral and unscrupulous African leaders, 
and provides aid and investment based on conditions that are palatable to the leaders, not 
the public.  
Another issue is that Chinese firms also do not act responsibility towards their African 
employees. China focuses its investment primarily on the manufacturing, mining, 
infrastructure, and energy industries in Africa. Chinese firms in African countries are often 
accused of flouting African countries’ labor legislation and the poor working environment – 
for example, an absence of safety supervision, low wages, unreasonable working hours, and 
unsafe working conditions. An example of this is the ‘copper belt’ in Zambia, which has been 
operated by Chinese firm for some time: African employees need to work for two years 
before they receive safety helmets without ventilation system in a mine, and there are deaths 
almost every day due to the absence of safety provisions. The firm’s managers offer hush 
money to union bosses, in order to conceal their criminal management. During the 
presidential election Zambia, in 2014, one of the candidates, Michael Sata, referred to the 
salaries at Chinese-owned copper mines as slave wages (Noyoo, 2013). In the case of the 
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manufacturing industry, Chinese firms are causing ever-more environment damage and 
making unfair deals, such as evading skills transfer and job creation, and treating African 
employee’s poorly, which is against human rights. This has led to rising African antipathy 
towards China, especially from groups that are pushing for greater transparency in civil 
society. In this regard, interviewee S-C1 has pointed out that there is still much room for 
improvement from China concerning their social responsibility, including environment 
considerations and community development. Moreover, China needs to comply with labor 
laws in African countries, instead of acting in such a mercenary manner. Unfortunately, few 
of China’s companies are making the appropriate efforts to fulfil their business and social 
responsibilities in Africa.  
In light of the above examples of discord between China and its African hosts, China is 
finding it difficult to evade criticisms of being a “colonialist power”, “imperialism”, 
“Cinafrica”, “Red-colonialism”, and “neo-colonialism”, not only from the West but also from 
African countries. The typical example of this was when former Nigerian central bank 
governor, Lamido Sanusi, condemned China’s approach to Nigeria as a new form of 
imperialism. He excoriated the unfair relations, and accused China of establishing its 
facilities in and boosting only those industries in Africa that presented China an advantage – 
for proof, he pointed to the import-export imbalances between China and Nigeria. 
Investigative journalist Richard Behar described Sino-African relations as one of “parasite 
and host”. In a special report for Fast Company, China Storms Africa, Behar (2008) argued 
that,  
Anyone who thinks that kind of ravenous acquisition of resources is a thing of the 
past should take a close look at the suction China is applying in the sub-Sahara. The 
region is now the scene of one of the most sweeping, bare-knuckled, and ingenious 
resource grabs the world has ever seen. 
In 2010, at a meeting with oil companies in Lagos, Nigeria, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs Johnnie Carson also expressed his views on China’s involvement in Africa 
that “[China] is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China 
is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily. […] China's 
presence is to secure votes in the United Nations from African countries” (The Guardian, 
2010).  
As has been noted by critics, China is exploiting African countries for their own benefit. 
However, Moyo (2010) asserted in her book that China’s involvement in Africa is different to 
that of the Western countries, which are confined to foreign aid, granting loans in return for 
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political reformation, thereby imposing Western values on the African political economy. 
She refers to the Chinese as “our friend”, because China offers multidirectional diplomatic 
support through personal visits from, for example, the Chinese President and government 
dignitaries, which generate a sympathetic bond from the African public. When one examines 
the African people’s survey of preferences towards China, conducted by the Pew Research 
Center between 2015-2017, one sees a different impression: overall, African people have a 
favorable opinion of China (favorable feelings contain, to a greater or lesser degree, “very” 
and “somewhat” favorable) – although, it is worth point out that the survey only measured 
responses from eleven African countries (Pew Research Center, 2016).88 Not only that, but 
according to a survey of fifteen Sub-Saharan African countries’ perceptions conducted by the 
Ethics Institute of South Africa89 in 2014, generally 49 percent of respondents thought that 
Chinese companies’ investment contributed to African countries; while 42.4 percent of 
respondents had negative views, and 35.3 percent of respondents had favorable perceptions 
towards Chinese companies in their own countries (Geerts, Xinwa, & Rossouw, 2014). Also, 
in terms of Chinese companies’ responsibility for the environment in Africa, only 11.4 
percent of respondents agreed that Chinese companies observe environmental standards and 
address their environmental impact in Africa. Many respondents did not think that Chinese 
companies fulfill their employment (43.7) or social (43.4) responsibilities (ibid). Taking 
these surveys’ findings together, the African people recognize that China’s involvement leads 
to development, but also want China to be held accountable for African countries’ economy 
and society in tandem with its investment. 
However, Beijing well understands these unfavorable issues: Chinese Premiere Li Keqiang 
referred to the problems in Africa as “growing pains”. Furthermore, the Chinese government 
not only hears the criticisms, but also is “sincere in deepening collaboration via equal and 
earnest consultation” to settle complicated problems in conjunction with its public 
diplomacy activities with African countries, by improving living standards, helping the 
environment, job creation, and education support – including scholarships, skill training, 
exchange student program (Xinhua News, 2014). Also, with regards to China’s neo-
colonialism in Africa, in an interview with the African press in 2014, Li insisted on  
assur[ing] our African friends in all seriousness that China will never pursue a 
colonialist path like some countries did or allow colonialism, which belonged to the 
past, to reappear in Africa. China will forever be a reliable friend and true partner of 
                                                
88 The surveyed countries are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.  
89 The institution is managed by non-profit and private.  
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the African people and contribute to Africa's endeavor in developing its beautiful 
home continent. (FOCAC, 2014) 
This is reflected in China’s Africa policy, which is linked to its public diplomacy activities. In 
recent years, China has become increasingly interested in countering and addressing dissent 
regarding its record on job creation and education support, including skill training in African 
countries. Chinese investment, concurrently, has had the effects of raising tax revenues, 
increasing job creation, and creating value in African products, in those countries in which it 
has invested.  
 
Trade relations between China and Africa 
 
Since 2009, China has been the biggest single trade partner with Africa. China passed the 
United States and took first place after record amounts of trade with Africa in 2009. 
However, China does not trade with all Sub-Saharan African countries, and instead 
concentrates heavily its exports on a few countries (Lugh, 2014). The total trade volume 
between China and Africa doubled from 2010 to 2014. Also, bilateral trade has grown rapidly 
since 2006, from US$55 billion to US$199 billion in 2013. This shows that China is the 
largest trade partner, surpassing the United States (Wang & Elliot, 2014). This is the result of 
China’s successful strategy, combining significant economic support with strengthening 
diplomatic power; although, global foreign trade increased according to its economic growth. 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang mentioned the goal of increasing bilateral trade to US$400 
billion, and raising China’s direct investment to US$100 billion by 2020, during his speech 
regarding a framework for China and Africa cooperation at the headquarters of the African 
Union in Ethiopia, in 2014. Furthermore, he reiterated that China’s Africa policy is meant to 
reflect China’s agreements to “deepen and grow Sino-African relations”, urging progress in 
six areas: “industrial cooperation, financial cooperation, poverty reduction, ecological 
protection, people-to-people exchange, and peace and security issue” (China Daily, 2014c).  
China began to trade with Africa in the 195os, at which time trade volume was only US$12.14 
million. China has gradually increased its trade with the continent, and by 2008 it had 
reached US$105.21 billion. Since 2009, as China’s economy has slowed, the total export and 
import volumes between China and African countries has also begun to experience a decline. 
However, China has maintained stability from 2010 to 2014 (see figure, below). The graph 
data shows total exports and imports. One can see a general rise in exports to Africa, while 
China’s import from Africa plummeted in 2015, a result of the global financial crisis and 
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China’s slowing economy. From 2015 onwards, the majority of African countries – including 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola – which rely on crude oil and raw materials for exports, 
accounting for around 70 percent of the continents’ total exports, suffered from a steep fall 
in commodity prices and the devaluing their currencies in the global market. Therefore, 
these countries experienced “a sharp decline in export values rather than export volumes”, 
and also took a hit from reduced Chinese imports, because China accounts for 13 percent of 
world commodity imports, and its portion of certain metals is as high as 40 percent (The 
World Bank, 2016b). 
Figure 5: China-Africa Bilateral Trade (1992-2015) 
 
 
Note: the y-axis is based on US$bn, adopted from UN COMTRADE and CARI at Johns Hopkins 
University 
China engages in trade with African countries based on the following factors: labor-intensive 
and capital-intensive production, from which China derives comparative benefits; China’s 
fast economic growth; securing of extensive and large amounts of natural resources in Africa; 
focusing on construction of infrastructure facilities in African countries; and concentrating 
on China’s shipping and light manufacturing sectors (Eisenman, 2012, p.1). Also, the hidden 
side of the China-Africa trade is that China’s low-price products appeal to Africa’s high 
demands for clothes, electronic devices, machinery, and textiles; it facilitates China’s ability 
to increase the amount it exports to African countries (Tull, 2006, p.464). In addition to this, 
China’s aid and investment in Africa shows a similar general disposition. Taken together, 
China shows a tendency for trade with African countries that is to their advantage, which 
reflects Chinese leader’s long-range goal in political economy. The principle exports and 
imports between China and Africa in 2014 accounted for 71 percent of China’s main import 

























































and transactions. Africa’s main imports, however, were machinery and transport equipment, 
and manufactured goods (see figure, below).  
Figure 6: The trade between China and Africa in 2014 
 
 
Note. The information of figure is adopted from UNCTADStat database of UNCTAD (n.a)  
 
While Chinese imports of energy products and resources from Africa have remained steady, 
the trend in African import from China has clearly shifted towards high-end and high-tech 
products, such as mechanical and electrical products, mobile phones and related equipment, 
televisions, and motorcycles (China Daily, 2014a). This situation is because the reasonable 
price and decent quality of China’s products appeals to and suits the recent, sharp increase in 
African people’s consumption. The African consumer market is growing fast, due to an ever-
growing and young middle class, urbanization, rapid economic growth (average annual 
growth has been around 5 percent since 2000), and a large population. Chinese enterprises 
that conduct business in Africa also contribute to increasing China’s export of electrical and 
mechanical products to Africa. The Chinese government endeavors to strengthen economic 
exchanges between China and Africa. To that end, during the fifth BRICS summit in Durban, 
South Africa, in 2013, Xi Jinping promised to exempt 97 percent of custom duties for 
products made in the least-developed countries that have diplomatic relations with China 
(Xinhua News, 2013a). Beijing’s preferential treatment of trade with African countries is 
another method to help African countries to create an “African free trade zone”, which will 
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be a result of the trade and economic cooperation in the Sino-African relations. The African 
free trade zone will include 26 African countries, and function as a form of regional 
organization. 90  In this regard, Beninese economist Pascal Komlan stressed that, “First, 
without that free trade zone at a continental scale, China has been for more than a decade 
the biggest trading partner of Africa. With this new framework, China-Africa trade relations 
will experience an exponential growth.” Moreover, he emphasized the significance of Chinese 
companies’ presence in Africa for the free trade zone, for the sake of infrastructure 
development which would allow for smoother African commerce (China Daily, 2014d). To 
put it another way, the majority of African countries require China’s aid for infrastructure 
facilities, such as expressways and railroads for basic transportation and also for generating 
electricity and drawing water, in order to improve its ability to process exports.  
 
5.3 The role of public diplomacy in China’s African strategy, with a focus on 
economic relations 
 
There are various perspectives on China’s foreign aid in Africa. However, most of them focus 
on diplomatic security, history, and politics, rather than public diplomacy. Thus, this section 
attempts to analyze China’s aid in Africa not only as a part of public diplomacy, but also its 
role in boosting economic ties through the various methods (discussed in Chapter 3). By 
looking at the pattern of China’s aid in Africa, this section also investigates how China 
utilizes its foreign aid to fill the gap between China and Africa that arises from economic ties 
and how it leads to closer economic relations. Also, it will assess the significance of Chinese 
companies’ involvement in China’s foreign aid in Africa.   
 
5.3.1 China’s aid in Africa  
This part will analyze the distinctive elements of China’s Africa aid, in line with China’s 
public diplomacy strategy of creating close Sino-African economic ties. China’s economic aid 
in Africa is generally carried out based on the methods and characteristics of its foreign aid 
system, as discussed in Chapter 4. As with China’s foreign aid to other countries, China also 
adheres to bilateral aid as a core policy in Sino-African ties. However, the Chinese 
government often employs co-financing to cope with a common development barrier, i.e., 
the regional and sub-regional transport corridor projects (Hayashikawa, 2015). It is easy to 
                                                
90 The regional organizations include SADC and COMESA.  
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find evidence of this from the speeches of Chinese high-ranking governmental officials. 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s pledge of $30 billion credit included a $10 billion credit line to 
African countries for reciprocal projects agreed at the Africa Union, on his first trip to Africa 
(China Daily, 2014b). A few days later, he emphasized Sino-Africa economic ties at the 
Plenary Session of the 24th World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa: 
China-Africa friendship as the ‘axle bearing’ driven by the two ‘wheels’ of economic 
and trade as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges […] China is willing to 
move forward shoulder to shoulder with the African countries in equal treatment and 
sincere cooperation, elevate Africa’s development to a new high, and make greater 
contributions to world prosperity, progress and lasting peace. (MFA, 2014a) 
China embarked on aid and investment in Africa in the form of basic infrastructure 
development (such as railroads, agriculture, drinking water and hospital facilities), and 
dispatched experts in the fields of medical care, resource development, and infrastructure 
construction. The Chinese government employed trade and investment with foreign aid in 
the name of economic cooperation. This is because China believes that it would develop a 
mutual benefit with a win-win situation, for both China and recipient countries. Moreover, 
China also believes that this strategy will benefit China’s own in interest in economic growth 
(Ping, 2013, p.126).  
China’s official finance in Africa is comprised of grants, debt relief, and interest-free loans, as 
with other aid-recipient countries, in conjunction with market-rate export buyers’ credits, 
preferential export credits, and commercial loans from Chinese banks, none of which would 
qualify as ODA (Brautigam, 2011c). There are two distinguishing ways in which China 
renders aid to Africa. First is a purely commercial-centric aid (such as debt relief and 
interest-free loans in return for a natural resources), and the second is a combined 
commercial aid with public diplomacy (such as directly connecting to the African public’s 
livelihood). However, it is hard to clearly draw a line between these two approaches, as they 
are based on similar calculations under the government’s political and economic goals. 
Nevertheless, China’s mechanism for African aid is categorized according to its unique style, 
which is representative of Sino-African economic ties: charm offensive aid, aid in 
combination with commerce, and China’s enterprises’ overseas expansion. Charm offensive 
aid is part of China’s public diplomacy-related aid. However, due to the fact that the public 
diplomacy-related aid is also connected with aid for trade and investment, such as 
infrastructure development and assisting with public amenities, this author has sorted 
medical and health care, humanitarian aid, cultural exchanges and scientific and technical 
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assistance as charm offensive aid.91 Put another way, the aid aims to bridge the gap between 
China and Africa when problems arise from the aid in combination with commerce and 
investment. Hence, China’s aid in Africa based on communicating with the African public is 
for eliciting positive opinions of China from African people, to secure future African political 
and economic support, and not for China’s economic benefit and development. For example, 
China’s considerable medical aid in Africa. China has built 27 hospitals in Ghana, Zimbabwe, 
and other African countries; it has dispatched 43 medical teams to 42 African countries, 
which have treated over 5.57 million patients. Beijing recently launched a “Brightness Action” 
initiative to treat cataract patients and provide customized support – for example, providing 
mobile hospitals, setting up demonstration and training centers for diagnosis and treatment 
technologies, to advance Sino-African cooperation in medicine and healthcare.  
China also zealously promotes cultural and educational exchanges as a crucial part of a new 
type of strategic partnership in Sino-African relations. As of 2012, over two years, China has 
granted 18,743 government scholarships to African students. Twenty pairs of leading African 
and Chinese universities have started cooperating under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for 
Chinese and African Universities. After the launch of the China-Africa Joint Research and 
Exchange plan in March 2010, 64 educational projects have been supported through visits 
and exchanges of over 600 Chinese and African scholars (The State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2014b). In addition, China provides diverse aid programs connected to 
African people’s welfare and livelihood. Given that most public diplomacy-related aid was 
drawn up through the FOCAC ministerial conference, the details of China’s aid from public 
diplomacy activities will be discussed in a later case study chapter.  
Second, regarding the aid in combination with commerce, this exhibits the typical 
characteristics of Chinese aid, and the majority of China’s aid in Africa is related to aid-for-
trade and investment. In aid-for-trade, infrastructure construction has two characteristics: 
commercial products in tandem with public goods. Moreover, Beijing provides preferential 
credit through either the Export-Import Bank of China (hereafter Exim Bank) or the China 
Development Bank when it carries out infrastructure projects in Africa (Aurégan, 2017; 
Tang, 2015). In terms of power, telecommunication, and transport, which make up the main 
areas of aid China provides in Africa, these are classified as aid-for-trade, not investment. 
(Hayashikawa, 2015). In particular, large scale of infrastructure projects proceed as part of a 
financial package that also includes concessional loans, sellers and buys’ credits, and bank 
guarantees, adopted by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Exim Bank (Brautigam, 2011b). 
                                                
91 The characteristic of charm offensive aid style is not related to construction work but directly link to 
the African public.  
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Chinese aid is provided in the form of complete or in-kind projects through financial 
transfers, and complete projects are not only financed with either zero-free loans or grants 
(which account for 40 percent of China’s aid expenditures), but also Chinese enterprises 
receive and carry out projects (OECD, 2012, pp.12,17). Since 2000, to greater and lesser 
degrees, China’s loans to Africa have increased for over a decade (see figure, below).   
Figure 7: Chinese Loans to Africa, 2000-2014 
 
 
Note. Adopted from CARI at Johns Hopkins University, 2016 
From 2010 to May 2012, China approved concessional loans of around $11.3 billion for 92 
African projects (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014b). Chinese aid 
typically concentrates on specific projects, rather than the large programmatic models that 
Western donors prefer – such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or a 
program for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment (Cheng and Taylor, 2017). Hence, in 
general, China’s complete projects improve the lives of Africa’s people, in the fields of 
production, agriculture, culture, and education, covering industry, health care, power supply, 
communication, energy, transportation, and others. Technical cooperation is also provided 
through subsequent actions (operation or maintenance) after the projects are completed 
(SCIO, 2011). In 2012, Chinese enterprises completed construction contracts worth $40.83 
billion in Africa, which accounted for 35.02 percent of China’s overseas completed contract 
work. This was an increase of 45 percent since 2009. Also, since 2013, Africa has been 
China’s second largest overseas construction project contract market. China’s capital, 
technologies, and equipment have effectively helped reduce construction costs for African 
countries, as result, their infrastructure situation have gradually improved (The State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014b).  The Tanzania-Zambia Railway project is a 





















p.11) in the 1970s. As of 2015, China has completed 1,046 projects, including 3,530km of 
highways, and 2,233km of railway in Africa (Xinhua News, 2015b). The table below shows 
the largest projects that China financed, valued at over $1 billion. 
Table 6: The biggest development projects between China and Africa 
 
 
Note. The project is between 2000 and 2015, adopted from M&G Africa, 2015 and S. Zhao, 2015. 
Another example of a successful Chinese aid project is the Martyrs of Pentecost Stadium (or 
Stade des Martyrs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was constructed 
between 1988 and 1993. From 2008 to 2015, China completed the following significant 
infrastructure aid projects: the African Union Conference Center in Ethiopia, which cost 
$200 million and was completely funded by China; the Addis Ababa-Adama expressway in 
Ethiopia; the largest Maputo Airport in Mozambique; and the Merowe Dam in northern 
Sudan. Other aid projects for cultural and welfare facilities include: the Zimpeto Stadium in 
Zimpeto, Mozambique; the Dakar Grand Theatre in Senegal; the Mali Hospital in Mali; and 
the Yaounde Conference Center in Cameroon (The State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2015).  
According to the OECD’s data about trade flow and aid, China financed around $743 million 
of aid-for-trade between 2006 and 2011 (OECD, 2013). While there are no official figures 
and data to prove Chinese aid-for-trade exists, China’s trade for aid-related assistance has a 
tendency to be made up of the following three elements: first, quota-free and duty free 
market access to products from less-developed countries (LDCs); second, large-scale 
infrastructure projects (such as factories, roads, and ports) to address supply-side 
constraints; third, sharing of Chinese experience and knowledge in economic and trade 
development, and capacity development training programs (Hayashikawa, 2015). Another 
type of widely-known Chinese aid is the so-called “Angola Model”: the obvious suggestion 
that in return for infrastructure development support, China will receive contracts related to 
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natural resources (Klaver and Trebilcock 2016). In 2004, through China’s Exim Bank, China 
approved a $2 billion financing package for public investment projects in the fields of 
infrastructure, telecommunications, and agri-business to Angola. The loan was payable over 
12 years, at a deeply concessional interest rate, delivered in two $1 billion-tranches, with a 
grace period of up to three years (Brautigam, 2011c). At the same time, China imposed the 
condition that over 50 percent of the construction’s materials, equipment, and workforce 
were to be provided by China. In 2007, the Chinese government financed an additional $2.5 
billion infrastructure loan, for hydroelectric power generation and oil refinery expansion in 
Angola (Alves, 2013). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) also operated under the 
“Angola Model”, when it has received aid from China. In 2008, China entered into a $9 
billion contract with the DRC for large infrastructure projects, to be provided by a Sino-
Congolese Joint venture, Sicomines, in exchange for access to copper and cobalt concessions. 
The large infrastructure projects included the construction of 3,200kim of railway tracks, 
4,000km of roads, airports, schools, hospitals, and two hydroelectric dams (Kabemba, 2016).  
China has deployed the “Angola Model” as a major strategy for its foreign aid in other 
resource- producing countries in Africa. These African countries have in common a dire need 
for infrastructure reconstruction, due to the backward basic facilities caused by poverty 
and/or war, while simultaneously flourishing in the natural resource sector. Debora 
Brautigam argues that “commodity-backed loans are a pre-commitment technique”. It is best 
suited to countries with weak governance, suffering from the “resource curse”, and incapable 
of accessing global finance. It also allows “a government to have public works expenditures 
today, paying for them with future exports” (Brautigam, 2011a, pp.6-7). China’s aid in 
combination with commerce is for strengthening China’s position in Africa and gaining 
Africa’s trust. In a win-win situation, China turns Africa’s poor conditions to its advantage, 
not only for the supply of mineral, oil and gas, but also for the extension of Chinese 
enterprises’ influence into African countries, in return for infrastructure assistance. At the 
same time, African countries are able to establish infrastructure, thereby improving the 
quality of life for their populations, and improving their countries’ economic development, 
through China’s aid in return for natural resources with no attendant political intervention 
or interference. The reason for China’s extensive provision of infrastructure aid is that 
infrastructure development is an important motivational factor for Africa, explains 
interviewee S-F2, is that African nations are keen to invite foreign capital because most of 
the continent lacks basic, or sufficient infrastructure, as well as the skills crucial to its 
countries’ development. He adds that China seizes the opportunity to gain allies and enlarge 
its influence in Africa through targeted infrastructure assistance (Interviewee S-F2, 2017).  
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Lastly, Chinese enterprises’ overseas expansion is a crucial means of China’s Africa aid and 
investment. Chinese enterprises are comprised of Chinese state-owned enterprises (central, 
state-owned enterprises and provincial state-owned enterprises)92  and small- and medium-
sized private firms. Through the first and second China’s Africa aid mechanisms, above, a 
large number of Chinese enterprises have made advances into various regions of Africa and 
complemented each other with their own advantages. The Chinese government supports and 
encourages Chinese enterprises with strengths and good reputations to expand their 
investment in Africa, and has set up necessary measures to guide enterprises to manage this 
expansion (China Daily, 2010d). Chinese enterprises play as important a role as the Chinese 
government, because they play substantive and effective roles for governmental aid projects 
as a part of China’s public diplomacy and as private businesses on the ground.  
As briefly noted above, from the middle of the 1990s onwards, large and mostly state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) went to Africa as investors and as contractors for Chinese-aid-funded 
projects in the fields of infrastructure and public building, due to a dramatic increase in 
China’s trade with Africa and the need for resources. Then, China’s small- and medium-sized 
private firms entered Africa to establish a Chinese-based incorporated entity, or to start a 
business from scratch in Africa (Kaplinsky and Morries, 2009). The Chinese government 
also employs investment through Chinese enterprises as a means for achieving its goals. For 
example, Guinea made a $7 billion of mining-and-infrastructure deal with the China 
International Fund (CIF) Ltd., in 2009. CIF founded an additional partnership to exploit 
Guinea’s diamond, iron ore, oil reserves, and also the world’s largest reserves of bauxite. 
Recently, to increase China’s investment and investment diversification in Africa, China 
signed bilateral investment treaties with 32 African countries, and established joint 
economic commission mechanisms with 45 African countries (Oster, 2009). China has been 
pushing the establishment of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa 
through Chinese enterprises. China built economic and trade cooperation zones in Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Zambia, and has invested nearly $250 million in 
infrastructure construction. Based on the support of China’s and African countries’ 
governments, Chinese enterprises oversee infrastructure construction in these cooperation 
                                                
92 Since there is no clear definition to distinguish between central state-owned and provincial state-
owned enterprises in China, the author refers to them en masse as “SOEs”, instead of differentiating 
between the two sub-categories. According to Xu Yi-Chong (2014), the majority of SOEs operate 
under the auspices of the Chinese government, expanding China’s influence into Africa to secure 
supplies of natural resources and to counter Western political and economic influence. He also argued 
that the following China’s major government departments support China’s SOEs: the MFA, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) and other line ministries such as health, education, water resources, railway, and 
agriculture.  
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zones. As for the cooperation in resource development, an important component of China 
and Africa investment cooperation, China always focuses on Africa’s social and economic 
development for mutual benefit and development. Chinese enterprises also stick to open and 
transparent ways of cooperation to jointly utilize resources with African countries to support 
local people and governments (China Daily, 2010d). China’s enterprises mostly concentrate 
on the service sector (60 percent), extracting natural resources (20 percent), and 
manufacturing sector (20 percent) in Africa (S. Zhao, 2015). However, from 2003 to 2015, 
the top ten recipients of Chinese FDI were African countries,93 to be used in the energy and 
manufacturing sectors (CARI, 2016). 
Chinese state-owned enterprises, such as PetroChina, CNOOC, and Sinopec, and 
corporations such as Nonferrous Metals Group, directly take part in the extraction of natural 
resources in Africa. Moreover, small, private Chinese enterprises expand manufacturing 
investment, especially in small-scale commodities. The 2013 white paper on “China-Africa 
Economic and Trade Cooperation” stated that “manufacturing is China’s key investment 
field in Africa”: the volume of Chinese enterprises’ direct investment in African 
manufacturing sectors totaled US$1.33 billion, 2009 to 2012. China’s investment in 
manufacturing industries in Africa, also, amounts to US$3.43 billion. The majority of 
African countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, and Uganda, which do not possess natural 
resources, are delighted by large Chinese investment in industries such as sugar refineries, 
glass, fur, medical capsule and automobile factories, textile, and steel pipe manufacturing 






Figure 8: Sectoral Changes in Africa’s fast-growing countries, 2009-14 
 
                                                
93  The top ten African countries are South Africa ($5186.9 m), Nigeria ($2090.62 m), Zambia 
($2023.04 m), Democratic Republic of the Congo ($1510.27 m), Zimbabwe ($1455.48 m), Sudan 
($1598 m), Kenya ($1104.76 m), Tanzania ($793.21 m), Ethiopia ($777.3 m), and Republic of the 
Congo ($700.83 m) (m=million). 
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Note. Adopted from AfDB, OECD development Centre, and UNDP, 2016 
Since 2015, and in part owing to a recent drop in the price of crude oil and raw materials, 
most natural resource-producing African countries – such as Nigeria, Angola, South Africa – 
have striven to shift their economies from resource-dependency connected to foreign 
investment of infrastructure (harbors, electricity-generation, and railroads) to 
manufacturing (vehicles and textiles) in response to slowing economic growth (see figure, 
above). Contrary to the countries’ situation, non-natural resource-producing countries – 
such as Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Cote d’Ivoire – have experienced better growth rates 
based on China’s investment in their infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.  
 
5.3.2 China’s public diplomacy through media  
China’s media engagement in Africa is expansive. The question arises regarding the purpose 
of the Chinese media in African countries, especially how to boost mutual understanding 
through its media. From a soft power point of view, Kurlantzick (2007) says that the Chinese 
media’s expansion and cooperation in African countries is a way to deliver the Chinese 
charm offensive directly. Whereas China’s public diplomacy through foreign aid is directly 














public opinion in Africa by introducing various elements of China’s culture, such as news, 
movies, soap operas, TV shows, documentaries, and others, to positively influence overall 
Sino-Africa relations, including economic ties. As China provides more and more aid, trades 
at greater volumes, and invests more broadly in Africa than do other world powers, it 
becomes more necessary to encourage a favorable image of China and its culture among the 
African public (Bailard, 2016). 
The Chinese media, recently, is more invigorated in Africa. It is present in both the state-
owned media, such as CCTV Africa, China Daily Africa Weekly, CRI, and the Beijing Review, 
as well as the Xinhua News Agency and private media companies such as a private Chinese 
digital pay-TV operator and Star Times. However, Chinese media strategies were built on a 
solid foundation. CRI commenced its radio transmissions to Africa in 1956, when it was still 
called Radio Peking (established in 1941) (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p.207). After 50 years, 
in 2006, CRI officially set up its first overseas FM radio station branch in Nairobi, Kenya. 
CRI 91.9 FM in Nairobi broadcasts programs 19 hours per day provided in English, 
KiSwahili, and Chinese for around two million listeners in the East African nations. Most 
programs cover subjects from current events around the world, including China-related 
news such as the economy, social and cultural development, introducing cultural and 
educational exchange information between China and Africa. During its official launch 
ceremony, Wang Gengnian, director-general of China CRI, said, 
I appreciate the vital role that China has played and continues to play in the 
economic development of Kenya. I am convinced that the launch of CRI in Nairobi 
will open up new possibilities of exchanges as well as creating synergy in our different 
fields of our social endeavors like culture, tourism and the media. (English.gov.cn, 
2006) 
By bringing China’s media to African nations via CCTV-Africa certainly granted international 
prestige to the organization. China’s CCTV launched in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, as its 
first broadcast hub outside of its Beijing head office, in January 2012 (Zhang, 2014, p.2). The 
primary reason to set up CCTV-Africa in Nairobi was the consideration of securing key 
points in East Africa, the English-speaking countries (Li and April, 2013, p.89). It was the 
first Chinese overseas news center, which was part of the Beijing government’s media 
expansion project, and included investment of US$6 billion. China’s intent for CCTV Africa 
was not only to strengthen its voice in a region of greater interest, but also to consider 
Chinese viewers who work and reside in many African countries. CCTV broadcasts African 
programs – e.g., Africa Live, Faces of Africa, and Talk Africa – at least 10 hours per week to 
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the world. Also, in January of the same year, the China Daily started to publish its African 
Weekly edition in Nairobi, in cooperation with Nation Media Group, which is the largest 
media company in East and Central Africa (Zhang, 2014, p.3). 
In this way, Bilard (2016) noted that “the relevance of China’s international broadcasting 
presence in Africa to its soft power and public diplomacy objectives is clear” (p.448). 
Gagliardone (2015) comments that China wants the following three benefits from CCTV 
Africa: First, China redresses its negative image among the African public, on account of the 
limitations on domestic media freedom, by focusing on broadcasting on comprehensive, 
everyday African topics, rather than reporting Chinese thoughts in detail. Second, the 
Chinese media offers Africa “positive reporting” regarding Chinese-related news, rather than 
negative and contentious topics such as political disputes, religion, and famine. Third, 
having already experienced colonial rule from Western powers, much of the African public 
harbor animosity towards China because they do not wish to be colonized again. CCTV 
Africa, therefore, affords a great opportunity for African journalists to experience China’s 
new style of media and its freedoms, which provide differentiated services from Western 
media (pp.26-27). In the same vein, Li and Rønning (2013) have argued that Chinese 
government agencies, such as the Department of Publicity (also known as Central 
Propaganda Department), disseminate the contents of China’s Africa policy through media 
such as CCTV Africa, as an instrument of outbound propaganda. According to statistical 
analysis data produced by Marsh (2017) of the BBC and CCTV’s African news programmes, 
CCTV displays a tendency to mirror the highest priorities of Chinese policy: that is, 
“stability” and “harmony”. CCTV Africa focuses on “stability”, as it relates to the country, 
government or society, hopes, the future, and “human interest” stories. Marsh interprets the 
results as “CCTV’s tendency to prioritise officials and government pronouncements militate 
against the picture-led imperative for which Western television news has been criticised, 
while still favouring a dialogue of the elite rather than providing a truly alternative 
perspective” (Marsh, 2017, p.185-6). In this way, Interviewee S-A3 (2017) said that the 
general character of China’s media in Africa focuses on the contents of cultural exchanges 
between China and Africa, China and Africa’s public, a peace-loving China, mutual benefits 
and win-win cooperation, and the China model.  
China has expanded its media influence through cooperation with African journalists and 
media practitioners every year. In the 2013-2015 FOCAC action plan, China pledged to train 
30,000 African journalists in China, and offered 18,000 scholarships for study during their 
stays in China. Nevertheless, the majority of African journalists are from state broadcasters 
and government-affiliated media, and these journalists tend to have a more positive image of 
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China than they initially had after they finish their training and return to Africa. The 
majority of the discussion of media cooperation is set up through FOCAC, and the FOCAC 
Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) is an especially good resource regarding China’s 
rational public diplomacy activities in Africa. Through FOCAC, China has a program to train 
a thousand African media practitioners per year (a detailed discussion of FOCAC will be in 
Chapter 8). Furthermore, the role of Chinese telecommunications companies stands out in 
connection with training and technology support of media digitalization, and the 
dissemination of various Chinese TV channels in Africa. In this regard, Jiang, Li, Rønning, 
and Tjønneland (2016) explained the extension of the influence of China’s 
telecommunications companies in Africa thus: “soft power is an often-mentioned concept. 
Power in this context must be understood as combining ideology aspects with economic 
power: media communication investments are very much about economic influence” (p.3). 
Moreover, Li and colleagues argued that of China’s major telecommunications companies 
entered the African media market, it is not only China’s behemoth – such as ZTE and 
Huawei – but also small- and medium-sized businesses, such as Techno and Star Times, as 
well as digital broadcasting ventures (ibid, p.4). The expansion of China’s 
telecommunications companies was possible in Africa because the majority of African 
governments hardened their desire to develop and modernise their telecommunications 
industries: as a result, they liberalized their telecommunications policies to promote a 
pleasant investment environment for foreign investors (Berg and Hamilton, 2002). Through 
China’s go out policy, the majority of China’s companies are now in African countries to 
expand their business and facilitate the embedding of a positive, modernized and developed 
image of the China model, through companies’ social responsibility, helping to develop social 
communities, job creation, voluntary work for the local populations, and technical education. 
Hence, Chinese companies work in partnership with local African telecommunications 
operators, and set up collaborative systems for the mutual benefit of China and Africa. (More 
detailed discussion of China’s public diplomacy with media will appear in Chapters 6 and 7.) 
In sum, China deploys media and Chinese telecommunications companies as instruments of 
its public diplomacy to create a positive image of itself, countering Western’s bias and 
negative media reports, and to address the China’s unfavorable public reputation that has 
arisen due to the asymmetrical economic ties between China and Africa. By broadcasting a 
favorable image of China and focusing on the friendly interaction between Chinese and 
African populations, China seeks to embed a mutual development relationship and peaceful 
coexistence, rather than lopsided relations based on obtaining an advantage in Africa. Also, 
Chinese telecommunications companies in Africa assist in dispelling the criticism that China 
 179 
is not providing sufficient technology transfer to Africa and only focuses on expanding its 
business and exploiting Africa’s natural resources. 
 
5.4 The perception of China with regards to China’s public diplomacy through 
cultural soft power  
 
This part will discuss China’s varied cultural and educational exchange activities based on 
the framework of China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Sino-African social, cultural, and 
educational exchanges have shown marked improvement in quantity, scale, and form lately. 
From 1995 to 2005, China signed 65 cultural agreements with African countries, including 
151 implementation plans, sent 50 Chinese governmental cultural delegations to Africa, and 
brought over 160 African cultural groups to visit China. Also, China has already established 
relations for educational exchanges with nearly 50 African countries, offering nearly 20,000 
government scholarships (Xu, 2008). As previously mentioned, in Chapter 4, China’s 
cultural diplomacy is based on its culture and traditions, and the Chinese government 
utilizes Chinese language and culture through Confucius Institutions as an instrument of 
public diplomacy. However, in addition to the general activities of the Confucius Institute 
and Confucius classrooms, which Hanban publishes openly, King (2014) has pointed out that 
China does not publicize a full report of China’s cooperation in education and training in 
Africa. It is therefore a challenge to ascertain the extent of China’s cultural education and 
training aid in Africa, nor to pinpoint the major differences with traditional donors’ activities 
in African countries. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1, China does not conduct formulaic 
public diplomacy activities across all African countries, but rather adjusts its public 
diplomacy to each countries’ political economic conditions, in addition to offering the core 
activities such as Confucius Institutes and Cultural Centers in Africa. Hence, China’s public 
diplomacy through cultural soft power is often perceived as being conducted through 
Confucius Institutes and the Cultural Centers in Africa because they are not only managed by 
the Chinese government, but also operated based on China’s culture and language. 
There are 46 Confucius Institutes and 23 Confucius Classrooms in Africa (Hanban-b, n.d.). 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, Confucius Institutions are non-profit educational 
institutions and aim to spread understanding of Chinese culture and language to foreign 
people, and cooperate in educational and cultural exchanges between China and the world. 
However, Yang and Hsiao (2012) have argued that Confucius Institutes are not relevant for 
teaching or introduction of Confucianism, but rather to provide Chinese language teaching 
projects combined with comprehensive social, cultural and diplomatic outreach. Thus, King 
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(2010, 2013) associates Confucius Institutes with China’s foreign policy, to understand the 
role of Confucius Institutes in Africa. Yang (2010) believes the Chinese government takes 
advantage of Confucius Institutes to promote its governance model and expand its influence 
on the global stage by teaching students. In a similar vein, China utilizes Confucius Institutes 
to convey the political ideas of its elites through various channels based on “Going Global 
Cultural Diplomacy” (wenhua zou chuqu waijiao) and “Popularize Chinese Culture around 
the world” (tuidong zhonghua wenhua zouxiang shijie) (Yang & Hsiao, 2012). However, 
Stambach and Kwayu (2017) have a different view of Confucius Institutes, that they provide 
more practical training to the local populations, based on their fieldwork of taking classes at 
a Confucius Institute at the University of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania. Due to the colonial 
experience, African people are more sensitive towards propaganda. However, they concluded 
that China offers the Confucius Institution program as aid, and also the programs in 
Confucius Institute are pragmatic, not ideological. From the University of Dar es Salaam 
perspective, the Confucius Institute is an example of self-reliance and independence from 
the United States and European countries, to forge a better direction for the country’s 
development. The activities of China’s Confucius Institutions showed through during one of 
the interviews in Nigeria. Interviewee N-B1 (2016) said that the image of Chinese culture 
among the African public is a profound and mysterious one, due to the images of kung fu, 
which is a very popular component of Chinese culture in Africa. On the other hand, some 
African people have an image of China as very modernized, due to modern Chinese culture 
seen in movies and TV shows, and on TV channels. Nowadays, therefore, the interviewee 
considers teaching programs at Confucius Institute to feature China’s traditional and 
modern cultures to draw the attention of African youth to learn Chinese culture and 
language, to learn more about China in order to cement future relations. At the same time, 
the interviewee supports language training to support local Nigerian people to get jobs at 
Chinese companies, and also supports the awarding of scholarships to give local students the 
opportunity to complete their studies (this will be discussed at greater length in a case study 
chapter). In sum, from the functional perspective of public diplomacy, China efficiently 
utilizes Confucius Institutions to communicate with African people, and to develop a bond of 
sympathy through China’s culture. However, they also provoke criticism that Confucius 
Institutes contribute to achieving China’s foreign policy goal, because they are inseparable 
from relations with the Chinese government. 
Not only Confucius Institutes but also China’s Cultural Centers play a vital role in 
introducing China to Africa through Chinese culture. The Chinese government has 
established twenty Chinese cultural centers overseas, five of which are in Africa (Mauritius, 
Benin, Cairo, Nigeria, and Tanzania). The difference between a Cultural Institute and a 
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Confucius Institute is that Cultural Institutes are focused only on promoting mutual 
understanding between Chinese and local populations, instead of engaging in education 
support, such as at universities and offering language training, which are the role of 
Confucius Institutes (Interviewee N-B2, 2016). Recently, a variety of events for cultural and 
art exchange have been held in both China and Africa to cement Sino-Africa ties. China has 
also hosted diverse events with African people in China; for example, the Second China-
Africa Cultural Heritage Preservation Forum in Chengdu, in 2015; the African Cultures in 
Focus program in China to introduce Africa’s culture and art performances; the Spring 
Festival in Africa; and the 2016 Meet in Beijing Arts Festival, attended by South Africa’s 
MusicFest Art Troupe. Moreover, Cultural Centers arrange various events with the Ministry 
of Culture and provincial and municipal cultural bureaus, and 14 of China’s provinces and 
municipalities have engaged in cultural exchange programs with over 20 African countries. 
The cultural exchanges in Africa that introduce China have also been diverse, and events are 
held around a wide range of subjects; including movies, traditional dance, Chinaware art, 
calligraphy, singing contests with Chinese popular music, traditional clothes, and others 
(ibid). (More detailed information on this will be included in the case study chapter.)  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The present foundation of solid Sino-African relations was laid in the 1950s to 1990s, the 
fruit of China’s efforts despite its inability to offer financial and infrastructure assistance to 
Africa from 1950 to the 1970s. The majority of African countries entered into diplomatic 
relations with China in the late 1950s, after which China began offering assistance to the 
continent. The key aspect of the relations between China and Africa, until the 1970s, was 
Chinese aid to Africa intended to address political isolation on the international stage, and in 
joining the United Nations with the help of African countries. In return for becoming a 
member of the international community, Beijing supported the construction of a railway that 
connected Tanzanian and Zambia. Furthermore, China provided economic assistance free of 
interest, and dispatched technicians in the fields of construction, agriculture, and medical 
treatment to African countries. Since then, China has adopted reforms and its opening up 
policy, and suffered the Tiananmen Square massacre, which marked a watershed moment 
that led to the adoption of utilitarianism over ideology-centric policies, aimed at boosting its 
economic development and reforming the global image of China, from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s.  
In the course of a decade of Sino-Africa relations, China established the FOCAC and an 
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Africa policy to strengthen relations between China and the continent. Beijing focused on the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, mutual benefit, mutual development, and providing 
economic aid without political involvement. However, it is designed for economic gain, 
maintaining the One China policy, and expanding its influence through political bonds with 
African countries, and the expansion of its companies in Africa. As a result of increasingly 
lopsided trade between China and Africa, there has been a rise in discord. The majority of 
African countries rely on China’s imports, thus China’s economic recession/slowdown have 
an impact on Africa’s economy, as does any depreciation in raw materials prices. Chinese 
exports with low prices also seriously affect African countries’ domestic enterprises. 
However, China attempts to address the gap between China and Africa that springs from 
unbalanced economic ties. Thus, the Chinese government exercises public diplomacy 
through various instruments – such as foreign aid, the media, and cultural institutions – to 
improve the country’s image, and to gain the trust of the African public through practical and 
humanitarian aid intended to improve the African population’s welfare and economy. Also, 
China endeavors to develop a bond of sympathy by introducing Chinese culture and 
language through diverse events and activities with the African public.  
The next chapter will look in more detail at China’s public diplomacy activities in bilateral 
and multilateral ties, based on data collected through interviews, conducted during fieldwork 
















Chapter 6. Case Study: Bilateral Channel 
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Chapter 6.1 Nigeria  
 
The Sino-Nigerian relationship is one based on cooperative and mutually beneficial 
economic relations. China wants to secure energy resources, and diversify its export market 
through the expansion of Chinese enterprises in Nigeria. This is because Nigeria is not only 
Africa’s leading oil producer, but also offers plenty of potential customers for Chinese 
commodities, and freight and transportation opportunities as a result of its harbor. That 
being said, while Nigeria’s political situation is not perfectly stable, Nigeria has a relatively 
democratic system when compared to other oil-producing countries in Africa. Hence, those 
factors fully qualify Nigeria for stronger economic and diplomatic relations with China. In 
contrast to China, Nigeria’s needs of economic development are in its manufacturing sector, 
and the desire to enrich its agriculture industry. However, while the two countries’ 
requirements are hard to align perfectly, relations have been linked together by interests.94  
Thus, based on the discussion in the conceptual chapters on public diplomacy with soft 
power (Chapters 3 and 4) and the general background of China’s relationship with and policy 
towards Africa (Chapter 5), this chapter will examine the role of China’s public diplomacy in 
Nigeria, to explore the links between China’s public diplomacy and its policy towards Sino-
Nigerian political economy relations. Thus, it is comprised of three parts: the first introduces 
the general background of how China and Nigeria developed a strategic partnership with the 
Nigerian government. This part also covers the cause of disharmony between China and 
Nigeria in their bilateral economic relations. The second part discusses the role of China’s 
public diplomacy, using three instruments – foreign aid, cultural and education institutes, 
and media – to analyze how China’s public diplomacy works in Nigeria and how it carries out 
China’s foreign policy in Nigeria. The third part considers the effect of China’s public 
diplomacy on the Nigerian public sector, Nigeria’s political economy, and relations between 
Nigeria and China, and also assess how China’s public diplomacy works to strengthen ties 
and boost ongoing interaction between the two countries.  
 
                                                
94 While China and Nigeria enjoy active economic relations with high volumes of trade and investment, 
there is cacophony between them. Contentious matters in Sino-African relations have already been 
broadly explored in Chapter 5. However, this section will discuss this discord related to economic 
relations, focusing on bilateral relations between China and Nigeria. It will not cover all contentious 
issues between China and Nigeria, due to a limited time to research within the doctoral program, but 
will examine typical and well-known issues to connect with the discussion of China’s public diplomacy 
in Chapter 7. This approach will also be applied to the next case study, on South Africa, in Chapter 6.2.  
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6.1.1 The background of Sino-Nigeria strategic partnership 
 
China and Nigeria established diplomatic ties in 1971, and bilateral relations between the two 
countries have strengthened at a quicker rate than China’s relations with other African 
countries. Despite the fact that China took Taiwan’s seat as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council with the help of African nations in 1971, mutual exchanges between China 
and Nigeria were minimal before the 1990s. From the early 1990s, however, the two 
countries began to develop strategic ties over the course of three stages. The first stage of 
Sino-Nigeria relations was overcoming hardship to develop close economic ties. When Sani 
Abacha’s regime came to power after a military coup in 1993, the West imposed economic 
sanctions against Nigeria, and so Nigeria chose China as an alternative source of aid and 
investment. Based on Abacha’s efforts at the beginning of his regime (1993-1998) to make 
contact with the Chinese government, the Nigerian-Chinese Chambers of Commerce was 
established in 1994. The China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) took 
advantage of this, and in 1995 gained a $529 million contract for the restoration of Nigeria’s 
railway system. This, in turn, led to a 1997 visit from Li Peng, then-premier of China’s State 
Council, to sign protocols regarding power generation, oil, and steel production. However, 
CCECC’s restoration work and Li’s protocols were unsuccessful due to the Western sanctions 
(Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014) and the military coup in Nigeria’s political system. The next 
stage of relations between China and Nigeria forged ahead with economic cooperation. 
Olusegun Obasanjo’s 1999 victory in the presidential elections paved the way for active 
Chinese economic cooperation with Nigeria. Furthermore, during his second term, from 
2003 to 2007, the two countries solidified their interdependence based on each country’s 
demands. During former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria in 2006, Hu and 
Olusegun agreed to work on a strategic plan for the future growth of bilateral, strategic ties 
between two countries. In a bid to achieve this bilateral strategic partnership, the two leaders 
agreed on a four-point proposal95 that contained the key components of political mutual 
trust, economic reciprocity, and mutual assistance in international affairs (China.org.cn, 
2006). In the same year, the intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum was 
established; Obasanjo significantly boosted Chinese companies’ infrastructure-building 
engagement across a range of sectors, adding a growing number of Nigerian projects, in 
return for which China secured access to several of Nigeria’s major oil fields (Salter, 2009). 
                                                
95 The four proposals are: 1) to enhance political mutual trust to promote strategic cooperation; 2) to 
expand cultural exchanges and cooperation and jointly combat various diseases, including malaria 
and bird flu; 3) to expand cooperation in areas including agriculture, energy, electricity, infrastructure 
construction, telecommunications and satellite, to achieve reciprocity and win-win results; and 4) to 
promote South-South and South-North spirit, and strengthen cooperation in international affairs to 
boost world peace, improve coordination and cooperation on the major international issues of human 
rights, peacekeeping, anti-terrorism, and UN reform.  
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In laying the foundation of an oil-for-infrastructure policy, China and Nigeria’s economic 
interests were suitably matched. China began to spread out, not only securing oil and gas but 
also expanding its companies’ clout in the Nigerian market. The final stage of the two 
countries’ relations moves beyond just economic ties and grew into mutual exchanges in 
many different fields. For example, Nigeria offered four oil blocks to the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in return for its commitment to invest US$2 billion in the 
Kaduna refinery project in Lagos. In 2007, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) was also offered four blocks in exchange for a US$2.5 billion China Exim Bank 
loan to upgrade the Lagos-Kano railway and construct a hydropower project at Mambilla. 
However, the two agreements foundered due to deep-seated corruption, irregularities, and 
instability in Nigeria’s political system (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, 2011). After laying 
the economic groundwork of Sino-Nigeria relations in the early of 2000s (the second stage, 
above), from around the end of 2010, the two countries have expanded their strategic 
relations, covering not only the political economic sector but also welfare and general 
livelihood. To use the words of Zhao Linxiang, Economic and Commercial Counselor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, “both countries had experienced steady increase in bilateral 
relations right from the administration of former President, Goodluck Jonathan” (Amaugo, 
2016). Chinese merchandise and companies are found all over Nigeria: from industrial 
products to service commodities, Chinese goods are part of the Nigerian people’s lives. In 
addition to economic cooperation, China and Nigeria’s political bond has also deepened on 
the international stage. In 2015, for example, China supported Nigeria for a permanent seat 
in the United Nations Security Council, in recognition of China’s One-China policy. Also, 
through people-to-people communications and cultural exchanges, China and Nigeria have 
endeavored to broaden and deepen their understanding of each other, which goes beyond 
economic ties.  
China and Nigeria have improved their relationship utilizing high-ranking governmental 
officials visiting and high-level talks ever since they established diplomatic ties. Since 2000, 
a Chinese delegation including the Chinese Foreign Minister has paid a state visit to Nigeria 
almost every year (Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, 2004), and previous Chinese President Hu 
Jintao also visited Nigeria during his term. Nigeria’s current president, Muhammadu Buhari, 
made an official visit to Beijing in 2015 to conduct formal talks. The strategic partnership 
between China and Nigeria has led to complementary cooperation as part of their win-win 
relations. Also, China’s various actors – such as government-affiliated groups, private and 
government-owned companies – have helped to maximize the impact of the strategic 
partnership on Nigeria’s politics, economic, social and cultural spheres. Based on the 
enormous efforts between the two countries, as of 2016, Nigeria is the second largest market 
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for Chinese exports in Africa. On the back of these close economic ties, China and Nigeria 
have something in common: they both have very large populations, and put economic 
growth first in their government policies. In addition to economic ties, the two countries 
have made it clear that they support South-South cooperation on the world stage. Recently, 
despite trade between China and Nigeria experienced a slump due to a drop in global oil 
prices and the 2015-16 global economic recession, the two countries’ trade nevertheless grew 
from US$384 million in 1998, to around US$18.1 billion in 2014. (Oguh, 2016). When we 
consider China’s import and export products in trade with Nigeria, in 2010 China’s exports 
are driven by manufactured goods (38 percent). The other items include vehicles (11 percent), 
electrical equipment (10 percent), textile products, industrial machinery, and telecom 
equipment (9 percent), and agri-food products (3 percent). On the other hand, China 
imports nearly 90 percent of its petroleum and gas from Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng, 2011, 
p.8). Nigeria is the largest recipient of FDI among African countries. The total flow of FDI 
into Nigeria has increased ten times: from US$1.14 billion in 2001, to US$11.5 billion in 
2009. China has also expanded its FDI into Nigeria, from US$3 billion in 2003, to US$10 
billion. The Chinese government directly invested US$1.1 billion in Nigeria’s infrastructure, 
in the form of low-interest loans. However, 75 percent of China’s FDI goes to Nigeria’s oil 
and gas sector (Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014, p.366).   
That being said, Sino-Nigerian ties do not always go smoothly, despite the leaders of the two 
countries displaying a strong desire to cooperate with each other to establish a win-win 
strategy. Although they share mutual interests in deriving benefits through a strategic 
partnership, “the engagement between Nigeria and China may be sour as well as sweet” 
(Adekola, 2013, p.4). This is because China holds an edge over Nigeria in the various fields 
(trade and investment), because Nigeria relies heavily on China that now plays an important 
role in Nigeria’s economy and its people’s daily lives. Hence, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 
4, Nigeria is deeply affected by a slowdown in China’s economic growth. Another 
problematic cause of tension in Sino-Nigerian economic relations is the huge amount of 
textiles imports from China: this weakens the textile sector in Nigeria, and has caused many 
Nigerian textile firms to go out of business due to the difficulties of competition with China. 
Thus, around 160,000 textile workers have been laid off, and the workforce declined to 
approximately 90,000 from 1995 to 2002. In 2005, the available workforce for textiles was 
only 35,000; and in 2010, there were fewer than 40 textiles factories in Nigeria, down from 
around 200 operating previously. This phenomenon is caused by massive Chinese illegal and 
legal imports, available at preposterously low prices (Muhammad, Mukhtar, and Lola, 2017).  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the form of China’s complete aid is a problem in Nigeria as well. 
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China does not procure construction materials in Nigeria, but rather imports the majority of 
necessary equipment, including building materials, from China (Interviewee N-D2, 2016). As 
a result, Chinese aid does not always lead to the development of local Nigerian companies. 
Furthermore, China’s construction aid is not connected to all of Nigeria’s economic 
development and the improvement of Nigerian people’s life. Some of China’s construction 
aid is for the privileged class: for example, airport expansions in Abuja, Enugu, Kano, and 
Port Harcourt. In addition, according to Interviewee N-F1 (2016), the majority of Chinese 
small- and medium-sized businesses operating in Nigeria, which are outside of the scope of 
the Chinese embassy or Chinese government management, tend not to follow the 
agreements based on environmental protections and technology transfer between the 
Chinese and the Nigerian government. Thus, while Chinese SOEs and behemoths do obey 
the agreements, it is hard to ignore the fact that most Nigerian workers who work for small- 
and medium-sized Chinese enterprises complain about the lack of technology transfer and 
environmental protections in Nigeria. Based on these tensions between China and Nigeria, 
the following section will discuss how China endeavors to create a harmonious environment 
to foster close economic relations with Nigeria.  
 
6.1.2 The role of China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria  
 
As stated in the preceding chapter, although China and Nigeria have a mutual goal in gaining 
an economic advantage and mutual global political protection, there remains a gap that 
prevents China and Nigeria from strengthening their relations. Thus, the following chapters 
will discuss how China’s public diplomacy works with the Nigerian people, using different 
measures to cement strategic ties between China and Nigeria.   
 
6.1.2.1 Foreign aid  
In addition to trade and FDI, China provides various types of assistance to Nigeria that is 
directly related to improving the Nigerian people’s living environments and contributing to 
economic growth. Regarding the significant factors for Nigeria’s economic development, to 
refer to Udoma Udo Udoma, Minister of Budget and National Planning: “Infrastructure is 
very necessary to grow the economy of a nation. There is need to fix infrastructure in order 
to create an environment for private sector to grow”. To accomplish infrastructure 
development in Nigeria, the CEO of the Infrastructure Bank of Nigeria, Adekunle Oyinloye 
stresses the importance of “funding commercially viable infrastructure projects”, which are 
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assisted by both public institutions and private sector companies with the provision of 
specially-designed construction loans (Ministry of Budget and National Planning, n.a). 
Nigeria’s President Buhari, by extension, highlighted China’s pledge to provide support in 
the areas of power, infrastructure, agriculture, transport, and roads, when he visited China in 
2016 (China Daily, 2016b). On that note, China carries out public diplomacy by rendering 
assistance in the form of funding and collaborative work between China’s private companies 
and Nigerian businesses to boost Nigeria’s infrastructure development. Prior to 2000s, while 
China only focuses on establishing infrastructure through its companies in Nigeria, Beijing 
now considers both the development of infrastructure and the region as a whole, when 
deciding on where construction work will be located.  
As for China’s typical infrastructure development assistance, the Chinese construction and 
engineering firm China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) pledged to improve Nigeria’s 
human resources development. The company’s headquarters were established in Abuja, the 
Nigerian capital, out of which they operate their business linked to all north and west African 
countries. The company also promised to do a good job of integration and social 
responsibility practices, sharing the fruits of development, and building a good environment 
for the local people (China Daily, 2016d). At the same time, the CGGC conducted project for 
the construction of dams, power plants, bridges and roads in Nigeria. A typical example of 
the company’s project is $3.2 billion hydroelectric plant construction on the Mambila 
plateau, with Sinohydro. Seventy-five percent of the project’s financing came from China’s 
ExImBank, and the Nigerian government paid the rest. The project agreed to repay the loan 
out of the revenue generated by the hydroelectric plant; and the project is expected to be 
completed in early 2018 (AidData, n.a). In 2014, the China Railway Construction Corp won a 
contract for a nearly $12 billion project for coastal railway construction, which is one of 
China’s largest overseas construction projects. The total length of the track is to be 1,402 
kilometers, connecting Nigeria’s economic capital Lagos in the west, to Calabar in the east. 
The project will create nearly 200,000 local jobs and is expected to vitalize Nigeria’s 
manufacturing sector along the railway (CCTV, 2014). In 2017, the Chinese firm CCECC 
Nigeria Ltd. began construction of the Lagos-Ibadan double-track railway, which adopts 
Chinese standard in 2017. The construction is a $1.58 billion project, and will take three 
years to complete. Spinning out of the railway construction, the Nigerian government and 
the CCECC expect around 4,000 jobs to be created for young Nigerians, and regional 
development through boosting related industries and the creation of new tax opportunities 
(People’s Daily, 2017).  
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Also, China funds support infrastructure and agriculture development. From 2000 to 2007, 
China provided infrastructure financial assistance mainly for transport (over 60 percent), 
electricity, telecom and others (Oyeranti, Babatunde, and Ogunkola, 2011, p.188). China 
then decided to support Nigeria’s key facilities to boost its economic development. In 2017, 
Beijing decided to invest an additional $40 billion in Nigeria, following the previous $45 
billion investment. The additional funds were provided aside from the total $60 billion 
which China pledged at FOCAC; and is planned to be used for Nigeria’s economic 
development (Guardian, 2017). Recently, the Chinese government has focused on utilitarian 
and practical assistance, rather than the apparent aid that China had provided during the 
mid-2000s. For example, in 2006, Beijing agreed to provide a CNY40 million grant for 
infrastructure projects, which includes establishing a power generation station and the 
maintenance and management of the Kaduna refinery, in return for four oil-backed 
contracts. Two years later, China provided a $2.5 billion loan to Nigeria for an infrastructure 
project in exchange for oil exploitation rights, but the project was rejected by the Yar’Adua 
Administration (Ploch, 2010, pp.27-28). Although the Chinese government still has good 
cause for financially supporting Nigeria, China nevertheless endeavors to reach a reasonable 
compromise with Nigeria, and at the same time aims to meet the economic development 
needs of the Nigerian government. On that score, in 2011, the Chinese government sent over 
400 Chinese agriculture experts in a bid to boost crop cultivation at the small earth dams in 
Nigeria (AidData, n.a).  
China has gradually increased its aid to Nigeria every year. China’s latest plan for Nigerian 
support is a long-term blueprint that facilitates the fulfillment of deeper relations with 
Nigeria, for the mutual benefit of political economy on the international stage. To gain 
Nigeria's trust, China needs to get rid of the negative impression that China obtains a 
unilateral advantage through Sino-Nigerian economic ties. Hence, Beijing supports the 
vitalization of Nigeria’s production sector, which links economic development with 
maximizing the efficiency of China’s aid. Through the process of assistance in diversified and 
modernized production industries, such as manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, China 
not only counts on the knock-on effect of job creation and regional development to present a 
positive image of China, but also places itself in a position of advantage by expanding 
Chinese companies’ influence in the manufacturing and infrastructure business sectors. By 
using aid as part of its public diplomacy approach, Sino-Nigerian ties expect more extensive 
practical cooperation and deepened strategic relations.  
In addition to China’s aid above, Beijing also focuses on improving the Nigerian people’s 
welfare, and providing scientific technology. In 2014, the Nigerian and Chinese governments 
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agreed on a CNY10 million grant for assistance with medical treatment and protection 
against Ebola. In the same year, the Chinese embassy in Nigeria also donated vehicles to the 
Nigerian FCT Police Command to combat crime. In 2013, China donated 250 books to 
Nigeria’s National Library, and provided scholarships for 70 Nigerian youths to study at the 
Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology and the Guangzhou City Construction 
College in China. China also set up a library in Abuja for the local youth. China also worked 
on a hospital construction project in Abuja, which cost US$12.5 million, from 2009 to 2013. 
The project was conducted under China-Africa cooperation adopted in 2006 (AidData, n.a).  
 
6.1.2.2 China’s Media 
The role of the media in Nigeria is to create a positive and favorable global image of China – 
one that not only presents its long strides for economic development under the control of a 
highly-centralized system of government, but also of being at the center of the world with an 
attractive historical backdrop. Thus, while Chinese cultural institutions and people-to-people 
exchanges inform the few Nigerian people who engage with them, the Chinese media focuses 
on disseminating China’s social culture more widely. The expansion of China’s media and 
telecommunication companies has been conducted as a part of a policy of extending the 
boundaries of its public diplomacy activities. Lately, the Confucius Institute at the University 
of Lagos and the CCC in Nigeria have launched a renewed Chinese Culture Month “Movie 
Week” series of events for local Nigerian people. In the case of the Confucius Institute, they 
do not limit the audience, and allow students enrolled in classes at the Confucius Institute 
and also other university students and staff, other community members, and elementary and 
middle school students from the Confucius Institute teaching sites. Chinese Director of the 
Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos Wang Yongjing explains her views on using 
media for cultural exchanges and its ripple effect, thus: 
We used modern multimedia sound equipment, for a vivid and captivating promotion 
of Chinese culture, leaving the classroom so that they could reach a broader audience 
of Nigerian locals. After watching these films, the students could obtain a direct 
understanding of contemporary Chinese culture and the rapid development of 
technology in China, while at the same time also deepening their impression of China. 
(Hanban, 2016) 
As for China’s media, Beijing utilizes three vehicles to interact with the Nigerian public. The 
first are China’s media programs, which are produced in China. To improve intercultural 
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exchanges, since 2016, more than 17 Chinese movies and TV dramas across diverse genres – 
including urban comedy, family, and adventure – were broadcast over more than 400 hours 
in Nigeria. The Chinese movies and dramas aired through the cooperation between 
StarTimes, a Chinese international pay-TV service provider, and the state-run Nigeria 
Television Authority. StarTimes boasts the largest number of subscribers in Nigeria, so that 
China expects a collateral benefit of rapidly disseminating Chinese culture and providing a 
window of second-hand experience through Chinese movies and TV dramas. With regards to 
the introduction of Chinese movies and TV dramas, Yan Xiangdong, cultural counselor of 
the Embassy of China in Nigeria, said that, “dramas and movies are important parts of 
culture and cultural exchanges between the two countries” (Xinhua News, 2016e). 
All Chinese TV shows and movies are dubbed into Igbo, Yoruba, and other local Nigerian 
languages, so that local populations can watch Chinese shows more easily. Nigerian viewers 
appreciate China’s thoughtful consideration and the TV shows and movies that feature 
family affection, a developed China, and fascinating action scenes like Kung Fu. Based on the 
positive response from the Nigerian public, François Dubé (2016) argues that screen-t0-
screen cultural interaction goes a long way to grow links between the two countries’ film 
industries. Hence, recently, Nigerian movies have used China as a background, or used 
Chinese and Nigerian’s relations (for example, in a love story) as material for movies. When 
one considers that Nigeria’s film industry (Nollywood) is the world’s third-largest producer 
of feature films (with around 300 producers making 1,000 films a year) (Towse, 2010, 
p.436), such collaboration will not only boost cultural understanding, but also generate 
closer economic ties between China and Nigeria. 
The second measure is using Nigeria’s journalists. China’s media expansion in Nigeria is the 
result of various cooperative processes in Sino-Nigeria ties. The “Experience China: China-
Nigeria Media Symposium”, was a significant meeting for interaction between major Chinese 
and Nigerian media outlets, was held in Abuja in 2013. China’s vice-minister of the State 
Council Information Office, Li Wufeng, visited Nigeria to attend the meeting with the 
Chinese ambassador. The priority agenda of the meeting was establishing programs to 
improve a mutual sense of solidarity in Sino-Nigeria relations, and to rectify the wrong 
impression of China that resulted from the biased reporting in Western media. Thus, China 
began to run the “Experience China” program, which is jointly controlled by China (through 
the State Council Information Office and the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria) and Nigeria 
(through its Federal Ministry of Education). The program reflects Nigerian requests for more 
Chinese media involvement in Nigeria, improvement of China’s media’s leverage in the 
nation, and a boost to trade relations between the two countries (China.org.cn, 2013b). The 
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Chinese government also deploys reporters and journalists to understand each country and 
keep up with the pace of their strengthening economic ties. With the aim of strengthening 
China-Africa friendship, Beijing also provides for Nigerian journalists, as well as other 
African journalists, to learn and acquire wider and deeper knowledge of Chinese political 
economy, media, and cultural development through a 10-month media and cultural 
exchange fellowship in collaboration with the China Public Diplomacy Association at the 
China Africa Press Center in Beijing. During the fellowship, the journalists have the 
opportunity to interview officials from relevant government ministries, agencies and 
enterprises, and experience working with major Chinese media organizations. By extension, 
the journalists are allowed to attend major events, such as plenary sessions of the Chinese 
People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, G20 Summit, and 
FOCAC Coordinators’ Meeting, to grow their understanding of China’s major politic systems 
as it relates to Africa. To understand the real image of China, the journalists visit around 35 
cities and towns across 12 provinces and municipalities (People’s Daily, December 2nd, 2016). 
China recognizes the role of journalists, and put effort into training them, as the journalists 
are the medium that connects China with the Nigerian public. Also, Beijing has attempted to 
bridge the gap between Nigerian journalists and Chinese correspondents in Nigeria. 
Although there are Chinese correspondents in Nigeria, the reality is that interaction with 
local journalists is lower in Nigeria. Considering that Nigeria’s media system is more liberal 
and enjoys greater freedom of speech than China’s (Oyeyinka, Olalere, Lateef, and Omolayo, 
2013), the role of journalists is of enormous importance to introduce a favorable image of 
China to Nigeria – certainly as important as teaching Chinese language, and watching 
Chinese movies and TV shows. For that reason, Executive Secretary of the All-China 
Journalists Association Wang Dongmei has requested Chinese and Nigerian media 
practitioners’ unity to boost win-win cooperation between the two countries. As of 2017, 
there are around 230,000 certified members who have participated in an exchange program 
in China. The Chinese government is planning to expand and diversify programs available to 
Nigerian journalists. “As journalists […] we should work harmoniously together in 
promoting more cordial diplomatic relations between our two countries”, and “We strongly 
believe that as journalists in Nigeria and China, we must join hands, promote more training 
programmes and exchanges between us, in the interest of our two nations” said Wang 
(Business Day, 2017).  
The last method is the Chinese news media. In Nigeria, there are officially only China Radio 
International (CRI) and Xinhua correspondents as part of a government media company. 
Several Chinese private companies, such as StarTimes, Huafei Nigeria Times, the West 
Africa Business Weekly newspaper, and others, support China’s major media organizations 
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(Interviewee N-A1, 2016) in China when they publish articles about the various concerns in 
Nigeria. Government-owned media company CRI established an office in Lagos, in 2009, 
and broadcasts in the Hausa language to target the northern region of Nigeria. Around five 
million radio listeners are Nigerians in the Northern region and neighboring countries, and 
listen to CRI’s Chinese news and programs in Hausa. CRI Director of the Hausa Service Chen 
Liming said, “the radio programme had so far continued to draw the attraction of Nigerians 
to the business and other opportunities currently existing for Nigerians in Nigeria and 
China’s relations” (PM News, 2017). The CRI continues its efforts to get close to the Nigerian 
public. To do this, for example, a Chinese radio presenter adopts a Nigerian name to add a 
local touch, when running a radio program; and also collects feedback from Nigerian radio 
listeners through bulletin boards, postcards, and by phone. The Chinese government also 
employs Nigerian graduates of the Hausa language and dispatches them to the CRI 
headquarters in Beijing, to ensure accurate and efficient radio broadcasting.   
Unlike the CRI, there is neither a joint venture newspaper between China and Nigeria, nor a 
Chinese newspaper for Nigerian subscribers in Nigeria. However, a private Chinese 
newspaper does play a role in communicating between China and Nigeria. According to 
Interviewee N-A1 (2016), the Chinese newspaper in Nigeria is aimed at promoting China-
Africa cooperation and reflecting Chinese voices. In the Nigerian media market, the West 
Africa Business Weekly is the most powerful private Chinese media. This newspaper has 
cooperative relationships with both Nigerian and Chinese media. The editorial team of the 
newspaper is based in China. In Nigeria, the journalists are responsible for interviewing both 
Nigerian and Chinese celebrities and notables, and translating and sorting Nigerian news. 
The newspaper was established in 2003, by the Nigeria-China Council for the promotion of 
peaceful national reunification. In a bid to build a media platform, the newspaper gained the 
support of the Chinese embassy in Abuja, the Consulate in Lagos, the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office of the State Council of China, and China’s mainstream media in its early years 
(Interviewee N-A1, 2016). However, since 2014, the newspaper has more freedom of 
expression than in previous years, after a new Chief took control of the newspaper 
(Interviewee N-A2, 2016).  
The West Africa Business Weekly is a solely Chinese newspaper that publishes 32 pages 
every week in Nigeria, and includes Nigerian news and Nigeria-Chinese groups news. The 
newspaper covers Nigerian visits by Chinese leaders, politicians or businessman, Chamber of 
Commerce activities, the activities of the embassy and consulates as part of its coverage for 
Chinese in Nigeria, and it is free to both Chinese and Nigerians. The articles regarding 
Nigerian news in the newspaper are drawn from the main local newspapers, such as Punch, 
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Thisday, Business Today, Daily Trust, The Guardian, Vanguard, Premium Times Nigeria, 
the Sun News, and others, to better comprehend the local situation. Not only that, other 
news in the fields of the exhibitions, business opportunities, exchange rates, and the security 
situation are featured in the newspaper (Interviewee N-A1, 2016). The news articles are 
provided both in Chinese and English.  Although the West Africa Business Weekly 
newspaper was initially aimed at Chinese people in Nigeria, Nigerians who are interested in 
Chinese news and business trends in Nigeria also now subscribe to the newspaper. With 
regards to cementing better relations between China and Nigeria, the newspaper broadens 
the boundaries, and performs a role of “bilateral communication” between China and Nigeria, 
according to Interviewee N-A2 (2016). Hence, from 2017, the newspaper’s journalists and 
correspondents will increase the prominence of article that focus on how to promote better 
Sino-Nigerian relations, rather than focusing on what the relationship is (Interviewee N-A2, 
2016). In the same vein, the newspaper reports on the Chinese People’s Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAEFC) delegation, which includes the Export-Import 
Bank of China and Chinese state-owned and private companies, who are looking for 
cooperative projects as a part of China’s going out policy in Nigeria in 2016. The founder of 
the newspaper also provided a three board seats for Nigerian governors and CPAEFC 
members to discuss the creation of projects (Interviewee N-A1, 2016). All these efforts of 
China’s media involvement have brought about positive effects: not only do more and more 
Chinese companies and businessmen come to Nigeria to do business to boost active 
economic ties, but Chinese and Nigerian younger generations also have the chance to 
develop broader knowledge and engagement, said the interviewee. The interviewee also 
explained the difficulties experienced by China’s media in Nigeria, and that China media has 
difficulty exporting its values due to its strong censorship system, hierarchy, and 
conservative policies, and at the same time Nigerians do not really identify with China’s 
values (Interviewee N-A1, 2016).  
 
6.1.2.3 Cultural and Education Institutes  
Chinese culture is a crucial factor for China’s wider publicity push for its political economy 
and social culture, as has already been stated in Chapter 3. Culture and education factors are 
the core means by which the Chinese government first promoted its public diplomacy 
activities in Nigeria, as most of China’s public diplomacy activities have expand based on the 
influence of cultural and education interchanges. In 2016, during a symposium marking the 
45th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria, China did not forgot to 
add mention of people-to-people exchanges, science and technology education as critical 
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factor which have led to fruitful cooperation between China and Nigeria. Hence, Chinese 
cultural and education institutions in Nigeria are mostly run by the Chinese government, but 
Chinese private companies have also worked to foster support from Nigeria’s younger 
generations and to promote community economic development through its own skill 
training programs.  
In the mid-2000s, Beijing put a lot of effort into cultural exchanges. Typical examples are the 
establishment of Confucius Institutes and visits from Chinese delegations to Nigeria, for 
example for the “Chinese Movie Week 2008”, which the Chinese government financed, 
provided the film projectors, and trained local Nigerians to use them. The “Chinese Movie 
Week 2008” was a collaboration between the Chinese embassy in Nigeria and the Nigerian 
Film Corporation (NFC). As part of the collaboration, the embassy created a scholarship to 
support NFC staffers’ graduate degrees in film studies at Chinese universities (Shinn & 
Eisenman, 2012, p.221). However, Sino-Nigerian cultural exchanges began to diversify in 
earnest after former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan made an official visit to China 
with Edem Duke, then-chief of the Minister of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, in 
2013. In the same year, the Chinese government took the opportunity to establish a Chinese 
cultural center in Abuja, the 14th overseas cultural center (Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, 
2015). Since then, exchanges between China and Nigeria have become more active, including 
not only language instruction, but also comprehensive instruction and introductions to 
Chinese culture, music, calligraphy, traditional dance, and Chinese beauty.  
There are three main ways in which China has introduced its culture into Nigeria. The first is 
through the Confucius Institutions. There are two Confucius Institutes in Nigeria: the first 
institute is at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Oka, the second is at the University of Lagos. 
Both institutes were established in 2007. Although two the Confucius Institutes are located 
in different areas in Nigeria, the education programs are 98 percent similar, because each 
institute follows the goals established by the headquarters, Hanban. Also, all Chinese 
directors are trained through the same courses, and work under similar guidelines and rules. 
So, all directors have similar directives from the headquarters (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The 
general principles of the Confucius Institutes, as defined by their constitution and by-laws, 
are as follows:  
Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from 
different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to 
enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to 
strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and 
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other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting 
the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. (Hanban, 
n.a) 
Not only this, the constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institutes offer the same services: 
Chinese language teaching; holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test), and 
tests for the Certification of Chinese Language Teachers; training Chinese language 
instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources; providing information and 
consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth; conducting 
language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries. Especially in 
Nigeria, the Confucius Institutes offer various programs based on the Hanban’s general goals. 
According to the instructors at the Confucius Institutions in Nigeria, the institutions are 
angled towards Nigerian people in various ways: for example, sharing all Chinese festivals 
with the Nigerian people, performances with Chinese people only open to the Nigerian 
public, cultural activities with Nigerian students at primary or secondary school, and the 
indirect introduction of Confucius ideas (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The need for an indirect 
approach is meant to help disarm any initial resistance to Chinese culture, because there are 
some cultural differences between China and Nigeria. On that note, the Confucius Institutes 
in Nigeria also hold various events for Nigerian students who are learning Chinese language, 
providing an opportunity to boost interest for learning about Chinese culture and language, 
and to stimulate contacts with Nigerian public. In support of the Institutions’ goals, Chinese 
corporations, such as Huawei, offer prizes and the Chinese government offers a one-year 
exchange student program for Nigerian students who win events or contests in Chinese 
singing or dancing, or other areas of Chinese popular culture.  
As of 2016, there are 15 schools at which one can learn Chinese language, operated through 
the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria. The Institutes plan to open more Chinese language 
classes at local Nigerian schools, and to provide free Chinese language classes to Nigerian 
employees at newly-arrived Chinese companies that have recently arrived in Nigeria 
(Interviewee N-B1, 2016). Through Chinese language teaching at local primary and 
secondary schools, and universities, Confucius Institutes play the role of a bridge linking 
China and Nigeria. The Chinese language classes at schools cover not only watching Chinese 
movies, but also learning origami to make Chinese traditional marks and symbols to 
comprehend and acquire general experience of contemporary Chinese culture. However, the 
majority of scholars ask whether or not the Confucius Institutes fulfil functions that follow 
the general principles of the Confucius Institutes. Hartig (2015) argued that Confucius 
Institutions do not show the “real” China to the world, but rather the “correct version” of it, 
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which is influenced by political and/or ideological concerns and practical issues. The “correct 
version” pushed by Confucius Institutes limits their ability to boost China’s soft power and 
communicate strategically with the public. Hughes (2014) also pointed out that the 
difficulties of excluding Chinese political influence in Confucius Institutes because the 
Chinese Party-State manages and is closely linked to the Confucius Institutes. Although 
there are diverse perspectives on the Confucius Institutes, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria 
surely attempt to connect China with Nigeria through language and social culture exchanges. 
Nigerian students who learn the Chinese language and about its culture open doors to new 
opportunities, for example, the chance to get a job at a Chinese company in Nigeria. By 
extension, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria create scholarships for study in China, which 
are fully funded by the Chinese government, and are awarded based on the Nigerian 
students’ HSK score. Nearly 50 Nigerian students seized the chance to study in China. The 
headquarters organize technical training, for example in Chinese cooking, agricultural 
methods, and phone repairs, according to students’ demand. The different types of education 
available to Nigerian students are linked to promoting employment by Chinese companies 
and regional economic development in Nigeria (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The Confucius 
Institutes in Nigeria, in other words, play an influential role for both the Nigerian people and 
also Chinese companies. The Institutes provide opportunities not only for Nigerians to get 
jobs at Chinese companies, but also to help Chinese businesses to thrive in Nigeria.  
The second means for spreading Chinese culture is through the China Cultural Centers 
(CCC). The first CCC opened in Nigeria in 2013, after the two countries signed a joint 
agreement in 2012. Around the same time, a Nigerian Cultural Center also opened in China, 
the first African Cultural Center in China, with the purpose of deepening relations and 
friendship between China and Nigeria through active cultural exchanges, to learn about their 
different histories and cultures. The CCC in Nigeria was the third center in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, after Mauritius and Benin, and it is run by the Ministry of Culture with financial 
support from the Chinese government. The CCC provides the following services and 
activities (Interviewee N-B2, 2016): 
a. Chines language training; 
b. Arts and craft exhibitions (hosting and participation); 
c. Martial arts training, such as Kung Fu; 
d. Painting and sculpture training; 
e. Chinese tea production training; 
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f. Excursion exercise; 
g. Professional seminar hosting and facilities rental; 
h. Corporate translation service (English-Chinese vice versa); 
i. Chinese cuisine training  
In addition, the CCC provides facilities and venues for educational activities from local 
government, schools, and public agencies (CCC, 2015). The CCC works in collaboration with 
the Secondary Education Board and Education Resource Center in Abuja to educate school 
students. It hosts various competitions (such as Wushu and spring festival), and Nigerian-
China women fashion shows, and exhibitions to increase understanding of each culture’s 
differences. Moreover, the CCC has held performances of Cultural Entertainment in 
conjunction with Nigeria’s National Council for Arts and Culture (NCAC), and an evening of 
Cultural Entertainment with performances from Qinghai Culture Troupe, and Federal 
Capital Territory Center for Social Development to mark the 45th anniversary of diplomatic 
relations (Interviewee N-B3, 2016). Although the Confucius Institutes and the CCC provide 
similar programs, there is a key difference between the two organizations. The Confucius 
Institutes are managed by Hanban, and offer free language classes mostly to students. The 
CCC, on the other hand, targets the Nigerian public more generally, with more specialized 
cultural introductions. Also, the CCC does not provide free Chinese language courses, and 
also charges for the HSK Chinese Proficiency Examination – setting the price depending on 
the level of Chinese language class being taken. The role of the CCC is to interact with the 
Nigerian public through participation in a variety of cultural events and festivals. The center 
is also designed to stimulate interest in Chinese culture and cement cultural exchanges in 
Sino-Nigeria relations (Interviewee N- B2, 2016).  
Notwithstanding the major role of the CCC in cultural exchange activities in Nigeria, the CCC 
also plays a crucial role in intergovernmental conferences and meeting meant to smooth 
communications with the Nigerian government, and to strengthen bilateral relations. The 
CCC, for example, arranged a meeting with the Director of Foreign Cultural Center in Nigeria, 
and hosted a seminar to celebrate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) in 2016. A Chinese staff member at the CCC in Nigeria described the 
success of the countries’ efforts is the cooperative and amicable diplomatic relations between 
China and Nigeria under mutual understanding and development (Interviewee N- B3, 2016).  
Lastly, both the Chinese government and Chinese private company Huawei have worked 
hard to develop human resources at Huawei’s private training center in Nigeria. Since 1999, 
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when Huawei first arrived in Nigeria, the company has hired locals – today, around 70 
percent of its employees in Nigeria are Nigerian (Interviewee N-D3, 2016). The role of 
Huawei’s training program has been to contribute to the Nigerian community, to promote 
employment opportunities, and to facilitate technology transfers. Beginning with the 
establishment of the first information and communications technology (ICT) solutions 
provider, and founding an ICT training center in Abuja96, in 2004, Huawei launched many 
programs for Nigerians – for example, free short-term training and internships for Nigerian 
women in 2013, in partnership with Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Communication 
Technology (FMCT) (Interviewee N-D3, 2016). Not only that, but Huawei also operates a 
Nigerian youth training program, ICT to Youth, but also, in 2015, the company entered into 
an MOU with the Federal Government of Nigeria with a promise to provide over 2,000 
training opportunities for Nigerian youths. As of 2016, Huawei’s Abuja ICT Training Center 
has trained over 12,000 of its employee, customers, suppliers and partners (ibid). Youth 
training is held at Huawei’s Abuja and Lagos ICT centers, and each sends selected youths 
who are in the top 5 percent of each training class to China in order to receive intensive 
training at Huawei’s headquarters’ training center. Huawei employs the trained Nigerian 
youths and continues to train them for promotion and ongoing development, for both 
Nigerian people and Nigeria’s ICT sector (ibid). In 2016, Huawei launched an Innovation 
and Experience (I&E) center in Lagos, with an investment of $6 million. The center is the 
first in West Africa, and was established to “exchange ideas, explore business solutions 
through innovation and also a platform to develop win-win information and 
communications technology (ICT) eco-system” for the sake of the development of the 
company and Nigeria. Huawei Technology Nigeria Limited also signed a Joint Innovation 
MOU with the University of Lagos, to foster more ICT talent in Nigeria (Xinhua News, 2016f).  
The Chinese government does not have an ownership stake in or have any right to control of 
Huawei, because the company is an independent, private company. However, Beijing works 
in conjunction with Huawei to create close economic ties and implement its public 
diplomacy strategy for Sino-Nigeria relations. Huawei, in particular, has had a major, 
positive effect on the development of Nigeria’s telecommunications sector and skills training. 
Charles Ding, Senior Vice President of Huawei, clearly indicates the company’s intention, as 
the only representative from the telecom industry present at the 5th Conference of Chinese 
and African Entrepreneurs, a side event of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): 
We […] cooperate with governments, customers, and industrial partners to increase 
the telecom network coverage significantly to achieve a win-win cooperation. […] 
                                                
96 The Huawei training centre is located in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia.  
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Huawei looks forward to working together with governments, industrial partners, 
and enterprises in Africa and China, to build a better connected Africa, ensuring that 
the digital economy becomes the bridge of friendship that connects China and Africa. 
(Huawei, 2015) 
Huawei maintains economic cooperation with Nigeria; at the same time, its social 
responsibility plays a role as part of China’s public diplomacy to encourage communication 
between China and the Nigerian public. To support Huawei’s work in Nigeria, the Chinese 
government not only supports Huawei’s overseas expansion financially, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 7, but also promotes positive relations with the Nigerian government.  
In addition to ICT training, a Chinese multinational Group of Companies (CGC) was started 
to focus on promoting integrated agricultural technology in Nigeria. Agriculture is a key 
sector of the Nigerian economy: around 30 percent of the Nigerian people are engaged in the 
sector. This is the first time that an organization has collaborated on work between the 
Chinese Embassy in Nigeria and the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, in a bid to grow Nigeria’s economy. According to a training program that 
includes the China-Africa agriculture modernization plan – one of China’s ten major 
cooperation plans with Africa – the program is designed to introduce content mainly related 
to agriculture technology (Xinhua News, 2016c). 
 
6.1.3 The effect of China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria  
 
Based on the previous content, this section will discuss how various Chinese governmental, 
semi-governmental and non-governmental actors – such as government agents, enterprises 
including SOEs, and private companies, and institutions – exert influence in Nigeria through 
public diplomacy instruments (e.g., foreign aid, culture and education institute, and media).  
Furthermore, it will consider how it encourages better results when China communicates 
with the Nigerian public and boosts China’s reputation on the ground. Thus, the section will 
start with the Nigerian public, to examine how Chinese public diplomacy is affected and how 
it has broadened its scope to address Nigeria’s political economy and the bilateral ties 
between the two countries.  
6.1.3.1 The Nigerian public  
China’s public diplomacy exerts a positive influence on China’s reputation in the eyes of the 
Nigerian public. Nigerians learn about Chinese culture and watch Chinese broadcasts 
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through the institutions and media; they get first-hand experience of China’s assistance 
boosting Nigeria’s infrastructure. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, Nigeria 
was one of the countries viewed favorably by Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and 
South Africa. Nigeria enjoyed a good impression from 76 percent of Kenya (78 percent) and 
Senegal (77 percent) respondents. In Pew’s 2007 research there was no data regarding 
Nigeria’s attitudes towards China (Kohut, et al., 2013), but now results show that most 
Nigerian people have a favorable image of China. Considering that China really started to 
focus on it public diplomacy during the Hu Jintao era, China’s public diplomacy strategy has 
paid off and delivered positive results from the Nigerian people. By extension, the favorable 
image of China can be connected to a positive local reaction to China’s foreign policy towards 
and enterprise activity in Nigeria. The Pew has also been shown that 70 percent of Nigerians 
believe that China considers Nigeria’s interests when they compose their foreign policy 
towards Nigeria. China’s scientific and technological success is recognized by 85 percent of 
Nigerians, across all age groups. Nigerians also think positively about the way the Chinese 
are conducting their business in Nigeria (Ibid, p.31). In the same vein,  Ayoola (2013) found 
that nearly 90 percent of Nigerians strongly believed that increased trade relations with 
China will boost the Nigerian economy, as part of the Vision 20:2020 program/policy in his 
2011 field survey. Due to China’s various public diplomacy efforts at communicating with the 
Nigerian public, the image of China and its enterprises has gradually improved in Nigeria. 
Despite some differing opinions about China’s involvement in Nigeria, nearly half of 
Nigerians deem that China is not in Nigeria solely for natural resources, and nor does it 
practice neo-colonialism in Nigeria. Nigerians also display a tendency to prefer China’s 
policy and its implementation over that of the West. Furthermore, they have positive views 
on Chinese migration, Chinese company’s business for large projects, Chinese small-
business activities, China’s rising international power, and China’s non-interference policy 
(Sautman and Yan, 2009).  
As can be seen from the survey results above, Nigerians and Chinese have a common interest 
that puts economic development first, and consequently there is a generally favorable view of 
China’s economic involvement in Nigeria. This clearly reflects that China is a major trade 
and investment partner in Nigeria, and China’s rapid economic growth has become an object 
of envy in Nigeria. Through China’s various media and cultural institutions’ activities, 
Nigerians have deepened their understanding of China as an advanced and modernized 
country, its ideas and customs, and has replaced its negative impression of China (that it 
always pursues its own interests unilaterally) with a more friendly impression.  At the same 
time, Chinese enterprises’ efforts have also taken part in the process of promoting a positive 
Chinese image in Nigeria, through skills training and area development. By showing their 
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social responsibility, Chinese companies contribute to the impression that relations between 
China and Nigeria are equal. Hence, Nigerians bridge the gap between China and Nigeria 
caused by unequal economic relations with complementary partnership and mutual 
understanding, via various exchange programs for learning their different cultures. 
Interviewee N-A2 (2016) also notes that the Chinese government and its enterprises’ efforts 
establish harmonious relations between China and Nigeria. Interviewee N-B1 (2016) also 
looks ahead to a better future in Sino-Nigerian ties, as the majority of Nigerian youths get 
the chance to experience Chinese TV shows and dramas, learn the Chinese language, and 
participate in cultural exchange activities – more so than do adults. When the younger 
generations have grown up, the two countries will further close the gap caused by economic 
relations, and enjoy closer relationships than today’s.  
To conclude, China’s improved image in Nigeria boosts Sino-Nigerian economic relations. 
The efforts to understand each other have led to concrete relations for a more developed 
strategic partnership, in order to achieve their mutual interests. China’s public diplomacy 
towards the Nigerian public is not only to improve understanding of China’s culture and 
language, but also to generate a sympathetic bond and enhance China’s credibility. This is 
directly linked to improving and growing foreign relations between China and Nigeria. As a 
result of China’s positive and friendly image in the eyes of the Nigerian people, Beijing 
expands its leverage in Nigeria’s political economy sector. China’s expanded leverage, and its 
effect on Nigeria’s political economy sector are explored in the following section.  
 
6.1.3.2 The political economy sector in Nigeria  
There are still problems waiting to be resolved regarding China’s economic involvement in 
Nigeria. Nevertheless, China’s public diplomacy approach to its relationship with Nigeria has 
been positively receives by the Nigerian government. China’s public diplomacy contributes to 
boosting China and Nigeria’s economic activities by presenting a positive image to the 
Nigerian politicians and public. Notwithstanding the cooperation between China and Nigeria 
already existing in various fields (agriculture, fisheries, mineral exploitation, light industry, 
textile, mechatronics, and oil refining), China also provides full support to professionals, 
infrastructure, funds for modern agriculture, industry development, and expanding mutual 
cooperation in the fields of culture, education, media, women, and youth (Xinhua News, 
2016a). China’s multidirectional support for Nigeria is interpreted as not only solving 
Nigeria’s domestic issues, but also eliciting a positive reaction from Nigerians towards 
Chinese involvement in the country’s economy. 
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The biggest obstacles in Nigeria’s economy are as follows: high unemployment rates, with 
low output; a weakness in competitive exports, resulting from poor domestic production 
capability; a fragile internal power and energy supply system, due to insufficient and poor oil 
refining technology and supply facilities; the unstable Naira currency, which is linked to the 
import market; and the worsening deficit in government finance. Due to the decline in 
international oil prices, Nigeria is also faced with unexpected difficulties arising from an 
economic recession, wasting foreign reserves, and a weak Nigerian currency. Hence, the 
Nigerian government is keen to receive assistance from China to address the shaky Nigerian 
economic conditions. To maximize economic ties with China, in 2016, Nigeria adopted the 
renminbi as a reserve currency (instead of the US dollar) to shore up the Naira, after Buhari 
paid a visit to Beijing. Regarding this, Interviewee S-F2 (2017) said, 
On the point of RMB internationalization, I think it’s still a strategic move of Chinese 
government in order to gain more say in trade. Also, African countries’ economies 
are tied with USD as well, it is also many of the countries’ target to lower the in 
influence from USA. I believe RMB will bring more diversity to the trading world, 
and help balancing the USD dominant situation. 
This momentous decision signified that China wields considerable economic influence in 
Nigeria, through its enormous investment and generous aid. The Nigerian government also 
recognizes the positive Chinese influence in its country. Since 2016, Nigeria’s central bank 
planned to diversify its foreign exchange reverses away from the US dollar, by converting its 
stock to the Renminbi. Also, Buhari requested that China’s technical committees promptly 
complete discussions of a new joint project for rail, power, manufacturing, agriculture, and 
solid mineral projects, which are crucial for its economic diversification and development. 
While previous regimes were passive about the unfair economic relations, Buhari attempted 
to rectify the gap between China and Nigeria, seeking mutually benefits and reciprocated 
respect and trust to further strengthen relations. In 2016, he called upon Chinese investors 
to improve economic ties through a Nigeria-China Business and Investment Forum, and said: 
Although the Nigerian and Chinese business communities have recorded tremendous 
successes in bilateral trade, there is a large trade imbalance in favour of China, as 
Chinese exports represent some 80 per cent of the total bilateral trade volume. This 
gap needs to be reduced. Therefore, I would like to challenge the business 
communities in both countries to work together to reduce the trade imbalance. You 
must also imbibe the spirit of having a mutually beneficial relationship in your 
business transactions. You must not see Nigeria as a consumer market alone, but as 
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an investment destination where goods can be manufactured and consumed locally. 
The future is bright and I am very confident that our policies will make Nigeria the 
investment destination of your choice. (FOCAC, 2016) 
Through China’s support and Buhari’s efforts on diversifying its production market, Nigeria 
got the chance to establish a foothold to strength the weak point for economic development. 
Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Onyeama noted that, “partnership with China 
in the identified area would enable Nigeria to achieve its economic diversification plans” 
(Allafrica, 2016). The Nigerian government embraces Chinese companies’ investment and 
technology transfer to achieve its goal. Interviewee N-D2 (2016) argued that Nigeria needs 
China to achieve economic development under a win-win strategy, although Sino-Nigerian 
ties are perceived in a negative light by the West. This is because Chinese companies provide 
not only better-priced products for the Nigerian people, and reasonably priced construction, 
but also transfer high technology. Also, the interviewee has a positive view of Chinese 
involvement in Nigeria’s economy due to their experience that major sectors – such as 
telecommunication, manufacturing, and agriculture – are improving as a result of 
cooperation with Chinese enterprises. By extension, they also pointed out that China’s 
various recent activities and efforts related to improving the living and welfare conditions of 
the Nigerian people also lead to better results in Nigeria’s economic development. Since the 
early 2000s, when China began to operate in earnest in the Nigerian business environment, 
gross capital formation has risen as a percentage of GDP. At the same time, China’s 
increased FDI has led to a decrease in Nigeria’s unemployment rate (Nnanna, 2015, pp.41-
43). Interviewee N-A2 (2016) also expressed his views on China’s efforts at communication 
diversification in Nigeria. He said that it enables the formation of a good Chinese reputation 
in Nigeria, which in turn leads to positive results, as there are diverse fields in which China 
and Nigeria cooperate. Hence, over 40 medium- and large-sized Chinese private firms have 
arrived in Nigeria: they have invested US$ 800 million (China Daily, 2014c), and cooperate 
with local Nigerian companies. The Chinese government also focuses on supporting Nigeria’s 
economy by encouraging its companies to go out into Nigeria, and by sending its scholars to 
Nigeria to boost certain areas’ technology, and also by rendering financial aid.  
The Nigerian economy does not rely heavily on the oil sector, nowadays. Given a nearly 7 
percent increased the Nigeria’s annual real GDP over last ten years, non-oil sectors and 
services (such as telecommunication and retail) account for 57 percent of GDP growth. Also, 
manufacturing and agriculture constitute 9 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the 
growth (Chen, Sun, Ukaejiofo, Tang, and Brautigam, 2016). Thus, cooperation with China is 
of even more importance than it was in the early 2000s, as China has developed the most 
 205 
competitive and largest construction industries with specialized expertise, linked to its 
ability to render necessary financial assistance to Nigeria (Oyeranti, Babatunde, and 
Ogunkola, 2011). China, in practice, helped Nigeria to get results in various fields; it steered 
a win-win situation in both Nigeria and China’s economy.  
A typical example is that China’s foreign aid casts a glow in the Free-Trade Zones (FTZs) in 
Nigeria. Oyeranti and his colleagues note that Kajola Specialized Railway Industrial FTZ, 
Ogun Guangdong FTZ, China Town, and Lekki FTZ have converged on Chinese investment, 
and operate a joint undertaking that is mostly for manufacturing, trade, and transportation 
between China and Nigeria (Oyeranti, et al., 2011). The FTZs in Nigeria were established by a 
joint venture between Chinese companies and the Nigerian government; and various spin-
offs from the FTZs were expected. Lekki FTZ, for example, was established through a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Chinese Government (on behalf of 
China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), Nanjing Jiangning 
Development Zone in the Jiangsu Province, and the Chinese Railway Construction 
Corporation (CRCC)) and the Lagos State Government (on behalf of Lekki Worldwide 
Investment Limited), with China-Africa Lekki Investment Ltd (CALI) and China-Africa 
Development Fund Ltd (CAD Fund), in 2007. As the largest Nigerian trade, economic, and 
financial hub, the FTZ is located on the Lekki Peninsula in Lagos, and was approved by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2007 (Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 2016). To 
promote the FTZ, Nigeria’s government provides preferential policies to investors as follows: 
complete tax exemption for all Federal, State and Local Government taxes, rates, customs 
duties, and levies; 99 year-land leasehold, and 50 years of concessionary rights of the zone’s 
operation and management; 100 percent repatriation of capital, profits and dividends; and 
one-stop approvals for all permits, operating licenses and incorporation papers. Since 2016, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria also began to issue the Guidelines for Banking Operations in the 
FTZ. CALI also assists the enterprises in the FTZ to prepare to start their business in Nigeria, 
by introducing their products and services to CRCC and CCECC, who reserve a seat 
beforehand in Nigeria. Although the CAD Fund is currently China’s only operating fund 
specialized in Africa, and CALI’s second largest shareholder, it can provide the necessary 
financing if a project fits their investing criteria (Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 
2016). The aim of the Lekki FTZ is to develop an offshore economic growth zone, promoting 
exports, creating more job opportunities, attracting foreign investment, minimizing capital 
flight, and setting up a one-stop global business haven. Recently, the FTZ began the 
construction work of not only a power plant that could supply a stable amount of energy 
across the country, but also water and sewage treatment plants. The promising investors at 
the FTZ are agri-processing, clothing and textiles, food and beverages, forestry, 
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pharmaceuticals, and mining. The current total investment of $140 million is from steel 
structuring, truck assembly, steel pipes, furniture manufacturing, and generator 
manufacturing in the Lekki FTZ (Oyeranti, et al., 2011).  
In addition, Nigeria achieved good results in agriculture development through the two 
phases of the China-Nigeria South-South Agriculture cooperation program, between 2002 
and 2004. China provided Nigeria with all-around technical training in fisheries, agronomy, 
water conservancy, and animal husbandry. Beijing offered not only numerous training 
opportunities to Nigerian agriculture officials and technical staff to improve their capability, 
but also provided high-quality seeds to Nigerian farmers. The agriculture sector accounts for 
23 percent of Nigeria’s GDP, and engages 38 percent of its working population. The Nigerian 
government expects its agriculture industry to be a stable driver of its GDP under Buhari’s 
Economic Recovery Growth Plan (Xinhua News, 2017e). Not only that, but China’s 
telecommunication companies are also expanding their business in Nigeria; while at the 
same time assisting in improving Nigeria’s communication facilities by training the local 
people. Chinese enterprises operate satellite networks with Nigerian companies; 
consequently, the systems cover 84 percent of Nigeria, and boost the broadcasting and 
electronic equipment business. In the same vein, interviewee N-D2 (2016) discussed the 
development of the Nigeria’s telecommunication sector. As he works at one of the companies 
engaged in the extension of broadband fiber optic cable from Abuja to Lagos, he argued that 
Chinese telecom companies helped to improve Nigeria’s communications network with its 
technology. During the fiber installation operation, the company provided good quality 
materials at a reasonable price, hired locals who were willing to learn the technology for the 
construction, and trained them.  
In sum, it is true that there are outstanding issues that the Nigerian government still needs 
to solve regarding Chinese economic involvement in Nigeria. These problems include 
adjusting prices between China and Nigerian in manufacturing, definite core technology 
transfer, environmental problems, quality enhancement, the Nigerian people’s working 
conditions at Chinese company, and others. However, overall, China’s Nigeria involvement 
makes up for Nigeria’s deficiencies, and its merits outweigh the problems. Per Söderbom and 
Teal (2002)’s research, based on the 2001 Nigerian Manufacturing Enterprise Survey, the 
factors that Nigeria needs to address in its manufacturing sector, in order to catch up, are the 
poor investment in equipment and machinery, insufficient skilled labor, and a lack of 
technology.  Together, these result in poor product quality and high prices, which cannot be 
competitive domestically or internationally. These issues are not only relevant to the 
manufacturing sector, but are pervasive in Nigeria’s various industries, all of which hinders 
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its economic development. From the early 2000s, the Chinese government’s multi-
directional strategy towards economic ties with Nigeria has brought about encouraging 
results in key areas that are connected to its economic development in Nigeria. Today, 
Chinese enterprises also have an equitable agreement and protection of local businesses in 
mind when they operate in Nigeria (Nnanna, 2015). Unlike the previous public image, that 
China only exploits Nigeria to gain access to oil and gas, Nigeria now recognizes China’s 
positive, necessary impact on Nigeria’s economy, after receiving the various training sessions, 
large amounts of investment, and improved infrastructure facilities resulting from the 
Chinese government and companies’ efforts. It is safe to say that the reflection of public 
diplomacy in China’s foreign economic policy has had the effect of boosting Sino-Nigerian 
economic ties.  
 
6.1.3.3 The relations between Nigeria and China  
Given China’s positive effect on Nigeria, above, the strategic relations between China and 
Nigeria are strengthening economically and politically as a result of China’s public diplomacy. 
As discussed above, China has gone a long way to provide substantive assistance directly 
linked to the Nigerian public and its economic development, in order to cement good 
relations between China and Nigeria. Hence, China’s public diplomacy policy plays an 
important role in creating a forum for conversation of political economy cooperation. With 
regards to Sino-Nigerian economic cooperation, at a meeting with Nigerian President 
Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that, “China is willing to 
strengthen cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of areas with Nigeria, including 
politics, trade, investment, finance, agriculture, education, security, international issues and 
others”. In response, Buhari reconfirmed Nigeria’s support for the all-round development of 
bilateral ties, and further stressed that the relationship has made progress in various fields, 
including developments in the emergent areas of infrastructure, agriculture, and power 
production (Xinhua News, 2015e). One year later, China pledged to stimulate production 
capacity cooperation with Nigeria, during a meeting with Buhari in Beijing. This type of 
cooperation is part of China’s public diplomacy connected to economic ties, which also 
includes providing assistance through infrastructure construction (railways, highways, and 
hydroelectric stations), the creation of free trade areas, expansion of agriculture technology 
transfer and investment, and boosting the development in mining, aviation, and finance. At 
the same time, Beijing encourages its enterprises to invest in Nigeria, with the expectation of 
receiving more support from Nigeria. In this way, Buhari has an optimistic view of 
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cooperation with China, and referred to it as “lifting the Nigeria-China cooperation to a new 
level” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016b).  
The reciprocal cooperation and extension of ties serves as the foundation for bolstering 
relations, especially in the fields of economics and trade. Through overseas trip by the two 
countries’ leaders, major issues and deals are negotiated and launched. In terms of China’s 
support to Nigeria, China has strengthened its position and gained the upper hand in the 
cooperative area in Nigeria. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s government 
policy towards Nigeria, China’s aims with regards to Nigeria are to expand Chinese 
manufactured goods’ access into the Nigerian market; to increase the share of Chinese 
multinational companies in the Nigerian market; and to increase China’s influence in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector and its investment in Nigeria so as to join the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) market (Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014, p.362). 
Based on the Chinese government’s goals, Beijing has extended trade and secured resource 
in support of China’s economic growth and globalization, and to accomplish Sino-centrism 
with a peaceful rise through cooperation with Nigeria.  
As for Nigeria’s demands, Nigeria wants China’s assistance with economic development. 
According to the core purpose and primary principles of Nigeria’s state constitution, the aim 
of the country’s foreign policy (Adekola, 2013, p.2), which is reflects the importance of 
economic expansion by wielding its influence over African countries and globally, can be 
summarized thus: 
a. promotion and protection of the national interests;  
b. promotion of African integration and support for African unity; 
c. promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace; 
d. promotion of mutual respect among all nations; 
e. promotion of a just world economic order; 
f. respect for international law and treaty obligations.  
Nigeria, as mentioned above, received an economic assistance package from China, which 
covered the areas of education, infrastructure development, fund support, petroleum 
refining technology and facilities, agriculture, mining, telecommunication, media 
development, and others. The acute need for China’s support, which is greater than before, is 
because of an overall economic crisis in Nigeria. Nigeria’s high growth did not last long: it 
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was enjoying a 7 percent of annual average increase until 2014, after which it started a 
precipitous decline. The reason for this decreased growth rate included continuing internal 
matters (mentioned earlier) and government incapacity due to inefficient budget policies 
and corruption. Under current-President Buhari’s policy objectives, focused on economic 
reconstruction, strengthening public security, and rooting out corruption, Nigeria 
established “Economic Recovery and Growth Plan for 2017-2020” (ERGP). The Medium 
Term Plan for 2017-2020 builds on the Strategic Implementation Plan, which was as short-
term strategy for Buhari’s three objectives, and was developed with the goal of restoring 
economic growth in mind, through leveraging of the ingenuity and resilience of the Nigerian 
people. The key priorities of the ERGP are as follows: stabilizing the macroeconomic 
environment, achieving agriculture and food security, ensuring energy sufficiency (power 
and petroleum products), improving transportation infrastructure, and driving 
industrialization focused on small- and medium-scale enterprises. The Nigerian government 
also focuses on the Nigerian people’s healthcare, education, social inclusion, job creation, 
youth empowerment, population growth management, and environment sustainability 
(ERGP, n.a.). Hence, through China’s assistance, Nigeria can resolve its dependency on 
imported Chinese goods, by boosting domestic productivity so that Nigeria’s economy can be 
less vulnerable to Chinese and global economic fluctuations. Drawing on diversified 
production investment in Nigeria, Nigeria can shift away from a reliance on oil and gas, and 
move into competitive fields such as mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. The transfer of 
advanced technology from China also fortifies the foundation for qualitatively improving 
Nigeria’s education system. These serve as catalysts for bridging the divide between 
government, corporations, and the public, and in the long run should create jobs and help 
the poor in Nigeria.  
In return for China’s extensive support, Nigeria upholds China’s One-China policy, which is 
of utmost importance to China. When it comes to China’s political demands, the One China 
policy is a necessity for not only establishing bilateral ties but also maintaining relations with 
Nigeria. On that note, in the mid-2000s, when China and Nigeria established their strategic 
ties, then-Nigerian President Obasanjo supported China’s Anti-Secession Law, which is 
meant to prevent Taiwan independence. In 2017, the Nigerian government reaffirmed its 
commitment to the One-China policy, with the view to maintaining the long-standing 
friendship and cooperation with China, during a tour of Nigeria by Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi. In a joint statement by Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Geoffrey Onyeama, 
affirming that the core of the two countries’ strategic partnership is the One-China policy, 
Nigeria recognized that “the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal 
government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
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China's territory” (CCTV, 2017). According to the policy, Nigeria reconsidered a trade 
agreement with Taiwan and imposed sanctions against Taiwan, such as a prohibition on the 
use of the country’s name and insisting that permission be obtained prior to Taiwanese 
government officials’ entry into and departure from Nigeria. By insisting on total support, 
China have brought Nigeria over to China’s side in its diplomatic dispute with Taiwan.  
Recently, China has lead the fight to eradicate terrorism in Nigeria. In 2017, China formally 
pledged to support not only Nigeria but also other West African countries to fight against 
terrorism. Although the number of Chinese residents in Nigeria are increasing, the Chinese 
government was helpless against misdemeanors and terrorism in Nigeria. A decisive incident 
in China’s military cooperation was during the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria, which led to 
irreversible damage to both China and Nigeria. In 2012, some Chinese were killed by Boko 
Haram when they opened fire at crowds in the city of Maiduguri, in northern Nigeria 
(Xinhua News, 2012a). After this, China and Nigeria entered into an agreement of military 
cooperation, including training and retaining a security presence in regions plagued by 
terrorism, and also providing disaster response capabilities. President of the Senate of 
Nigeria David Mark, additionally, requested China’s assistance in the mass production of 
military hardware for the Nigerian Navy, Airforce, Army, the Police, and an aircraft spare 
parts production center in Nigeria, when he met with the President of the Chinese 
Parliament, Zhang Dejiang in Abuja in 2013 (Channels TV, 2013). The next year, Boko 
Haram kidnapped 276 girls from dormitories in Chibok, Borno State. China emphasized its 
responsibility as a powerful nation, and performed the role of a member of the UN Security 
Council in combating terrorism in Nigeria. However, China’s plan was to gain ground 
gradually, to earn a strong partnership with Nigeria through humanitarian intervention 
based on respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to the Chinese 
government’s efforts, Chinese enterprises enthusiastically promoted friendship in Sino-
Nigerian relations, by sending relief to the victims of Boko Haram. A typical example of this 
is Huawei’s donation of relief materials to the Nigerian people displaced by Boko Haram. 
Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria Zhou Pingjian shared his impression of the Chinese 
company’s social responsibility: 
As a good friend of Nigeria, we are ready to play our due part. At the government level, 
we are working with the government to do something on the issue and at the business 
level we encourage more and more Chinese companies here to follow Huawei's 
example to better integrate with the Nigerians here. (Xinhua News, 2017b)  
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6.1.4 Conclusion  
 
Contemporary Sino-Nigerian relations display an expansion of strategic relations based on 
the four-point proposal agreed by Hu Jintao and Olusegun Obasanjo. To be more exact, the 
two countries cooperate with each other in various ways and fields to gain advantages 
through close relations in international society. However, multiple issues remain: such as the 
trade imbalance, Nigerian textile industry recession, the lack of technology transfer, 
problems related to China’s completed aid projects, and others. In China’s Nigerian foreign 
policy of the 2010s, China addresses these issues and focuses on political equality, economic 
win-win cooperation, and cultural exchanges aimed at generating mutual trust. China’s 
public diplomacy plays the role of a bridge between China and Nigeria, to build trust and 
expand cooperation.  
First, the Chinese government utilizes its foreign aid, focused on utilitarian and practical 
assistance in production sectors, and connected directly to Nigeria’s economic development 
– such as power plants, oil refineries, manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and others, to 
create maximum value from China’s foreign assistance in Nigeria. Beijing also concentrates 
on improving Nigeria public’s welfare, and expects science and technology development to 
improve cooperation and deepen strategic relations, as well as earn the local populations’ 
trust.  
Second, China’s media in Nigeria focuses on producing an friendly atmosphere that connects 
China and Nigeria in the sectors of political economy and social culture, through newspapers, 
magazine, and a radio station.   
Third, by using China’s cultural and educational institutes, Beijing seeks to introduce 
Chinese language and culture to the Nigerian public, and promotes not only local Chinese 
companies’ development but also job creation for local people. Chinese telecommunications 
behemoth, Huawei, engages in technical education for local youths and people, to help local 
development and improve China’s image. Chinese public diplomacy activities in Nigeria 
display a tendency for both introducing China through culture and language, and also for 
considering China’s economic development through its companies in Nigeria. At the same 
time, through China’s public diplomacy activities, China endeavors to support local people’s 
welfare, human resource development, job creation, and Nigeria’s economic development, in 
a number of ways, which improves China’s public image and weakens discontent that arises 
from the lopsided economic relationship it has with Nigeria.  
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As a result of China’s public diplomacy activities in Nigeria, the Nigerian public seem to have 
developed a favorable image of China, which is also reflect in Nigerian foreign policy. As 
expressed in Pew’s aforementioned research, the majority of Nigerians recognize that China 
endeavors for mutual development and understanding as part of its win-win strategy. Also, 
the common interests between China and Nigeria, which puts economic development first, 
generate momentum for various forms of political economy cooperation between the two 
countries: for example, in the fields of development in emergent industries, infrastructure, 
agriculture and power production, and in providing assistance for infrastructure 
construction, expanding agriculture technology transfers and investment, and boosting 
developments in mining, aviation, and finance, as part of China’s public diplomacy. China 
now also supports Nigeria on security issues that arise from Boko Haram’s operations, and 
supports social stability and security. With China’s multidirectional assistance, Nigeria 
established the FTZs, and expects to develop its vulnerable sectors – such as manufacturing, 
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South Africa’s economy has taken the industrial lead in Africa. Unlike other African 
countries, South Africa has a firm footing in the steel and auto industries, including 
manufacturing, based on its abundant natural resources. It also became an official member 
of the BRICs countries in 2010. Thus, South Africa’s politically and economically influential 
conditions attract China’s attention, as they enjoy the common grounds of being emerging 
markets, powerful developing countries, and members of the BRICs countries. Hence, China 
cements its relations with South Africa in order to wield greater influence over political 
economy issues on the international stage. Through complementary multilateral cooperation, 
China and South Africa seek to enhance their mutual interests and develop their relationship 
into a strategic partnership. However, the economic ties between the two countries are not 
mutually favorable, as China has the upper hand over South Africa due to a disparity in the 
economic power between the two countries.  
The chapter keeps the same framework and aims as the previous chapter, and will explore 
the role of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa to create a close economic relationship, 
and examines the connection between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy 
towards Sino-South African political economy relations. The chapter is divided into three 
parts: first, it introduces the overall background of how China and South Africa have become 
strategic partners, and discusses the causes for disharmony between China and South Africa 
in bilateral economic relations. Second, it looks at the role of China’s public diplomacy using 
three instruments – foreign aid, cultural and education institutes, and the media – to 
analyze how China’s public diplomacy works in South Africa, and how it carries out in 
China’s foreign policy towards South Africa. Third, it examines the effect of China’s public 
diplomacy on the South African public, South Africa’s political economy, and the relations 
between China and South Africa, and assesses how China’s public diplomacy works to 
strengthen ties and boost ongoing interaction between the two countries.  
 
6.2.1 The background of China-South Africa relations  
 
South Africa officially established diplomatic ties with China in 1998. Due to the fact that 
South Africa established diplomatic ties with Taiwan before 1998, official relations between 
China and South Africa were a step behind those Beijing enjoyed with other African 
countries. Sino-South African relations have gone through three different stages: first, the 
two countries entered a limited partnership based on common interests; next, this developed 
into a more mature strategic economic and political relationship; and, lastly, they 
established the current “comprehensive strategic partnership”, which is based on a 
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strengthened trade relationship and increased the nations’ common interests (Bradley, 2016, 
pp.882). The gradual changes were led by former President Thabo Mbeki, and the 
strengthened cooperation in Sino-South African ties were made by President Jacob Zuma. 
Most of the diplomatic relations in Sino-South African ties were established in the early 
2000s. The Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between China and South Africa was 
signed, in 2000, by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and South African President Thabo 
Mbeki. The declaration underlined the importance of cooperation and mutual support 
regarding key global multilateral issues, based on mutual benefit. Based on the declaration, 
the China and South Africa Bi-National Commission was also established to “guide and 
coordinate all government-to-government relations between China and South Africa, and to 
consult on matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and multilateral spheres”. Through the 
Bi-National Commission, the two countries agreed to cooperate politically and economically 
on the international stage (MFA, 2004). The first meeting of the China and South Africa Bi-
National Commission was held in 2001, and the second was held in 2004, when China’s Vice 
President Zeng Qinghong paid an official visit to South Africa. During the second meeting, 
the two countries agreed to cooperate to elevate their strategic partnership and developed 
the shape of trade between China and South Africa. China embraced the Southern African 
Customs Union decision negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China, which was the 
result of South Africa recognizing China’s positive market economy status. The two countries 
agreed not only to launch the negotiation, but also to support mutual trade and investment 
in the name of mutual economic interests. Through the second commission meeting, China 
and Africa set up the deeper, strengthened, and diversified strategic partnership between 
China and South African through exchanges in the areas of trade, investment, culture, 
education, science, technology, and international affairs, including defense issues for world 
peace and stability. 
Through Sectoral Committee Meetings and counterpart consultation, the two sides’ 
respective Foreign Ministries have intensified cooperation and consultation on mutual 
concerns regarding international issues of education, trade, economic cooperation, and 
improving market access for agriculture products into the two countries’ markets (DIRCO, 
2004). In 2006, China and South Africa signed the Program of Cooperation on Deepening 
the Strategic Partnership, during a visit to South Africa by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao with 
South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki. The two countries agreed to not only foster and 
support each countries’ enterprises, but also to deepen cooperation in health, forestry, 
agriculture, technology, transportation science, IT, renewable energy, mining, cultural 
exchange, human resource development, medical science, and others (MFA, 2007). The 
following year, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a visit to South Africa to further enhance 
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the strategic partnership between China and South Africa, during his first tour of eight 
African countries. During his visit to South Africa, he highlighted the Beijing FOCAC (so 
called Beijing Summit) in 2006, and reaffirmed the strong partnership between the two 
countries. Hu said, 
It has been proved that strong China-South Africa relations of all-round cooperation 
serve the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples, promote unity and 
cooperation among developing countries and contribute to global peace and 
development. The Chinese Government and people will work closely with the South 
African Government and people to enhance mutual political trust and practical 
cooperation and steadily strengthen China-South Africa strategic partnership to the 
benefit of our two peoples. (MFA, 2007) 
Sino-South Africa ties became solidified after the signing of the Beijing Declaration on the 
Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, during South African President 
Jacob Zuma’s first official visit to China, in 2010. The key component of the declaration is 
that “the two sides expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen friendly exchange 
and cooperation between the two nations in both political and regional affairs by 
establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and 
common development”. Based on the aim of the promoting strengthened political economy 
ties, the declaration covers 38 bilateral cooperation agreements, such as political dialogue, 
mineral exploration, investment, trade, and agriculture for a collaborative effort in the UN 
and FOCAC. As a result of Zuma and Hu’s agreement, the two countries not only discussed 
the establishment of a consolidated partnership on climate change, but also agreed to 
encourage each country’s companies to increase infrastructure construction (power 
generation, railway, airport, housing, road, and ports). Furthermore, China and South Africa 
have an understanding to facilitate practical cooperation between the two countries’ energy 
companies, as well as expand cooperation in the sectors of cultural exchange, education, 
health, aquaculture, information communication, personnel exchange, science and 
technology – including civil aviation, defense, transportation, civil aviation, and mineral 
resource. The declaration also highlights that South Africa adheres to the One-China policy 
and supports the peaceful development of Cross-Taiwan Straits relations and the cause of 
China's national reunification (China Daily, 2010b).  
As a result of the cooperation agreement between China and South Africa, China has been 
South Africa’s largest single trading partner since 2009, and bilateral trade increased 
significantly – nearly 30 percent – from 2012 to 2013. Since then, China has become not 
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only South Africa’s biggest import county, but also the largest importer of South African 
goods. As of 2016, the volume of South Africa’s exports to China was R101.18bn, and the 
volume of imports from China was R199.03bn.97 The main export items to China are mineral 
products (59.93%), iron and steel (25.36%), wood pulp paper (3.83%)  and textiles 
(2.65%). South Africa’s imported items from China are machinery (45.53%), textiles 
(10.04%), iron and steel products (8.48%), chemicals (6.25%), toys and sports apparel (5%), 
plastic and rubbers (4.98%) and footwear (4.21%) (SARS, n.a). Due to South Africa’s 
developed domestic environment, Chinese investors converged on South Africa’s mining, 
manufacturing, finance, wholesale and retail business, transport, and tourism sectors.  
However, there is discord between China and South Africa due to the unbalanced nature of 
their economic ties. First, as mentioned above, South Africa is heavily reliant on completed 
products and high-technology electronics and machinery. On the other hand, China imports 
a large amount of minerals, iron and steel from South Africa. In other words, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 5, South Africa is in the precarious position of being subject to the 
fluctuations in international raw materials prices, and also China’s changing domestic 
economic situation. Hence, South Africa recorded an approximately R73 billion trade deficit 
with China in 2014, and considered countermeasures when South African International 
Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
(Fin24.com, 2014). Also, South Africa’s steel industry has damaged due to Chinese steel 
dumping and a sharp decline in raw material prices. This led South African steel company 
ArcelorMittal to close its century-old Vereeniging steelworks, and reduce its workforce by 
around 1,200 personnel, following a 25 percent decrease in production. In 2015, 
approximately 11,000 people in the South African steel industry lost their jobs due to 
Chinese dumping, and the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa 
worried that the South African steel industry was in danger of collapsing (ITAC, 2016). South 
Africa also depends on imports of low-price manufactured goods, such as knitted and 
crocheted fabrics, clothing, footwear, household appliances, general purpose machinery, 
electronic products, and others, which has a direct impact on the South African 
manufacturing sector, which in turn results in lost profits, slow growth in output, and a 
decline in the number of jobs available (Edwards and Jenkins, 2015). From 2001-2010, 
76,000 people lost their jobs in the manufacturing sector in South Africa, which was a 70 
percent total loss resulting from increased imports (ibid). Based on this discord between 
                                                
97 The volume of South Africa’s exports to China was R90.71bn in 2011, R84.69bn in 2012, R116.38bn 
in 2013, R95.22 in 2014, R94.40bn in 2015, and R101.19bn in 2016. The volume of South Africa’s 
imports from China was R104.14bn in 2011, R119.94bn in 2012, R154.44bn in 2013, R167.71bn in 
2014, R199.39bn in 2015, R199.03bn in 2016. 
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China and South Africa, the following part will discuss how Chinese public diplomacy has 
worked to build harmonious and close economic ties with South Africa. 
 
6.2.2 The role of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa  
6.2.2.1 Foreign Aid  
The strategy of China’s South Africa foreign aid is distinctive from that with other African 
countries, such as Nigeria, which focuses on infrastructure development as a means for 
encouraging economic development. Interviewee S-G1 (2017) pointed out that South Africa 
is a unique country, in many ways, and that it should be classified as a developed country. It 
is at the forefront of African development in its civil infrastructure development, medical 
field, mining, agriculture, and others. Interviewee S-C2 (2017) also said that the “South 
Africa industrial sector even compete[s] with Chinese companies. South Africa doesn’t 
seriously need to get help from China in that part.” Because South Africa is equipped with 
better infrastructure than other African countries, China gives greater weight to finance, 
equipment manufacturing, and aviation cooperation, rather than all-around infrastructure 
development. However, this does not mean that South Africa has advanced, developed and 
well-appointed infrastructure facilities like other developed countries. Hence, in 2013, the 
China Development Bank offered US$5 billion to South African logistics group Transnet, to 
repair and restore South Africa’s old railway, which is used for commodities transportation. 
In 2015, Transnet and China Export Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) signed a 
US$2.5 billion deal for a port, railway, and pipeline project in South Africa. The agreement 
was made during a meeting between Zuma and Xi; and covered Chinese mechanical 
products, and South African service and operation, based Chinese companies’ construction 
work and management (Interviewee S-F1, 2017). 
From 2000, China embarked on providing aid in a variety of areas in South Africa. However, 
unlike in other African countries, China did not offer South Africa unconditional 
infrastructure construction and development, and instead gradually expanded its aid to 
South Africa. In 2000, China assisted South Africa with a US$44 million grant to improve 
water supply materials, which was helped it to implement the South Africa Free Basic Water 
Policy (Interviewee S-F1, 2017). The following year, the Chinese municipality of Tianjin and 
South Africa’s Tshwane municipal council entered into an agreement to cooperate on mutual 
interests, through the exchange of sports, trade, and tourism. Also, in the same year, 
Shanghai signed a US$3 billion cooperative development deal with KwaZulu-Natal, in the 
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areas of economic development and investment, culture, environmental management, 
culture, and education. Shanghai also invested in 19 factories manufacturing garments, steel, 
electronics, and appliances. In 2002, China and South Africa signed an agreement to jointly 
develop herbal AIDS medicine. China also supports financially South Africa’s Human 
Resource Project. Since 2004, China and South Africa have agreed to provide to each other 
mutual legal assistance on criminal matters (AidData, n.a). From the mid-2000s to the early 
2010s, China provided financial assistance not only for cultural exchanges and the 
establishment of education centers, but also for malaria prevention to the South African 
public. In 2006, China rendered US$2.5 million in support to South Africa for various skills 
training as part of 13 agreements on a wide range of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, 
national defense, sciences and technology, politics, economy, and trade signed by Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao and South African President Thabo Mbeki. The agreement was signed 
when Wen arrived in South Africa on the fifth leg of his seven-nation African tour, and he 
underlined the aim of the meeting “to strengthen China-South Africa friendship, enhance 
political mutual trust, expand cooperation of mutual benefit and promote common 
development” (China Daily, 2006). Since then, China began in earnest to expand its aid to 
more sectors, such as South Africa’s banking sector, infrastructure development, providing 
scholarships, crude oil refineries, and renewable energy projects. Among China’s aid to 
South Africa, the support for renewable energy projects is particularly worthy of notice. 
China ICBC and Standard Bank Group agreed to provide US$2.4 billion (R20bn) of financial 
assistance to renewable energy projects in South Africa, in 2013. In this regard, ICBC 
Chairman Jiang Jianpinq explained the aim of the assistance, which it was intended to 
“promote the use of renewable energy in South Africa in support of the South African 
government’s renewable energy programme, and through this partnership, to help save the 
environment.” He added that, “the objective of this partnership is to facilitate the entry of 
investors into South Africa, and ICBC is excited about the opportunity to co-lend into 
renewable energy with Standard Bank” (Standard Bank, 2013). The Chinese bank’s activities 
in South Africa are part of an agreement between China and South Africa made when the 
South African Vice-President visited China in 2011. The two countries agreed to cooperate on 
geology and sustainable mineral resource management, development, and utilization in 
China and South Africa based on mutual benefit. Furthermore, the agreement included the 
development of financial cooperation, signed by China Development Bank and Development 
Bank of South Africa. Through the two banks’ support, the financial assistance provides for 
bilateral cooperation in the areas of infrastructure construction, water resource utilization, 
transportation, housing, education, and health. Additionally, Xi Jinping urged greater 
bilateral cooperation in the areas of media, technology, education, human resource training 
 219 
by using various mechanisms such as the United Nations, G20, World Trade Organization, 
and BRICS. Xi also stressed that “the two countries should keep closer negotiation and 
cooperation on major international and regional issues and maintain their common interests” 
(China Daily, 2011).  
Based on the agreement above, China’s other major banks arrived in South Africa, and act as 
intermediaries between Chinese companies and South African market. The Bank of China, 
for example, opened its Johannesburg branch in 2000, as the first Chines bank operating in 
South Africa. Since then, the bank has focused on the wholesale business, and endeavors to 
cement China and South Africa’s economic and trade cooperation by actively taking part in 
South Africa’s local markets and complying with related regulations. The Bank of China 
Johannesburg branch’s loan and syndication services and partnership with the China and 
Africa Development Fund is an example of how it supports Chinese companies addition to 
obtaining spin-off effects in South Africa. The Bank of China launched the R1 billion 
syndicated loan project when Chinese company Jidong Development Group and the China-
Africa Development Fund signed a memorandum of understanding with South Africa’s 
Women Investment Portfolio Holdings group and limestone-miner Continental Cement, 
with regards to building a R165 billion cement manufacturing plant in the north of Brits, in 
South Africa, in 2010. Thanks to the bank’s syndicated loan, insured against political and 
default risk by Sinosure, Jidong’s investment was successfully accomplished. The project was 
set up successfully in 2014, and created 600 job opportunities during the construction of the 
manufacturing plant. Also, more jobs were created for South African workers through the 
plant’s operation. The Bank of China’s Johannesburg branch also grants credit facility to 
South Africa’s local consumers of machinery and equipment produced in China. 
Furthermore, the bank offered R6 million when China Southern Railway received an order 
for 459 locomotives to be exported to South Africa (Gao, 2016). Thus, the first cooperation 
between China and South Africa’s companies over local electric locomotive production 
contributed to the establishment of a developed transportation system in South Africa. 
In sum, unlike in other African countries, where most of China’s aid is concentrated on 
infrastructure development, China’s support for South Africa is relatively diverse. China 
focuses on improving facilities that are connected to South African people’s health and living 
conditions, key infrastructure facilities development, and financial support through Chinese 
banks in South Africa (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Cape Town, Bank of 
China in Johannesburg, China Construction Bank in Johannesburg, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China in Johannesburg). The major Chinese banks' expansion into South Africa 
suggests that the inroads into South Africa made by Chinese companies are gaining 
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momentum, contributing to South Africa’s infrastructure development and providing funds 
to boost South African businesses in resource exploitation. China carries out public 
diplomacy in South Africa, such as ICBC’s renewable energy support. At the same time, 
China and South Africa attempt to work for mutual benefit through strategic partnerships. 
ICBC is very relevant to Standard Bank Group, because ICBC purchased a 20 percent stake 
in the bank, in 2007, because Standard Bank Group has a very wide sphere of activities, and 
fulfills the necessary conditions as a major African bank, as it operates in 18 African 
countries, has advanced operating system, management information and credit risk policies, 
and a market capitalization of ZAR146 billion. (Meyer, Alao, Alden, and Alves, 2011). The 
two banks cooperate on over 26 projects, with a total value of US$14 billion across multiple 
fields, such as risk management, business for enterprises, IT, money market, cash 
management, and others (interviewee S-F2, 2017).  
 
6.2.2.2 The media  
The majority of China’s major media organizations entered the South African market, unlike 
in other African countries, where only a few organizations opened operations. Since 2000, 
China Daily, Xinhua, CCTV, and China Radio International (CRI) established offices staffed 
by numerous journalists; the People’s Daily also has a large number of correspondents in 
South Africa. According to Interviewee S-A1 (2017), the role of Chinese journalists and 
correspondents in South Africa is to introduce and connect China to Africa, and vice versa. 
He added that the reason for the large Chinese media presence in South Africa is because it 
is an important country for China, both politically and economically. Interviewee S-A2 (2017) 
also expressed his opinion on the importance of media in Sino-South African relations, 
stating that China and South Africa are crucial to each other through exchanges of economy, 
culture, tourism, language and others. Thus, the two sides need to better understand each 
other, but the reality is that there are still many misunderstandings. That is why the media is 
so curial for the two countries, because journalists report accurate information so that the 
Chinese and South Africans can better understand each other (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). 
Therefore, China’s biggest newspaper, the China Daily, established an English-language 
African edition in South Africa, in 2013. The second African bureau for China Daily’s English 
daily was opened in Johannesburg, following the launch of a Nairobi branch in 2012. The 
newspaper’s aim is “to introduce China to the world and present news with a Chinese angle,” 
said China Daily’s deputy chief editor Gao Anming. The China Daily’s English newspaper is 
published every Friday, and covers mostly business news targeted at South Africans. The 
newspaper focuses on following an independent editorial policy, although the newspaper is 
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fully under Chinese government control. Hence, they hire local and Chinese journalists who 
understand more about China and South African business trends (Smith, 2012). Also, there 
is a private Chinese website, NF online (Nanfei zaixian), which has a goal of collecting major 
news related to Chinese in South Africa, and South African news to inform its readers on 
various issues such as crime, major events, cultural exchanges, scholarships, and others, in 
order to facilitate understanding between the two countries.  
China focuses on introducing China not only through newspapers, but also through 
broadcasting via local mass media organizations. Chinese media in South Africa also 
cooperates with the local media, such as the Independent Media Group, to exchange news 
articles so as to promote mutual understanding between China and South Africa 
(Interviewee S-A1, 2017). In other words, the range of China’s media activities has increased, 
and is not limited to information delivered by newspapers. Wu (2016) pointed out that China 
began to focus on to disseminating China’s viewpoint in Africa in 2012; the following year, it 
concentrated on media investments in South Africa to introduce China to the public. Hence, 
China has conducted the following three significant investments when Chinese media 
entered South Africa: joint ventures (e.g., WeChat’s launch in South Africa with Naspers and 
China’s Tencent); engaging South Africans as partners or consumers (e.g., setting up 
telecommunications infrastructure and selling Chinese-brand mobile handsets); and 
accepting South African company shares – such as China’s Star Time, which has a stake in 
South Africa’s TopTV and StarSat, and the purchase of South Africa’s Independent News and 
Media by the Sekunjalo consortium partially by providing funding and also by acquiring 20 
percent of the country’s second-largest newspaper publisher. The consortium is composed of 
South Africa’s state-owned broadcaster, CCTV, and the China-Africa Development Fund 
(Harber, 2014, p.149; Wu, 2016).  
Here is an example of China’s media engagement in South African media: the China Hour 
was launched at CTV, a Cape Town-based TV channel that features cooking shows, 
documentaries, and kids’ entertainment. The China Hour is broadcast four times per week 
on CTV, produced by LB International Productions. The show mostly covers lifestyle content 
about China and South Africa, such as fashion, food, travel, and culture. The show’s original 
purpose was to provide information to viewers to help them understand the differences 
between China’s and South Africa’s cultural background, as a result of the increased Chinese 
population in South Africa. The China Hour at CTV has won popular acclaim and high 
ratings since May 2016 and the program’s airtime has increased 30 minutes more than usual 
from December 2016 (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). Also, StarSat introduced Chinese 
broadcasting as a subscriber channel in South Africa. China’s StarTimes owns 20 percent of 
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StarSat, which began broadcasting in South Africa in 2010. StarSat launched pay TV 
packages including 47 channels for R99 (around $8) per month, which offers more channels 
per package with competitive price than other companies in South Africa. A notable product 
of company was when it offered a Chinese TV channel package with 17 Chinese channels, for 
R149 (around $11), which let South Africans watch Chinese television broadcasts easily at 
with only one subscription (StarSat, 2017). Moreover, StarSat broadcast widely the “2015 
Beijing TV Dramas & Movies Broadcasting Exhibition”, which contained 30 Chinese TV 
movies and dramas, dubbed into the local language, through their Chinese channels. As one 
of the events among the Beijing Week activities for the Year of China in South Africa, the 
exhibition was sponsored by the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, 
and Television (Interviewee S-A1, 2017).  
To encourage harmonious communication between Chinese journalists and South Africa, 
China cooperates with South African academia. Since 2009, the Journalism Department at 
Wits University in South Africa has arranged various programs to help form connections 
between China and South Africa, through the Wits Africa-China Reporting Project. The 
project’s coordinator (Interviewee S-A2, 2017) said that the aim was to support Chinese and 
South African journalists to write about Sino-South African relations and issues. Through 
the project, the department not only offers different types of seminar and meeting to create 
understanding between China and South Africa, but also publishes China-Africa related 
articles collected from Chinese and South African journalists through its website. In 2016, 
the Wits China-Africa project arranged a joint event to open communication between South 
African journalists and Chinese Universities in Beijing, and with the Chinese embassy in 
South Africa. The first joint event was for Chinese journalists, for two weeks in 2016. The 
content of the workshop was mostly based on practical skills training experience for Chinese 
journalists, regarding how to report in and on Africa, through lectures and training at Wits 
Journalism Department, including a number of excursions to selected places in 
Johannesburg. The Chinese participants were affiliated with government-owned media 
agencies, private businesses, financial news companies, and also freelancers for People’s 
Daily, CCTV, Global Times, and China Daily (Interviewee S-A2, 2017). Furthermore, in the 
same year, the Wits China-Africa projects organized a Sino-South Africa Business and 
Journalism Seminar, which was jointly hosted by the Wits China-Africa Project and the 
China and South Africa Economy and Trade Association at the China Construction Bank 
Building in Johannesburg. The seminar, which arranged meetings for South African 
journalists working in Sino-South Africa financial circles, was the first in South Africa. With 
influential Chinese companies in South Africa (FAW, CRI Eagle, China Construction Bank, 
ICBC, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation, ZTE, Huawei and Hisense) and major South 
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Africa media outlets (the Mail and Guardian, The Independent, and Kaya FM) attending, the 
two groups presented a plan for how to fill the gap between the practical problems for 
reporting about Chinese firms, and Chinese companies’ expectations from the local media. 
Through the seminar, moreover, the two groups learned the differences between each 
group’s view of social responsibility, the methods of cooperative communication, companies’ 
management methods based on different cultural backgrounds – all to help rectify false 
reporting of Chinese companies, and to smooth communication between the two groups in 
the future (The Wits Africa-China Reporting Project, 2016).  Through the joint events and 
workshops, Chinese people from universities would like to cement relations with South 
African schools to encourage them to learn the Chinese language and learn about Chinese 
culture. Also, Chinese people who run their businesses in South Africa are keen to get the 
message out to the South African public about what they are doing for the local people and 
the country. Through better publicity, Chinese companies can make up for their 
shortcomings, which arise from their cultural background – such as speaking loudly, shy, 
aggressive image, and others – and therefore improve their business reputations in the eyes 
of the South African people (Interviewee S-A2, 2017). Interviewee S-G1 (2017), for example, 
also could not easily understand the situation of Chinese people and companies’ distrust in 
South Africa, although Shanghai Zendai contributes to the local community and 
environmental protection in South Africa as a part of social responsibility.  
With regards to China’s media involvement in South Africa, Interviewee S-A1 (2017) 
summed up the three advantages of media involvement: first, it will help Chinese tourists 
and entrepreneurs in China to understand South Africa, and therefore attract Chinese 
tourists and investment in South Africa. Second, it is a good means through which the 
Chinese government can establish its diplomatic strategy towards, and improve relations 
with South Africa, based on contemporary issues. Third, it attracts voluntary participation 
from the Chinese public, by delivering news about what the Chinese government is up to in 
South Africa, thereby generating better support for China’s Africa policy. The interviewee, 
however, referred to China’s media involvement in South Africa as a double-edged sword. 
The interviewee pointed out that the disadvantage of media involvement is that the crime 
and disorder in South Africa news in China presents a negative image of South Africa to the 
Chinese public, and consequently demotivates Chinese people from traveling to or 
expanding their business in South Africa (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). 
The cooperative media work between China and South Africa is based on a Letter of Intent of 
Friendly Co-Operation and Exchange between South Africa’s Government Communication 
and Information System (GCIS) and China’s State Council Information office (SCIO), issued 
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in 2004. The letter is meant to improve mutual exchanges of information, and the 
cooperation of the media between the two parties. The two parties agreed on the following 
stipulations:  
. To boost mutual visits by high-level delegations of up to six persons every two years 
for a period of seven days, from 2005.  
. To set up a mechanism for consultation and a continued cooperative relationship.  
. To exchange media and information through periodicals, electronic video and audio 
products, and books.  
. To stimulate cooperation and exchange between the media organizations of the two 
countries, dispatching journalists from the two countries to collect news.  
. To encourage conducting workshops and seminars with media organization-related 
people from the two countries (GCIS, 2004).  
Furthermore, in 2015, the Chinese government officially called for enhanced media 
cooperation with South Africa, to give it a louder voice on the global stage and create mutual 
development between the two countries. The appeal for media cooperation was made at the 
China-Africa Media Summit in Cape Town, South Africa. Xi Jinping highlighted the media as 
an important channel for both countries to learn and communicate with each other, in his 
congratulatory message at the Summit. He added that, “I hope the media of both sides can 
use the opportunity of this summit to have more broadened and in-depth cooperation to 
promote the friendship of China and Africa” (China Daily, 2015c). The role of the media is to 
rectify misunderstandings, prejudices, and stereotypes created by the world’s unbalanced 
media power system. And as a result, create an objective, balanced and impartial 
international public opinion environment. Through media cooperation in Sino-South Africa 
ties, the two countries are able to pursue enlarged cooperation in various directions, not only 
at the people-to-people level, but also business-to-business, and government-to-government 
levels, Zuma stressed (ibid). 
 
6.2.2.3 Cultural and Educational Institutes 
As mentioned earlier, China began to expand the establishment of its cultural and education 
institutes during the mid-2000. China focused on introducing Chinese culture and language 
to South Africa through the exchange activities. Interviewee S-B2 (2017) highlights the 
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importance of Chinese language in South Africa in introducing China, because the language 
contains Chinese elements such as culture, history, customs, and propriety. Thus, South 
Africans could understand and learn China more easily without reserve when they learn 
Chinese language. Confucius Institutes took charge of teaching Chinese language in South 
Africa. Interviewee S-B1 (2017) said the aim of the institute in South Africa is to teach 
Chinese language, introduce Chinese culture to the local people, enhance mutual 
understanding, and cooperate in the development of projects with locals. Interviewee S-C2 
(2017) stressed the significance of the Confucius Institutes in South Africa, because there are 
no professional institutions through which South Africans can learn Mandarin except for the 
Confucius Institutes. Hence, recently, the Chinese government has exerted influence by 
setting up a Mandarin Language Training Program in South Africa, since 2013, and entered 
into an agreement with the South African government to cooperate with China to popularize 
the Chinese language in South African schools and among the South African public. Thus, 
Chinese language teachers who come from China, and local Chinese people in South Africa 
engage in teaching the Chinese language to South African government officials and staff at 
South African companies, in order to create more opportunities to learn the Chinese 
language outside of the Confucius Institutes. The Chinese embassy in South Africa welcomes 
not only students but also adults, from various fields, to learn Mandarin because it is a good 
opportunity to introduce China’s culture and history through language (Interviewee S-A1, 
2017).  
In addition to the Confucius Institute, the Chinese government deploys various other means 
to introduce China to South African society, including its social culture and political 
economy, in the following ways. The first is by using booklets. Every month, the Chinese 
embassy distributes a monthly magazine, ChinAfrica, published by the Beijing Review 
(China’s national English news weekly) to universities, with the purpose of giving wider 
publicity to students and professors so as to share information about China’s relations with 
Africa (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). The Beijing Review’s Africa branch was established in 
Johannesburg in 2012, publishing the first Chinese print media aimed at elite African 
readers in public office, the media, political parties, international organizations, and 
business. Through the ChinAfrica monthly magazine, China introduced general information 
about business trends, culture, and the media. Also, Chinese diplomats visited the 
universities in person, and instructed South African students about general Chinese trends 
on the global stage. They also held a Q-and-A sessions afterward. The intent of this was to 
break down the walls of China’s negative reputation, and increase comfort and familiarity 
through direct conversation with government officials (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). The last way 
is scholarship. The Chinese government granted scholarships that offered the largest amount 
 226 
of funding in South Africa (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). The various scholarships are based on 
numerous sector-level agreements made during the 3th China and South Africa Binational 
Commission in 2007, when Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcka made an official visit 
to China to strengthen the strategic partnership through mutual political trust, and deepened 
sector-level cooperation with key economic objectives. As part of the sector-level 
agreement,98 the Chinese government pledged to invest RMB20 million in education and 
skills initiatives in various fields, growing the number of opportunities that South African 
students’ had to obtain a scholarship from China; and also supplied Chinese language 
teachers to promote the establishment of Mandarin courses in 50 South African high schools. 
Starting in the mid-2000s, five Confucius Institutes and four classrooms 99  have been 
established in South Africa. The Confucius Institutes offer classes mainly in Mandarin, 
culture, cultural exchanges, academic activities, the HSK test, summer and winter camps in 
China, and a Chinese bridge competition.  
Keeping up with the fact that South Africans show an enthusiasm for learning the Chinese 
language and becoming more deeply involved in relations between China and South Africa, 
the Confucius classrooms were also set up at high schools. The Chinese language classes are 
similar at each school, where the Chinese language class is mandatory for students between 
Grade 8 and 12. Each school’s Chinese classroom is run in collaboration with the South 
Africa-based Confucius Institute. The classroom mostly provides Chinese language 
instruction, and people-to-people and cultural exchange activities. To introduce China to the 
South African youth, China has devised a far-reaching plan through various activities. The 
Confucius Institutes hold a “Chinese bridge” language competition to encourage students’ 
interest in the Chinese language. Hanban links Confucius classrooms at the high schools to 
foreign language schools in China to motivate South African students to study the Chinese 
language, and provides Chinese language teachers through an exchange system (Interviewee 
S-B1, 2017). And the Confucius Institutes in South Africa make efforts to train local people to 
produce Chinese teachers and organize diverse Chinese language teaching and learning 
conferences affiliated with South African high school principals. By extension, the Chinese 
government supports South African high school students to take history tours in China, to 
                                                
98 The two countries signed an agreement to cooperate on Education, Human Resources, public 
Administration, Mineral and Energy, Water, Forestry, Traditional Medicine, Science and Technology, 
and Trading.  
99 The five Confucius Institutions are at the following universities in South Africa: first, in 2007, at 
Rhodes University and Tshwane University of Technology, Stellenbosch University (in 2009), the 
University of Cape Town (in 2010), Durban University of Technology (in 2014), and the University of 
Johannesburg (in 2016). Moreover, Hanban established four Confucius Classrooms at the Westerford 
High School, the Cape Academy of Mathematics, Science, and Technology (in 2009), Chinese Cultural 
and International Education Exchange Center (in 2016), and Groote Schuur High School in Cape 
Town (in 2017). 
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learn about China through a field trip (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). The Confucius classroom is 
regarded as a foothold to Confucius Institutes, which links them with the high school, where 
the younger generations are stimulated to learn about China through Chinese language in 
the classroom. Furthermore, in the case of the Confucius classroom at the Cape Academy of 
Mathematics, Science, and Technology, a Chinese language class is offered for business 
people and social community, to teach Business Chinese and is not confined to the students 
at the school. The classroom also opens a Chinese learning materials book shop and 
compiles Chinese teaching materials in the 11 languages of South Africa, to allow Chinese 
language to be taught to a greater number of South Africans (Hanban, 2011).  
In addition, in 2016, the Confucius Classroom was set up in cooperation with the 
Department of Tourism of South Africa at the Chinese Culture and International Education 
Exchange Center to develop tourism in the country. Through the joint establishment of the 
Confucius Classroom, China launched the first Chinese language training program for a 
professional workforce for the department and managerial personnel in the fields of 
hospitality, tourism, and museum profession. The Chinese language training program is 
composed of a three-months, customized Chinese cultural course aimed at helping students 
to understand the differences between Chinese and South African culture, China’s traditional 
and modern life, tourism, and business etiquette through study of tourism. Also, the Chinese 
government offers an additional exchange training course in China to those who complete 
the language training program at the center in South Africa. All classes at the center are 
designed for government ministries of South Africa, with useful and rich content in an 
intense, 40-hours per week course. The intensified courses are given as lectures by the 
faculty members of the Confucius Classroom, unlike at other Confucius Institutions and its 
Classrooms (Hanban, 2016). Not only that, the Confucius Institutes in South Africa have 
operated a daily half-hour on-air Chinese classroom in West Pretoria since 2012. The 
purpose of the class is to promote Chinese language and culture more extensively to the 
South African public. Teachers mainly manage the class at Confucius Institute at the 
Tshwane University of Technology, but other South Africa-based Confucius Institutes also 
try their best to encourage students and local populations to participate in the class. The on-
air class covers general Chinese information, such as Chinese language, history, customs, 
calligraphy, cultural trends, dialects, Chinese tea drinking habits, and ancient stories. 
Besides the class, there is also the annual Hanyuqiao competition, and the organization also 
provides information regarding scholarships that the Chinese government awards to South 
African students every year. The Director of the Confucius Institute at the Tshwane 
University of Technology pointed out that over 530 students, including residents, take the 
on-air class and it creates ripple effects: for example, more Chinese companies – such as 
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Lenovo, Huawei, and StarTimes – expand the range of their business activities in South 
Africa. He also highlighted that more Chinese tourists are expected to visit South Africa after 
2012, when 100,000 Chinese chose to travel to South Africa (China Daily, 2013b). Thus, 
there are more job opportunities for South Africans with advanced Chinese language abilities 
in the service and tourism sectors in South Africa. Also, the South Africa-based Confucius 
Institutes carry out distinct activities, which differentiate them from other Confucius 
Institutes in other African countries. Interviewee S-B1 (2017) said that one of the successful 
activities are the China Health Maintenance Seminars. The interviewee said that the 
Confucius Institution at Stellenbosch University (CISU) has successfully hosted the South 
Africa–China Health Maintenance Seminar for three years, and have a very good reputation. 
The seminar is aimed at providing intensive training to local practitioners, promoting 
medical science between experts from both countries, improving academic abilities through 
workshops, and skills through clinical instruction. This event has already gained support 
from the Department of Health in South Africa, and all attendants receive credits towards 
their continuing professional development requirements. CISU invites experts in traditional 
Chinese medicine from Xiamen University, Guangzhou University of Chinese Medicine, and 
other hospitals in China, to provide regular training to local practitioners and medical 
students, introducing this health approach to local communities. They host this event with 
the help of the University of the Western Cape and South African Association of Chinese 
Medicine and Acupuncture (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). 
Based on the Chinese government’s efforts, South African public schools officially began to 
teach Mandarin as an optional second language from 2016. As of 2016, over 40 schools, as 
well as the Confucius Institutes and their classrooms, have introduced Mandarin, and 
around 500 schools in South Africa are planned to offer Chinese language classes as a second 
additional language in the next five years. The Chinese language training is aimed at 
students from Grade 4 to 12 at local schools (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). This means that most 
South African youth who are between Grade 4 to 9 learn Mandarin as part of their 
compulsory education courses, as stipulated in the South African Schools Act of 1996. To 
boost Chinese language classes in South Africa, the Chinese government not only provides 
textbooks and teachers for the classes, but also connects the South Africa-based Confucius 
Institutes with Chinese language education in South Africa (Xinhua News, 2017c). Chinese 
vice Premier Liu Yandong referred to the role of the Confucius Institute as “a ‘rainbow bridge’ 
which connects the hearts of the two peoples of China and South Africa”, during her visit to 
the Confucius Institute at the Durban University of Technology, in 2017. There are a total of 
46 Confucius Institutes in 32 African countries, and 23 Confucius Classrooms in 14 countries 
(Hanban, 2016). 
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In addition to Confucius Institutes, Chinese private company Huawei puts a lot of effort into 
conducting public diplomacy in South Africa. Huawei entered the South Africa market in 
1998 and established its East and South African regional headquarters in Johannesburg. In 
2008, Huawei launched its first training centre in South Africa to “transfer skills and share 
expertise in next generation telecom technologies with employees, local partners and the 
industry” (Huawei, 2008). In 2016, Huawei launched its first African Innovation and 
Experience Centre in Johannesburg. Huawei invested around US$ 4.8 million for the centre 
to showcase the company’s state-of-the-art Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) products and solution in the field such as 5G wireless communication technology, safe 
city solution, smart home solutions, and others. Moreover, the centre serves as not only an 
open lab for university students but also an incubation centre for upcoming ICT enterprises 
in South Africa (Xinhua News, 2017f).  In the same year, Huawei and the Tshwane 
University of Technology have jointly launched Huawei Network Academy, which is 
composed of “a global ICT technology education program” and Huawei’s first installation in 
the Eastern and Southern Africa region. Thus, the program aims to “help accelerate the 
development of educational tools and promote the development of the local ICT technical 
workforce” (Huawei, 2016). Moreover, Huawei sent 10 South African university students, 
who are selected from five top universities in South Africa, to China for a two-week ICT 
training in Beijing and Shenzhen the same year. The students participated in the “Seeds for 
the Future” training program100 which is “a social investment program that takes students 
from the world to receive ICT training and culture exchange” at Huawei Shenzhen and 
Beijing branches (ChinAfrica, 2016a). The Chinese Economic and Commercial Counselor 
Rong Yansong said that “the cooperation between China and South Africa will benefit the 
African continent and people”. And he wished “the students can be experienced ambassadors 
on their return to South Africa” (ibid).  
 
6.2.3 The effect of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa 
  
This section will discuss to what extent the effect of China’s public diplomacy is linked to the 
South Africa public and its domestic political economy, as well as Sino-South African 
relations. It will also look at the how China’s public diplomacy impacts China’s foreign policy 
towards South Africa, in terms of both South African political economy and also Sino-South 
Africa ties in general.  
                                                
100 The program has been carried out in 67 countries and regions across five continents, benefiting 
more than 15,000 students from 150 universities. Over 1,700 university student from all around the 
world have studied and trained at the Huawei headquarters (ChinAfrica, 2016a).  
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6.2.3.1 The South Africa public  
China has slowly won South African’s favor since 2000, from the perspective of Interviewee 
S-G1 and S-D1 (2017). Drawing on the research of Wike, Stokes, Poushter, and Oates at Pew 
Research Center, the degree of South African’s favorable impression of China is not 
surprising, when one compares it with South Africans’ opinions of Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, 
and Nigeria – where, in 2004, there were both favorable (40 percent) and unfavorable (45 
percent) views (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, and Oates, July 2014). However, the South Africans’ 
view showed a 7 percent increase in their favorable opinion of China in 2015 (Wike, Stokes, 
and Poushter, June 2015). Such a phenomenon is largely due to South Africa’s status as a 
developing country among other African countries, and as a result they have different 
requirements and priorities to those of other nations. For example, according to Wike and 
Simmons’s research (2015), the South African public’s most important priorities was 
education and not health care, food supply, infrastructure, energy supply, and governance. 
The importance of the health care sector appeared remarkably lower than for other countries. 
As can be seen from their research, 74 percent of the South African public also does not see 
the necessity of foreign aid, while 68 percent of other African countries believe that more 
foreign assistance is needed (Wike and Simmons, 2015).  
Seen from this perspective, the South African public hopes to show to China that they are 
different to other African countries. South Africa still grapples with poverty reduction, and 
the need to address the gap between rich and poor, but due to its relatively stable domestic 
environment (not enjoyed by other African countries), China’s public diplomacy requires 
diverse programs to present a favorable impression of China to the South African people. In 
this connection, Interviewee S-C1 (2017) singled out one mode of China’s public diplomacy 
communication: He said that China’s public diplomacy still had a limited attitude, close to 
the typical image of China, when they introduced Chinese broadcasts to foreigners. He also 
found a problem with how China’s public diplomacy is operated: the majority of its public 
diplomacy is managed by the government. Interviewee S-C2 (2017) also expressed his view 
on China’s cultural public diplomacy, that China needs to utilize popular culture that can 
improve understanding of China and can better keep pace with the times, as opposed to 
relying on traditional Chinese subjects. However, the two interviewees agreed that China’s 
public diplomacy media activities and language teaching has contributed to greater positive 
publicity in South Africa, when compared to the situation when the Chinese government did 
not incorporate soft power into its foreign policy. Despite China’s improved, positive image 
in South Africa, Interviewee S-C2 (2017) says, there remains a gap in favorable opinions 
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between South Africa’s public and government. The South African public still has a negative 
opinion of China due to China’s different political and ideological stances on contemporary 
issues – for example, the South African government’s frequent refusal to issue the Dalai 
Lama with a visa, the trade imbalance between China and South Africa, and the 
encroachment of Chinese businesses into South Africa’s manufacturing, textiles, and other 
sectors. Whereas the South African government wholeheartedly welcomes China, and has 
even adopted China’s development model based on authoritarian capitalism for its economic 
development. This manifested as shared political views, and support for maintaining a pro-
Chinese stance on the global stage. This will be discussed more in following sections. 
There is, however, a problem that China needs to solve with regards to the South African 
public. In terms of South Africa’s development, Interviewee S-C1 and S-C2 (2017) stresses 
the importance of China to South Africa’s economic development. As the volume of trade 
between the two countries increased, South Africa recognized China’s economic power and 
its significance for generating investment in South Africa. Conversely, Hess and Aidoo (2015) 
argued that the South African public “diverges from this pattern of recognition in its 
engagement with China, as it sees its relationship as a positive one but not essentially as a 
blueprint to economic self-determinations” (pp.70-71). Hence, by using Chinese companies’ 
social responsibility to develop local businesses and transfer skills and technology, combined 
with aid from financial and education institutions, China gains favor in South Africa that 
allows it to expand cooperation and investment in the economic sectors. Due to the fact that 
South Africa’s infrastructure is already quite developed, China conducts a different approach 
to foreign policy, unlike that with other African countries. Hence, China cannot draw public 
attention by offering various infrastructure development products as part of an 
unconditional aid strategy. Instead, China must indirectly impress upon the South African 
public the importance of China to its economy by presenting itself as a mature country 
interested in social responsibility, developing renewable energy and environmental 
protection in South Africa. For example, in 2011, China joined the plan of South Africa’s New 
Economic Growth Path, which focuses on renewable energy and energy-saving as a driver for 
economic development. At the same time, Chinese businesses operate in businesses such as 
solar and wind energy, and coal chemistry through mutually beneficial joint investment with 
South African companies. Based on China’s different approach to South Africa, by adapting 
its South Africa policy for the local situation, China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge 
to bring together China and the South Africa’s public and business to improve foreign policy, 
which is beneficial for its country’s economic growth resulting from smooth and cordial 
relations with South Africa.  
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6.2.3.2 The political economy sector in South Africa  
In 2011, the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report, appointed by President 
Zuma in 2010, identified nine primaries, deep-seated challenges that have faced South 
Africa’s development since 1994. The challenges are as follows: an unemployment problem; 
a want of advanced infrastructure in proportion to its rapid economic growth; a lack of 
quality school education for black people; social divisions; a resource-intensive economic 
system; uneven and poor public services; high corruption; and the gap between the rich and 
the poor (National Planning Commission, 2011). It is true that the challenges remain a work 
in progress for the South African government, with its long-term economic development 
plan. However, the role of China is in no small measure part of South Africa’s development 
plan. Hence, it is necessary to keep an eye on Chinese public diplomacy activities, including 
its various actors, and how they boost South Africa’s economy, as well as improve China’s 
standing on the international stage. As mentioned above, the South African people considers 
relations with China to be important, both domestically and internationally. At the same 
time, there are still many obstacles preventing further strengthening of the strategic 
partnership. China’s positive reputation with the South African public and its government, 
based on China’s public diplomacy efforts in many different spheres, creates a bridge 
between China and South Africa and its people. South Africa attracts not only more Chinese 
corporate investment, but also takes the lead in smooth technological cooperation, 
establishing factories, infrastructure, and others that are essential for South Africa’s 
economic growth. In this way, China contributes to relieve some chronic problems that 
impede national development in South Africa; at the same time, they boost the South African 
economy. Interviewee S-A3 (2017) argues that a characteristic of China’s public diplomacy 
shows that its aim is economic, and the means of carrying out its public diplomacy is based 
on its strategy of mutual benefit. In other words, China’s public diplomacy is one part of its 
government’s economic growth plan based on the win-win strategy aspect of its African 
policy. 
South Africa’s government believes that its high unemployment rate is the biggest obstacle 
that hinders its economic development. As discussed earlier, Chinese companies and 
Confucius Institutes play an important role in education activities, including language and 
skill training, and contribute to reducing the unemployment rate in South Africa. By 
extension, the overall favorable impression of China in South Africa led to many Chinese 
companies expanding their operations and investment in South Africa. By the end of 2015, 
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according to a Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in South Africa by the 
South Africa-China Economy and Trade Association, Chinese companies invested around 
US$13 billion, and over 300 Chinese companies operated in industries related to mining, 
financing, and household electronic appliances, construction machinery, and 
telecommunications in South Africa. Through its activities in South Africa, Chinese 
companies helped address South Africa’s employment problem, because South Africans 
comprise 91 percent of the total number of employees at Chinese companies (ChinAfrica, 
2016b). However, this does not mean that South Africa’s employment condition is as bad as 
in other African countries. For example, the average wage in South Africa is higher, and 
labor laws are also strict than in other African countries (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). 
Nevertheless, as the number of Chinese companies increased in South Africa, most Chinese 
companies focused on hiring local South African workers as part of a win-win strategy for 
both China and South Africa and as a way of raising Chinese companies’ profiles in South 
Africa. Also, from the South African perspective, as China’s image changed in South Africa, a 
fair amount of South African people are now willing to work at a Chinese company, whereas 
before they avoided working for the Chinese due to their negative reputation (Interviewee S-
B2, 2017).  Thus, all the efforts – both at the policy and people-to-people levels – have paid 
dividends by reducing the unemployment rate. More specifically, Statistic South Africa 
reported that the rate of unemployment went down slightly by 0.6 percent according to the 
results of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the fourth quarter of 2016. The growth in 
employment was mostly driven by the service industry and Transport and Manufacturing 
sectors. Particularly impressive was that the unemployment rate among youth aged between 
15 and 34 declined by 1.1 percentage points; which improved the overall national youth 
unemployment average (The Statistics South Africa, 2017). Pali Lehohla, Statistician-General 
for Statistics South Africa, underscored the importance of education to reducing the 
unemployment rate based on the fact that those in the group with sub-high school level 
educations showed higher unemployment rate when compared with the group whose 
members are fully educated. Lehohla added that “the labour participation rate of graduates 
is higher because the likelihood of them getting jobs is higher and they continue searching 
for work” (SA News, 2017a). It is true that the statistical results show that the unemployment 
rate was little improved in 2016. But when one considers Chinese companies’ wide range of 
activities and considerable investment in South Africa, the results show that the general 
effort of Chinese enterprises and its education institutions can be seen as playing an 
important role in reducing the unemployment rate.  
When one examines the role of public diplomacy in South Africa’s main economic sector 
development, its tourism and mining sectors are intimately linked to China. The Chinese 
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government especially focuses on the tourism and mining industries in South Africa as part 
of its approach to intergovernmental cooperation. In other words, China plays a larger role 
in the two areas (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). With regards to South Africa’s tourism, China is 
the leading growth market: South Africa received around 11,800 visitors from China in 2016, 
a 38 percent increase on the previous year. It is expected that even more Chinese tourists will 
travel to South Africa in 2017 (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). Hence, South African travel agencies 
have begun to hire sightseeing guides who could speak Mandarin. Moreover, the South 
African government created new promotional materials that are translated into Mandarin 
for the main tourist areas that appeal to the Chinese. The Confucius Institutes in South 
Africa provide assistance to local travel companies and the South African government for 
their Mandarin-related tourist work, as the role of tourism is increasingly crucial for South 
Africa as a major source of national income. In 2015, South Africa earned $2.7 billion from 
tourism that directly supported 711,746 jobs, according to Tourism Satellite Account (China 
Daily, 2017a). The two countries’ smooth cooperation on tourism is based on the Agreement 
on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism, which was signed in October 2013. The agreement 
mainly covers the promotion of tourism development, skills development, includes an 
exchange of capacity-building initiatives, and also investment opportunities related to both 
countries’ tourism marketing. In 2017, the two countries reconfirmed their commitment to 
deepening their partnership to grow the tourism industry in both countries at the first 
meeting of the South Africa-China High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism 
(PPEM). To accomplish this aim, the PPEM allows for the creation of opportunities for 
people in both countries, and exchanges information and identifies common causes and 
strategies between the two countries to benefit from the sharing of academic, social, cultural 
and economic capital across the government, businesses, and civil society. By extension, 
tourism for South Africa is “emerging as an important foreign policy tool and an instrument 
of economic diplomacy in strengthening the broader bilateral relations” on the global stage, 
according South African Tourism Minister Tokozile Xasa (SA News, 2017a). With regards to 
South Africa’s mining sector, it is also part of the South African government’s plan to attract 
Chinese investors to South Africa’s downstream mineral development industries. In addition, 
in 2016, China and South Africa entered into a mining research partnership between the 
University of the Witwatersrand and China University of Mining and Technology. In the 
same year, the two universities also established the joint International Research Laboratory 
of China-Africa Mining Geospatial Informatics. The situation that currently requires 
cooperation with China is associated with the rapid decline of raw materials, including 
minerals in the international market and the changing structure of South Africa’s mining 
sector. Drawing on a comparison between South Africa’s mining sector in 1980 and in 2012, 
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gold mining exports have decreased steeply due to the lack of gold deposits, whereas the 
importance of platinum group metals – such as iron ore, manganese, chromite, copper, 
nickel, and zinc – as well as related quarrying products have increased. The mining sector 
plays a crucial role in the South African economy, especially its considerable contribution 
towards earning foreign currency. Therefore, the struggling mining industry is directly 
linked to the rest of its economy. The areas experiencing the greatest impact are job creation 
in value-added sectors, such as financial and business services; trade, catering and 
accommodation; and transport, storage and communication (ICD, 2013). Thus, South Africa 
expects to produce positive economic development by receiving support from China, such as 
skills transfer and investment for mining infrastructure. One example of this is the 
development project for the July 2011 Bakubung Platinum Mine in Ledig.  The project is 
composed of an underground mine with a twin vertical shaft system and a processing plant,  
a US$1 billion project that joins a Chinese investment consortium, Jinchuan and the China 
Africa Development Fund in holding a 45 percent interest in Wesizwe Company. As a result, 
the cooperative work not only created 3,135 jobs when at full production, but also serves as a 
positive showcase of a successful BRICS strategic partnership in action to the international 
stage (SA News, 2014). 
Furthermore, Chinese companies serve as a driving force behind South Africa’s maritime 
development, as Chinese investment has sharply increased in this field in recent years. As 
the trade volume between China and South Africa has increased, China’s marine transport 
and the logistics market have risen alongside (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). South Africa owns a 
large number of port facilities in Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth; 95 percent of 
South Africa’s export cargo is moved via marine transportation. South Africa is also the 
primary logistics competition for all sub-Saharan African countries. However, the current 
situation in South Africa’s logistics market faces several issues such as inefficient port 
facilities, high logistic costs, the lack of connected facilities to inland areas, and others. This 
is directly linked to South Africa’s economic development. At the China-South Africa 
Business Forum in China in 2014, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma therefore 
encouraged Chinese investment in its blue economy programme, Operation Phakisa, which 
focuses on as mineral resource beneficiation, improving industrial capacity, enhancing agro-
processing (including energy). Zuma also highlighted the importance of maritime 
development in South Africa due for the following reason: “The ocean has a potential to 
contribute to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) up to R177 billion. The ocean also has a 
potential to contribute between eight hundred and one million direct jobs.” In 2010, the 
marine sector contributed around R54 billion to South Africa’s GDP and created around 
316,000 jobs. To encourage Operation Phakisa’s success, the South African government 
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focuses on marine transportation and manufacturing activities, such as coastal shipping, 
trans-shipment, boat building, refurbishment and repair; offshore oil and gas exploration; 
aquaculture and marine protection service and ocean government (SA News, 2015b).  
In sum, given the situation explained above, China’s public diplomacy has an important 
bearing not only on many parts of South Africa’s economy and its development, but also on 
China’s foreign policy in pursuing economic interests. The common features of China’s 
public diplomacy activities appear in South Africa’s tourism and mining sectors, which show 
the links between China’s non-state actors, such as language institutions and think tanks, 
and South Africa’s non-state actors. The public diplomacy activities also connect Chinese 
non-state actors and the South African state actors to encourage partnerships on certain 
topics or issues to produce better results.  
By cooperating broadly with South Africa in many different fields, China’s economic 
involvement in South Africa will increase in the future. China’s public diplomacy will become 
more active, keeping pace with China’s non-state actors’ expansion into South Africa in order 
to produce good results in the economic sector. The expectation comes from Zuma’s 
economic policy for South Africa. In response to the sluggish economic growth resulting 
from the global recession in 2009, Zuma adopted a “New Growth Path” in 2011 to boost its 
domestic development by creating five million jobs over ten years, and reducing the 
unemployment rate to benefit South Africa’s economic growth. The South African 
government considered the unemployment matter to be the chief issue holding back the 
country’s economy. Hence, the plan focused on “the partnering between key social players, 
business and government to address key structural challenges in the economy”, and boosting 
the six sectors to create more jobs. The key areas that required attention for the plan were 
infrastructure, mining, green economy, manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture (SA News, 
2011). Also, the plan was based on China’s development model, which presented the Zuma 
administration with a foothold for the country's economic development. All this considered, 
South Africa needs more cooperation with China in order to expand investment and trade, 
and to realize China’s development model successfully in its own economy, as well as 
solidifying its status as Africa’s greatest economic power. When one examines the trends in 
South Africa, that Chinese investors are already keenly converging on six sectors by focusing 
on skill training and promoting small- and medium-sized local businesses through 
collaborative works, a greater variety of public diplomacy activities will need to be carried 
out to catch up with South Africa’s development plan in order to benefit mutual interests 
between the two countries. Details of the two countries’ mutual interests, and the results of 
China’s public diplomacy in South Africa will be discussed in the next section. 
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6.2.3.3 The relations between South Africa and China  
Drawing on China’s varied public diplomacy activities, above, the overall view of Sino-South 
Africa relations is of deepened and strategic ties. During a 2017 official visit to China, 
President Zuma hailed China’s support for Africa’s independent growth, and expressed his 
hope for maintaining close cooperation with China in regional and international affairs – not 
only at the United Nations but also among the BRICs. He also encouraged the expansion of 
bilateral ties between China and South Africa through closer high-level engagement. Hence, 
in the same year, China and South Africa officially agreed to launch the South Africa-China 
High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism (PPEM) to foster a strengthened 
partnership. Zuma said that “the official launch of the PPEM will facilitate public 
participation in developing South Africa-China relations and bring more benefits to the 
people” (Xinhua News, 2017d). Based on the existing programs between the two countries 
related to government communications, journalists, and broadcasters, the communication 
agreement was intended to boost collaborative work on news coverage between television 
and radio broadcasters from the two nations. With regards to the communication agreement, 
China’s State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television Vice Minister Tong Gang said 
that, “the agreement has a lot of scope of strengthening cooperation in news coverage for the 
dissemination of just and objective information to the world for ‘our mutual benefit’” 
(Chinese Embassy in South Africa, 2017). Thus, China and South Africa were further 
empowered to do the following: exchange information, create opportunities, and identify 
common causes and strategies. This is intended to provide benefits for the publics in both 
countries by sharing economic, social, and cultural capital throughout the academic world, 
government, civil society, and business. Not only that, but in terms of general and technical 
professional activity in the two countries, China and South Africa highlighted technical 
exchanges and cooperation in public radio and television broadcasting, including the 
creation of communication and training opportunities (ibid). 
As pointed out above, the South Africa’s government’s priority is its economic development, 
based on a reduction in its unemployment rate and levels poverty. It also shares China’s 
opinion and view that economic development should be primary in foreign policy. As for 
economic interests, South Africa upgraded its ties with China as part of a comprehensive 
strategic partnership in 2010 (as mentioned above), based on the efforts of China’s public 
diplomacy activities in South Africa during the 2000s. Since then, China and South Africa’s 
relations have strengthened in the social and cultural, political, and economic spheres. 
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Bilateral ties between China and South Africa were enhanced when the two countries entered 
into several agreements in the mid-2010s. In 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pledged to President 
Zuma that “China will make South Africa a priority destination for oversea investment, and 
encourage and support the country’s industry”. China also promised South Africa that it 
would improve its contributions to the medical treatment for Ebola, marine economy, 
finance cooperation, nuclear power, and joint venture airlines (China.org.cn., 2014b). In the 
same year, South Africa also signed several strategic agreements with China intended to 
“strengthen bilateral relations, trade cooperation and create sustainable investment 
opportunities between the two countries”. The agreements included “the Five to-Ten Year 
Programme on Cooperation Between China and South Africa” which concentrated on 
bilateral cooperation, mutual political trust and strategic coordination, mutual cooperation 
on economic benefit and trade, people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, African affairs 
and China-Africa relations, and international affairs and BRICS-related issues. Not only that, 
but the two countries also agreed to enlarge their previous agreement over agriculture 
cooperation and phytosanitary measures (The Presidency, 2014). In 2014, the two countries’ 
leaders, Jacob Zuma and Xi Jinping, signed twenty-six agreements valued at R94 billion, 
and based on “the Five-to-Ten Year Programme on Cooperation Between China and South 
Africa”. The agreements were focused on the following six areas (The Presidency, 2015): 
a. Alignment of industries to accelerate South Africa’s industrialization process  
b. Enhancement of cooperation in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
c. Enhancement of marine cooperation 
d. Infrastructure development  
e. Human Resources cooperation 
f. Financial cooperation  
The agreements that South Africa made with China are associated with improving the 
existing Industrial Development Zones by establishing SEZs. The SEZs not only facilitate 
industrial and economic decentralization by creating new hubs in South Africa, but also 
boost job creation, investment, and economic development through trade with China (Cissé, 
2012b). South Africa did not have any SEZs in its country, so South African officials regularly 
visit China to receive training as a part of the aforementioned 2014 agreement. The training 
is made of learning about marketing tools and channels, planning, infrastructure 
development, financing and managing of SEZs, and how to deal with potential investors 
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(Xinhua News, 2016b). The new move of establishing SEZs is considered to be evidence of 
South Africa is adopting the Chinese development model; while, at the same time, attracting 
China’s investment and expanding trade with China. By extension, South Africa expects 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional integration through 
industrialization, mineral and infrastructure development with China. Based on Zuma’s 
pragmatic, regional approach, it paired China’s support for SADC’s infrastructure 
construction to establish a foothold for accelerated regional integration. By using its close-
knit economic relations with SADC members, South Africa could achieve its goal of economic 
growth through job creation (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). In the same vein, there was an 
attempt to encourage China’s investment and boost trade between the SADC and China. For 
example, the first SADC-China Trade Fair and Investment Forum in Johannesburg, in 2011. 
The Forum was called “IMEXPO”, and was supported by the Department of Trade and 
Industry of South Africa and the SADC Secretariat. The aim of the forum was “to show new 
markets and projects and to promote inter-Africa trade within SADC region. Traders from 
SADC and China will be able to form and build relationships”. A delegation of over 60 
companies from China and 13 from the 15 SADC countries attended the forum (Government 
Communication, 2011). As for China’s extensive economic cooperation in South Africa, 
China has reaffirmed its intention “to play a pivotal role in South Africa’s re-industrialization 
and development agenda, as well as to continue to be a strategic partner for South Africa in 
the bilateral and multilateral arena” as part of the win-win cooperation between both 
countries (SA News, 2015a). In light of this, Bradley (2016) pointed out that Zuma’s African 
National Congress (ANC) government is “increasingly hitching its fortunes to the economic 
potential of China’s rise” (p.884). 
From a political perspective, South Africa’s ANC and China’s CCP have closer relations than 
other African countries, because South Africa is only country to establish ties with China’s 
National People’s Congress after China set up the Parliamentary Regular Exchange 
Mechanism in 2011 (Bradley, 2016). South Africa has, therefore, adhered to China’s One 
China Policy since establishing diplomatic ties with China in 1998. Current President Zuma 
said that the One China Policy “address[es] the question of the territorial sovereignty of 
China as the sole and legitimate representative of all the people of that country, with which 
we have strong historical, political, economic and social relations”. At a meeting for aspect of 
South African Foreign Policy at the University of Pretoria in 2011, he also explained South 
Africa’s adoption of the One China Policy as “consistent with international law, which 
recognises the PRC as the sole and legitimate representative of all the people of China” (The 
Presidency, 2011). As a provision of China’s One China policy, the South African government 
canceled the Dalai Lama’s visa to attend the 14th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in 
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Cape Town in 2014. It was a third time in five years that the Dalai Lama’s visa was denied by 
the South African government (News 24, 2014b). In this regard, Anthony (2014) interpreted 
the situation as “economic and political ties with China now far outweigh the domestic South 
African opinion of a vocal, but ultimately minority, constituency”. And the incident damaged 
China’s reputation with the majority of South Africans, who have an ambivalent feeling 
about China. Olander, Standen, and Bradley argued that China and South Africa’s ties not 
only go beyond economic, ideological and political cooperation, but also more and more 
extend beyond the state-level connections between the ANC and CCP. Hence, the two ruling 
parties are on a “parallel engagement track” that seems entirely separated from that of “the 
day-to-day state-led diplomacy” between the two countries (Olander, Standen, and Bradley, 
2016). South Africa has been voting with China on a number of issues, including sensitive 
subjects such as human rights. Recently, South Africa has had common cause on the 
international stage with China over various issues, including voting against a 2016 United 
Nations resolution on the “promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet” alongside China and Russia. Moreover, South Africa, domestically, accepted 
considerable funding from China intended for the building of the ANC’s political school, in 
2014. Not only that, but the ANC sends many of its Members of Parliament and leaders to 
China for political education hosted by the Chinese government (News24, 2014a).  
Internationally, China and South Africa adhere to South-South cooperation; at the same time 
they share responsibilities to maintain international security and peace, climate change, and 
promote African’s development and reform of major international institutions (Niu, 2011). 
South Africa also takes part in multilateral forums (such as the G20, the BRICS, FOCAC, and 
BASIC) with China, and the pattern of its multilateral behavior clearly displays its alignment 
with China and other developing nations. In the same vein, the ANC has mapped out a 
noticeably anti-Western and pro-China path for its international relations (Bradley, 2016). 
South Africa also anticipates China to provide assistance for economic development and 
poverty reduction in South Africa and other African countries through BRICS. Deputy 
President Cyril Ramaphosa said that the two countries’ cooperation is “leading to new 




Although China established diplomatic ties with South Africa relatively late compared to 
other African countries, China and South Africa have now formed firm cooperative relations 
based on the efforts of former President Thabo Mbeki and current President Jacob Zuma. 
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However, there have been tensions due to the lopsided economic and trade relations 
between the two countries, which has mostly effected South Africa’s steel market, a key 
industry in South Africa for a long time. In addition, South Africa’s textile industry also faces 
possible collapse due to China’s dumping of exports in South Africa. Through public 
diplomacy, the Chinese government endeavors to plug the gap between China and South 
Africa to engender closer economic relations. However, China adopted a different public 
diplomacy approach in South African due to South Africa’s more advanced economy and 
developed financial and legal systems compared to other African countries. Also, the 
majority of the South African public is more concerned with education and not food supply, 
infrastructure and energy supply, governance, and foreign aid. Under these circumstances, 
China carries out its public diplomacy in the following ways: First, China utilizes its foreign 
aid to extensively expand its support in various fields, such as assisting in development of 
culture, environmental management, education, tourism, health and welfare, infrastructure 
construction, manufacturing, human resource, banking system, water resource utilization, 
transportation, housing, and others – rather than giving undue attention to and support for 
developing South Africa’s infrastructure. Through China’s public diplomacy based on foreign 
aid, the Bank of China, one of the biggest Chinese commercial banks, seized the opportunity 
to enter South Africa’s banking sector. The bank functions as a support for both Chinese and 
South African companies for mutual benefit. Second, the role of the media in China’s public 
diplomacy in South Africa is not only for introducing Chinese culture but also encouraging 
breakthroughs in resolving misunderstandings between South Africa’s public and Chinese 
companies. The media provides a deeper and better understanding of each other through 
journalist exchanges and a variety of seminars between the Chinese and South African media. 
Third, the role of Chinese culture and education institutions is not only to introduce Chinese 
culture and language to the South African public, including younger generations, but also to 
support South African government officials and staff at South African companies to boost 
tourism and increase opportunities for South Africans to get service and tourism jobs. Taken 
together, the role of China’s media, education and cultural institution influences not only the 
South African public, but also its business sector. China also promotes mutual benefits for 
China and South Africa through its public diplomacy activities in South Africa.  
Based on China’s public diplomacy activities, the South African public has divided opinions 
on China. It is true that the general image of China has improved and become more 
favorably in South Africa, compare to when China did not carry out its public diplomacy in 
earnest. However, the South African people are still wary due to their differing opinions on 
Chinese politics and ideology – for example, refusing the Dalai Lama’s visa and frequent 
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damage to its business sector caused by trade with China, especially with regards to South 
Africa’s steel and textile industries. However, the South African government welcomes 
relations with and support from China more than its public, because the government wants 
to attract Chinese companies’ investment as well as cooperation in technology, establishing 
factories, infrastructure, and others that are essential to South Africa’s economic growth. The 
leaders of the two countries signed 26 agreements based on the Five-to-Ten Year Programme 
on Cooperation in 2014, to create closer economic connections. Through deepened economic 
relations, political cooperation has also been strengthened. As a result of all of this, China 
expects to expand its influence on the African continent through the SADC to assist in its 
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The previous chapter examined the bilateral ties between China and Nigeria, and China and 
South Africa. This chapter aims to discuss the Forum on China-African Cooperation 
(FOCAC), including its background, purpose, procedures, participating institutions, and its 
direct/indirect effect on Sino-African relations. This is because bilateral ties between China 
and African countries are based on the agreed policy frameworks that were made through 
the FOCAC. Hence, this chapter focuses in particular on how China and African countries 
with conflicting interests can cooperate with each other through FOCAC mechanisms. It will 
also consider how much of a priority China’s public diplomacy has in the FOCAC to enhance 
cooperation, including economic relations in Sino-African relations. Furthermore, the 
chapter will examine how China’s public diplomacy activities reflect China’s wider 
understanding of the role of its relationship with Africa in the international system.  
This chapter’s discussion is connected to Chapter 5, which covered China’s African policy 
and its public diplomacy activities linked to economic growth. Hence, the chapter will mostly 
concentrate on the overall flow of FOCAC’s agenda, which is based on China’s public 
diplomacy strategy towards African countries and the involvement of institutions for mutual 
benefit and solving problems between China and Africa multilaterally, rather than analyzing 
detailed information on public diplomacy activities. Hence, it will begin with an introduction 
of the FOCAC before examining the contents of FOCAC, in conjunction with the institutional 
public diplomacy agenda to analyze not only the connection between the FOCAC and public 
diplomacy, but also the linkage between cooperation and institutions through the FOCAC. 
The second section will examine the correlation between public diplomacy and economic 
relations between China and African countries who participate in the FOCAC, institutions, 
and public diplomacy. The last section will evaluate the role of public diplomacy in China’s 
economic relations with Africa.  
 
7.1 Introduction of FOCAC 
  
In 2000, China established the FOCAC as a multilateral platform for cooperation and 
exchange in the areas of politics, economics, social development, and international 
development between China and the African countries with which it has formal diplomatic 
ties (Li and April, 2013). FOCAC, initially, was created as a new regional multilateral forum 
by China at the suggestion of African countries. Contrary to the belief that the Chinese 
government was solely responsible for FOCAC, the core of FOCAC’s establishment was 
African nations. In 1997, when envoys from Ethiopia and Mauritius visited China, they 
proposed the establishment of “one to multi partnerships” for cooperation in Sino-African 
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relations. Since then, many other African countries proposed that “a new kind of partnership 
with China” with fresh measures and innovative institutions based on large-scale, high-level 
contacts – similar in style to the US-Africa Business Forum, the British Commonwealth 
Conference, the Franco-African Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development, and the Africa-EU Summit – with increased communications about mutual 
concerns, such as development and peace. In 1999, the Foreign Minister of Madagascar 
referred to a “multilateral forum”, while talking with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, 
to strengthen relations between China and Africa. When African countries suggested the new 
framework of a multilateral forum in the late 1990s, the aim of cooperation between China 
and Africa shifted from projects to long-term strategic planning. Based on the African 
countries’ suggestion, China also keenly felt the necessity for building a permanent 
cooperative mechanism with African countries to cope with, or address Western competition 
in Africa. International economic globalization was also a contributing factor to the need for 
the FOCAC. In 1997, Zhao Changhui of the Exim Bank suggested pushing for cooperation 
with Africa as an overall strategy, including a plan that forms an inter-ministerial committee 
to shape and carry out the strategy. After two years, Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially 
proposed the first FOCAC Ministerial Conference to the Secretary-General of the then 
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) and all Heads of State of African 
Countries. Consequently, the FOCAC was formally established in 2000 (Li, et al., 2012, pp.7-
11; Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012, pp.16-17). The Chinese government defines FOCAC as 
“a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation 
and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls 
into the category of South-South cooperation”. The primary concerns of the FOCAC are: first, 
“pragmatic cooperation”, which focuses on expanding cooperation and strengthening 
consultation; second, “equality and mutual benefit”, which aims to boost economic 
cooperation, including trade and political dialogue for mutual development and 
reinforcement (FOCAC-b, n.a).  
FOCAC is especially focused on cooperation between China and Africa. Former President of 
China Jiang Zemin underlined the importance of cooperation at the Opening Ceremony of 
the FOCAC Ministerial Conference: “Despite twists and turns on the road ahead, there are 
bright prospects for this cause. So long as we work together tirelessly, we will surely achieve 
the great goals that we have been pursuing together and accomplish the lofty cause that we 
have been promoting” (FOCAC, 2009a). On the basis of cooperation, FOCAC influences “the 
central pillar in advancing China-Africa relations and is the arena for constructive diplomatic 
interaction” (Shelton and Paruk, 2008, p.2). Based on the official FOCAC definition, many 
scholars consider FOCAC as follows. Interviewee S-A3 (2017) views FOCAC as a great forum 
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for collecting various dialogs from different African countries at one time. Power and Alves 
(2012) described FOCAC as a “regularised structure”, and read it as “provid[ing] a public 
setting for celebrating the achievements of the relationship, an opportunity to formulate a 
raft of economic targets aimed at fostering mutual development interests and recalibrating 
policies to match these, as well as a stage to endorse common perspectives on global issues” 
(p.20). Plessis (2014) also argued that “the main goal of FOCAC is without a doubt based on 
greater co-operation and equality between partners” (p.122). To sum up, the forum provides 
the following conditions for Sino-African relations: first, promoting a long-term win-win 
relationship by developing cooperation and problem-solving in Sino-African ties; second, 
building a positive and advanced South-South cooperation through dialogue between China 
and Africa; third, opening the door for Chinese and African leaders to grow closer and share 
their views on policy coordination, inclusive commercial interaction, and common prosperity; 
finally, establishing policy frameworks and assembling an agenda of a common political and 
economy for mutual benefit for future constructive communication (Shelton and Paruk, 
2008, p.3-4). Not only that, FOCAC discusses diverse activities under a public diplomacy 
framework to enhance communication between China and African countries by using 
various instruments, such as Confucius Institutions, think tanks, media, human resource 
development, and others, to cement political trust and mutual economic interests. After 
launching the first FOCAC in October 2000 in Beijing, the forum convenes every three years 
to boost cooperation between China and African countries. Since 2000, a total of six FOCAC 
meetings have taken place; China’s first Africa policy was published to coincide with the 
third FOCAC, in 2006; and its second Africa policy was released in 2015, when the sixth 
FOCAC meeting was held. When we examine the six forums from 2000 to 2016, the common 
agenda between China and African countries was expanded upon and detailed at every 
triennial meeting. Furthermore, FOCAC set the stage for expanding Sino-African economic 
ties multilaterally on the global stage. To facilitate understanding of the mechanism of 
FOCAC, it is necessary to examine the contents of the six forums and institutions that are 
involved in FOCAC at the macro level. Then, we will discuss the detailed public diplomacy 
activities agenda, which are divided into media, education and culture.  
 
7.2 The contents of FOCAC in connection with public diplomacy agenda through 
the connections of institution  
 
The FOCAC is based on existing China and African relations (covered in Chapter 5), with 
additional consideration of practical economic issues (Brown and Chun, 2009) and public 
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diplomacy-related agendas to mitigate various issues that arise from Sino-African economic 
ties. The FOCAC process sprung from the convergence of various economic and political 
factors in China and Africa. Unlike Since the 2000s, the interaction between China and 
Africa has not only become more multidimensional and multi-layered, but there are also 
more diverse actors in policy-making and implementation (Brown and Chun, 2009). Hence, 
China and Africa’s common objectives have converged on mutual and equal benefit to pursue 
peace and development. This is articulated in two documents, the Declaration and the Plan 
of Action. The Declaration was issued at the first Minister Conference. It simply summed up 
the areas of mutual interest that needed progress from the Chinese and African delegations. 
And the Plan of Action contained more extensive information that provides a concrete path 
for the stakeholders’ relations with objectives to be carried out before the next Ministerial 
Conference, three years later (MacDonald, 2012). The following section will discuss the 
contents of the FOCAC (from the first to the sixth Ministerial Conference) to establish what 
kind of plans for mutual benefit were set up during the meetings. However, it is hard to cover 
all detailed contents of each ministerial conference, so the chapter will focus the core 
agendas, which marked a watershed in Sino-African multilateral relations.   
The 1st Ministerial Conference (October 2000 in Beijing, China): The aim of this conference 
was to discuss the establishment of a new, stable, and strong long-term partnership for 
economic cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit, and keeping pace with the new 
international political and economic order in the 21 century. The first meeting was attended 
by 44 African countries, over 80 Chinese ministers, 17 representatives of regional and 
international organizations (including OAU), and members of the Chinese and African 
business communities (FOCAC-a, n.a). During the conference, the Beijing Declaration of the 
FOCAC and “the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social development” 
were adopted for cementing and improving Sino-African ties.  
Through the first FOCAC meeting, the agenda related to finance, development assistance, 
and trade were notably crystallized. China established the China-Africa Products Exhibition 
Centre in China to not only boost bilateral trade but to also facilitate the introduction of 
African products into the Chinese market (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012). The 
Chinese government pledged to expunge or reduce 156 African loan debts, worth RMB10.9 
billion, held by the most heavily indebted and least developed African countries. Beijing also 
announced the establishment of the Human Resource Development Fund to Africa in order 
to train professionals for economic development (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012; 
FOCAC, 2013). King (2007) argued that the African Human Resource Development Fund 
was connected to “a new modality, the short-term training of African professionals in 
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different disciplines” (p.341). Notwithstanding the fact that the two sides did not establish a 
series of hard-and-fast targets during the first meeting, it laid the groundwork for a new level 
of interaction in education in various dimensions. At the first meeting, the two sides agreed 
to grapple with “specific cooperation projects” and “country-specific training plans” for their 
implementation (King, 2007). With this example providing momentum, therefore, 
successive scholarship mechanisms for long-term training such as a degree courses and 
dispatching Chinese teachers to Africa, were established to boost communication between 
Chinese and African universities. 
The 2nd Ministerial Conference (December 2003 in Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia): the 
second forum had the theme of “practical and action-oriented cooperation”, and was 
intended to produce positive results in three years – especially in the areas of the politics, 
trade, economics, and social development. At the forum’s opening ceremony, Premier Wen 
Jiabao proposed a four-point proposal,101 which was based on mutual support, consolidated 
consultation on the coordination of positions, and improved cooperation, to strengthen 
relations between China and Africa. The forum adopted the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-
2006), discussed the establishment of “a new type of partnership” in Sino-African relations 
for more practical and inclusive cooperation (FOCAC-c, n.a). The action plan contained 
different aspects when compared to plans that begin in 2006. It does not a) include “consular 
and judicial co-operation”, b) consider “increased exchanges between political parties, 
legislatures and local governments”, nor c) make preparations for “climate and 
environmental protection” in China and Africa (Plessie, 2014, p.121).  
Although the scale of aid that came out of the second conference remained small (King, 
2007), the outcomes of the second forum were also concentrated on the economic sector. 
China agreed to provide financial assistance for infrastructure development – such as roads, 
railway, and buildings – as a part of the second FOCAC agenda. In terms of trade, Chinese 
and African ministries (Commerce, Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and 
Economy) agreed on preferential market access for products from Africa to China so as to 
boost bilateral economic cooperation. Furthermore, trade agreements were signed by the 
two sides that fall within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework for making a 
better trade environment – such as harmonizing trade policies and trade negotiations for 
mutual benefits. As for investment, the agriculture sector received the most attention during 
                                                
101 The four proposal are first, continuing to keep the traditional friendship between China and Africa 
through mutual support; second, stimulating democratization of international relations via intensified 
consultation; third, coping with the globalization jointly with coordination of position; fourth, having 
advanced relations in Sino-African ties through enhanced cooperation.  
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the second FOCAC meeting. Through the outline of the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-
2006), the development policies for the sector were established. China also established 
policies for financial support for companies using MOFCOM and China’s Exim Bank for 
agriculture development in African countries. Not only the agriculture sector, but also the 
establishment of joint ventures was a key issue in China-Economic partnership, for business 
management exchanges and joint investment by enterprises on both sides. To boost 
investment, the second FOCAC meeting encouraged private, small-, and medium-sized 
enterprises in China and Africa. In this way, African countries produced good results such as 
job creation, technology transfer, and human resource development with Chinese support. 
Through the meeting, China set up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Nigeria, Egypt, 
Mauritius, Zambia, and Ethiopia, to encourage Chinese private, small-, and medium-sized 
companies to open their businesses in Africa (Cissé, 2012b). Moreover, to build on economic 
ties between China and Africa, the first China-Africa Business Conference was also held in 
tandem with the second FOCAC meeting. The amount of US$1 billion was signed by twenty-
one cooperation agreement when over 500 Chinese and African entrepreneurs attended the 
meeting. Also, China agreed to exempt from custom duties 190 tariff items exported from the 
28 least-developed African countries (ChinAfrica, 2012).  
The culture and education sectors were also addressed during the second FOCAC forum. The 
education-related detailed agenda was officially established through the Addis Ababa Action 
Plan (2004-2006). According to the plan, China pledged to provide aid for human resource 
development and training of African personnel in various fields over three years, and 
supported higher education and technical and vocational education and training institutions 
to enhance and strengthen its disciplines and fields of specialization with new a scholarship 
system and communication exchanges (King, 2007). Beijing also extended tourism 
cooperation to African countries: sponsoring both “Meet in Beijing” (an international arts 
festival for African arts), “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa”, increasing people-to-people 
exchanges with Africa, and proposing the “China-Africa Youth Festival” that was held in 
China in 2004 (FOCAC-c, n.a). Based on the plan’s agenda of the second FOCAC meeting, 
the Chinese government made 382 different assistance agreements with African countries, 
and agreed to train 12,600 African professionals. Beijing also granted 17 African countries 
the Approved Destination Status for Chinese (FOCAC, 2012a).  
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The 3rd Ministerial Conference and the Beijing Summit102 (November 2006 in Beijing, 
China): the two meetings were held under the banner of “friendship, peace, cooperation, and 
development”. Due to the participation of top political leaders, the third FOCAC was 
designated a “summit” rather than a conference. The plan for China and Africa’s relationship 
took more concrete shape through the adoption of the “Declaration of the Beijing Summit of 
the FOCAC” and the “Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)”, in which 48 African countries joined. 
The 2006 Beijing Action plan is of upmost importance as it not only covered extensively the 
“new type of strategic partnership” in Sino-African relations, but also became a template for 
all future FOCAC action plans after 2006 (Plessis, 2014). At the opening ceremony of the 
Beijing Summit of FOCAC, then-President Hu also interpreted “the new type of strategic 
partnership” as follows: “Building strong ties between China and Africa will not only promote 
development of each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation among developing 
countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new international political and 
economic order”. Hu stressed “friendship”, “mutual trust”, “mutual support”, “common 
development” for “the forging of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership” in politics, 
economics, a balanced and harmonious global development, and international affairs 
(especially security cooperation) (FOCAC, 2006b).  
To fulfil the new type of China and Africa strategic partnership and cement the two parties’ 
cooperation, Hu suggested the following eight steps at the Summit (FOCAC, 2009a):  
a. By 2009, China doubles its assistance to Africa (based on 2006 level); 
b. China provides US$3 billion for preferential loans and US$2 billion for preferential 
buyer’s credit to Africa;  
c. By establishing the China-Africa Development Fund, it will raise US$5 billion to 
encourage and support Chinese companies to invest in Africa;  
d. China constructs the African Union Conference Centre to support Africa’s unity and 
the African integration process;  
e. Beijing cancels those debts that matured in 2005, owed by the most heavily indebted 
and least-developed African countries; 
                                                
102 The Beijing Summit initiated to celebrate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between 
China and African countries. The summit jointly introduced to the two sides at the third FOCAC 
meeting in 2006. 
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f. China increases the number of export items from 190 to over 440, and offers zero-
tariff treatment to the least-developed African countries;  
g. China establishes three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa;  
h. Beijing trains 15,000 African professionals; dispatches 100 senior agriculture experts 
and 300 youth volunteers to Africa; establishes ten special agriculture technology 
demonstration centres, building 30 hospitals, 30 malaria prevention and treatment 
centres, and 100 rural schools in Africa, rendering RMB300million grant for 
providing artemisinin; and increase Chinese government scholarships for African 
students from 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year, by 2009.  
The 4th Ministerial Conference (November 2009 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt): the theme for 
this conference was deepening the new type of strategic partnership in China and Africa 
relations. During the conference, Chinese and African delegations present adopted the 
“Declaration of Sharm El Sheik” and the “Sharm El Sheik Action Plan (2010-2012)”. Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao also announced five new measures103 in addition to those Chinese 
President Hu proposed at the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC in 2006, to further enhance 
cooperation between China and Africa. Wen highlighted China’s constant support for Africa 
thus: “Whatever change may take place in the world… our policy of supporting Africa’s 
economic and social development will not change” (FOCAC, 2009c).  
After the conference, China and Africa made new progress on cultural exchanges and 
cooperation on trade, development, political economy, FOCAC institution building, and on 
other areas. From an economic perspective of the fourth FOCAC, China put less emphasis on 
loans and grants, instead underlining the importance of capacity building and technology 
transfer to Africa when compared to previous Ministerial Conferences. By extension, Beijing 
announced its support for the African Union by extending its range of activities in Africa and 
international affairs (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012). China offered support in the 
form of US$10 billion in concessional loans and US$1 billion in special loans for African 
small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and promised US$966 million for 38 specific 
African SME projects. Beijing also cancelled the debts of the poorest and least-developed 
African countries that were due by the end of 2009. In addition, the least-developed Africa 
counties received the benefit of zero-tariff treatment for 60 percent of their exports to China. 
                                                
103  The five new measures are: first, China proposes to establish a China-Africa partnership to 
deliberate climate change; second, China will enhance cooperation with Africa in the fields of 
technology and science; third, China will support Africa to establish financing capacity; fourth, China 
will further open up its market to African products; lastly, China will improve cooperation with Africa 
in agriculture (FOCAC, 2009d).  
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Apart from economic assistance, the fields of climate change, scientific and technology 
transfer received attention, and projects in the area of agriculture, education, human 
resource, health, and cultural exchange were expanded. As a result, China announced nearly 
150 clean energy projects, including five new agro-technology demonstration centers, 
coupled with dispatch of 300 Chinese specialists to Africa. Not only that, China supported 30 
hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers in African countries. Through the 
China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Program, China held nearly 90 projects 
for joint research and demonstration, and invited 42 African researchers to conduct their 
post-doctoral studies in China by the end of 2011. China also supported the China-Africa 
Joint Research and Exchange Program, thereby carrying out Chinese and African academic 
institution projects, holding international seminars in both China and in Africa, and 
sponsored Chinese and African scholars for academic visits and exchanges (FOCAC, 2012a).  
The 5th Ministerial Conference (November 2012 in Beijing, China): the number of 
conference attendees was increased to include important personnel from each African 
country and institution. Chinese President Hu Jintao, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
and African leaders attended the opening ceremony. Fifty Chinese and African foreign 
ministers for international economic cooperation joined the conference. The theme of the 
Conference was “build[ing] on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new 
type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. With that goal in mind, the Beijing Declaration 
and the Beijing Action Plan (2012-2015) were adopted to bring about new cooperative 
programs to be carried out over the next three years. At the opening ceremony of the 
Conference, Hu delivered a speech focusing on deepening cooperation between China and 
Africa (FOCAC, 2012b):  
China and Africa should, with both current and long-term needs in mind, redouble 
efforts to draw up a blueprint for promoting our cooperation in the next stage and lay 
a solid foundation for making new and greater progress in growing China-Africa 
relations in the years ahead. 
Hu also suggested taking new steps to open new prospects for forming a new type of China-
Africa strategic partnership by “strengthening political mutual trust, expanding practical 
cooperation, increasing cultural and people-to-people exchange, developing coordination 
and cooperation in international affairs, and making FOCAC stronger”. Thus, the Chinese 
government pledged to adopt measures in the five areas as follows. As part of the measures, 
China committed to provide a US$20 billions line of credit for the development of 
infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and small- and medium-sized enterprises in 
 252 
African countries, to support their sustainable development. In a bid to implement China’s 
public diplomacy, Beijing carried out its “Brightness Action” activities as a part of health 
cooperation for African people, and the “African Talent Program” to strengthen the African 
people’s abilities – for example, training 30,000 personnel in diverse sectors, offering 
18,000 government scholarships, and building cultural and vocational skills training 
facilities in Africa. China initiated water supply projects in Africa to provide safe drinking 
water (FOCAC, 2013). To improve understanding between China and Africa, China proposed 
the “China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Action” in order to promote and support 
cooperation and exchanges between people’s organizations, especially between women and 
youth. China also suggested a “China-Africa Press Exchange Center” in China to boost China 
and Africa’s media, including correspondent exchanges between media organizations in 
China and African nations. In addition, China proposed the “China-Africa Joint Research 
and Exchange Plan” to support 100 academic and scholarship programs research, exchanges, 
and cooperation from the both sides. The purpose of China’s public diplomacy-related plans 
and activities was to establish solid public support for improving China-Africa common 
development (FOCAC, 2012b). At the conference, China highlighted its support for the 
African integration process through enhancing capacity. President Hu said, 
China’s relations with all African countries, the African Union (AU) and other regional 
organizations have grown in strength. China has formed strategic partnerships and 
launched strategic dialogue mechanisms with many African countries. And China has 
supported African countries in independently resolving hotspot issues in the region 
and advancing the process of African integration. […]  China will establish a 
partnership with Africa on transnational and trans-regional infrastructural 
development, support related project planning and feasibility studies and encourage 
established Chinese companies and financial institutions to take part in transnational 
and trans-regional infrastructural development in Africa. China will help African 
countries upgrade customs and commodity inspection facilities to promote intra-
regional trade facilitation. (FOCAC, 2012b) 
Not only that, but China paid more attention to Africa’s peace, and security by supporting 
the African Union. To that end, the Chinese government started the “Initiative on China-
Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” to support and cement ties between 
the African Union and African countries; financed the “AU peace-keeping missions” and the 
“development of the African Standby Force”; and trained the African Union’s security and 
peace-related officials and peacekeepers (FOCAC, 2013). 
 253 
The 6th Ministerial Conference (3rd December 2015) and the second FOCAC Summit (4th-5th 
December 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa): The sixth Conference was held alongside 
the second Summit. Attending the Summit were Chinese President Xi Jinping, fifty African 
heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and 
heads of international and regional organizations (The UN, 2015b). They met with all leaders 
in Africa for the first time, an example of the deepening cooperation. The theme of the 
Summit was “Africa-China Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common 
Development”, and it led to the adoption of the “Johannesburg Declaration” and 
“Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)”, which outlined concrete measures for cementing 
the growing mutual partnership in Sino-African relations for the next three years after 
reviewing the status of previous agreements made at the first Summit. 
At the Summit, Xi proposed ten major plans for China-Africa cooperation in different areas 
over the next three years: industrialization, agriculture modernization, infrastructure, green 
development, financial services, trade and investment facilities, poverty reduction and public 
welfare, public heath, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security.  The purpose of 
the plans was to upgrade Sino-African relations to a comprehensive strategic cooperative 
partnership. As for the initiatives, Xi said that “China-Africa relations have today reaches a 
stage of growth unmatched in history. […] Let’s join hands and open a new era of China-
Africa win-win cooperation and common development” (FOCAC, 2015a). Xi pledged US$60 
billion104 to help African countries’ address the impediments hindering their independent 
and sustainable development. Hence, Xi offered to assist in the areas of infrastructure, 
financial problem, industrialization, and agriculture modernization through public 
diplomacy activities aimed at the African public. A new suggestion at the Summit was that, 
for agriculture cooperation, China offered to set up a “10+10 cooperation mechanism” for 
agriculture research between the two sides, and implement “agriculture development 
projects” in 100 African villages to improve Africans’ standard of living in rural area. As a 
part of its public diplomacy, China also proposed to launch “Happy Life projects” and 
programs for women and children. Beijing established regional vocational education centers 
and capacity-building colleges for African countries, providing training for 200,000 
technicians in Africa and 40,000 training opportunities in China. With regards to security 
cooperation, Xi announced US$60 billion in free aid for the African Union, and said, “China 
will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and support African 
                                                
104 The financial support included US$5 billion in free aid and interest-free loans, additional capital 
for the China and Africa Development Fund, and the Special Loan for the Development of African 
SMEs. Also, it included US$35 billion for preferential loans and export credits on more favorable 
terms, and US$5 billion for a China-Africa production capacity cooperation fund, with a starting 
capital of US$10 billion.  
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countries’ capacity building in areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, 
customs and immigration control” (FOCAC, 2015a).  
For the broader perspective, China and Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
the Promotion of China-Africa for practical cooperation between China and the African 
Union, across many different fields: such as industrialization, highways, railways, regional 
aviation networks, and utilizing existing cooperation mechanism including the Joint 
Working Group of Transnational and Transregional Infrastructure Cooperation in Africa 
(FOCAC, 2015b). China also offered to promote major shared priorities, specifically 
comprehensive economic growth for sustainable development through poverty reduction 
and the allocation of adequate resources, as stipulated by Africa’s Agenda 2063, which 
included the First Ten Year Implementation Plan, China’s New Five-Year Plan and Two 
Centenary Goals, and the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. In this way, the African Union (AU, 2015) interpreted China’s new 
focus on Africa’s sustainable development as “the 2nd FOCAC Summit afford[ing] the right 
opportunity to share the African Union’s new strategic direction in addressing its 
development and integration agenda.”  
Looking at the events and agreements from the first six FOCAC summits, the main aim of 
Sino-Africa relations has been to grow closer through the Forum. This was reflected in each 
Forum’s theme, which changed from “long-term partnership for economic cooperation” at 
the first Forum, to “companionship” at the sixth Forum, at which China expressed its desire 
for “Africa-China Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development”.  
The action plans, declarations, and outcomes from all six Forums displayed Africa’s 
perspectives influencing the economic (trade and investment) relations, and their attempt to 
relieve the asymmetry in the relationships between China and African countries. Not only 
that, China also embraced African countries’ needs from China, which were, first, support for 
African economic development through investment, aid, infrastructure, and trade; second, to 
support African nations’ political legitimacy and recognition in bilateral interactions and in 
multilateral fora, such as at the World Bank and the United Nations (Hanauer and Morris, 
2014); and, third, render necessary assistance for the development of younger African 
generations, welfare, media, medical fields, and others to aid Africa’s future development 
and poverty alleviation (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). At the first Summit in 2006, 
Ghanaian President John Kufuor stated his view on the Sino-Africa relations through 
FOCAC, that China is a partner who could help the New Partnership for Africa Development 
(NEPAD) become a world economic power (MFA, 2006). Consequently, as explained above, 
the notable outcome was China’s agreement to pledge financial aid to Africa. At the third 
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Forum, Hu suggested US$5 billion for preferential loans and preferential buyer’s credit to 
Africa; and a further US$100 billion by the next Ministerial Meeting, through the 
Declaration. At the next FOCAC meeting, China pledged US$11 billion in concessional loans, 
including a special credit for SMEs, and US$966 million for its projects. China doubled its 
financial aid at the fifth Forum, committing to provide US$20 billion for Africa’s sustainable 
development. At the sixth Forum, China pledged US$60 billion in free aid to the African 
Union. In addition to financing for loans and business, China supported training programs, 
agriculture sector development, medical development (including hospital development), 
alternative energy, and Africa’s integration, security, peace, and others. The program for 
sectors receiving aid and attention becomes more detailed and expansive with every new 
Ministerial Meeting. In relation to this, Alden (2014) argued that the situation is 
a convergence that reflects the obvious economic asymmetries between China’s 
activist form of state-led capitalism and Africa’s exploitation of its under-developed 
resource based to attract Chinese investment and, concurrently, the paradoxical 
political symmetry implied in the mutual commitment to sovereign equality. (p.364) 
However, when one draws a line between FOCAC and China’s first and second Africa policy, 
which clearly represented China’s views, the two documents contain a wide-ranging 
discussion and view of the ministerial meetings and summits. The recent FOCAC also 
focused on Africa’s industrialization, infrastructure, health, agriculture, culture, people-to-
people relations, and human resources development so as to deepen cooperation (Mthembu, 
2016). Nevertheless, interviewee S-A3 (2017) pointed out that China’s second Africa policy 
focused on Africa’s industrial development over infrastructure to achieve the dream Agenda 
2063, although Agenda 2063 needs infrastructure development for regional integration. 
Albeit there is a divergence of opinion over which sector needs to prioritize between China 
and Africa, China makes a lot of effort to cement relations through bridge the gap that arises 
from lopsided Sino-African ties. At FOCAC, China is conscious of the asymmetric relations 
between itself and Africa, especially with regards to economic ties. To improve the situation, 
China introduced the “Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development”, which was adopted at the first Ministerial Conference. The Programme 
clearly specifies what needs improving in the economic relationship between China and 
Africa:  
The Ministers note the necessity to move towards balanced and enhanced trade and 
acknowledge the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in 
diversifying the composition of African exports. They pledge to collaborate and share 
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experience in overcoming Africa's export dependence on primary commodities, single 
products and raw materials… promote two-way trade and facilitate access for products 
to the Chinese market… providing better and preferential access to the Chinese market 
for Africa export of commercial importance. (FOCAC, 2009b) 
In addition to trade, investment also reflected Africa’s views of the development of African 
enterprises and locals “through bilateral and/or trilateral cooperation channels”. In the 
natural resource sector, which provokes criticism from African countries and the West, 
China agreed to “promote investment in, and exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical 
resources and that such beneficiation should be done in Africa” (ibid) for mutual benefit. 
Besides, China promotes activities connected with international institutions, when delivering 
on commitments to African countries. For example, China pledged to establish agriculture 
demonstration centers across the African continent, and set up 10 in 2006 and 30 in 2009, 
in cooperation with the United Nations’ (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (The 
UN, 2015c), as suggested by the Programme, rather than working unilaterally. Rather than 
disregarding Africa’s domestic situations, China worked with African countries for mutual 
benefit. After the second Summit, the strategic partnership aspect of Sino-Africa relations 
took more concrete shape (see table, below), which underlined mutual concerns in individual 
sectors. This led to various cooperative activities, such as in political affairs and regional 
peace and security, cooperation in the field of development, economic cooperation, 
cooperation in international affairs, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges and 
cooperation. The sphere of cooperative activities so far covers all levels and fields of African 
society (MacDonald, 2012).  
Table 7: The chronology of cooperation, based on main commitments of FOCAC 
Cooperation 
Field 








Investment o o o o o o 




o o o o o o 
Debt Relief o x o o o o 
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Zero-Tariff treatment x o o o o o 




o o o o o o 
People-to-people 
exchange 
x o o o o o 
Welfare assistance o o o o o o 
Media x x x o o o 
Tourism x o o o o o 
Agriculture x o o o o o 
Environmental 
Protection 
x x o o o o 
Security o o o o o o 
 
Note. Organized by author based on the information on FOCAC.org 
 
7.2.1 The mechanism and Institutions of FOCAC  
To streamline consultation between China and Africa, joint follow-up mechanisms at various 
levels were established through “the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and 
Social Development” at the first FOCAC, agreed upon by all parties. Based on the agreement, 
the Senior Official Preparatory Meeting for the Ministerial Conference is held a few days 
before, and the Senior Official Follow-up Meeting is held a year before the conference. Also, 
a meeting of the Chinese Follow-up Committee and African diplomats in China is arranged 
twice per year to facilitate good results from the follow-up actions. The Ministerial 
Conference is held every three years to assess the progress adopted and implemented by the 
Programme during the conference (FOCAC, 2013).  
FOCAC is a multilateral cooperation platform with multi-level interactions between China 
and African countries (Li, et al., 2012). Hence, it is composed of 28 member departments 
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including agencies of the Chinese Follow-up Committee, which was set up in November 
2000. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce are in charge of FOCAC, 
and the Committee members have irregular plenary meetings to report on the 
implementation of FOCAC measures. In addition, the following Chinese departments take 
part in FOCAC for public diplomacy-related activities: Agriculture, Science and Technology, 
Education, Health, Culture, Environmental Protection, Land and Resources, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Information Office of the State Council, State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the Beijing Municipal Government, the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the Bank of China, the People’s Bank of 
China, the Export-Import Bank, the China Africa Development Fund, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade, the General Administration of Customs, and the National Tourism Administration. In 
addition, the Committee has a secretariat that consists of two separate parts: one is made up 
of director general-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Culture; the second is the director general of the 
Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, functioning as the Secretary 
General under the management of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (FOCAC, 2013). The majority of Chinese departments involve in FOCAC also 
manage and supervise public diplomacy activities related to society, culture, media, tourism, 
education, and finance in China. In addition to China’s Follow-Up Committee of the FOCAC, 
there are also four African institutional groups – African Diplomatic Corps, Senior Officials 
of African Countries, African Foreign Ministers, African Union – involve in a similar process 
of consultation, feedback, and implementation. Besides these four institutions, there are 
three others that facilitate the implementation of FOCAC projects at the national and 
regional levels: African Ambassadors in China, follow-up committees in the relevant 
departments in African countries, and sub-regional organizations. While the Chinese Follow-
up Committee has a centralized and unified structure, the African institutions in FOCAC 
feature multilateral/bilateral and centralized/decentralized organizations that speak for 
Sino-African relations (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012). The role of the African institutions 
in FOCAC, is to serve not only as exchanges and modifiers of FOCAC measures for the 
further improvement of Sino-Africa relations Follow-up Committee, but also to forge 
connections between collaborative programs of FOCAC and African countries to smooth 
progress. However, the African side is less centralized when compared to the Chinese. For 
example, South Africa and Ethiopia only have specific offices for FOCAC follow-up, unlike 
other African countries that have a specific desk to manage Sino-related affairs (The UN, 
2015a). Moreover, unlike China’s institutionalized Follow-Up Committee, Africa does not 
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have a core institution that coordinates and manages follow-up in African countries. Thus, 
each African country manages its own follow-up actions (Li, et al., 2012).  
As referred to earlier, FOCAC is a platform for multilateral cooperation with multiple levels 
of interaction between China and African countries. For multilateral cooperation, FOCAC 
follows a process of preparation and formation for a series of Declarations, Action Plans, and 
Programmes that are based on multi-level interaction. The center of the mechanism is the 
interaction between heads of state from all sides; the second level is comprised of senior 
officials’ meetings; the final level of interaction is between diplomats and the host countries 
(Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012). As for the decision-making procedure of FOCAC, China 
assumes the lead in fulfilling commitments, such as hosting the meetings and combining 
suggestions and opinions (see figure, below). 
Figure 9: The procedure of multi-level interaction of FOCAC for decision making 
 
Note. Adopted from Li, et al., 2012 
7.2.2 FOCAC and Institutions 
Besides the strengthened economic ties between China and Africa, China and Africa affirmed 
their solidarity and expanded their dialogue through the South-South agenda before the 
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establishment of the FOCAC. Based on the same objective as South-South agenda, China and 
Africa have pursued stronger voices in the international arena and at international 
institutions such as the UN, WTO, IMF, and World Bank (Shelton and Paruk, 2008). The 
South-South cooperation is an effective tool in the FOCAC framework for strengthening 
Sino-Africa relations; it helps to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
alleviates poverty to dramatically cut down on social and economic ills in Africa countries. 
Through the framework, China has been giving its assistance to Africa in the fields of health, 
infrastructure development, agriculture, and education (UN, 2005).  
One thing to note in connection with FOCAC is that the institutionalization is visible beyond 
bilateral relations with African countries, and can be seen in multilateral relations with the 
African continent (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012). China has gradually engaged regional, sub-
regional, and international organizations in providing active support to strengthen the 
African voice regionally and internationally, and to clarify information although dialogue 
and consultation underlie the process of FOCAC and its related cooperation (The UN, 2015a). 
By extension, China seeks to expand and create multilayered transnational government 
networks through FOCAC (Sohn, 2011). In this regard, Plessis (2014) said that “FOCAC 
institutionalised China and Africa’s relations and functioned as the ideal mechanism to 
manage contemporary China-Africa relations” (p.117). Through the FOCAC framework, 
China supports African integration via the African Union and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme, including regional efforts. Furthermore, at the 
second Summit in 2015, Beijing pledged to cooperate with the African Union’s Agenda for 
Regional and Continental Integration and Development through programs such as Agenda 
2063, including the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 (FOCAC, 2015a). 
As previously mentioned, FOCAC and the African Union cooperate closely, and the 
cooperation has become stronger over time. The Africa Union Commission joined as a full 
member of the FOCAC in 2011, at the Senior Officials’ meeting in China. A year later, China 
gifted the construction of the African Union headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, at a cost 
of around US$200 million. After three years, the African Union signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with China on industrial development and to improve transportation 
networks on the Africa continent. About this Zuma said, “It was in that meeting that we 
discussed what we think is important for Africa to attain its vision and objective of a 
prosperous, united and peaceful Africa guided by its people." (AllAfrica, 2015). In 2015, 
China has officially opened its permanent mission to the African Union headquarters for 
cementing diplomatic relations with African countries on the African continent 105 . In 
                                                
105 For more information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/08/c_134219455.htm 
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addition, China set up a forum for economics and trade, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), in 2008. China also cemented its relations with the South African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012) to contribute to regional integration – for example, 
with the establishment of the Great COMESA-SADC-EAC (East African Community) Free 
Trade Zone.  
China expands its cooperation multilaterally by approaching growth from the bottom-up, 
and from inside-out through regional organizations and international institutions not only to 
strengthen economic ties, but also to deepen relations between China and Africa. This 
connects with the background of FOCAC’s aim to enhance cooperation and equality between 
China and Africa. FOCAC also functions as the ideal institution to coordinate Sino-African 
relations. There are two main ways in which FOCAC restructures Sino-African relations: first, 
FOCAC creates coordination for Chinese interventions in Africa; second, FOCAC encourages 
the level of cooperation between China and Africa. The deeper Sino-African relations become, 
the more the interaction between the two sides is complicated by diverse actors on both sides. 
Hence, individuals, workers, entrepreneurs, and multinational companies, local, provincial, 
and national governments play an active role on the international stage under the FOCAC 
framework (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012; Plessie, 2014).  Under the FOCAC framework, there 
are various subsidiary forums aimed not only at widening and cementing cooperation 
between China and Africa, but also improving the quality of the content of FOCAC. The sub-
forums cover science and technology, agriculture, culture, think tanks, NGOs, media, finance, 
youth, women, law, and local governments (FOCAC, 2013).  
 
7.3 Overview of economic relations between China and African countries 
among FOCAC, institutions, and public diplomacy  
7.3.1 The economic sector related institutions 
As discussed in Chapter 5, China and Africa have had robust economic relations (mostly 
through trade and investment) since 2000. Since the FOCAC’s establishment in 2000, the 
trade volume between China and African countries has expanded significantly. This has 
made China the largest trading partner with African countries today (more information on 
this can be found in Chapter 5). As part of the FOCAC initiatives that strengthen trade, 
investment, and aid in Sino-Africa relations, the China-Africa Business Council (CABC), the 
China and Africa Development Fund (CADFund), and SEZs were created. After adopting the 
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first FOCAC action plan, all economic tools have been utilized by China with a view to 
cooperating with African countries (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012).  
The CABC is the first Public Private Partnership (PPP) initiative model between China and 
Africa, under the auspices of the South-South cooperation (CABC, 2015) and the 
“Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development” that was 
created during the first Ministerial Conference. The United Nation Development Program 
(UNDP) provided US$1 million in initial seed capital (ERA, October 2009). As a non-profit 
organization and an adjunct to FOCAC, the CABC was jointly established by the UNDP, the 
China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange, and the China Society for 
Promotion of the Guangcai Program, in 2005. The Chinese central government officially 
approved as part of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2006. The core aim of the CABC is to 
“establish a strong international network of international organizations, national investment 
agencies, chambers of commerce, industry associations and civil society organizations to 
address socioeconomic development issues”. In addition to its economics-related aims, the 
CABC aims to also improve infrastructure, promote vocational education, address poverty, 
health, gender equality issues (UNCTAD, 2017, pp.1-2). The CABC is designed to boost 
China-Africa trade and investment through a close relationship between the Chinese 
government and private sector, the latter of which includes over 16,500 Chinese private 
companies. The CABC has offices in China and six African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania). In 2008, the CABC held a seminar that 
concentrated on the impact of the global financial crisis on China-Africa commercial 
relations, and concluded that the FOCAC provided a sold framework through which China 
and Africa can address global crises (ERA, 2009).  
The council provides the following services: organizing business visits between China and 
Africa, analyzing investment opportunities; providing advanced information service through 
the CABC’s own database and publications (such as Chinese Enterprises in Africa 2015, 
Guide for Chinese Companies to Invest in Africa 2016, and The Third United Republic of 
Tanzania-China Business Forum Handbook); offering financial services using domestic and 
international financial institutions, such as the China Development Bank, the CAD Fund, 
and the IFC, human resource service such as organizing workshops and training members; 
holding exhibitions in China and Africa for trade, investment, and technology transfer 
(CABC, 2015; UNCTAD, 2017). In 2015, the CABC’s expenditures were around US$744,000; 
most spent on employees, services, goods, and operating costs. The council organized the 
following events in 2016 related to finance, investment, agriculture, think tank, and welfare 
(ibid): 
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a. Action makes vision reality; 
b. Signing of the cooperation agreement between the China-Africa Business Council and 
the China-Africa Development Fund; 
c. Forum on Angola’s Investment Environment and Legal Risks; 
d. China-Nigeria Forum on Productive Capacity and Investment cooperation; 
e. China-Côte d’Ivoire Conference on Agriculture cooperation; 
f. China-Mozambique Forum on Productive Capacity and Investment Cooperation; 
g. Fifth China-Africa Think Tank Forum; 
h. Commencing the potential of pharmaceuticals in the socioeconomic transformation 
of Africa; 
i. Twenty-sixth ordinary session of the African Union Assembly and signing of the 
cooperation agreement with the Organization of African First Ladies against 
HIV/AIDS. 
The CADFund is one of the “Eight Measures” for China-Africa practical cooperation 
announced by President Hu Jintao at the 2006 Beijing Summit of FOCAC. A year later, the 
fund, “an Africa-focused equity investment fund”, was officially launched by the Chinese 
government with the aim of supporting and boosting investment by Chinese enterprises in 
Africa. The Fund mainly serves Chinese firms that invest in Africa and seeks Chinese 
partners for African projects. It is a vehicle for equity investment, quasi-equity investment, 
and fund investment (CADFund-a, n.a). Grimm and Schickerling (2013) argue “[it] forms 
part of the Chinese government’s practical implementation, for some of its plans and 
objectives, for the African continent”, and that “the Fund is an economic and diplomatic tool 
of the Chinese government” to achieve its goals in Africa (p.1). So, the CADFund focuses on 
improving capacity building of the African economy and enabling cooperation between 
China and Africa using direct investment and advisory services (ibid). The Fund supports to 
boost Africa’s industrialization and agricultural modernization, energy sector, transportation, 
telecommunication facilities, trade zones, and sustainable development. Thus, the 
CADFund’s priority investment areas are as follows: first, providing capital financing for 
companies that invest in Africa and sharing in their risk; second, connecting African projects 
with Chinese companies and vice versa; third, providing value-added services, supporting 
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companies that are in difficult circumstances in Africa’s investment environment (CADFund-
a, n.a).  
A representative office of the CADFund was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2016, which is 
not only the second representative office of CADFund in eastern African countries but also 
the first regional office in East African Community countries. The Fund’s five overseas 
representative offices are located in Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, and South Africa (CADFund, 
2016). The CADFund is fully financed by the China Development Bank, which also supports 
China’s infrastructure development projects and encourages basic and strategic industries 
(ERA, October 2009). The total amount of the Fund has gradually increased to US$10 billion 
(as of 2016). In 2007, the Fund was worth US$5 billion (including the initial US$1 billion), 
and added an additional US$2 billion after the Conference of Chinese and African 
Entrepreneurs, which was held in conjunction with the 2012 FOCAC. Chinese President Xi 
Jinping pledged US$5 billion to the Fund at the Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC in 2015. 
The CADFund works in tandem with over 1,000 companies, including over 500 investment 
projects in Africa; and has invested more than US$3.5 billion in 87 projects in 36 African 
countries. The projects are steer the investment of Chinese companies in Africa, and support 
sustainable development in Africa through investment (CADFund, 2016). Examples of the 
Fund’s activities include (Grimm and Schickerling, 2013): 
a. US$22.6 million invested in a cotton cultivation project in Malawi, Mozambique, and 
Zambia; 
b. US$16.4 million invested in a power plant in Ghana; 
c. US$50.9 million invested in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector;  
d. Reserving shares in SEZs, Lekki in Nigeria and Suez in Egypt.  
While China established the China-led institutions and plans for cooperation through 
multilayered and multilateral networks through FOCAC, a difference of opinion between 
China and Africa on FOCAC nevertheless exists. The first problem is the China-centric 
operating system. In other words, China is “in control of the whole process and […] sets the 
agenda and the declarations and outcomes” (Taylor, 2012, p.31). Structurally, Africa does not 
have centralized institutions and mechanisms to collect African countries’ opinions as 
discussed earlier. Therefore, it is difficult for the FOCAC to express the views of African 
heads of state (MacDonald, 2012). Ian Taylor (2011) argued that “A key issue facing Africa’s 
engagement with FOCAC is that the continent lacks a consistent and unified collective policy 
to connect with Beijing” (p.94). In the same vein, interviewee S-A3 (2017) argued that “it is 
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so urgent for Africa to set up China policy like the Africa policy, which China established 
towards African countries, to have equal relations with China”. Li, et al (2012) indicated the 
structural problem with FOCAC regarding the decision-making process and collecting 
dialogue from African countries; suggesting the need to give the AU greater input between 
China and Africa in the operation FOCAC. Thus, they proposed the establishment of an office 
at the AU, like the Chinese Follow-up Committee, to cooperate with China through efficient 
and effective communication and coordination. In 2011, the Chinese government has invited 
the African Union Commission to become a full member of the FOCAC, and also provided 
financial support to the AU. So far, nothing has happened with regards to an organized 
African institution related to FOCAC and a bottom-up approach to solving Africa’s chronic 
problems. In this context, interviewee S-C2 (2017) pointed out that the general South African 
public does not know much about the FOCAC nor its functions, unlike the government and 
other high ranking positions. The second problem is the level transparency of China’s aid 
commitments related to FOCAC action plans. Interviewee S-C1 (2017) said that FOCAC sets 
action plans and agendas at every tri-annual meeting, but does not release detailed 
information – such as how many plans were carried out, and which countries received 
China’s support. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese government (unlike the West) does 
not announce the minutiae of its aid deals, including where it goes and how it is used. For 
example, the Exim Bank opened its figures on export credits and guarantees to the public, 
but kept information regarding sovereign aid lending secret (Guéin, 2008). A typical 
operational problem of China’s commitment is in the NGOs sector, as it relates to FOCAC 
action plans (Sohn, 2011). Take, for example, this instance from the Johannesburg action 
plan: for the sake of education and human resources development in Africa, the two sides 
agreed to mobilize resources, including NGOs, to carry out “Africa 200 ‘Happy Life’ Projects” 
and “poverty reduction programs for children and women”. In terms of the agenda of 
“people-to-people exchanges” and “environmental protection and tackling climate changes”, 
China and Africa also intended the action plan to enhance mutual visits by NGOs, and to 
examine a model for environmental cooperation between Chinese and African governments 
and non-governmental capital (FOCAC, 2015b). But the present situation of China’s NGOs is 
that “many Chinese NGOs are unable to attain official non-profit registration status, thereby 
negatively impacting their social and political legitimacy” due to the fact that they are under 
government control (Tai, 2015, p.19). These circumstances leave room for doubt about 
whether Chinese NGOs in Africa work properly and appropriately in the role of NGOs.  
7.3.2 FOCAC and Public diplomacy  
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Shelton and Paruk (2008) called FOCAC as “part of China’s foreign policy of ‘soft power’” 
(p.19). As discussed in Chapter 5, one of the reasons for establishment of China’s public 
diplomacy was to bridge the gap that has been created in Sino-African economic relations 
(mainly trade and investment), as well as a growing number of Chinese living and working in 
African countries. The role of public diplomacy in FOCAC is also to mitigate the divergence 
of opinion within FOCAC between China and Africa. Hence, there are 13 sub-Forums within 
the framework of the FOCAC focused on the areas of law, youth, women, think tanks, media, 
and others, aimed at further strengthening the role of the FOCAC (Secretariat of the Chinese 
Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). Each session not only reflects a variety of 
opinions from African countries including the AU and other African regional organizations 
but also displays a clear goal of bridging the divide through different discussions about 
future activities. The Chinese government also connects its existing public diplomacy means, 
such as medical teams and human resources development, used for bilateral ties between 
China and Africa, to the work of these sub-Forums. As discussed earlier, the FOCAC carries 
out its diverse programs and shares its opinions with the AU and international institutions’ 
programs, such as the UNDP. However, the UN agencies have not fully participated in 
FOCAC’s works and activities, such as tracking commitments or directly supporting 
coordination. Nonetheless, the UN has gradually been taking a bigger part in the FOCAC as 
an observer – for example, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon attended the fourth FOCAC 
(The UN, 2015c).  
FOCAC sees the necessity of public diplomacy, thus the China-Africa Public Diplomacy 
Forum was held in 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. It was attended by officials, experts, 
businessmen, and media professionals from China and Africa. The aim of the forum was to 
“explor[e] opportunities for future development and shared diplomatic perceptions so as to 
understand the divergence of opinions which could lead to misunderstandings”, with an 
emphasis on connecting China and African countries “heart and soul” (SCIO, 2016). The 
forum’s theme was prepared by the China public diplomacy association and included three 
sub-forums concentrated on public welfare, culture, and traditional medicine, with 
representatives from China and Africa countries seeking cooperation with local communities, 
companies, and NGOs to improve mutual understanding and win-win cooperation (CRI, 
2016). At the opening ceremony, the Minister for Information, Culture, Arts and Sports Nape 
Nnauye, emphasised the importance of the media as it acts, first, in bridging the gap between 
the publics of both sides; second, promotes national culture; and finally safeguards stability. 
From the African angle, the necessity for mutual understanding between China and Africa is 
“the development of the continent”, added Communication Advisor for the African Union 
Commission Doreen Apollos (SCIO, 2016).  
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Prior to having the public diplomacy forum, China carried out its public diplomacy through 
the media; China’s media-led public diplomacy was briskly carried out following the third 
FOCAC with the Beijing Summit, in 2006 (Madrid-Morales, 2016). The Forum on China-
Africa Media Cooperation has been held every two years to boost mutual trust and promote 
inclusive development for deepening cooperation between China and African media 
(Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). For example, the 
FOCAC media seminar was held in Beijing three months before the fourth FOCAC, in 
November 2009, jointly hosted by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The participants of the seminar included around 70 delegates 
composed of press officials and major press media from 27 African countries, and 
representatives of African media agencies in China. Also, journalists from China and Africa 
attended the seminar to discuss these two topics: “the role of media in promoting China-
Africa relations” and “how to raise the voice of the developing countries in the international 
public opinion”. During the seminar, Beijing stressed the media’s role in Sin0-African ties 
and its function in “enhancing the mutual understanding between the Chinese and the 
African people and maintaining the China-Africa friendly cooperation” under the framework 
of FOCAC. The two sides agreed on the following: the Chinese and African media should 
reinforce cooperation, promote China and Africa to the world in one voice, introduce China-
Africa pragmatic cooperation, serve as the promoters, protectors and builders of China-
Africa friendship, increase the voice of China and Africa in international public opinion, 
clarify false remarks on China-Africa cooperation, and strive for greater say for the 
developing countries (MFA, 2009). To boost friendship between China and Africa, the two 
sides implemented the “China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Action” and the “China-
Africa People-to-People Friendship Partnership Plan” through small and micro-scale social 
livelihood projects, mutual visits by NGOs, and extensive people-to-people exchanges and 
cooperation through diverse programs (FOCAC, 2015b). In addition, the China-Africa Think 
Tank Forum has been held every year to offer a platform and regular institution for dialogue 
and exchanges between Chinese and African think tanks (Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-
up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). The education cooperation agenda was specifically 
established at the Sino-African Education Minister Forum in November 2005. Through the 
“China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Program” and the “China-Africa Think Tank 
10+10 Partnership Plan”, China and Africa expanded cooperation, for example by 
implementing various Chinese and African academic institutional projects, and inviting 200 
African scholars to visit China every year. China also pledged to provide US$2 million a year 
through the framework of the UNESCO trust fund for education development programmes 
in Africa (Li and Liu, 2013). As for Chinese public diplomacy for education and human 
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resource development, China recently implemented the “20+20 Cooperation Plan” to 
enhance the cooperation mechanisms between Chinese and African institutions of higher 
education, boosting regional and national studies between Chinese and African universities. 
The plan supports schools to establish partnerships between research centers pursuant to 
the Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) (FOCAC, 2015b). In addition to China’s public 
diplomacy through the sub-forums, the Chinese government has carried out various public 
diplomacy activities based on each of the FOCACs’ declarations and action plans.  
To cite one example, medical cooperation gave shape to the establishment of detailed 
programs and activities through FOCAC, although China has been cooperating in the 
medical field for the past 46 years. Through the medical aid agreements at the first FOCAC, 
China has been providing aid to treat malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis. Since 2003, 
China has dispatched Chinese medical soldiers alongside the UN Peace-Keeping Force to, for 
example, the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Chinese government established anti-
Malaria centres in African countries to boost efficient medical support, as part of President 
Hu’s commitment at the third FOCAC in 2006. China also encourages Chinese 
pharmaceutical companies to produce anti-malaria drugs and establish branches in Africa to 
streamline distribution – for example, Beijing Holley Cotec developed DihydroArtemisinin 
or “Cotecxin” in 1993, which was approved by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a 
malaria treatment. As part of the medical cooperation, Beijing cooperated with African 
countries to promote hospitals and medical facilities and provide Chinese medical training to 
improve the local health care systems in Africa (Li, 2013, pp.64-71). The Chinese government 
also deploys multiple actors – such as Chinese and African women, legal, young youth, 
Chinese and African Non-Government Organizations – to implement the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals and boost China’s public diplomacy in African countries. To sum up, as 
Li Baoping and Liu Jianbo have noted, “The FOCAC measures to promote people-to-people 
exchanges, higher education and training speak of international cooperation between the 
two regions” (2013, p.29). FOCAC enables China to establish various practical policies and 
major institutions for public diplomacy through multilateral communications. In Batchelor’s 
(2017) understanding, the plans for cultural cooperation in FOCAC action plans have been 
extended and prominent since 2009 (the fourth FOCAC), whereas before they fell under a 
broader heading. FOCAC, in turn, sets the stage for China to carry out its public diplomacy 
more efficiently based on dialogue during the tri-annual ministerial meetings and annual or 
tri-annual sub-forums, through the framework of FOCAC. As discussed above, therefore, 
China bases its attempts to bolster its positive image in diplomatic relations with African 
countries and strengthen economic ties with leading African countries by calming 
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controversy over the gap created between China and Africa by asymmetric economic 
relations.  
 
7.4 Evaluate the role of China’s public diplomacy in the dynamics of economic 
relations with Africa  
 
One needs to be clear about how the FOCAC mechanisms work in conjunction with China’s 
public diplomacy. A noteworthy feature of the FOCAC institutions established by China to 
enhance cooperation with Africa are the China-centric institutions, as discussed above. To 
understand the establishment of China-centric institutions, G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. 
Lim (2017) noted today’s international order, which is “complex and multilayered, both at 
regional and global levels, and states can be ‘in’ some of it, while staying outside of or 
opposing other parts of it” (p.5). It consists of norms, rules, and institutions; global 
multilateral economic rules and institutions such as the Bretton Woods regime and the WTO, 
and multilateral security institutions (such as the UN), as well as diverse alliance 
partnerships (ibid). Under circumstance like these, the two scholars argue that China “will 
not pursue a blanket approach to the existing international order, but will find themselves 
supporting and participating in some area, while opposing and working around other areas” 
(p.6). On that note, Beijing is particularly interested in regional rules and institutions, which 
can provide membership to venues for great power activities (p.7). China’s approach is based 
on its own, different view of “the United States’ hegemonic position within the international 
order”, “its liberal internationalism”, and the necessity for “deeper foundations of 
sovereignty and the primacy of state actors” on the global stage. China therefore attempts to 
diverge from the America-centric international system, and away from liberal 
internationalist rules and principles, such as human rights, free trade, and democracy; and 
liberal characteristics, such as self-determination and institutions of decolonization in the 
international system (pp.6-7). Forsby (2011) also analyzed China-centric institutions based 
on liberal institutionalism, stating that “by engaging China and entangling it in a mesh of 
liberal institutions, China will gradually be turned into fully fledged-member of the Liberal 
Order, in the process liberalizing its own polity” (p.13). However, despite China adjusting 
itself to become a regular member of international society – for example, by joining 
institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and G20, and also liberalized its economy – 
there has also been a lack of political reform and liberalization in China (ibid, p.13-4).  
However, the Chinese government facilitates its institutions based on its economic power 
over member states. China’s non-liberal political system – its limitation of freedom of the 
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press, speech, and religion and media control – impedes the public diplomacy activities of 
the FOCAC framework. It is hard to deny that the FOCAC’s system of public diplomacy is not 
considerably different from the typical style of China’s own public diplomacy, which was 
covered in Chapter 3. The public diplomacy in FOCAC is mostly based on existing Chinese 
public diplomacy activities. Of course, China’s government-led and controlled public 
diplomacy system has the benefit of being able to consistently and coherently map out a 
long-term plan, as discussed in Chapter 3. China’s public diplomacy in FOCAC gives 
prominence to the importance of public opinion, which is a measure as well as a source of 
power through communication, as has been argued by Henrikson (2006). Though FOCAC 
provides various venues for exchanging information, establishing plans and forging 
relationships between China and Africa, such the sub-forums, there are weaknesses which 
FOCAC compensates for in order to generate better results. First, China has a monopoly in 
Africa on public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy has emerged as an important matter 
of FOCAC, but it highlights the imbalanced interactions between China and Africa. For 
instance, cultural cooperation based on the “Cultures in Focus”, part of the action plan in 
2013 and 2014, was conducted disproportionately with regards to location, sponsorship, and 
organization of events for cultural cooperation. In terms of Cultures in Focus event locations 
in 2013 and 2014, twice as many events were held in Africa than in China. The Chinese 
government alone not only supported over 70 percent of the events, but also organized 37 
percent of events in 2013 and 72 percent of events in 2014, while Africa organized only 9 
percent and 12 percent of events in 2013 and 2014, respectively (Batchelor, 2017, pp.81-85). 
Counter to the initial intent of cultural cooperation, that it would help create a positive image 
of China among the African public through cultural exchanges, the lopsided China-led 
cooperation had difficulty in generating positive results (such as mutual trust, understanding, 
and amicable relations with Africa). Second is the lack of opportunities for communication 
between China and the general public in African countries. The FOCAC compiles dialogue 
and establishes action plans and declarations with high-ranking officers from China and 
Africa. Thus, the sub-forum topics of FOCAC are not directly associated with the African 
public, but communication through the sub-forums is at the root of developing a positive 
image and recognition of China in Africa, and cementing relations between China and the 
continent. Therefore, this raises doubts about whether government officials fully reflect the 
will of public diplomacy in action plans during meetings, or whether the plans are of help to 
direct communications with the African people to form a sympathetic bond with China, and 
vice versa. For example, Yun Sun (2015) pointed to the think tank forum of FOCAC, and that 
the focus of the forum “eventually lies upon the African elite, rather than the general public 
at the grassroots level”, although it seems to focus on think tanks over governments.  She 
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also argued that China needs to concentrate on the view of local communities and general 




This chapter discussed FOCAC and how it contributes to improving Sino-African ties, South-
South cooperation, closer relationships between Chinese and African leaders, and 
establishing an agenda and policy framework for mutual development and benefit for the 
next FOCAC meeting. FOCAC also supports the establishment of diverse Chinese public 
diplomacy activities based on various opinions surveyed during FOCAC meetings. There 
have been six FOCAC meetings between 2000 and 2016, and the areas of cooperation 
covered by the Declarations and a Plans of Action have diversified over time. Thus, FOCAC 
VI covered not only general topics of economic relations (such as investment, trade, zero-
tariff treatment, and debt relief), but also cooperation on the media, human resource 
development, education, technical training, environmental protection, security, and people-
to-people exchanges as part of China’s public diplomacy.  
China leads FOCAC meetings and its mechanisms, but the majority of African countries also 
engage in decision-making, delivering their opinions on various agenda before they are 
implemented. The mechanism of FOCAC includes multi-level cooperation between different 
Chinese government departments, agencies, and embassies and their counterparts in Africa. 
By using the tools and aims of South-South cooperation, FOCAC advances cooperation 
between China and African countries through the AU, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and alleviate poverty, thereby attempting to 
dramatically address the social and economic ills in Africa countries. Through the framework, 
China has given its assistance to Africa in the fields of health, infrastructure development, 
agriculture, and education. Also, FOCAC established the CABC, CADFund, and SEZs to 
strengthen and buttress economic ties in Sino-Africa relations. Furthermore, China works 
with UN-affiliated organizations, such as UNDP and UNESCO, to support African countries’ 
development under the FOCAC framework. However, while the Chinese government utilizes 
its economic power and China-centric institutions to cooperate with African countries, there 
remain problems that need to be resolved – such as limitation of freedom of speech, religion, 
and strong state control of the media in China’s domestic political system, which in turn 
hinders its public diplomacy activities through FOCAC. Also, China needs to improve the 
systematic issue of the lopsided, China-led cooperation and the lack of opportunities in 
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communication with the general public in Africa, which could lead to stronger cooperation, 





















Chapter 8: Conclusion  
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This thesis has focused on understanding the necessity and role of China’s public diplomacy 
in Sino-Africa’s relations, as a means for cementing economic ties between China and the 
continent. In addition, it has shed light on the significance of China’s public diplomacy for its 
foreign policy, which is focused on domestic economic development. As noted in the 
introduction to the research, most nations pay attention to public opinion in the 
establishment of foreign policy due to an increased participation in foreign affairs resulting 
from more-developed information and communication technology. Public diplomacy 
research, furthermore, is an important research topic that has recently attracted the 
attention of scholars in an increasingly global society. Thus, in the early 2000s, China joined 
the ranks of countries utilizing public diplomacy to generate positive foreign policy results. 
However, the question was raised among scholars as to whether the role and substance of 
China’s public diplomacy share its intentions, from the perspective of public diplomacy from 
other countries (especially the West), due to China’s authoritarian governmental system.  
As this research has discussed, China’s public diplomacy achieves its foreign policy 
objectives based on its culture, domestic institutions and values, and foreign policies in 
connection with its economic power and other soft power instruments, rather than through 
coercion and force as a means of persuasion. Despite the fact that China’s public diplomacy 
functions well in foreign nations (especially developing countries), the character and 
mechanisms of its public diplomacy provoke controversy in academic circles, because it is 
based on propaganda and a government-led system that sets limits to maximize China’s 
public diplomacy effect. Based on the differing perspectives, the thesis looked into the 
function and role of China’s public diplomacy in Sino-African relations, which have the 
problem of lopsided economic ties, and examined how China has led cooperation through its 
public diplomacy. The aims of the research were: first, to explore the diversification of 
China’s African policy through the use of public diplomacy, in accordance with changes of 
the diplomatic paradigm that have arisen from globalization; second, to examine the 
significance and role of China’s public diplomacy in its African policy through the lens of 
power politics of economic (asymmetric) interdependence over sub-Saharan African nations; 
third, to investigate how China’s diversified new African policy has compensated for the 
limitations of its previous policies, and produce actual results in the form of amicable Sino-
African relations. In order to achieve these aims, the research posed three research questions, 
which were addressed throughout the thesis. To arrive at proper conclusions, the three 
research questions will be addressed here based on the discussions in main chapters. Then, 
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this chapter will examine the limitations and contributions of the research, and implications 
for further research into China’s public diplomacy in the field of International Relations.  
 
China’s public diplomacy and economic ties with Africa  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research focused on the correlation between 
China’s public diplomacy activities and its effects, especially the maintenance of close 
economic relations with African countries, boosting Chinese economic development, and 
improving China’s reputation among the African public. Thus, it adopted a framework of 
neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence to understand 1) the lopsided 
economic ties between China and Africa, and 2) the character of China’s soft power-based 
public diplomacy and instruments to examine public diplomacy’s effect on Sino-Africa 
asymmetrical relations.  
Prior to the discussion of Sino-African economic ties and China’s public diplomacy, it is 
necessary to first sum up the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, and how it provided 
a framework for understanding the research topic and answering the research questions. 
Neoliberals recognize the concept of power as “power-as-resource” and a “relational power” 
approach that conceives of power as “a relationship (actual or potential) in which the 
behavior of actor A at least partially causes a change in the behavior of actor B” (Baldwin, 
2013, p.274).  Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) assessed the source of power as asymmetrical 
interdependence which linked realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of liberal with 
interdependence.  They regarded the two as “necessary complements to one another”. And 
they also argued that “this approach was analytically justified, in our view, because realism 
and liberalism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world, in which individual 
actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentive” (Keohane & Nye, 1987, p.728). 
Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) observed the burgeoning of informal and formal relations 
between states, companies, and economics and the proliferation of actors involved in 
international relations. Whereas international relations concern states, transnational 
relations include sub-state and extra-state actors, creating complex interdependence at the 
global system level. Within interdependence, international institutions have an influence on 
“state prerogative growth” (Telò, 2009, p.85). Thus, Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) argued 
that asymmetric interdependence can be the source of power in interdependent relations 
between transnational actors, governments, and in interstate relations. In this situation, 
complex interdependence refers to “the complex ways in which as a result of growing ties, 
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the transnational actors become mutually dependent, vulnerable to each other’s actions and 
sensitive to each other’s needs” (Rana, 2015, p.291). Thus, Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) 
suggested that the key characteristics of complex interdependence are the multiple channels 
connecting societies,106 the absence of hierarchy among domestic and foreign issues,107 and a 
minor role for military force. Keohane and Nye (2011) also understood that, “It is 
asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in 
their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependence 
relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other 
issues” (pp.10-11). By extension, they focused on “the pattern of economic interdependence 
has implications for power and vice versa” (Keohane & Nye, 1987, p.737). Moreover, 
asymmetrical economic interdependence provides “a political resource to the less dependent 
state”, and the state can “effectively threaten to make a change in its economic relationship 
with more dependent states to bring about political change” (Crescenzi, 2003, p.74). In other 
words, asymmetrical interdependence give rise to bargaining power. 
Through the lens of this theoretical framework, the thesis assessed that, in Sino-Africa 
relations, asymmetrical economic interdependence is a source of power for China. To use 
Keohane and Nye (2011)’s formulation, interdependence does not only concern mutual 
benefit, but there are two different types of interdependence that lead power relations: 
sensitive interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. In terms of Sino-African 
asymmetrical economic ties, this research found that China gained the upper hand in 
interdependent economic relations with Africa, and exhibited fewer sensitivities and 
vulnerabilities in trade and investment. Thus, African countries that have active economic 
ties with China likely complain about the lopsided relations. However, from a macro point of 
view, the thesis found that China and Africa are interdependent, although China holds power 
in asymmetrical economic relations with Africa. This is because Africa plays an important 
role in China’s economy, especially for its enterprises executing the going out policy, as well 
as the ongoing need to secure energy resources from African countries for China’s continued 
economic development.  
Keohane and Nye (2011) argued that the power of information arose due to the 
contemporary information revolution resulting from globalization, and thus they focused on 
                                                
106 The multiple channels are interstate relations, comprised of normal channels of communications 
by realists; transgovernmental relations, which are informal ties among nongovernmental elites; and 
transnational relations, which are between multinational banks or corporations. 
107 This means that the military issue is not the sole agenda. Governments stress welfare, health, 
education, and other issues as well. Thus, there is no longer a clear distinction between high politics 
and low politics in the late twentieth century. Economic, cultural, commercial, and technological 
relations play an important part in major issues of international politics.  
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the connection between the information revolution and globalization and interdependence. 
The international exchange and flow of information fosters a multitude of opinions and 
interests. Also, the actions of transnational actors, multinational companies, tourism, and 
others influence governments’ policies and society. However, interdependent relations do 
not always promote cooperation, and cooperation operates within the same (or similar) 
types of regime. Cooperation “arises out of discourse, along with the shared belief that 
mutual adjustment is necessary – albeit often painful” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.256). Thus, 
Keohane and Nye (2011) stressed the difference between the power that comes from 
asymmetrical interdependence and soft power: 
asymmetrical interdependence is an important source of hard power. The ability of 
the less vulnerable to manipulate or escape the constraints of an interdependent 
relationship at low cost is an important source of power. In the context of hard power, 
asymmetries of information can greatly strengthen the hand of the less vulnerable 
party. Soft power, on the other hand, is the ability to get desired outcomes because 
others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through 
attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow or getting 
them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft 
power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or culture or the ability to set the agenda 
through standards and institutions that shape the preferences of others. It depends 
largely on the persuasiveness of the free information that an actor seeks to transmit. 
(Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.216) 
As in Table 2 in Chapter 3, Nye (2011) divided power into hard power and soft power, based 
on resource power and behavioral power suggested in Keohane and Nye (1998)’s work. Nye 
argued that the power shift from hard to soft ranges from command power to co-optive 
power, from coercion to economic inducements, to agenda-setting, to pure attraction. The 
significance of public diplomacy and soft power is stressed in an interdependent and 
globalized world. By extension, Keohane and Nye (2002) argued that “global” refers to 
multilateral interdependence and “a network of relationship”, including multicontinental 
distance and global links to “networks of connections (multiple relations), not simply to 
single linages”108 (p.193) 
Complex interdependence provides a framework with which one can examine how 
                                                
108 The connection between global and interdependence and a network of relationship are from 
Keohane and Nye’s view of globalism. Keohane and Nye (2002) defined globalism in connection with 
interdependence as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at a multicontinental 
distance. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information 
and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances” (p.193). 
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interdependence relations affect norms, institutions, and regimes, and are intricately 
entwined with each other in the era of globalization. Based on this framework, this thesis 
analyzed China’s public diplomacy and soft power in conjunction with a global 
understanding of public diplomacy. In the early 2000s, China began in earnest to utilize 
public diplomacy in its foreign policy, after recognizing the significance of China’s reputation 
and image for enhancing diplomatic relations with foreign countries – especially in the wake 
of China’s development and a lingering concern about a ‘China Threat’ in international 
society. Beijing also recognized power had shifted from states to non-state actors, and that 
information was no longer constrained by national boundaries due to globalization and the 
emerging information age. Thus, the Chinese government utilizes various soft power 
instruments to produce a positive reputation for itself from foreign publics, and form 
amicable relationships with foreign countries. This accords with the global understanding of 
public diplomacy, as defined by the University of Southern California’s Center on Public 
Diplomacy, that “the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in 
nature, but also involves a multitude of actors and networks. It is a key mechanism through 
which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships and has become crucial to 
building a secure global environment” (n.d). The idea of public diplomacy evolved from the 
old to a new public diplomacy with diverse cutting-edge communication instruments, as 
shown in Table 1 in Chapter 3. However, judging by the general trends and character of 
public diplomacy, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the research found that the China’s 
public diplomacy is somewhere between the old and new formulations. Beijing still 
maintains an old-style public diplomacy that is governmental centered, top-down, and very 
much limited to international non-governmental actors, rooted in political advocacy and 
propaganda, and targeted messaging. On the other hand, China also utilizes various 
instruments – such as the internet, the media and soft power – to maximize the effects of its 
public diplomacy, and considers corporate branding and relationship-building with foreign 
publics which are typical of the new public diplomacy.  
While China does not follow the general tendencies of new public diplomacy, this thesis 
verified that China’s soft power public diplomacy encourages cooperation in Sino-African 
relations through two-way communications with African publics. On that note, as mentioned 
in Chapters 6 and 7, China’s public diplomacy shares the neoliberal perspective that pursues 
cooperation by deploying soft power to achieve common goals, rather than to dominate 
others. In the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the salient state-centric perspective of 
neo-realism is accepted. Therefore, neoliberalists consider nations as unitary and rational 
actors in pursuit of maximized absolute gains through cooperation in all issue-areas in 
competitive international relations – which means that, insofar as nations get profits, 
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neoliberalists are indifferent to the extent of other nations’ profit-making. Regarding 
institutional neoliberalist cooperation, Keohane accounts for it as follows: 
“intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one 
government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as 
the result of a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1984, pp.51-2). Neoliberal 
institutionalists stress the importance of institutions, which enhance cooperation through 
increased mutual responsiveness and transparency based on a “set of rules”, and provide 
information that facilitates long-term cooperation through shared mutual interests with 
other nations.  
China states that it is pursuing peaceful development and mutual development in 
international society. This is reflected in its African policy in 2006 and 2015, in which 
China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge between China and the continent to relieve 
disharmony that has arisen from asymmetrical economic ties, and to boost cooperation for 
mutual benefit. Notwithstanding China’s foreign policy focus on economic development, 
China’s public diplomacy performs a communications role with the African people, and 
supports improvements in welfare and infrastructure. Furthermore, the Chinese government 
simultaneously utilizes its public diplomacy to boost cooperation and promote its economic 
development through various activities, including foreign aid, media, education and cultural 
exchange institutes in Africa. This research found that China’s public diplomacy is linked to 
its foreign policy in support of China’s domestic economic development, and it is crucial to 
strengthening economic and political relations with African countries. China began to utilize 
FOCAC, in connection with its South-South Cooperation strategy, to expand its multilateral 
diplomatic, economic and political cooperation with African countries. By extension, China 
strengthened its relations with the UN and actively engaged in various public diplomacy 
activities to establish a foothold to take part in multilateral diplomacy. The role of China’s 
public diplomacy at the UN stands China in good stead for presenting itself as a responsible 
country, thereby securing for China the right to speak and pursue its national interest on the 
global stage.  
The theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence 
provided a big picture with which to understand the importance of cooperation between 
nations for mutual benefit, and to explain China’s public diplomacy and its lopsided 
economic ties with Africa. Furthermore, the theoretical framework helps to understand how 
the emergence of non-state actors and the development of communication technology are of 
growing importance in public diplomacy in an ever-more globalized world. Thus, countries 
carry out public diplomacy in diverse ways, and share and exchange information easily. The 
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neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence theoretical framework provided a 
big picture with which to understand the importance of cooperation between nations for 
mutual benefit, and to explain China’s public diplomacy and lopsided economic ties with 
Africa. Furthermore, the theoretical framework helps to understand that, in a more 
globalized world, the emergence of non-state actors and the development of communications 
technology are of growing importance in public diplomacy. Thus, countries carry out public 
diplomacy in diverse ways and share and exchange information easily. Drawing on the 
theoretical framework, this chapter will answer and draw conclusions from the research 
questions. 
 
8.1 Answering the Research Questions  
 
Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, this thesis was designed with three primary 
parts: the nature and role of public diplomacy in international relations, China’s 
international strategy (policy framework), and China’s strategy in Africa (implementation 
framework), and three case studies that examine bilateral ties (two countries) and 
multilateral ties (one organization). Based on the findings in previous chapters, this chapter 
will answer the research questions in turn.  
Question 1: What is the meaning of public diplomacy in international relations, and in the 
Chinese form of international relations? Why and how did China map out and implement its 
new strategy of public diplomacy in the context of the asymmetrical interdependent relations 
between China and Africa, and how did this connect to its political purpose based on the 
former and current Chinese leaders’ political perspective?  
The answer to question one is based on the discussion in Chapter 3. Prior to discussing 
China’s public diplomacy, the general character of public diplomacy and the linkage between 
public diplomacy and soft power was discussed, in order to comprehend the public 
diplomacy mechanisms for addressing foreign publics. Although different scholars have 
differing definitions and understandings of public diplomacy, this thesis understands public 
diplomacy as communication with foreign publics and/or foreign governments and/or the 
domestic publics through diverse actors and instruments, directly or indirectly addressing 
negative impressions and phrases, generating sympathy and understanding for a nation’s 
ideas, goals, foreign policies and its institutions, culture, and societal model. It also aims to 
build relationships and positive images, facilitating closer political ties or alliances. With the 
advent of globalization and the information age, public diplomacy enhances the processes of 
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social and economic interdependence in the international system. The importance of public 
diplomacy is highlighted due to the increased influence of non-state actors in foreign affairs, 
thus establishing networks of relationships between non-state actors and facilitating a 
collaborative approach to foreign relations. Unlike during the Cold War era, public 
diplomacy in the twenty-first century is less likely to be connected to propaganda, because it 
uses soft power as its instrument and focuses on two-way communication and engaging with 
diverse actors to shape perceptions and change people’s minds (Nye, 2015a). Thus, as 
neoliberal institutionalism suggests, public diplomacy pursues two-way communication and 
cooperation through soft power aimed at foreign publics, to achieve mutual goals. Also, 
strategic communication is a subset and function of public diplomacy as it focuses on 
designing and disseminating a message to achieve a nation’s foreign policy objectives and 
long-term goals for select issues, as well as mutual understanding through networked 
relationships.  
The Chinese understanding of public diplomacy is broader than that of the West. Unlike the 
West, the Chinese perspective of public diplomacy refers to propaganda, which means a 
conversation between the government and the public – propaganda does not have negative 
connotation in China. China mostly perceives its public diplomacy as people-to-people 
diplomacy through cultural exchanges. The aim of China’s public diplomacy is similar to 
Western public diplomacy, but the Chinese government utilizes its public diplomacy to 
support its foreign policy that is focused on domestic economic development. Also, China’s 
public diplomacy is a top-down and government-led system. Thus, governmental, semi-
governmental, and non-governmental actors carry out public diplomacy through foreign aid, 
media, education and cultural exchange institutes based on China’s foreign policy goals (see 









Figure 10: The Composition of China’s Public Diplomacy 
 
 
Note: Author assembled this diagram based on content in previous chapters109  
The significance of public diplomacy to the Chinese government is highlighted by its 
connection with globalization, the transition into an information-oriented society, and the 
importance of domestic economic development in its political system. China’s former and 
current leaders have focused on economic development since adopting the reforms and 
openness policy, thus endeavoring to promote a peaceful international environment. China 
encountered reputational difficulties due to its rapid economic growth during the 1990s. 
Thus, since the 2000s, China has carried out its public diplomacy using various instruments 
(foreign aid, media, education and cultural exchange institutes) to boost its image on the 
international stage, as well as calm controversies such as the West’s ‘China Threat’ theory. 
The Chinese government moved to improve the country’s international image when its soft 
power and the international image were damaged by various major crises, such as SARS in 
2003, avian influenza (H5N1) in 2004, and the contaminated milk and infant formula 
scandal in 2008. Since then, China has hosted the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Shanghai 
                                                
109 As for various foreign aid activities based on China’s economic power in the category of a sphere of 
public diplomacy, it contains rendering complete projects including infrastructure development, 
goods and material supports, and debt relief.  
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Expo in 2010, and various events to present a positive image to the world. Former Chinese 
President Hu Jintao also pushed forward the concept of China’s peaceful rise/development 
with mutual development as the core of its foreign policy to promote cooperative and 
friendly relations with foreign countries. In 2005 and 2015, Hu also established new African 
policies based around various public diplomacy activities not only to bridge the gap that 
arose from asymmetrical economic ties, but also to publicize China’s new, responsible image 
to the African people. Based on China’s foreign public diplomacy-based strategy, Beijing 
utilizes public diplomacy in multidirectional ways towards African countries, directly 
connected to China’s economic development. As discussing in Chapter 4, continuous 
economic development is important for the Chinese government, as it enhances the domestic 
legitimacy of the CCP, and enhances the international legitimacy of its socialist market 
economy. Due to China’s going out policy, in conjunction with its rapid economic growth, 
Africa is important to China for securing energy resources, expanding China’s businesses in 
the African market, and establishing a solid foothold on the global stage through African 
countries. Hence, the Chinese government makes the best use of public diplomacy to resolve 
disputes over asymmetrical economic ties between China and Africa. 
 
Question 2: What problems have emerged from the asymmetrical economic interdependence 
in Sino-African relations? To what extent does China’s public diplomacy activity in Africa 
coincide with the development of an economic relationship of asymmetric interdependence 
between China and key African partners, and how does that public diplomacy address 
China’s vulnerabilities?  
The answer to this question is based on Chapters 4 and 5, and the discord arising from the 
lopsided economic ties between China and Africa discussed in Chapter 5. African countries 
that have close economic relations with China have complained that imports from China ruin 
African countries’ domestic small- and medium-sized businesses, because they are unable to 
compete with China’s low-priced products. Also, China’s foreign aid and investments have 
managed to generate economic profits for China, without providing much actual assistance 
to economic development. In other words, the majority of African countries failed to gain the 
upper hand over Chinese investment, such as the inflow of capital, technology transfers and 
balance of trade (especially manufactured goods) with China. The disparity between China 
and African countries intensified due to the effect of China’s declining economic growth on 
African economies, as well as the global economic recession – these led to a decrease in 
demand for raw materials and investment in Africa. Due to the price reduction of raw 
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materials and oil, resource-rich African nations’ domestic economies suffered, thus giving 
rise in unemployment and socio-economic inequality. Given that most African countries 
show the high degree of dependence upon foreign trade with China, this situation was 
inescapable.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, China is most concerned with maximizing its economic 
advantages through foreign policy. This includes its African policy, which is more concerned 
with China and its companies benefiting in Sino-African economic relations. China’s foreign 
aid is also provided mostly in the form of completed projects. However, various public 
diplomacy aspects of China’s Africa policy mitigate antipathy between China and African 
countries through practical support, such as Africa’s industrialization, agriculture 
modernization, and infrastructure development, all of which are linked to African countries’ 
economic development based on political and economic cooperation. China also focuses on 
culture, academia, people-to-people exchanges, the cooperation of the media, tourism, 
establishing welfare facilities, public health systems, enhancing human resources 
development through technology education, as well as supporting peace and security, and 
environmental protection in Africa. Thus, China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge 
between its peaceful rise/development, the Five Core foreign policy principles, and the 
pursuit of Chinese economic interests in Africa. In other words, China earns trust from 
African countries through its public diplomacy, which leads to mutual trust, understanding, 
benefits, and win-win cooperation based on amicable relations. By using different forms of 
public diplomacy, China is able to mitigate an existing negative reputation – that of China 
focusing only on securing energy resources and returning a good profit in its economic 
relations with African countries. It also allows China to seize the opportunity to cement its 
political and economic relations with African countries, bilaterally and multilaterally. While 
China has gained the upper hand in economic relations with Africa, public diplomacy also 
reduces its vulnerability to worldwide economic downturns. The various public diplomacy 
activities cultivate an opportunity for China’s enterprises to enter and expand their 
operations in Africa based on their improved reputation among the African people. The 
Chinese government also extends its cooperation to African countries in various fields to 
strengthen political and economic solidarity. 
 
Question 3: What role has China’s public diplomacy played in its foreign policy towards sub-
Saharan African countries? How has public diplomacy worked within the greater changes in 
China’s African policy between the year between 2003 and 2016, and influenced not only 
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Africa’s political economy but also the context of Sino-African ties? To what extent can 
China’s public diplomacy activities be seen as separate from, or subordinate to its pursuit of 
key economic relations with African countries?  
The answer of the final question is based on the discussion in Chapter 5 and the case studies 
(Chapters 6 and 7). China definitely concentrates on public diplomacy as an overarching 
strategy in its foreign policy. This is reflected in the fact that China has spent approximately 
US$10 billion per year on external propaganda, while the United States spent only US$666 
million on public diplomacy in 2014 (Shambaugh, 2015). China’s public diplomacy is a 
foreign policy instrument deployed to achieve the long-term strategy expressed by previous 
and current leaders: that of continuing economic growth. Hence, China’s public diplomacy is 
designed to contribute to the economic growth of China by creating amicable and friendly 
relations with foreign countries, as discussed via research questions 1 and 2. The Chinese 
government began to utilize public diplomacy to foster harmonious relations and to calm 
dissent in economic relations with Africa in the early 2000s.  
The research required case studies (Chapters 6 and 7) to examine the role of China’s public 
diplomacy, its effects on Africa’s political economy and Sino-Africa’s relations, between 2003 
and 2016. First, the thesis compared China’s public diplomacy approaches in Nigeria and 
South Africa, and found that China carries out different public diplomacy programs in each 
country according to its political and economic situation and China’s diplomatic goals. The 
common denominator in China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria and South Africa is the focus 
on mending fences with each country, because the two countries have suffered domestic 
economic problems due to their trade relations with China. With regards to Sino-Nigerian 
relations, China imports around 90 percent of its oil and gas from Nigeria, whereas Nigeria 
imports nearly 40 percent of its manufactured goods from China. Sino-South African trade 
ties also showed that China relies heavily on mineral products from South Africa (nearly 60 
percent). On the other hand, South Africa is heavily dependent on trade with China for 
manufactured products, such as machinery and textiles. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa are 
significant to China for securing natural resources. Therefore, China’s public diplomacy is 
designed to maintain an amicable and harmonious environment in bilateral relations 
through the use of foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes.  
China utilizes its public diplomacy instruments (foreign aid, media, education and cultural 
exchange institutes) in Nigeria and South Africa in various ways. The common aim of the 
three instruments is to create a friendly and positive Chinese reputation among the African 
public and support for China’s foreign policy to foster domestic economic growth. The role of 
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the media and education and cultural exchange institutes in both countries is to create 
understanding between China and Nigeria and South Africa, by introducing and sharing 
their different cultures and languages. This is based on people-to-people exchanges, cultural 
events and bilateral cooperation, which allows people in China, Nigeria and South Africa to 
experience each other’s culture and media. China’s semi-governmental and non-
governmental actors engage in cultural exchange activities through, for example, the 
Confucius Institutes and Cultural Centers in Nigeria and South Africa. China’s foreign aid 
focuses on the establishment of supporting infrastructure and welfare facilities based on 
China’s economic power to assist Nigeria and South Africa’s economic and social 
development. China’s foreign aid is also carried out through Chinese educational institutes, 
which are operated by its enterprises – providing, for example, technical education 
assistance to develop human resources and companies in the fields of agriculture, medicine, 
and others, which are directly linked to job creation and Nigerian and South African 
economic development. In addition, the Chinese government provides necessary assistance 
to Nigeria and South Africa for economic development through technical cooperation and 
associated technology development in connection with Chinese academia and enterprises in 
the mining and manufacture sectors. For example, Chinese telecommunications company, 
Huawei, provides technical training at its training centers to Nigerian and South African to 
cultivate a promising young workforce, and hires them to smooth over any conflicts between 
Chinese and Nigerians, and to create jobs to support the Nigerian and South African 
economy. China’s public diplomacy activities are also intended to address the language 
barrier that exists between Chinese enterprises and local people and staff, by providing 
language courses and instruction. Chinese enterprises also utilize public diplomacy to boost 
their business in Africa. In sum, China’s public diplomacy conducted via foreign aid and 
education and cultural exchange institutes is meant to assist Nigeria and South Africa’s 
economic development through language and technical training and cooperation to push 
unemployment down, develop vulnerable sectors, improve China’s reputation among local 
people, and generate profits from cooperative works and projects.  
Although the two countries have close economic ties with China, there is a different public 
diplomacy goal for each:  
a. Foreign aid: China’s foreign aid in Nigeria is mostly focused on supporting Nigeria’s 
economic development and improving the lives of its people, through technology 
transfer and infrastructure projects. On the other hand, China’s foreign aid in South 
Africa assists in various fields, such as the development of environmental 
management, education, tourism, health and welfare, infrastructure construction, a 
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banking system, and others, but does not place undue value on developing 
infrastructure. The Chinese foreign aid programs reflect Nigeria’s and South Africa’s 
(government and public) general preferences in that Nigeria focuses on economic 
development as a priority, while South Africa is interested in creating the necessary 
environment for its people’s health and living conditions as well as helping domestic 
businesses to prosper.  
b. Media: The Chinese government utilizes Nigerian and South African journalists for 
cultural exchanges and media through various events and exchange programs, to 
release proper news verified by journalists in order to rectify bias reporting from the 
West. The media’s role in Nigeria is to create positive and favorable impressions of 
China, using its traditional culture and the China model, and also China’s modern 
culture. In particular, the China model presents a favorable impression to Nigerian 
people, as the country puts economic development first. Chinese media in South 
Africa more actively use domestic media than in Nigeria. The aim of this is to attract 
Chinese enterprises to come to South Africa (as part of China’s going out policy), 
promote Chinese tourism business in South Africa, cement relations with the South 
African government by addressing contemporary issues of mutual benefit, introduce 
China’s culture and media to the South African people, and appeal to Chinese people 
in China about its international economic power in order to legitimize the 
government’s status. The South African media also functions as an intermediary to 
find ways for enhancing South African public opinion of Chinese companies through 
the exchange of opinions based on contemporary issues. To achieve its aims China 
pursues various methods and collaborations with local media and by acquiring shares 
in local media companies, because it is hard to break into South Africa’s media field 
due to its more advanced media system (compared to Nigeria’s).  
c. Educational and cultural exchange institutes: Confucius Institutes do much work to 
teach the Chinese language, introduce Chinese culture, and provide various 
scholarships to local students in Nigeria and South Africa. In addition, the Confucius 
Institutes in Nigeria support employment by Chinese companies and regional 
economic development in Nigeria by teaching the Chinese language. China’s Cultural 
Center in Nigeria arranges diverse cultural events in cooperation with local 
communities to foster mutual understanding. While Confucius Institutes in South 
Africa also focus on boosting tourism through the Chinese-language training 
program, it also offers classes on cultural differences between China and South 
Africa, China’s traditional and modern life, tourism, and business etiquette through 
case analysis of tourism. In addition to the Confucius Institutes’ activities, the 
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Chinese Embassy in South Africa utilizes booklets, such as a monthly magazine, 
ChinAfrica, published by Beijing Review to local universities to introduce students to 
Chinese culture. Chinese enterprises, especially Huawei, also run private training 
centers in Nigeria and South Africa and actively train the younger generation locals in 
order to aid in the transfer of skills.  
Taken together, the public diplomacy programs are different in Nigeria and South Africa, 
although they have a similar purpose. This is because not only do the two countries have 
different levels of political economy, but also the Chinese government has different 
diplomatic goals in the bilateral relationships. As for Sino-Nigerian ties, China aims to 
strength its political alliance internationally, for example to expand support for the One 
China policy, and to wield stronger influence at the UN, secure energy resources, pursue its 
economic interests through trade and investment, increase the clout of Chinese enterprises 
in the Nigerian market, and gain a foothold to manufacture and sell Chinese products to the 
world, “Made in Africa”. Regarding Sino-South Africa relations, Beijing focuses on political 
alliance internationally and economic interests through trade and investment, as in Nigeria, 
supporting Chinese companies’ overseas expansion via the Standard Bank and in connection 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in South Africa. The Chinese also 
seek to utilize South Africa’s power in regional integration such as SADC, and regional 
development programs such as NEPAD, to extend China’s political and economic leverage 
over the African continent. Furthermore, there is a connection to BRICs, providing China 
with a platform to gain and hold a more prominent position on the global stage.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, the FOCAC is based on existing Sino-African relations with an 
additional practical economic consideration and public diplomacy-related agendas. From the 
perspective of multilateral ties through FOCAC, China’s public diplomacy – provided 
through foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes – boosts mutual 
understanding and mutual benefit, as part of China’s win-win cooperation strategy, an 
extension of South-South cooperation. The entire public diplomacy agenda at FOCAC is to 
mitigate various issues that have arisen from Sino-African economic ties. The minutiae of 
China’s public diplomacy are discussed during FOCAC meetings and articulated in two 
documents, the Declaration and the Plan of Action. The public diplomacy content is updated 
every three years, and the recent FOCAC VI meeting discussed China’s multidirectional 
public diplomacy to strengthen relations with African countries. It covers education, media, 
human resource development, infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, 
welfare assistance, environmental protection, and security, as well as economic assistance 
such as investment, trade, zero-tariff treatment, and debt relief. China boosts cooperation 
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with African countries through the UN, the framework of the WTO, the AU, COWAS, SADC, 
COMESA to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and alleviates poverty to 
dramatically cut social and economic ills in African countries.  
To sum up, as shown in Figure 10 above, a variety of actors in three different groups engage 
in China’s public diplomacy activities, deploying its soft power and economic power in 
Nigeria and South Africa. By using smart power in the two countries, China’s public 
diplomacy produces the following results. 
First, the bilateral ties between China and Nigeria and South Africa: 
a. China’s image has improved based on its public diplomacy programs in the eyes of 
the Nigerian and South African public. However, South Africans exhibit a less-
favorable impression towards China’s economic power than do Nigerians, due to 
having more-developed economic and infrastructure systems than other African 
countries. Thus, China’s public diplomacy has limitations. For example, there are soft 
power issues related to Tibet and China’s authoritarian system. However, South 
African sentiment is far more favorable about learning the Chinese language as a 
result of China’s cultural public diplomacy activities and non-governmental actors’ 
willingness to employ local people.  
b. China’s public diplomacy creates an opportunity for its businesses to establish 
branches and operations in Nigeria and South Africa, based on its government aid 
projects and collaborative works.  
c. China’s public diplomacy supports African countries’ political economy by agreeing 
to share and develop technology, help alleviate poverty and create jobs with the 
Nigerian and South African governments.  
d. China’s public diplomacy has led to more concrete bilateral ties with the Nigerian and 
South African governments, as part of China’s South-South cooperation strategy, and 
has also expanded China’s diplomatic, political and economic relations.  
Second, the role of public diplomacy in the multilateral ties through the FOCAC is similar to 
the discussion about bilateral relations, above. China’s public diplomacy is meant to promote 
mutual understanding and amicable ties. For example, when China focuses on resolving 
distributional issues in existing trade and investment relations, and problems of 
collaboration and cooperation in Sino-African relations. A difficulty is the perception that 
China-centered collaboration projects only provide profits to the Chinese involved, and also 
that offering complete projects does not support economic development in Africa. Thus, the 
role of public diplomacy in the FOCAC is also meant to mitigate the divergence of opinions 
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through various sub-Forum meetings, which mostly discuss detailed agenda of public 
diplomacy to settle deep-seated conflicts between China and Africa, and lead to mutual trust 
and enhance cooperation for mutual prosperity. The FOCAC also carries out various 
programs and shares its opinions with the AU and international institutions’ programs, such 
as the UNDP, to cement multilateral cooperation in Sino-African relations. 
Overall, China’s public diplomacy between 2003 and 2016 positively influenced not only 
Africa’s political economy, but also strengthened cordial relations to boost Sino-African 
mutually beneficial political and economic relations. Hence, China’s public diplomacy 
activities were subordinate to its pursuit of key economic relations with African countries. 
However, the limitations of China’s public diplomacy are the focus of this thesis. Although 
China’s public diplomacy brought about better results, as can be seen in the case studies, 
Beijing still faces certain challenges to address in its public diplomacy activities. The problem 
arises from a divergence of opinion about the value of soft power in public diplomacy 
between China and the West. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu (2008) compared the 
difference between the Chinese perspective and Nye’s ideas as follows: 
Chinese understanding of the sources of soft power encompasses the three 
components of soft power identified by Nye—culture, domestic institutions and 
values, and substance and style of foreign policy. But their emphasis is different from 
Nye’s regarding the first two components. Nye’s discussion of American soft power 
highlights contemporary American pop culture while Chinese discussion of Chinese 
soft power underscores traditional Chinese culture. Nye stresses the attraction of 
American political institutions and values, such as democracy and human rights, 
while Chinese analysts emphasize the attraction of the Chinese economic 
development model. Furthermore, in terms of policy recommendations, Chinese 
analysts attach great importance to the domestic foundation of soft power broadly 
defined, such as national coherence and government legitimacy, whereas Nye has 
focused his attention on improving the substance and style of America’s foreign 
policy to make the US more attractive abroad. (Wang and Lu, 2008, p.431) 
Although China pursues its soft power in foreign countries, there are disagreements about 
China’s soft power regarding the notion of state sovereignty and other normative values, 
such as humanitarian intervention and human rights, between the West and China (Huang, 
2013). Put differently, there are soft power ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ that also influence China’s 
public diplomacy (d’Hooghe, 2007). The assets that China possesses are its traditional and 
contemporary cultures, the China model, foreign aid, scientific progress, environmental 
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policies, and others. The liabilities includes human rights issues, minority race issues, 
Tibetan independence, China’s rapid economic development (the ‘China Threat’), freedom of 
religion, and others that arise from its socialist system. Other issues in China, such as the gap 
between the rich and poor and environmental pollution resulting from its rapid economic 
development, have emerged as considerable concerns. Furthermore, they have negative 
effects on China’s soft power. This has not considerably interrupted the effects of China’s 
public diplomacy in African countries, which still suffer from corruption in their political 
systems and also have large wealth gaps, but it has had an impact in other countries that 
have stable political and economic systems. With regards to the Nigerian and South Africa 
case studies in this thesis, the South African public was more sensitive to China’s human 
right issues and freedom of religion arising from its socialist system than were Nigerians. 
However, the Nigerian public accepted the China Model more readily than did South 
Africans. This shows that China’s public diplomacy is affected by the foreign country’s 
political economy system as suggested above. 
In sum, as mentioned earlier and in Chapters 6 and 7, the Chinese government acquired 
positive results through its public diplomacy as part of its foreign policy in Africa.110 However, 
scholars researching China’s public diplomacy question the effect of its public diplomacy 
under an authoritarian system, which in China is top-down and government-centered. Thus, 
the thesis proposes to carefully improve the following shortcomings to draw better 
conclusions about China’s public diplomacy: China’s media regulation, political ideology-
infused Confucius Institutes, ambiguity about the core values of China’s soft power, the 
standardized public diplomacy programs for political and diplomatic purposes, and the lack 
of transparency of China’s foreign aid and public diplomacy activities in Africa. 
This thesis concludes by mentioning challenges and limitations of the research, suggesting 
the main contributions of the research, and proposing further avenues for study of China’s 
public diplomacy in Sino-African relations.  
 
8.2 Research Challenges and Limitations  
 
The research suffered from a couple of limitations. First, a limitation in the data collection. 
Due to limited time in which to contact more interviewees through the snowball sampling 
                                                
110 The good results are first China improved positive reputation from Nigeria and South African 
publics; second, China led cooperation politically and economically by using international institutions 
and public diplomacy activities; third, China contributes Nigeria and South Africa’s economy through 
its public diplomacy policies and activities.  
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method during the fieldwork, the research could not create a balance between the number of 
Chinese and African interviewees in Nigeria. While the study attempted to contact two 
Nigerian professors who were engaged in cooperative think-tank activities after leaving 
Nigeria, the scholars requested anonymity as well as only conducting interviews via video 
calls to confirm the author’s identify. However, due to the poor electronic system in Nigeria, 
the interview did not go well as the internet connection was frequently dropped during an 
interview. Also, the majority of Chinese interviewees connected with its government, such as 
with the Confucius Institutes, Cultural Centers, Embassies, and Chinese companies who 
engage in government-led projects, were conscious of the Chinese government, and therefore 
it was difficult to collect balanced information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of 
China’s public diplomacy. All things considered, the research was hard to conduct via 
interviews due to the uniqueness of China’s public diplomacy, which is under the 
government’s management unlike other countries’. Hence, the research relied on practical 
activities to find the intent and aim behind China’s public diplomacy activities, through 
Chinese interviews. As mentioned earlier, the research provided detailed information and 
opinions about China’s other activities and public diplomacy, which could not be obtained 
during interviews, through documentary and archival analysis.  
Another limitation is the broad scope of the research topic, which is partially linked to the 
research’s contribution, which will discuss below. As mentioned at the beginning of the 
thesis, the research finds a necessity of public diplomacy in Sino-Africa’s economic relations, 
as well as for China’s political goals that focus on domestic economic development. Thus, it 
was hard to distill the extent of China’s public diplomacy activities through instruments and 
actors in order to examine the links between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy, 
which is largely concentrated on seeking economic profit from African countries. Due to the 
fact that China utilizes diverse instruments (especially foreign aid, media, and education and 
cultural exchange institutes) to carry out its public diplomacy in Africa, it was difficult to 
exclude certain elements to draw out the correlation between China’s foreign policy and its 
public diplomacy activities in Sino-African economic relations. Hence, the research covered 
China’s public diplomacy through all three instruments (foreign aid, media, and education 
and cultural exchange institutes) to examine the connection. However, it is hard to deny that 
the research could not include deeper discussion of each instrument when compared to other 
research, which might only study one of these public diplomacy instruments – in part due to 
the time limitations of a doctoral program. Nevertheless, the thesis found a linkage based on 
the contents of interviews and documentary and archival analysis. Most of all, the interviews 
provided great assistance in analyzing the correlation between the two. In addition, the 
research only examined China’s public diplomacy policies and activities in its African policies 
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from 2003 to 2016, and therefore its conclusions are not closed debates. Rather, the 
conclusions provide a new perspective for researching China’s public diplomacy, and also 
introduce an in-depth discussion of the various roles of China’s public diplomacy for further 
study.   
 
8.3 Research Contribution and Implications  
 
First, this thesis has modestly contributed to an examination of the topic of China’s public 
diplomacy in connection with Sino-Africa’s economic relations, and analyzed it under the 
framework of neoliberal institutionalism. Most research of public diplomacy, including 
China’s, is carried out in the fields of journalism, communications, public affairs/relations, 
and others, rather than International Relations, political diplomacy, and/or international 
politics. Notwithstanding the fact that China carries out its public diplomacy based on soft 
power and economic power in African countries, the research found that China’s public 
diplomacy focuses on encouraging cooperation among nations, international actors, and 
foreign publics through mutual understanding and bilateral communications, to achieve 
common goals rather than to dominate others which is characteristic of the public diplomacy 
of the West.  
Second, this thesis has modestly contributed to an examination of the connection between 
China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy that focuses on China’s economic 
development in Sino-Africa’s relations, especially economic ties. The trend in China’s public 
diplomacy research generally concentrates only on certain aspects of China’s public 
diplomacy activities (mostly the media and Confucius Institutes), the mechanisms of its 
public diplomacy in the Chinese domestic political structure, and the meaning of public 
diplomacy on the global stage. However, this thesis strived to establish the necessity of 
China’s public diplomacy in addressing disharmony in China-African economic relations, 
and discussed the changes in China’s foreign diplomacy keeping pace with globalization and 
China’s rapid economic development. As mentioned above, the research also covered various 
public diplomacy activities based on three instruments, which also acted as a limitation on 
the study. At the same time, the approach presents a broad picture of the role of China’s 
public diplomacy to analyze the connection between China’s foreign policy and its public 
diplomacy, whereupon it proved that China’s public diplomacy is linked to its foreign policy. 
In addition, China’s public diplomacy is connected to its economic relations with African 
countries as a means for cementing its relations by addressing the gap created by 
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asymmetric economic ties in which China gains the upper hand over trade and investment in 
Africa.  
Third, this thesis has modestly contributed to analyzing the significance of smart power 
(economic power and military assistance with soft power) in China’s public diplomacy 
activities. The foreign aid provided as part of China’s public diplomacy towards African 
countries is diverse, ranging from technology education and medical services, to 
infrastructure development such as hospitals, schools, and railroads, which are in turn 
connected to African people’s welfare and the continent’s economic development. The aid 
cannot be provided to Africa if China does not enjoy strong economic power. China also 
provides military assistance to prevent further terrorism from Boko Haram in Nigeria. The 
smart power in China’s public diplomacy casts light upon the importance of coupling hard 
power with soft power in African countries, unlike existing research which only focuses on 
China’s soft power (culture and language) to achieve its foreign policy goals.  
Lastly, this thesis has modestly contributed to illuminating China’s attempt to cooperate 
with diverse institutions, using the FOCAC as a case study. Although China has a top-down 
system for its public diplomacy, and an authoritarian government for its political system, 
China has pursued cooperation with foreign countries through various institutions as well as 
its public diplomacy activities.  
Based on the limitations and contributions of the thesis, further research into the following 
could prove useful in expanding our understanding of China’s public diplomacy. A potential 
avenue for future research would be into how President Xi utilizes public diplomacy to 
achieve the China Dream (Zhongguo Meng). At the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi stressed 
the need to “hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive 
victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the 
Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation”, and emphasis the One China principle, and need 
to realize the dream of building a powerful military (Xinhua News, 2017g). Xi also stressed 
that “socialism with Chinese characteristics is the right theory to guide to the Party and 
people to realize national rejuvenation” and exhorted a strengthening of the Party’s path, 
theory, and system as well as culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (ibid). Thus, 
the thesis suggests an avenue for the further study in how China draws a favorable 
reputation from foreign publics while still supporting Chinese political agenda with core 
values. The suggestion is to research the role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign policy 
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when the Chinese government strongly pushes its goal of realizing a national rejuvenation on 























APPENDIX I: List of Interviewees  
<Due to protecting interviewees’ confidentiality, the list of interviewees is deleted after 













































APPENDIX II: Interview Questions  
 
The interview questions for the research are as follows:  
 
Interview questions for the Chinese Embassy 
   
a. What is the status and character of Chinese public diplomacy activities in 
Nigeria/South Africa? 
b. How long has Chinese public diplomacy been carried out in Nigeria/South Africa and 
what are its core objectives? 
c. How does China conceive of public diplomacy as a part of its foreign policy? 
d. Can you give me examples of key support projects in Nigeria/South Africa? (If there 
is collaboration work going on with Nigeria/South Africa, can you be more specific?) 
e. Can you describe the most successful results you have achieved through the support 
projects? 
f. To what extent are Chinese companies involved in Chinese public diplomacy 
activities in Nigeria/South Africa? Can you describe Chinese company’s participation 
if they are involved in the project? 
g. What is your opinion over the general progress or problems for Chinese public 
diplomacy activities in Nigeria/South Africa? 
 
 
Interview questions for media-related public diplomacy activity of China 
 
a. Can you tell me about Chinese media activities and presence in Nigeria/South 
Africa’s media market?  
b. What is the extent of China’s media involvement in Nigeria/South Africa nowadays?   
c. Can you tell me about your division’s work in Nigeria/South Africa?  (in the event of 
company’s interview)  
d. Can you describe the latest project either you have worked on or are working on 
which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa? 
e. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the China’s cooperation 
program with Nigeria/South Africa? More broadly, what is the most 
successful/failure case for media cooperation in Africa?  
f. Can you explain the aim or purpose of media cooperation between China and 
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Nigeria/South Africa?  
g. How did your institution/project/company’s start to enter into a partnership with 
Chinese partners? 
h. Can you describe the advantage and disadvantage of receiving China’s technical 
support in Chinese TV shows and movies? 
i. What is your opinion on the prospects of China’s media involvement through 
technical cooperation or investment in television broadcasting in Nigeria/South 
Africa’s media business sector? 
 
 
Interview questions for education-related public diplomacy activity of China 
 
a. Can you describe what type and intent of training courses/programs are held at the 
company/agency?  
b. How does your company/agency/institution start to train the Nigerian/South African 
public based on Chinese skills? 
c. What kinds of Chinese company are involved providing its skills? 
d. What do you think about Chinese aid for the training courses/programs?  
e. It is easy to receive news that Chinese enterprises extend its business in 
Nigeria/South Africa, what is your opinion of the link between Chinese training 




Interview questions for the cultural exchange-related public diplomacy activities of China 
  
a. Can you describe the intention of establishing the Confucius Institute/Chinese 
cultural center in Nigeria/South Africa? 
b. Please explain what kinds of program are conducted at the Confucius 
Institute/Chinese cultural center? And can you explain the purpose of the program as 
well?  
c. How many Chinese and Nigerian/South African lecturers work at Confucius 
Institute/Chinese cultural center? Can you explain the aim or purpose of the 
lecturing in Nigeria/South Africa? 
d. Can you describe the Nigerian/South African’s participation level of learning cultural 
exchange?   
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e. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the cultural exchange 
program?  
f. Can you describe how the cultural exchange program relates to and influences Sino-
African relations?  
 
Interview questions for infrastructure-related public diplomacy activities of China 
 
a. Can you tell me about the significance of infrastructure development in African 
countries? 
b. Can you explain when China's infrastructure investment/assistance starts in 
Nigeria/South Africa? and explain what is the purpose of it? 
c. In what field of China’s infrastructure development investment/assistance normally 
implemented in Africa? Can you please give me specific examples of China’s 
infrastructure development investment/assistance in Nigeria/South Africa? 
d. To what extent and by which means does the Chinese government-owned companies 
or its private companies participate in its infrastructure development 
investment/assistance when they construct in Nigeria/South Africa? 
e. Can you describe the latest project either you have worked on or are working on 
which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa for infrastructure 
development or urban development? And what is the purpose of the collaboration 
work for? 
f. What is the extent of China’s involvement or part in South Africa’s infrastructure and 
urban development nowadays? 
g. Can you describe the advantage and disadvantage of China’s infrastructure 
development involvement in Nigeria/South Africa not only from China’s side but also 
from Nigeria/South Africa’s side? 
 
Interview questions for  finance-related111 public diplomacy activities of China  
 
a. Can you tell me the significance of China’s foreign aid especially financial assistance 
in Africa?  
b. Can you explain when China’s financial assistance starts in Africa?  
c. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the China’s foreign 
assistance program?  
                                                
111 As for Chinese banks within the category, the banks include foreign banks which China acquires 
shares in African countries and Chinese bank which entered financial market in Africa.  
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d. Can you describe the latest project either you or the bank/company have worked on 
or are working on which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa? 
e. Can you explain the character of China’s foreign assistance through its finance in 
Africa? And can you give me a typical example of it?  
f. What do you think about the linkage between China’s foreign assistance and Africa’s 
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